
From Plataea
to Potidaea

Studies in the
History and Historiography
of the Pentecontaetia

E. B A D I A N

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*To the Master and Fellows
of University College, Oxford*

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Preface

The articles here reprinted have all appeared during the last few years, but most of them were conceived many years ago and will be familiar to many of my students. Parts of three of them were heard, in one arrangement or another, by audiences in various parts of the world. The article on the Peace of Callias came first. As finally written, when a term of leave in Oxford gave me time to construct a suitable framework, it tied up much that I had been saying about foreign policy and domestic politics in the Athens of Cimon and of Pericles and that provides the necessary background for an understanding of the peace. My increased interest in Achaemenid Persia, in part due to D. M. Lewis' book *Sparta and Persia*, led me to the question discussed in my last section: that of how a treaty between the King of Persia and a Greek city-state, entities living under incompatible political systems, could become possible, and acceptable to both sides. I hope I have at least shown how that basic question must be approached.

Since there appeared to be overwhelming evidence for the historicity of the Peace of Callias, the silence of Thucydides, often urged as an argument against it, led me to think more carefully about the Thucydidean background: the history of the Pentecontaetia as formulated by him. Close attention to the debate between Archidamus and the Plataeans in Book 2, which next aroused my interest, not only yielded information about the oaths exacted by Pausanias after the battle of Plataea and their place in Greek history, but drew my attention to Thucydides' treatment of his speeches and the differences in their value as historical evidence. This led me to look more closely at what is surely one of the most authentic speeches we have: that of Sthenelaidas to the Spartan Assembly.

It was some years before I took this any further. Meanwhile, through teaching the history of Athens in the fifth century, I came to see to what extent the chronology of the Pentecontaetia, inevitably based largely on Thucydides, had been distorted by a long modern tradition that, in interpreting Thucydides' method of working, had failed to see the detailed application of what was usually admitted in general terms. His well-known concentration on what he thought important for the development of his story has led his interpreters into confusion, especially over the Messenian Revolt and Athenian support for Sparta at that time: only a few scholars had seen the outline of a story that Thucydides, for reasons of his own that were not difficult to understand, had chosen not to give us. A persistent (though unjustifiable) modern theory alleging that he told events in strict chronological order—a theory that can be disproved both for the Pentecontaetia and even for his account of the Peloponnesian War itself—added major confusion at various points. Although he does not give us enough information for a secure chronology (either because he himself did not always know it or because he did not think it important in the context of his story) and we unfortunately have little precise supplementary information, careful use of what we have seems to make an approach to a chronology possible, without the rejection of most of his testimony that has been advocated as a measure of despair. After frequently trying out my ideas on this in class, I finally wrote them up when invited to contribute to a collection edited by Professor K. H. Kinzl.

An invitation from Professor June Allison to contribute to a colloquium on conflict in ancient historiography made me return to Thucydides' treatment of the Pentecontaetia. Over the past generation, interesting work had been done by scholars who developed what W. Robert Connor has called the "modernist" approach to Thucydides: the recognition of what now seems the obvious fact that the picture of Thucydides as the passionless "scientific" historian that long dominated, and at times monopolized, scholarly writing as a premise to all work on him is largely myth based on anachronism. Not only is he a conscious literary artist (as has increasingly been stressed), but he was not aware of the historiographical principles that we owe largely to the nineteenth century: his history is a highly personal work, far more so than Herodotus', in his selection and his shaping of his material—indeed, much closer to that of his Roman disciple Tacitus.

When I began to work on these questions, the books by Connor and by Simon Hornblower were not yet available. Neither of them in fact deals in great detail with the treatment of the Pentecontaetia—understandably, perhaps, since that is only a preface to Thucydides’ actual subject, the Peloponnesian War. Yet in view of the importance of his evidence for our reconstruction of the history of that period, and of his own statement of the difference in his attitude to Periclean and to post-Periclean Athens, detailed investigation was needed. Eduard Schwartz long ago recognized the general character of Book 1, but he did not develop his view in sufficient detail for the mainstream of scholarship to take any notice. My investigation soon showed that practically throughout the history of the Pentecontaetia Thucydides was writing as an impassioned Athenian patriot and that his interpretation of that history must be read as critically as we read ancient forensic speeches.

Once this was recognized, various questions of detail could be asked that had not been asked before. Failure to ask them can actually lead to misinterpretation of Thucydides’ meaning and to the imposition on him of statements more in line with what he “ought” to have said than with documented linguistic usage. The last two essays in this book give examples, and show their relevance to a critical evaluation of Thucydides’ account of two minor episodes, which leads to historical conclusions of some interest. There is obviously more to be done along these lines.

Although this book is centered on the Pentecontaetia, discussion inevitably goes beyond its limits, at both ends. The story of Plataea must be pursued to the city’s first association with Athens to become intelligible, and the siege of Potidaea, of course, continued into the first years of the Peloponnesian War. The title and subtitle of this book should be regarded as complementary.

Acknowledgment of my indebtedness has been made, as relevant, in each of the essays. I should here like to thank Professor D. M. Lewis and Dr. Simon Hornblower both for help at several points and for the example that, in their different ways, they have set in their own work. My thanks are due to the Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies and to the editors of the *Classical Quarterly* and its publisher, the Oxford University Press, for permission to reprint “The Peace of Callias” and “Athens, the Locrians, and Naupactus,” to which they respectively hold the copyright.

My dedication expresses a more deep-seated gratitude to the institu-

tion where George Cawkwell first taught me how to use sources and to ask questions that had not been asked of them and which more recently did me the honor of electing me to membership.

The first five essays collected in this book first appeared as follows:

“The Peace of Callias” in *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 107 (1987).

“Toward a Chronology of the Pentecontaetia down to the Renewal of the Peace of Callias” in *Echos du Monde Classique / Classical Views* n.s. 8 (1989).

“Plataea between Athens and Sparta” in *Boiotika: Vorträge vom 5. Internationalen Böotien-Kolloquium zu Ehren von Professor Dr. Siegfried Lauffer*, ed. H. Beister and J. Buckler (Munich 1989).

“Thucydides and the Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War” in *Conflict, Antithesis, and the Ancient Historian*, ed. June W. Allison (Columbus, Ohio 1990).

“Athens, the Locrians, and Naupactus” in *Classical Quarterly* n.s. 40 (1990).

These essays have been revised (some of them considerably) for this collection, and they should not henceforth be cited in their original form. I am grateful to the Johns Hopkins University Press, and especially to its Editor-in-Chief, Mr. Eric Halpern, for suggesting this volume, for giving me the opportunity for revision, and for making it all a pleasant task. The last essay has not been previously published.

Abbreviations used for a few standard works will (I hope) cause no difficulty. Journals are abbreviated as in *L'Année Philologique*, with occasional slight variations accepted in English-speaking countries. The spelling, throughout the volume, is not my own.

From Plataea
to Potidaea

The Peace of Callias

To Raphael Sealey
γενέθλια φίλω

Less than a decade ago Robin Seager wrote that further discussion of the Peace of Callias would be inexcusable.¹ Needless to say, discussion has continued. Wherever one stands, on the problem as such, it ought to be admitted that new ideas have been put forward, or (since it seems unlikely, on a topic so much discussed, that anything new can now be said) at least old and forgotten ones have been revived and put in new perspectives. Meiggs' estimate of a special treatment to be expected every two years has stood up well enough: Klaus Meister's bibliography lists twenty special treatments between 1945 and 1982,² and one (by S. Accame) appeared in the same year (1982) as Meister's own.³

Statistically, it is clearly time for another paper. But my main excuse is that, as will be known to colleagues in more than one country, I have been putting forward my views on this theme, in various forms and at different levels, ever since I first sketched them in a much wider context at Berkeley in 1975. Now that Meister has kindly referred to one of my principal ideas,⁴ discussed with him over dinner when he had long finished his own study, it is time those ideas were set out in formal fashion. That Meister, like Seager, adopted and strongly defended the (nowadays) unconventional view denying the authenticity of the peace at the

very time when Accame was no less firmly taking it for granted will in any case show that further discussion may be helpful.⁵

The question of authenticity has in fact dominated debate to excess. That the peace is, in some form, authentic, seems to me to be not too difficult to prove, with a degree of assurance that matches most of what can be established in the history of the fifth century B.C. (see pp. 13–14, 50–51), though Meister's arguments on the other side, now the fullest and most concentrated attack on authenticity, will have to be discussed at full length. However, once authenticity is established, it will be seen that this is only the beginning and not the end. For the Peace of Callias is not a mere literary problem, as a survey of most of the discussions might make it appear, but a genuine and important historical problem. The question of how—in what circumstances and in what form—the war begun by Darius and Xerxes came to be finally settled, after at least a generation of intermittent hostilities, and the nature of the relationship between the two great powers of the Aegean area that developed out of the settlement—these are surely among the most important issues that the historian of the fifth century ought to treat. Although the history of the debate necessitates an unreasonable concentration on the preliminary literary problem, I hope, within the inevitable limitations of space available, to make at least a start on the historical aspects of the discussion. In particular, I shall suggest how the peace fits into the development of Athenian politics in the middle of the fifth century, and how the incompatible nature of the political systems of the two contracting powers made the actual process of concluding a peace a far more complex one than is usually recognized, so that its conclusion marks a milestone in the history of both Athenian and Persian diplomacy.

II

It is at least no longer necessary to argue in full that the accepted date of the peace in the fourth century appears to be straight after the battle of the Eurymedon and as a result of it. This date, which Meiggs still described as one "with which we need not be seriously concerned," has been shown, especially by Meister, to be at least worth serious concern in any discussion.⁶ But although the whole of the evidence need not be

presented, it is perhaps worth repeating that the first source suggesting a date is the *Menexenus* (241d–e), certainly written before 380, which puts the peace before the events leading to the battle of Tanagra. Now, the *Menexenus* is of course in part an elaborate joke, and certainly no model of chronological accuracy. But although plain chronological fiction is flaunted in the reader's face, in the basic pretense that the speech was at that point dictated to Socrates by Aspasia, this shows neither a desire to deceive nor chronological ignorance. The actual chronology of events offered by the speech must be taken to be the one that was regarded as canonical at the time when it was written. Soon after, by 380, we have the first detailed reference to some of the terms of the peace, in Isocrates' *Panegyricus*, where, as Meister has stressed, the word *παρ-αγνοίη* (120) seems to take it for granted that the actual terms of the peace, as of the King's Peace, were on public view. Although Isocrates does not imply any particular date, we hear from Plutarch (*Cim.* 13) that the peace was listed in Craterus' collection of Athenian decrees; and since Plutarch explicitly puts it after Eurymedon, it follows that Craterus listed it in the same chronological place. His copy quite possibly gave an archon date in the text (see n. 55 with text below). As Meister rightly reminds us, the peace was still put in the same chronological context in the fourth century A.D. by Ammianus Marcellinus (17.11.3).

Since Plutarch does not give an actual archon date, it is unfortunately impossible for us to recover the precise date that fourth-century tradition assigned to the peace. It has long been known that the Athenian embassy led by Callias, which Herodotus (7.151) reports as visiting Susa "on other business" (ἐτέρου πρῆγματος εἵνεκα) while an Argive embassy was there to ask Artaxerxes I whether he still regarded Argos as a friend, as his father Xerxes had done, must be relevant to the peace named after this Callias; and it is extraordinary that some modern scholars (listed by Meister p. 23 n. 48) have seen no difficulty in using this embassy as evidence for a peace made in or near 449. As Meister says, following earlier scholars, the Argive embassy was apparently on the traditional and necessary mission of securing a new ruler's friendship after his accession. Since the envoys refer only to their friendly relations with Xerxes, it is clear that this is the first Argive embassy to Artaxerxes since Xerxes' death; and in view of the importance that Argos evidently attached to the continuing Persian connection, it is impossible to believe that the city had allowed much time to pass before seek-

ing this reassurance. Any hypothesis that puts this first Argive embassy to Artaxerxes many years after his accession must therefore be discarded: it makes no good sense except soon after Xerxes' death.

Xerxes died about August 465.⁷ As nearly always at the death of an Achaemenid King, the details of the manner, and the actual date, of his death are obscure, and were no doubt never truthfully published. The successor, Artaxerxes, was (again as usual) insecure on his throne, whenever he in fact gained it and by whatever means. We cannot be sure how long it took him to secure his power, but it cannot have been before the end of (Attic) 465/4.⁸ Allowing some time for preparation of an embassy, but taking the Argives' apparent eagerness and anxiety into account, we might postulate the embassy's arrival at Susa late in 464. The very fact that the new King had been insecure might make it politic to appear particularly eager after his victory. As for Callias' contemporaneous embassy, Herodotus' refusal (for whatever reason) to tell us its purpose makes it legitimate to deny (with Meister) that it succeeded in making peace. But one important point must be borne in mind: unless peace had been made before, it must at least have been negotiating about it; for an Athenian embassy had no business at Susa at all (and indeed, no previous one is known) as long as a state of war existed, except, by special arrangement, to try to end that state of war. (Of course, if there was peace already, it might have been there for some consequential task.) The presence of Callias' embassy at Susa, whatever its purpose, soon after Artaxerxes' accession, therefore implies at least peace negotiations, if not an established state of peace. .

Whether peace *could* be made under Xerxes is a complex question. It depends, above all, on whether there was time. If the battle of the Eury-medon is put in 467 or before (as if often has been), then there is no doubt about this. If in the summer of 466, when Xerxes had only a year to live, the chronology is tight, but peace was still feasible. For both sides were eager to settle. We are in fact told that Xerxes was eager for peace, and he had reason to be. The battle had shown that resistance to Athenian power was impossible in the foreseeable future, anywhere along the coasts of the eastern Mediterranean. If the King could decently cut his losses, Cyprus and Egypt would at least remain safe from Athenian attacks and political intervention. It seems equally clear that Cimon wanted peace. After the outstanding victory, with the whole of the eastern Mediterranean coastline undefended, he made no move: not the obvious invasion of Cyprus (though Diodorus thinks this took

place), nor any move to support rebellion in Egypt. Instead, Cimon now concentrated on Thrace, where Thasos ultimately rebelled. But for that rebellion (which could not be foreseen), Thrace promised more profit at less risk than continued war against the King.⁹ As an experienced commander, Cimon must have known the effect of ever-lengthening lines of communication: raids and booty might beckon, but what was won would become increasingly difficult to hold; territorial control was clearly close to its limits, and continued war would only lead to increasing risks for doubtful returns. Cimon was not one to anticipate the error made by his inexperienced opponents in 460. Nor would the prospect that he would go down in history as the man who finally forced the King to concede defeat (for this is how it would be presented) be an unwelcome consideration.

Both parties had good reasons for wanting to settle. Peace should therefore have been easy to conclude, practically on the basis of actual possession, provided certain formal obstacles (to be discussed in detail in our last section) could be overcome. Those obstacles, however, would be well known to all participants. We may regard it as certain that, as soon as peace seemed desirable, the King's advisers would begin to discuss the technicalities and suggest a solution; and Cimon, who knew the Persians well, must also have been thinking of what would be acceptable to him and to Athens. We must never forget, of course, that the journey from Sardis to Susa along the Royal Road was laid out to take three months (Hdt. 5.50), and we must allow precisely this time for an official embassy. That means that Callias' embassy would spend about six months plus a week or two in actual travel. If (as this reconstruction requires) they arrived in winter, the King would at least be available, in Susa or possibly even in Babylon, and could give them a quick audience, if his interests demanded it. Preliminary questions would have been settled by talks at Sardis, the usual center for negotiations with Greeks, and a few weeks is surely an ample allowance for what had to be done in the King's presence. It is thus perfectly conceivable that peace was made under Xerxes, and it could easily be confirmed in Athens before Xerxes' death was officially known—at whatever time that was, in the second half of 465.

Needless to say, however, if we have to put the battle of the Eurymedon in 465, peace with Xerxes becomes impossible. So, incidentally, do many other events that followed. We cannot here examine the whole of the chronology of one of the most difficult periods of (even) the Pente-

contaetia (for an attempt to establish a partial chronology see Chapter 2 below), but we must recall one or two of the salient facts. The revolt of Thasos began some considerable time after Eurymedon: not only (as Beloch pointed out) is such a revolt hard to imagine after the most glorious Athenian success since Salamis, until enough time had passed to moderate the impact of that success, but Thucydides' phrase χρόνῳ ὕστερον implies a lengthy interval (cf. 1.8.4; 4.81.2): certainly more than a month or two. Hence the revolt of Thasos, which ended τρίτῳ ἔτει (i.e., it lasted over two winters), clearly not later than some time in 463, must have begun in 465; so that Eurymedon cannot be put later than 466. What is the positive evidence for its date?

This depends on the story of Themistocles' movements. The whole complex has now been analysed by Unz, who is certainly right in insisting (not for the first time) that there is no merit to the view (fashionable among English-speaking scholars in the last two generations or so) that Thucydides related his Pentecontaetia in strict chronological order. Indeed, Thucydides himself never tells us so, and the view cannot be maintained without arbitrary emendation and failure to note the difference between his (usual) vague phrases and his precise chronological statements where he happens to be well informed. But Unz's own arguments are not always sound and call for detailed discussion.¹⁰

Unz rightly insists that the emendation of Naxos to Thasos (based on a manuscript of Plutarch) in 1.137.2 had better be abandoned. Unfortunately he does not sufficiently attend to the fact that Thucydides has been taken as clearly putting Eurymedon after Naxos: his μετὰ ταῦτα (100.1) has been referred to 98.4, so that Eurymedon seems firmly set between Naxos and Thasos, χρόνῳ ὕστερον. Unz, nonchalantly denying that Eurymedon could even be contemporary with Naxos (on which, see further below), simply puts it *before* the revolt, without comment on Thucydides' precise phrase. He then puts Themistocles' arrival at Ephesus (1.137.2), straight after he had escaped capture by the fleet blockading Naxos, no earlier than September or October of 465, since Thucydides "implies only a very short interval between Themistocles' arrival in Ephesus and his attempt to contact Artaxerxes," and it would in any case not be safe for him to stay there, since the city was under Athenian control and therefore open to Athenian agents pursuing him. This is better than the recent suggestion that Themistocles could live at Ephesus, inconspicuous and unnoticed, for years;¹¹ yet it must not be accepted as obvious, without scrutiny.

In fact, Unz has here been guilty of doing precisely what he upbraids others for doing elsewhere: reading into Thucydides what the author never said or implied. Thucydides tells us nothing precise about Themistocles' movements in Asia—whether because he did not think them important or because he himself did not know. He does, however, report that the ship's captain who had taken him there was paid only later (ὕστερον), when Themistocles had succeeded in getting money sent by friends in Athens and bankers in Argos. How long this would take, we do not know; but weeks, or (more probably) months, must be allowed, for what was in part an illegal operation (cf. Plut. *Them.* 24.6; 25.3). Ephesus, admittedly, was not safe; but when we find Themistocles later (some months later?) going “up country” μετὰ τῶν κάτω Περσῶν τινος, he is clearly setting out from an area under Persian control, and with a Persian official as guide. Magnesia on Maeander, later connected with Themistocles (see n. 38 with text below), only a day's trip from Ephesus, would be safe and obvious: it is not too bold to suggest that he waited there, until he had money to proceed in state, and until (no doubt) permission from the King had been obtained. Little can be got out of Phantias' tale that he met Artabanus at Susa (Plut. *Them.* 27), which would put his arrival there (a year after his letter to the King) before Xerxes' death: Thucydides cannot be rejected in favor of the moral tale. But the strong tradition—including Ephorus and therefore based on Asia where (as we know) the family of Themistocles survived in honor for a long time—that he arrived while Xerxes was on the throne (*ibid.*) should not be lightly rejected.¹² It does not in fact contradict Thucydides, who must again not be saddled with what he does not say: he tells us that Artaxerxes had “recently succeeded” when Themistocles wrote his letter to the King, from somewhere “up country” and after leaving the Aegean area. He will have waited (at Magnesia, as suggested above?) through the troubled time when Xerxes' death was rumored, but not confirmed, from Susa, until things had settled down there. His arrival in Ionia is best put early in 465, his departure and his letter at the earliest late that same year; but we cannot be precise.

We must next closely inspect Thucydides' wording regarding the revolt of Naxos and the battle of the Eurymedon. The former follows on the capture of Scyrus and Carystus (1.98.4): Ναξίοις δὲ ἀποστάσι μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπολέμησαν καὶ πολιορκίᾳ παρεστήσαντο. This leads into a digression (98.4–99) on revolts and their causes and effects, before the narrative resumes at 100.1: ἐγένετο δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ ἐπ'

Εὐρυμέδοντι . . . πεζομαχία καὶ ναυμαχία. The question now arises: what precisely is the nature of the connection, at the point where the narrative resumes: what are the events after which the battle took place, and what is the point of καί? On only one other occasion in the Pentecontaetia, where μετὰ ταῦτα is one of the usual excruciating indications of time (indeed, nowhere else in the whole of Book 1), does Thucydides use καί with it. There (108.4) the structure is lucid and the meaning clear: after these events (the victories in Boeotia, Phocis, and Locris) the Aeginetans *as well* (as the inhabitants of those areas) came to terms with the Athenians. The meaning of καί should be the same in our passage. Yet it is not at all clear, at first reading, as well as *what* the battle of the Eurymedon was fought. It cannot mean that the battle, like all the other revolts by allies, came after Naxos: that would be both trivial and highly misleading, since the analysis of the revolts is meant to cover decades. Yet there is nothing else mentioned after Naxos, for Eurymedon to share with.

I would suggest that Thucydides has been misunderstood at this point, where he returns from a digression and tries to reconnect his narrative. The μετὰ ταῦτα καί is his way of doing it: it takes up the μετὰ ταῦτα of 98.4 and is intended to let us know (after the digression) that, in addition to the revolt of Naxos, something else *also* happened after the same events (the capture of Scyrus and Carystus), namely the battle of the Eurymedon. If this is correct, we must posit rough contemporaneity between Naxos and the Eurymedon, and not succession.

But there is more to be said. It is commonly assumed that the Naxos affair was over in a single season. There is no warrant for this in the text, and it is historically unlikely. In the only other cases of wars against major allied states in this period (Thasos and Samos), we know how difficult victory was, and how long the fighting: three seasons in one case, two in the other. At a time when Athenian power and skill was much less overwhelming, Naxos is not likely to have been significantly easier; indeed, the Naxians must have thought (as Thasos still did) that Athens could be beaten. In the case of Thasos, the length of the siege is an integral part of the story; for the Thasians, too weak to win on their own, turn to the Spartans for aid, are promised aid (so Thucydides would have us believe), but this is prevented by the earthquake and the Messenian revolt, so that the Thasians have to surrender in the third season. Both the earthquake and the revolt are major events in Thucydides' account, leading on to the first open διαφορά between Sparta

and Athens (102.3); and the promised aid is essential in supporting Thucydides' presentation of Sparta's malevolent designs and ultimate responsibility for the war.¹³ The Naxos story has none of these elements. Thucydides needs it merely as the first of the revolts against Athens. The siege and capture take up four words, leading to the reflections in the digression. The negative conclusion, that the war as such was quick and easy, is totally unjustified: we are not told how long it took, any more than we know how long (e.g.) the siege of Eion took. But at least two seasons, with a winter intervening, must surely be allowed, in the light of the other major rebellions. If Themistocles encountered the Athenian fleet at Naxos early in 465, as seems likely, we may put the siege either in 466–465 or in 465–464, if we allow two seasons for it. In fact, three, as in the case of Thasos, would not be absurd, given the size and importance of Naxos; so that 467 is not totally excluded for Eurymedon. But let us allow two, for the sake of argument, since this is all we need here. It will at once be clear that 465–464 will not work (Unz's calculations suffice to show this), and so it must be 466–465.

Next, it is untrue that, as Unz thinks, the battle of the Eurymedon could be fought only after Naxos had been subdued. The assumption is not argued; and if it is unnecessary even on the implausible hypothesis of a single campaign against Naxos, it becomes untenable if we allow two. We should not need the parallel of Thasos (where other ventures could be launched in the north during the three seasons of the revolt) to make us realize that, once Naxos' navy had been destroyed (presumably near the very beginning of the war), this would be followed by a landing on the island and a siege, as at Samos and at Thasos; after which, only a force large enough to keep up the siege was needed on the island, and more would be a positive disadvantage, since supplies would have to be shipped to them; as for ships, since Naxos could expect no help from anyone, unlike Samos and (if we believe it) Thasos, only a small screening force would be left behind. If Naxos rebelled early in 466 (for obvious reasons, already discussed, the rebellion cannot be put after Eurymedon), then there would be plenty of time for the siege to be set up and for the main forces of the alliance to leave for Asia Minor and, late in the summer, fight the battle there. This (I think) fits in with all the positive evidence we have and avoids the difficulties caused both by the "fundamentalist" interpretations attacked by Unz and by his own discussion of these events.

As for Themistocles, being a shrewd man who had too often turned

out to be on the wrong side in the end, he apparently preferred to obtain the insecure new King's permission to wait another year while he prepared himself for the royal presence—and could wait to see how things would turn out at Susa before he committed himself. By the time he finally arrived there (despite the tale in Diodorus 11.56–57 and Phanias' story in Plutarch, clearly long after the removal of Artabanus), it must have been at least late 464, perhaps early 463, and Artaxerxes received him as an honored guest. We shall have to come back to him.

In view of recent reexamination of the chronology concerned, long discussion has been necessary to show that the battle of the Eurymedon does indeed fit into 466. We can now state with some confidence that if it was fought in late summer of that year, there is no reason why it should not have been followed by peace between Athens and Xerxes before Xerxes' death. We shall soon see that this can be further supported.

On the other hand, the idea—a favorite with those scholars who do not believe in any formal peace—that there could be a *de facto* peace without any formal ceremony is not easy to accept, in Greek conditions as we know them. One need not enter into the “chicken-and-egg” question of whether war or peace was regarded as the “natural” (i.e., treaty-less) state in the Greek world of the Classical period, for it is at any rate clear that in fully historical times any change from one to the other had to be formalized by a ritual act. Even a truce long enough to recover one's dead had to be confirmed by oath. That a long period of major hostilities should be followed by a *de facto* peace, with demonstrable trade and frequent embassies, without any formal process seems rather a desperate hypothesis, and one is entitled to ask its propounders for some positive proof. Without formal agreements, both ships and persons would surely have been liable to instant seizure, and such incidents could hardly have altogether escaped our knowledge, defective though that is. We need only look at Thucydides 2.67 *fin.* for Spartan practice during the Peloponnesian War, or at Demosthenes 24 (Ag. *Timocrates*) for fourth-century Athens, to form a realistic picture of what to expect where there was no formal agreement between states. The Demosthenic example, in fact, is particularly instructive. Although charges of impropriety arose, no one questioned the basic right of Athenians to seize an “enemy” ship as a legitimate prize, even though the “war” had, to say the least, not been strenuously or continuously prosecuted, and the ship's captain was quite probably not aware of its existence.

We shall soon see other reasons for believing that a formal peace existed, on something like the terms reported by later authors. For the moment, these general considerations should suffice to show that an “informal” peace is a rather implausible concept. Our conclusion, therefore, is that it was quite probably Xerxes himself who made peace with Cimon’s brother-in-law, not too long before his death; and that the embassy found at the court of Artaxerxes, early in his reign, was there in order to assure itself of the continuation of that peace under Xerxes’ successor. For no matter what the terms of a peace (and we shall see at the end of this article that in this particular instance more than usual depended on the person of the King), its acceptance by a King’s successor could never be taken for granted.

It might be objected that in that case Callias’ purpose at Susa was very close to that of the Argive embassy, and Herodotus, although not strictly telling a lie, must be assumed to be highly misleading in implying a major difference between their missions. This should be faced, and accepted. For we must surely recognize that Herodotus is in any case deliberately suppressing what the Athenian embassy was doing. It was obviously not a minor matter of routine (*that* did not take prominent Greeks as far as Susa), and it cannot have been many years before his own arrival at Athens: he succeeded in obtaining far more recondite information about far earlier events. Nor would he omit an important item simply because of irrelevance at a particular point: on the contrary, as he himself admits, he loved an interesting excursus (4.30). If he did not tell us what Callias’ mission was doing, it was because he chose not to.

So far I agree with what is essentially Meister’s point (44–48). Where we part company, however, is over the reason for Herodotus’ choice. Meister argues that it must be the failure of the peace negotiations; and he connects this, rather oddly, with the statement by Demosthenes (19.273) that Callias was fined on his return, even though Demosthenes himself tells that story in connection with the actual conclusion of a peace.¹⁴ Meister thinks that, since the peace is universally described as glorious by the later sources reporting it, Herodotus would not have failed to report it, had it been concluded at this time. (And presumably this would also apply to a renewal under a new King.) However, this overlooks an important point: the fact that, after the King’s Peace and by contrast with it (which is when we first hear of Callias’ peace), the peace looked glorious is irrelevant to how it would look in Herodotus’

day, or to Herodotus himself. As we shall see, there was at least room for a difference of opinion on how to regard it. And as for Herodotus, he was celebrating Athens as the champion of Hellas against the Barbarian, even at the expense of Sparta: hence his continuation of his account through the siege of Sestos, which marked Sparta's first loss of leadership and Athens' first step toward a hegemonial role. Nothing would have less fitted into the picture he was trying to paint than to tell us, in a casual aside arising out of an incident attesting the conspicuous and continuing Medism of Argos, that the Athenians came to terms with the Barbarian a few years later. The fact that Herodotus does not report a peace, whether at this point or earlier, cannot be used as proof that no peace was made. On the other hand, Herodotus' coy refusal to tell us what Callias was up to, in his *prima facie* surprising presence at Susa, suffices to show that something that Herodotus would have thought disreputable was going on.

If peace was indeed made in Xerxes' day, there was no question that it would be ratified in Athens. Cimon was at the height of his power—so much so that, when we first hear of an attempted attack on his position, after his return from the north in (probably) 463, it ended in failure. As I have suggested, the person of Cimon's brother-in-law would in fact help to reassure the King, who was always given to regarding international relations in personal terms, that the "rulers" of Athens were serious about it. Even at the time of Artaxerxes' accession, when Callias returned to Athens with a renewal of the peace, or just possibly with the first formal peace made, acceptance in Athens should still be presumed. The embassy would certainly be back some time in 463—a time when Cimon could be attacked, but not yet defeated. The reforms of Ephialtes, fortunately, are one of the few dated events in this period: they came in 462/1 (*Ath. pol.* 25.2). Before midsummer of 462, Callias' embassy could not be disowned.

II

This brings us to the Athenian background of the 460s, the struggle between Cimon and his opponents against which these events took place and which must obviously be correlated with them. As we have noted, in the first part of the decade, Cimon, supported by the prestige of the return of the bones of "Theseus" and the victory at the Euryme-

don and strengthened by the allegiance of the Areopagus, seems to have been unchallenged. As Plutarch (*Per.* 7) makes clear, this was the time when young Pericles, son of the man who had successfully prosecuted Cimon's father and driven him to death in disgrace (Hdt. 6.136; cf. Plut. *Cim.* 4.4), despaired of being able to enter upon a political career. It is only on his return from the north that Cimon can be prosecuted (whatever the technical details of the prosecution),¹⁵ an event in which Pericles for the first time appears (not too gloriously) in a leading role. He had to abandon the prosecution, clearly (whatever later gossip suggested) because the time was not yet ripe for a conviction. It was not long after this that Cimon, against strong opposition, persuaded the People to support Sparta against the rebellious helots.¹⁶ As Wade-Gery saw long ago, Pericles' introduction of pay for jury service is dated to this period (the late sixties) in our sources (*Ath. pol.* 27.3–4; Plut. *Per.* 9.2). In practice, it marked the first admission of citizens of the poorest class to the courts, and it must certainly have played its part in enabling Ephialtes to obtain the conviction of Areopagites for past financial misdemeanors, presumably during their tenure of the archonship. (We do not know of any money handled by Areopagites as such.) If Cimon was prosecuted before a court (which our sources do not allow us to determine with any assurance), we might speculate that the idea for the reform may have come to Pericles through his failure in that trial; but it was not difficult to think of in any case, and Ephialtes' plan of discrediting the governing circles by prosecuting Areopagites may have sufficed to suggest it. They would presumably have been much more likely to gain acquittal from their peers in wealth.

It is also at precisely this time, of the rivalry between Cimon and Ephialtes and Pericles, that we must put the famous incidents reported (from Callisthenes) by Plutarch (*Cim.* 13.4): the naval sweeps by Pericles with fifty ships and by Ephialtes with thirty (we do not know in what order or precisely in what years) beyond the Chelidonian Islands, without meeting any Persian resistance. Meiggs dates these actions correctly, unlike some other scholars;¹⁷ but he regards them as "action following up the Eurymedon"—which in an objective sense is no doubt correct, in that the sweeps could not have been conceived of before that victory, but which misleadingly suggests collaboration between Cimon and the two commanders, where our sources clearly attest political opposition. In view of that testimony, we must surely take the naval sweeps as demonstrating opposition in one major sphere, that of foreign

policy—not surprisingly, since those sources do happen to record it not only over domestic matters, but also over policy toward Sparta, and even Macedon. Policy toward Persia might be expected to be no less controversial.

In fact, it seems clear that opposition would take the same line in that case as in the other two: just as Pericles had prosecuted Cimon for lack of a vigorous policy toward Macedon, and Ephialtes opposed him for not pursuing a vigorous policy toward Sparta, so both of them would have good reason to cry out against his seeking peace with the Barbarian. We need not assume that they were trying to disrupt the peace that Cimon either was trying to make or had already made: this must be stressed because it has persistently been stated (most recently by Walsh and by Meister) that Pericles and Ephialtes were deliberately breaking the terms of the peace. From this it can be further argued that the peace was at once destroyed, or that there cannot have been a peace at all, which is the conclusion these two scholars respectively arrived at. But the assertion is not supported by anything we know about the peace. Indeed, if the naval sweeps had been undertaken while negotiations were going on, they might have worried the King. But if they had come as close as that to Eurymedon, and before any peace terms were agreed upon, the obvious question must be asked: why do we hear only of naval sweeps and not of any landfall in enemy territory, which would be an obvious aim and corollary of such a sweep in normal conditions (cf. Thuc. 1.96.1)? Why was no booty taken from the unprotected enemy coast? There is only one plausible answer; but before we come to it, we must first look at the error shared by Walsh and Meister with many of their predecessors over the terms of the peace itself.

It is a common misapprehension that there was a *Fahrtgrenze* laid down in its terms: a line that marked a limit beyond which fleets, from east and west respectively, might not proceed; in fact, something comparable to a frontier on land. This view was rejected by Meiggs (*Athenian Empire* 147–48), but as recent work has shown, his argument has not been heeded. The theory of the *Fahrtgrenze* is in fact a purely modern construct, and not the only one of its kind in ancient history. It is worth recalling that, when Polybius mentions an obligation by Hasdrubal not to cross the Ebro with an army, modern scholars have more often than not made this into a reciprocal obligation, binding the Romans as well, in the same terms—and that even though Polybius, in this instance, plainly tells us that nothing of the sort was stipulated.¹⁸ In our

case, not a single source reports a limitation on the movement of Athenian fleets; and although it is conceivable that such a limitation might have been in the treaty, but not mentioned through patriotic misrepresentation, the fact is that we have no positive evidence at all for such a limitation. It is surely not proper method to construct it when it is not reported, and then to assert that an instance that runs counter to the construct was in fact a breach of the imagined provision.

It is more profitable to scrutinize the fact we have already noted: the failure of either of these leaders of a successful and unopposed expedition to bring home booty captured on the enemy's undefended coastline. There seems to be but one possible explanation for such remarkable restraint, contrasting with what we know of other Athenian commanders on numerous other occasions. There can be no doubt that any peace between Athens and the King would forbid attacks on the territory of either signatory by the other. The fact that Ephialtes and Pericles, on separate occasions, refrained from attacking the King's territory can be explained only on the hypothesis that there was already a peace in existence which they would not break: indeed, they could not have ventured to break a formal peace without positive authorization by the Assembly, which at this time (the time of Cimon's ascendancy) was unthinkable. Any actual breach of a peace recently agreed to would have meant the end of a man's career. The story quoted by Plutarch from Callisthenes as allegedly an argument *against* the existence of a peace turns out to be a powerful argument *for* it. It is only the assumption that the peace would be broken by the naval sweeps themselves that has prevented the patent fact from emerging. Unfortunately this does not succeed in securely dating the peace. However, it is helpful for that purpose. Since we are told that the two expeditions were separate, we must surely assign them to different years; and even if they took place in *successive* years, it is so difficult as to seem almost impossible to fit both of them in after a peace concluded only with Artaxerxes, i.e., not before 463, yet before Cimon's policies could be openly overturned (462/1). The probability of a peace concluded under Xerxes and only confirmed by Callias' embassy to Artaxerxes is considerably increased by the testimony of these naval expeditions.

Against the background of the peace recently concluded, and the general opposition to Cimon's policies on the part of these two leaders, their intention can now be interpreted. As we have seen, they were in no position actually to destroy the peace. But, first, they could not succeed

against the supremacy based on naval *strategiai*, which Cimon had built up, without demonstrating at least some skill (to the extent that it could at that point be demonstrated) at naval command. More important: whatever the Persian reaction to these expeditions, it could be turned to political advantage. If Persian ships came out to fight, under the extreme provocation of seeing Athenian fleets close to their shoreline, they would certainly have lost: the peace would have been broken by the enemy (if the Assembly could be persuaded to take this view of the action, which was quite likely), and the very victory would show that it was unnecessary to leave the Barbarian in peace when he was in no condition to challenge Athenian power. If (as was more likely, and as indeed happened) there was no opposition, then that would give the Athenian commanders cheap glory, and would show that (as Callisthenes later interpreted it) the Persians were now too weak and frightened to resist even a demonstration of enemy power deep within their sphere: hence, again, it would be argued that it was unnecessary to let the Barbarian have peace when he was helpless. In fact, Pericles and Ephialtes risked nothing and, in all foreseeable circumstances, could not lose. There can be no doubt that these expeditions were a powerful force in turning public opinion against Cimon's eastern policy and robbing his peace of the glory he had hoped to gain from it. The positive reversal of that policy—the attack on the King's territory—had to wait until the new leaders were securely in power; indeed, Ephialtes was quite probably dead before it began.¹⁹ However, his recognition of the fact that the great *strategos* could be defeated only by *stratego*i helped to carry him to political victory.

Once Cimon was ostracized, one of the first actions of the new leaders was to launch an expedition against Cyprus, soon diverted (in whole or in part) to Egypt; just as in Greece Cimon's pro-Spartan policy was reversed by an alliance with Argos and an attack on the Peloponnesian League. Even in the north, where Cimon's failure to attack Macedon had provided the grounds for his unsuccessful prosecution, active steps were taken. The line had to be drawn somewhere, and even the new activism could not combine an attack on Macedon with attacks on Sparta and Persia, which were politically more important. However, the groundwork was laid for the future, by means of an alliance with the Thessalians,²⁰ precisely corresponding to that with Argos in the south: Thessaly would provide a base for the future attack on Macedon, when

the time came, and Thessalian cavalry would be essential in actually implementing it.

Modern scholars have tended to ignore the clear evidence for consistent political opposition to Cimon's policies, foreign as well as domestic, on the part of the opponents who overthrew him. We may fitly conclude this section with a quotation from Gomme's *Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, which can stand for most opinions expressed since it was written: "There was no break in Athenian policy in the East after the ostracism of Cimon."²¹ Proper consideration of the Peace of Callias—concluded under Cimon's supremacy by his brother-in-law and almost demonstrably in effect before his overthrow; then swept away, with the rest of his policies, when his enemies took over the state—should have sufficed to make such judgments impossible.

III

It is not our task here to trace the failure, ultimately on all fronts, of the expansionist policy that followed Cimon's ostracism, with Pericles clearly the link between the attack on Cimon before and the reversal of his policies after. Nor is this the place to comment fully on the Citizenship Decree (*Ath. pol.* 26.3–4), one of the very few laws (another, much later, is the Megarian Decree) that we know stood in Pericles' own name.²² What is significant here is that it marks the change in Pericles' attitude to empire from exuberant expansionism (which had been demonstrated by him as a follower of Ephialtes and which had brought both of them to power) to an intensivist policy, limiting further expansion to where it was strategically feasible while increasing the actual profits of empire by peace and organized exploitation. The lesson had no doubt been learned in the Egyptian disaster of 454 and the heavy losses it inflicted on Athens: such risks could clearly not be taken again. The Citizenship Decree of 451/50 announces and implies the peace treaties with both Persia and Sparta, which it now became Pericles' aim to secure, and the change from "Delian League" to Athenian Empire. The process of transformation, once embarked upon, turned out to be remarkably quick.

Whether Cimon was in Athens while attitudes were changing under the impact of failure cannot be disengaged with real assurance from the

mythopoeia of our sources. The story of his recall after the battle of Tanagra, supposedly on the motion of Pericles himself, is well known (Plut. *Per.* 10; *Cim.* 17, *fin.*).²³ That Pericles himself moved the recall can almost certainly be regarded as a piece of dramatic fiction, the more so as we find it embroidered by the usual ἐνιοί with a secret agreement between them, arranged (inevitably) through the agency of Elpinice (who had already been cast in such a role in connection with the earlier prosecution of Cimon by Pericles), to the effect that Cimon was to attack the King's territory with two hundred ships, while Pericles was to have "power" within Athens.²⁴ And the association of the recall, in nearly all the sources, with an immediate truce between Sparta and Athens must surely rest on confusion with the five-year truce mentioned by Thucydides (1.112.1) at a much later date than is conceivable for Cimon's recall, which according to our specific sources for it was the result of the battle of Tanagra. That there was no major truce after Tanagra (the four months' truce of Diod. 11.80, *fin.* may be fact) is clear from the various actions against the Peloponnesian League recorded by Thucydides 1.108.2–5 and 111.2 (without precise dates, but clearly between Tanagra and three years before the five years' truce) and (with arbitrary dates) by Diodorus. Diodorus puts the five years' truce in 454/3, and tells us that it was negotiated by Cimon (11.86.1).²⁵

It should be clear that certainty on this is unattainable, in view of the delight of our sources in embroidering the motif of the recall. That Cimon negotiated the five years' truce should be believed; but the date for it given by Diodorus cannot prevail against that to be deduced from Thucydides. If indeed Cimon was allowed to return after Tanagra, as a special favor, it must have been on condition that he should not take part in public business: in other words, the ostracism was reduced to what, in the fourth century, was to be called *atimia*. I am inclined to think that this alleviation may be the true foundation on which the variants of the story were later based. His presence in the city (even without political rights) may help to explain the fact that the Spartans did not exploit the Egyptian disaster by launching an immediate attack on Athens, but let Athens recover for three years, until the truce was officially sworn. (That the *Athenians* were inactive during those years, 454–451, requires no explanation, after the losses they had suffered in Egypt and the consequent need to devote their resources to safeguarding their control of the league.) Cimon's recall may have aided those in Sparta who believed (as Cimon and his supporters did in Athens) that the accord

between the two powers ought to be restored, and who now saw a genuine possibility of this in the near future: such an accord, of course, would have outweighed any immediate gain to be won from an attack on a weakened Athens after 454. Acceptance of Cimon's recall thus helps us propound an answer to one of the problems of the late 450s that Thucydides chooses to ignore. Later sources would easily confuse this absence of hostility that followed his premature return with the truce actually arranged at the proper expiration of his term of ostracism.

Whether or not it was due to Cimon's fortuitous presence in Athens, the breathing space the Athenians thus gained gave Pericles time for reassessing his policy. As we have suggested, he used it wisely, and decided to initiate a change in the whole Athenian conception of the hegemony over the allies. The Citizenship Decree erected an impassable barrier between Athens and her allies and stopped for all time the intermarriages that must have resulted from the constant travel by Athenians to allied cities and the visits of large numbers of allies to Athens as the hegemonial power. At the same time, the transfer of the league treasury from Delos to Athens, from the patronage of Ionian Apollo to that of Athena guardian of Athens, had provided both a symbolic and a practical background for the demarcation of the Athenian "master race," which could not fail to profit in obvious ways from the concomitant geographical limitation of its ambitions.

This gave Cimon a chance to expound his own new policy. As soon as his term of ostracism had expired and the truce with Sparta was sworn, he led an expedition to Egypt and Cyprus. (We shall discuss the details in the Endnote below.) Athens was to resume leadership of the allies against the Barbarian. The political wheel had come full circle, and Cimon was using against Pericles' new policy the very weapons that Pericles, under Ephialtes' guidance, had successfully employed against him: he would show how the Egyptian disaster suffered under Pericles' leadership could be avenged. Whether Pericles opposed the expedition we cannot tell. He may well have welcomed it. If Cimon was successful, major political conflict lay ahead, and an uncertain outcome. But if Pericles' new policy of external peace was to become feasible, the King would in any case have to be taught a lesson; and there is probably this much truth to the story of the secret compact between Pericles and Cimon, that Pericles thought it safer to stay in Athens and risk the political consequences of Cimon's victory over the King than to hand the city

over to his opponent and, with doubtful prospects, himself seek to avenge his military failure.

In the end, Pericles was lucky beyond what could have been reasonably expected. The gods truly showed him their favor: it is no wonder that he before long gave Athena a magnificent reward. Cimon's expedition ended in the major naval victory off Cyprian Salamis, which almost rivaled that of the other Salamis in its glory and perhaps surpassed it in its effect (for the Persian fleet was swept off the seas beyond hope of quick recovery),²⁶ and by the time the crowning victory was won, Cimon was dead. Pericles reaped the profit, at no political cost or risk. He could now make peace with the Barbarian without inviting political attack at home, and proceed to carry out his new policies.

Once peace with the King was to be renewed, there was no doubt as to who was to be entrusted with the difficult task of persuading him that, this time, the Athenians could be trusted. Personal connections were always essential in diplomatic contacts with the King and his satraps, even had the task not been so delicate. It was for this reason that Sparta later sent Antalcidas on a number of missions, to Sardis and to Susa. He, as we happen to be told, was the King's ξένος and even φίλος (Plut. *Artox.* 22). The Athenian Timagoras, although we have no attestation of his rank, seems (to judge by his treatment) to have been in the same class, even though the Athenian *demos*, for good reasons, preferred not to profit by this. But more trustworthy Athenians are attested as the King's guest-friends. Pericles' friend Ppyrilampes went on at least one, and quite possibly more than one, embassy to Susa, and more to Sardis.²⁷ He was the first Athenian (perhaps the first Greek) to be given a pair of peacocks as a guest-friend's gift: Athenian wit (Plut. *Per.* 13.15, perhaps based on a comedy) suggested that he used the exotic birds to procure women for Pericles. His son Demus later exhibited them to the public; he may even have charged admission for seeing them.²⁸ Demus himself, no doubt through the inherited connection, was chosen to go to the King, we do not even know when or how often; and this very item helps to illustrate both the state of our information on Athenian relations with the King and the fact that embassies to Susa came to be regarded as normal and not always worth reporting. We hear of this one only by chance, when we find Demus, before 390, in possession of a gold *phiale* worth more than sixteen minae (the sum for which he expected to pawn it—so its value may have been *considerably* higher) given to him by the King as a *symbolon*; i.e., he too was officially (in

Greek terminology) the King's ξένος.²⁹ He was presumably expected to take it with him whenever he went on an embassy to the King or to a satrap. This was how Achaemenid diplomacy operated. There can be no question that Pericles was well aware of it.

The choice of Callias for the mission was inevitable. It was fortunate that he was still alive and active: a few years later, we find him negotiating the Thirty Years' Peace with Sparta. Davies, in unfortunate language, speaks of Callias' "shift to the Left," in that he now undertook missions on behalf of Pericles.³⁰ The terms of modern political topography are best avoided. But the point that must be made is that there was surely no shift in Callias' policy: if he made peace with both Persia and Sparta, that was just what he had learned under Cimon. It was Pericles who had come round to a policy that was basically Cimonian, at least in foreign affairs. Callias, quite probably elected *strategos*, set about repairing the disasters caused by the abandonment of Cimon's policy due to Cimon's enemies. He helped restore—for Athens, we might say, rather than for Pericles—what he had helped his brother-in-law build up.

As against the multitude of fourth-century and later sources that bear witness to the peace after the battle of the Eurymedon, this second peace is thinly attested. Only three sources appear to mention it, none of them trustworthy: Diodorus (12.4), Aristodemus (*FGrHist* 104 F 13), and the *Suda* (s.v. 'Καλλίας' 214 [A]). Had it not been for the attested absence of hostilities and occasional glimpses of normal relations between the two powers, for about a generation after this time, no one would have been tempted to believe that assortment of witnesses. As it is, it is little short of astonishing that late and demonstrably unreliable sources should have their evidence in a negative sense (i.e., their failure to mention a peace before c. 450) unquestioningly accepted by traditional scholarship, against the testimony of the fourth-century authors, at least some of whom seem to have seen an actual document. Let us examine the witnesses.

That Diodorus thoroughly mixes up the Eurymedon campaign and that on Cyprus c. 450 is generally recognized. He alone connects the Eurymedon victory with an invasion of Cyprus; Simonides' epigram on the victory of Cyprian Salamis is transferred to that imaginary campaign (11.61–62), and the victory is ascribed to Cimon, who was in fact dead by the time it was won. As for Aristodemus, whose date we cannot even reliably conjecture, Jacoby, in his very brief discussion, character-

izes him as unreliable in chronology, even though Jacoby never thought of questioning that particular specimen of it in his own account.³¹

One reason given for belief in the date thus transmitted is that Diodorus, here as elsewhere, is closely following Ephorus (see most recently Meister), and that Ephorus himself therefore did not refer to a peace after Eurymedon and, in this instance, should be believed. This is not a valid reason. If Diodorus is closely following Ephorus, then Ephorus himself was already guilty of the multiple confusions between the campaign of Eurymedon and that of c. 450 in Cyprus that are demonstrable in Diodorus. If so, the only conclusion would be that these errors were already old (fourth-century and not first-)—not that they were not errors. The date found in such a context would be no more acceptable than the story of the actual events. Oddly enough, the ascription of the confusion to Ephorus has not deterred scholars (Meister is an honorable exception) from accepting the date while rejecting the rest, at least in the form in which it is presented.

I should think it unlikely even on general grounds that Ephorus should be saddled with the blame for what we find in Diodorus. He was writing in the fourth century, quite probably even in Athens, at a time when (as we noted) there was an inscription on view which those who saw it (and those who followed their account) agreed in taking to refer to a peace of the period after Eurymedon—no doubt for some reason in the actual text (I have suggested an archon date). Now, historians might choose to reject the consensus, as is reported of Theopompus and Callisthenes (see below). But Ephorus is not reported to have done so, and in view of his record it is unlikely that he did; it is even more unlikely that he would accept the contents of the peace from the consensus and reject the date: historians of the fourth century B.C. did not practice the methods of their modern successors, accepting or rejecting parts of a source according to personal preference. And as everyone who has used Diodorus must know, he is quite capable of causing his own chronological confusions, even where Ephorus cannot be blamed.

There is a more specific argument for encouraging belief that Ephorus got the story of Callias' missions right. As we have seen, there are in fact only three sources that mention a peace negotiated by Callias after the Cyprian campaign. It has often been thought that they all derive from Ephorus, and this has been used to support the view that Ephorus rejected the fourth-century consensus. However, the story is not as simple as that. Diodorus and Aristodemus certainly do not mention an earlier

peace, and Aristodemus (F12–13) not only shares Diodorus' omission but improves on it, making the Cyprian campaign and Cimon's death follow at once (εὐθύς) on the battle of Oenophyta and managing to omit Eurymedon altogether. (It is not likely that Ephorus should be blamed for this!) But the case of the *Suda* entry is both more complex and more interesting. Let us quote the relevant part of the text:

Καλλίας ὁ Λακκόπλουτος ἐπικληθεὶς στρατηγῶν πρὸς Ἀρταξέρξην τοὺς ἐπὶ Κίμωνος τῶν σπονδῶν ἐβεβαίωσεν ὅρους.

We cannot be sure what this is intended to mean. It may be taken to say that Callias fought as general against Artaxerxes, and thus secured the boundaries of the treaty made in Cimon's day. That would not be the only confusion found in the *Suda*. Yet even in that case, most of the conclusions we are going to draw from the passage would still apply, although the error would have to be eliminated. But it is perhaps better to give the compiler the benefit of the doubt, since it is not actually necessary to assume confusion. We are entitled (and we therefore probably ought) to translate: "Callias . . . , while general, secured toward Artaxerxes the boundaries fixed in the treaty of Cimon's day." I.e., we should take the passage as referring to a negotiated renewal, while attesting Callias as general. But there is in any case no doubt that the compiler knew of a peace made in Cimon's day, which was now somehow renewed or secured. He gives the peace in full s.v. Κίμων 1620 (A), assigning it to Cimon and giving the date after Eurymedon and the terms essentially as known from the fourth-century sources:

Κίμων . . . ἐπ' Εὐρυμέδοντι ποταμῷ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ νικᾷ ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας. οὗτος ἔταξε καὶ τοὺς ὅρους τοῖς βαρβάροις . . . μηδὲ ἵππου δρόμον ἡμέρας ἐντὸς ἐπὶ θάλατταν καταβαίνειν βασιλέα[ς] αὐτονόμους τε εἶναι τοὺς Ἕλληνας [καὶ] τοὺς ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ.

On the other hand, his statement regarding Callias is closely related to that of Aristodemus, who, precisely after Cimon's death and the naval victory, has Callias (whom he alone, with the *Suda*, here calls Lacoplutus) elected general and then swearing a peace with Artaxerxes "and the rest of the Persians." The coincidences in these two accounts cannot be accidental. They certainly demand the second interpretation of the *Suda* passage (i.e., a renewal of peace, not a campaign) advanced above, and they demonstrate that these two authors go back to the same source. It follows, almost beyond refutation, that Aristodemus' source also knew of a peace sworn after the battle of the Eurymedon, which

Callias, as general, later renewed: in Aristodemus, the peace has simply disappeared together with the battle itself.

Who can this source be? The question is not too difficult to answer. As we have seen, Diodorus is the only surviving author, in addition to the *Suda* and Aristodemus, who reports a peace after Cimon's death and the battle off Cyprus (which he puts before Cimon's death), and Callias as negotiating it. As usual, Diodorus has been selective and has omitted what seemed unimportant to him (e.g., the nickname and rank of Callias); and the confusion over "Cimon's" victory is surely his own (by an easy piece of mythopoeia). Yet the coincidence in date, in the name of the negotiator, and in the actual terms (at least in outline), makes it possible to deduce that his report comes from the same source as the other two. It can only be Ephorus, therefore, long known as a likely source for Aristodemus and an almost certain one (for Greek affairs) for Diodorus.³² The general probability that Ephorus did not omit the peace after Eurymedon is thus confirmed by detailed analysis.

Surprisingly (perhaps) but demonstrably, the *Suda* is the only source that seems to have transmitted his account correctly: a treaty under Cimon (as in the other fourth-century sources), renewed by Callias after Cimon's death, and presumably (it would follow) broken in the interim. Aristodemus lost the first treaty together with the battle preceding it. The error is perhaps not too surprising, in a work as brief as his, yet we must ask: how could one of the best-known Athenian victories simply disappear? We can now see an answer: if Aristodemus, reading Ephorus, came across a record of two naval victories, each followed by a peace negotiated by Callias, he might well drop the first sequence—whether because he thought it must have been inserted by mistake or (more probably) because it was clear that the victory was not decisive and the peace not lasting (hence unimportant for his epitome).

The case of Diodorus is similar, though his solution was not as clean and neat. We must not underestimate the possibility that he chose to omit the peace after Eurymedon if he found it in his sources, simply because it was clearly ineffective. His judgment on what to omit, in his epitome of world history, is sometimes frustrating for the modern scholar, but nonetheless defensible from his own point of view. Thus he omits the peace negotiations of 392/1, since they did not come to anything. Somewhat surprisingly, he omits Alexander's colorful visit to Gordium, which he must certainly have found in his source, again because it cannot be shown to have had any effect on Alexander's cam-

paign or policies. He is very likely to have decided to omit the peace that was ineffective and concentrate on the one that lasted—just as, after omitting the negotiations of 392/1, he fully reports the King's Peace of 387/6. He would not, however, cheat the Greeks of the memory of one of their most glorious victories: he did not omit Eurymedon. In this case, though, the result was a certain amount of confusion: writing both about Eurymedon and about Cimon's Cyprian campaign and (as Diodorus saw it) his other glorious victory of Cyprian Salamis, he introduced confusion about the two campaigns. He was never good at dealing with true historical duplication: the showpiece in the genre is his amalgamation of two Persian campaigns against Egypt in the fourth century, the first a disastrous failure and the second a complete success (16.40ff.). But for our detailed contemporary documentation, no one would have been able to work out the true sequence in that instance, and few scholars would have had the courage to suggest what we know to be the truth.

In any case, Diodorus seems to have been as confused by his notes on this sequence as Aristodemus possibly was by Ephorus himself, and the larger scale of his account makes the confusion more apparent: he not only omits the first peace (which could be justified), but he reports *both* Eurymedon *and* the Cyprian campaign, yet transposes parts of the latter to fit in with the former. The similar sequences of naval victory plus peace treaty are probably largely to blame. We must always remember that ancient writers did not normally check their sources when writing: Diodorus, like Pliny or (I think) Cassius Dio, presumably worked from notes made from the text of his sources; in case of difficulty, he would smooth things over as best he could, without going back to his source.

The upshot of this discussion is that what must surely be Ephorus' account reported that there were two treaties between Athens and the King: the first made by Callias just before the fall of Cimon from power and the change to an activist foreign policy that at once rejected the newly made treaty, and the second after the activist foreign policy had led to disastrous failure and Pericles had come round to his own version of a Cimonian policy, which led to Callias' reviving the peace with the King (and, in due course, making peace with Sparta as well). This fits in well with what we know of the background of Athenian politics in the middle of the fifth century and is likely to be true.³³ The fourth-century sources, where they date the peace, are naturally interested only in the original peace, which for the first time forced the King to make conces-

sions: the later history of that peace is of no interest to them (they ignore the "Peace of Epilycus," known from Andoc. 3.29, just as they ignore the renewal of 449). This by no means discredits their evidence. As to the peace of 449, there is no reason whatever, especially in the light of the explicit statement in the *Suda*, to believe that it rests on mere confusion: it must be accepted as a renewal of the original peace.

IV

Why should Ephorus' account *not* be believed? The question of authenticity, which has been almost the only question regarding the Peace of Callias that scholars have usually discussed, is obviously a complex one. But let us start with a few arguments that can be fairly summarily dismissed.

First, and at first sight perhaps important: two fourth-century authors are attested as standing out against the consensus and denying that a peace was made. Theopompus' denial (*FGrHist* 115 F 153–54) is total: the peace "with Darius" is a lie (one of several invented by the Athenians for their greater glory), and this is clear from the fact that it was engraved in Ionian letters and not in Attic, as, in the fifth century, it ought to have been. No other argument advanced by him against the peace is cited, and we have no reason to invent others. But Theopompus, whatever his pretensions as an epigraphist, was no serious historian. His testimony to the actual existence of a stele engraved in the Ionian alphabet of the fourth century is important, as confirming what Isocrates and probably others saw. But the stele was not meant to deceive: it was a reengraving of an original that cannot possibly have survived the events of 411–403 B.C: the two oligarchies, the actual collapse of the treaty (with the King becoming Athens' most powerful enemy), and the defeat of Athens. This was seen by Meiggs (*Athenian Empire* 138), though he undermined the case by making it only one of three "possibilities," not all equally plausible. It makes the frequently advanced "explanation"—that Theopompus may have seen the Peace of Epilycus, and that this (c. 420) may well have been engraved in Ionian letters—superfluous. Whichever peace ("with Darius") Theopompus saw, it was one of a series of fifth-century documents destroyed during the Peloponnesian War and reengraved when they became important in the fourth.³⁴ The peace with the King became important after the very

different peace made by the Spartans, and was reengraved at that time: it is not surprising that we first hear of it in the 380s.

The other author denying (strictly speaking) only the peace made under Cimon's predominance (Plut. *Cim.* 13) is Callisthenes. (On this, see now pp. 71–72 below.) *Why* he did so, we cannot tell; but since his denial (as far as we can judge from Plutarch's citation) concerned only the peace made after Eurymedon, it is easiest to suggest that he (like some modern scholars and, as we have seen, perhaps Diodorus and Aristodemus) was struck by the fact that fighting between the two powers was soon resumed, and, knowing little about the political history of Athens, thought that the first reported peace was due to confusion with the later, well-supported one. At any rate, his suggestion of a *de facto* peace lasting a few years and due simply to the King's weakness and inability to meet Athenian forces should not be misused as support for the absurd modern construct of a *de facto* peace lasting for nearly half a century. It is not implausible in itself, but in view of Plutarch's failure to tell us Callisthenes' reasons (if indeed he advanced any), we have no good excuse for preferring his statement to that of the majority of fourth-century authors, partially supported as it is by Herodotus' report of Callias' embassy to Susa.

We have already seen that Herodotus' failure to mention the conclusion of the peace is entirely explicable in terms of the nature and purpose of his work. (The peace as such, of course, lies beyond the limits of his history and would not appear within its chronological framework.) The silence of Thucydides has seemed more of an obstacle. But we must bear in mind that we are equally unable to give a satisfactory explanation of other silences and near-silences of his. Thus the "Peace of Epilycus" is well attested. Yet Thucydides ignores it; indeed, that fact has been used by some as confirmation of the authenticity of the Peace of Callias, since (it is urged) he could not have omitted a peace between Athens and the King made during the period covered by his full *History* unless it was a mere technicality: a renewal of an earlier peace—which he did not report because he covered the Pentecontaetia very selectively. It is clear that this is rather an odd argument. But the fact that he did not report the peace, nor (e.g.) Athenian support for Amorges, which Andocides (*ibid.*) rightly thinks a crucial event in bringing about the King's hostility to Athens, shows the nature and scale of his selective omissions, even during the Peloponnesian War. As for the Pentecontaetia, his omissions can be explained as due partly to his selecting material

to support his thesis as to the causes of the war, and partly to his desire to conceal the extent of Athens' (and Pericles' personal) responsibility for it. (See Chapter 4 below.) He does not even mention, among many other matters, the transfer of the Delian treasury to Athens or the organization of the Athenian Empire, which a modern historian would again think essential toward an understanding of the war that is his main theme. It should be an accepted principle that the silence of an ancient author, whether Thucydides or (say) Diodorus, cannot be used as a negative argument, whatever the conventional degree of modern respect for that author.

Finally, an argument frequently advanced in this discussion (see Meister 35–36), which has been dragged into it by modern misinterpretation, needs detailed discussion, but can (I hope) be decisively banished from it for the future. It is the argument from the reported debate in Athens over the use for Athenian purposes of the funds contributed by the Allies.³⁵ I agree with Meister, as against what scholars like Andrewes have suggested (*JHS* 98 [1978] 2–5), that the account of the debate in Plutarch (*Per.* 12) must go back to contemporary sources and should be taken seriously: we cannot assert the authenticity of the Peace of Callias by denying the authenticity of this debate. According to Meiggs (*Athenian Empire* 491), it was Busolt (whom he praises for it) who first noticed the difficulty allegedly posed by what Pericles is reported to have pointed out to the Athenians. The crucial phrase (s. 3) must be quoted:

ὅτι χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ ὀφείλουσι τοῖς συμμάχοις λόγον, προπολεμοῦντες αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἀνείργοντες.

The first question must be: when did this debate take place? Meiggs, accepting the complex argument fully set out in *The Athenian Tribute Lists* III, which is based on interlocking interpretations of various sources, chief of them the scholia known as *Anonymus Argentinensis*, believes that the building policy was initiated in 450/49 (*Athenian Empire* 132–33, 139–40). The argument on which this date depends cannot be examined here. But if it is accepted, there is no difficulty whatsoever about this passage: it is only Meiggs' peculiar timetable of events around 450, chiefly due to his desire to justify an adapted version of the explanation of the "missing tribute list" given in *ATL*, that forces him to deny that Athenian forces were at that very time fighting the Persians in Cyprus and Egypt. (See the Endnote below.)

If the reconstruction based on the *ATL* interpretation of the *Anony-*

mus Argentinensis is rejected, then the debate should belong to the time (c. 447) when work on the Parthenon actually began. But even at this point the phrase used by Pericles causes no difficulty for anyone who believes in the authenticity of the (renewed) Peace of Callias. It must be noted that the participle *προπολεμοῦντες* can refer to the past just as easily as to the present. It is surprising that this simple and well-known Greek idiom has never been noted by the scholars who have worried over this passage.³⁶ If Plutarch intended his Pericles to say that the Athenians “had been fighting” (as distinct from “had fought”) on behalf of their allies, there was probably no other way in which he could have expressed this. The debate over the use of league funds, no matter when we choose to set it, is thus irrelevant to the question of whether and when peace was made between Athens and the King.

V

Meister (32–38) lists fifteen different points arising out of relations between Athens and Persia after c. 465, which on his view establish the fact that there cannot have been a peace after Eurymedon. He courteously refers to my view (informally communicated to him long after his monograph was in type) that peace was made on two occasions, with a renewal of war between them, but he misunderstands me as claiming (like some others) that the peace was frequently violated and “*letztlich nur ein Stück Papier geblieben sei*” (32 n. 62). I hope he will see that this was far from what I had in mind. But what must be said here is that, once it is admitted that my hypothesis may be essentially correct, five out of his first six points become irrelevant to the issue of authenticity. Since most of them have already been covered in this discussion, only a reminder will be needed.

Points 2 and 3 (the expeditions of Pericles and Ephialtes) are, as we have seen, irrelevant to any date and to any reasonable formulation of the terms of the peace our sources report; except that the commanders’ failure to bring back any actual booty from the King’s territory must be regarded as significant support for the existence of a formal agreement.³⁷ Points 4–6 comprise the expeditions against Cyprus and Egypt in 461/60 and against Cyprus in 450. (It is surprising that the expedition against Egypt on that occasion, mentioned both by Thucydides 1.112.3 and in Plutarch *Cim.* 18, has escaped Meister’s careful search.) We have

seen that those expeditions, far from being evidence against the existence of a treaty concluded under Cimon's auspices, fit well into the context of Athenian politics in those years on the basis of the existence of such a treaty.

The first of Meister's points is more impressive. It concerns the cities given to Themistocles by the King, and thus brings us back to the story of Themistocles, which we have already found to be crucial to interpretation of the Pentecontaetia in another respect. He was given Magnesia, Lampsacus, and Myous as the sources of his income (Thuc. 1.138.5), to befit his status as a Persian grandee. The connection with the first two is attested, and the story must be believed. According to Meister, this gift could not have been made, if there had been peace between Athens and the King, so that he could not dispose of Athens' subjects.

Now, we do not know when these gifts were made. Both Thucydides and the parallel tradition imply a long stay at Susa for Themistocles. (It would be interesting to know if he was there when Callias arrived.) Nor need we assume that all the cities were given at the same time. At Susa he would be maintained as the King's guest, and any time before his own death (probably 459) is possible. Magnesia he probably received at once; as we have seen, he probably found shelter there after his arrival in Asia, and a strong connection continued: he died and (at least originally) was buried there. Magnesia, like its homonym on Sipylus, was never under Athenian authority. It yielded him fifty talents a year, and a man could live in some state on that. The other two were presumably added after Athens renewed the war, at a time when (as our tradition agrees) his advice was more than ever sought by the King. The slender evidence that he remitted the tribute of Lampsacus may well be believed: with Magnesia's fifty talents, he hardly needed it. As for Myous, we know nothing: it was too small to attract any notice.³⁸ In any case: scrutiny of the cities received by Themistocles yields no argument against the authenticity of the Peace of Callias.

VI

We must now survey the series of incidents in which Athenian and Persian forces appear to come (or to be about to come) into conflict. Most scholars have accepted some of them as reconcilable with a peace. But for Meister they are among the strongest arguments against it. First, a

few general points must be made: such discussion needs a general framework.

First, and probably most important: if we assume (at least for the sake of argument) that there was a peace, we do not have its actual terms. We have only summaries in later literary sources, concerned not with transmitting facts but with stressing Athenian glory, and at times demonstrably inaccurate. The fact that the few terms we have (mostly concerning geography and taxation) are recorded with some diversity has—quite erroneously—been used as ammunition by those who deny the existence of a peace. The inadequacy of the literary record concerning treaties is a commonplace of modern scholarship and should not be suppressed in order to provide facile arguments.³⁹ Let us take the very genuine Thirty Years' Peace, one of the most important treaties of the fifth century. We shall fully discuss Thucydides' very selective and unsatisfactory treatment of it, even though an authentic document was there, for him and others to see. (See Chapter 4 below.) Some of the provisions that turn out to be most important for the *Kriegsschuldfrage* of the Peloponnesian War can at best be deduced from later allusions, sometimes not even that with real certainty: his principal treatment of the peace gives only the territorial clauses. The clause providing for compulsory arbitration of differences only becomes known when the Athenian ambassadors at Sparta mention it at the very end of their speech there (1.78.4). The Spartans, oddly enough, are never depicted as openly acknowledging its existence—not even Archidamus, who opposes hasty action, but who refers to arbitration only as general custom, not as mandatory in this instance (85.2). No one really knows on what precise grounds Megara claimed that the Athenian measures against her were contrary to the peace: much as some scholars dislike admitting it, we cannot say what justification the Megarians had for their claim, since Thucydides, undoubtedly for purposes of his own, chooses not to tell us, giving us only Pericles' denial (1.44.2). Nor do we know precisely what the peace stipulated about autonomy, though it can be shown with considerable probability that a general autonomy clause of some kind—not merely a special one for Aegina, as has often been argued from the fact of Aegina's complaint (67.2)—must be assumed.⁴⁰

Diodorus (12.7) is no improvement on Thucydides: although he gives us the names of two of the men who swore to the peace (not telling us whether they were Athenians or Spartans, which in one case we do not know), he gives us none of the actual terms at all. The one term cited by

Pausanias (5.23.4) from the stele he saw at Olympia is one that we do not find in any historian and could not have deduced for ourselves. What else there was, and how important, it is absurd even to estimate. It is pure self-delusion to claim that we know.

Similarly, had we had only Diodorus (12.74.5) on the Peace of Nicias, we could not have known that the return of Plataea and Nisaea by their respective occupiers was not provided for: scholars would (quite properly) have concluded that the failure to return them was parallel to other instances of nonfulfillment of the known territorial clauses, and (i.a.) Megara's motive for failing to adhere to the peace could not have been understood.

Instances could be multiplied. But these should suffice to remind us that, where we have no accurate record of a peace treaty, it is in principle impossible to decide whether it has been broken—the more so since, in our sketchy accounts of the fifth century, the events that might constitute a breach are themselves only imperfectly related. Such modern discussions, against a background of almost perfectly preserved evidence, as the debate on the outbreak of the war in 1914, provide a healthy antidote to optimistic interpretation in Athenian history. I shall suggest that several apparent breaches of the peace between Athens and the King were evidently not thus considered by the contracting parties, and that the appearance may go back to our ignorance of the actual terms.

The other general point to be borne in mind is one that has at times been noted. The Peace of Callias must be assumed to have been made, not because the contracting parties had come to love one another and wanted to be friendly, but because they had fought each other to a standstill and had come to think that there was more to be lost than gained by continued fighting. A peace—indeed, any treaty—lasts as long as both parties agree that it should, rather like a marriage. (The Roman definition of marriage by *affectio maritalis* might usefully be transferred to the definition of a treaty.) It is not in fact (though it is in law) broken by any actual deed, but by the determination that, in the light of the deed concerned, the peace should (or need) not be maintained. Except in extreme cases (most obviously territorial invasion), the transition from peace to war is not immediate even where that determination has been made. This important point is often misunderstood, and that has led to serious misinterpretation of (e.g.) the process leading to the formal outbreak of the Peloponnesian War; though here Thucy-

dides is in large part also to blame, through his desire to make Sparta appear solely or largely responsible. Seen in its proper light, the complex series of steps that ended in the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War and that, at various stages, could easily have been halted or reversed, demonstrates the inadequacy of a view that neatly contrasts peace and war.⁴¹

Scholars working in our day and age should in any case be less puzzled by the intermediate stages between peace and war, and by unwillingness to determine that a particular act constitutes a *casus belli*, than their predecessors in nineteenth-century *Studierzimmer*. A collection (such as that presented by Meister) of supposed breaches of the peace, even if not due to our ignorance of the precise terms of that peace, would no more suffice to prove the nonexistence of a treaty than (e.g.) such incidents as Afghanistan or Grenada can be used to prove the nonexistence of the undertakings entered into by the nations concerned in their adherence to the United Nations, or of what we may call the *Koine Eirene* presided over by that body. It is unfortunately as difficult in our own day to see the ancient world in real terms when we come to study it as it ever was in that *Studierzimmer*.

Fortunately we have occasional proof that an incident that has been seen by scholars as an act of war was not thus viewed by contemporary participants. This should make us more cautious in passing judgment in cases where we lack such positive attestation. The most striking of these is best approached circuitously, through another incident that is (a little less strikingly) of the same kind.

In his account of the events that precede the Samian War, Thucydides (1.115.4) mentions a *ξύμμαχία* between the exiled Samian oligarchs and the satrap Tissaphernes. This can be alleged (as by Meister) to be clear proof that the satrap was not observing a peace with Athens. However, we in fact know that no formal treaty was involved, for Thucydides says that the oligarchs also made a *ξύμμαχία* with the most powerful men at Samos, and that cannot be an international treaty. And we do not find Tissaphernes involved in any common military action with them: he merely permits the collection of seven hundred *epikouroi* in his territory ("volunteers," as we might nowadays call them). After their success, he must have received from them the Samian democrats and the Athenian forces and officials whom they had captured—a function that might nowadays well be performed by the International Red Cross, for we have no reason to believe that they came to any harm. (They certainly

nowhere appear as hostages in the Athenian response to the rebellion.) Despite Thucydides' statement (which can hardly be accurate) that the oligarchs smuggled all the hostages taken from among them by the Athenians out of Lemnos before their counterstroke, one must suspect that all or some of those hostages were in fact exchanged with the satrap's help for the prisoners entrusted to him.

In 430, not long after the outbreak of war, we find a similar situation (Thuc. 3.34). A garrison (we do not know its composition or the precise way it came to be there) under a man Itamanes, who must be an Iranian, has been installed at Colophon; no connection with Pissuthnes is actually recorded, but it is likely enough, since at the time Thucydides picks up the story, in 427, we find *epikouroi*, both Arcadian and barbarian, explicitly brought over from his satrapy by a faction at Notion that is said to be pro-Persian. It is at this point that Paches happens to sail past, and is called in by the other faction, whom, by a treacherous attack, he manages to rid of their opponents, at least at Notion. (We hear nothing further about Colophon.) The technique is reminiscent of what we saw fully attested in the Samian War; and it is to be presumed that the garrison at Colophon had got there (κατὰ στάσιν, as Thucydides tells us) in the same way.

Meister lists these events as: "Pissouthnes sendet . . . Soldaten nach Kolophon und greift . . . Notion an." This implies unambiguous acts of war. Yet not only is there the case of Samos to warn against facile conclusions, but as it happens, it is in this very case of Notion that we have the clearest example of an incident of this kind which was not regarded as an act of war or a breach of any peace. For it was at this very time, just before Paches' arrival at Notion, which was then occupied by the garrison of *epikouroi*, that some anti-Athenian Ionian exiles, with real or pretended optimism, tried to persuade the Spartan Alcidas, who happened to be in the area with a fleet, to seize an Ionian city and try to bring about the rebellion of Ionia, since he had failed to save Mytilene (3.31.1). Among other things, they said that they thought they could persuade Pissuthnes to join them in the war (πείσειν τε οἶεσθαι καὶ Πισσοῦθνην ὥστε ξυμπολεμεῖν). This makes it abundantly clear that, after all that had happened at Colophon and Notion, not only did Pissuthnes not consider himself at war with Athens (nor Athens with him, if we may judge by Paches' omission of any hostile action against his territory), but men with the highest possible stake in hopeful exaggeration could produce nothing better than the statement that they

“thought they would persuade him” to go to war. Alcidas—who perhaps deserves more credit for good sense than Thucydides seems to give him—did not think much of their vague promises and preferred to sail home.⁴²

It is clear that it never entered Thucydides’ mind that the actions at Colophon and Notion that he has been summarily describing (with interest arising only out of Paches’ accidental participation) amounted to acts of war, such as Meister indicates. In fact, he shows so little interest in this and similar incidents that he gives us no clear idea of what really happened. Here, for instance, once he has finished with Paches at Notion, he tells us nothing of the consequences, except that the Athenians “later” founded a colony at Notion, settling all the Colophonians they could find in exile in the colony. This must mean that they never did intervene at Colophon. In 428/7 (*ATL* I 317), we find the Colophonians (not specified as being at Notion) paying a small tribute, clearly much too soon for it to come from the colony “later” established there. Although guesses have been made, we simply do not know what happened.

Thucydides tells us nothing at all about a more interesting incident which we happen to pick up in Photius’ summary of Ctesias (*FGrHist* 688 F 14 [45]), and which has at least left an echo in Herodotus. It concerns a member of the highest Persian aristocracy, Zopyrus son of Megabyxus, who fled to Athens (on which his mother, we hear, had bestowed benefits) and was killed trying to win Caunus for the Athenians. His death was avenged by his grandmother Amestris. Herodotus (3.160) mentions the flight to Athens *obiter*, but says nothing about Caunus. This makes it likely (though not certain) that Zopyrus was living in Athens at the time he wrote and that the Caunus incident had not yet occurred. The summary of Ctesias, unfortunately, gives no indication of how long he lived there. But the Caunus affair, at least, can be dated with reasonable confidence, and Thucydides does not come out of it too well. Had it happened in the Pentecontaetia, it might not have been important enough to mention. But as has been worked out from the tribute record of Caunus, there is no room for the revolt except in the early twenties; and that fits in both with Herodotus’ silence regarding it and with the fact that in Ctesias it appears to be the last item before the death of Amestris and of Artaxerxes himself; and this last event can be dated, from Mesopotamian documents, to (probably) early 423.⁴³ As for Zopyrus’ flight to Athens, from what we can work out

regarding the complex story of revolt and pardon spun around Megabyxus, it cannot easily be put before 440.⁴⁴ But it was clearly years after his arrival that the revolt of Caunus offered him an opportunity to make himself useful to his hosts. In the actual rebellion, there is no mention of Persians. We do not hear of satrapal power or intervention, indeed not even of a garrison (though it would be rash to deny that there may have been *epikouroi* in the city). We hear only of citizens. The only reference to Persian interest comes when the killer of Zopyrus is cruelly executed at Amestris' orders. The simplest explanation is that, since Zopyrus was a rebel, his killer could be lured to Susa by promises of reward. As for Thucydides, although there is no satisfactory excuse for his ignoring the story, the fact that he does so at least clearly documents that he did not regard it as important for the war as such: there was no question of a Persian attack on Athenian interests.⁴⁵

So much for supposed Persian acts of aggression. On the Athenian side the showpiece is Pericles' action in the Pontic area (Plut. *Per.* 20), which led to the colonization of Sinope and probably of Amisus.⁴⁶ The date has been variously conjectured, since Plutarch does not write chronologically. But he certainly puts the story into a context of events after Cimon's death, and it looks as if he meant it to be thus understood. Various possibilities have been suggested. One that might be added, perhaps, is a connection with the Samian War. Thucydides, in one of his customary silences, never informs us of the precise settlement of the revolt of Byzantium or of its date, although he well knew its importance for the vital Athenian corn route. The revolt had exposed the vulnerability of that route, and it must itself be seen against a background of attested unrest and instability in the whole area. What is clear is that the satrap at Dascylium was not exercising any effective authority there, and a demonstration of Athenian power was urgently needed, even though it seems that the King counted the area among his dominions, as he did others over which he had no real control. We find a Cappadocian tyrant at Amisus, a Greek tyrant at Sinope, Bithynian attacks even on Propontic Astacus (an ally of Athens), and a war between Heraclea and her neighbors that went on for some time.⁴⁷ The revolt of Byzantium (however and whenever it was settled) must have brought the dangers into focus for any Athenian leader.

It was the unsettled state of affairs that accounts for Pericles' expedition. I see no doubt that Pericles was here technically intervening on territory claimed by the King. But the King had no control, indeed he

had lost it long ago. Plutarch contrasts the account of the Pontic expedition with a very different area: he matches it with Pericles' opposition to the attempts of Athenian hotheads to intervene in Egypt. That would have been at the heart of the King's concern, as was well known; war with the King would have been certain as a result of intervention. Even more significantly, Plutarch stresses that Pericles opposed any idea of attacks on the coasts of the King's lands.

There seems to be a pattern, closely corresponding on both sides. First, there is the fact, noted especially by Eddy, that both sides try to avoid a major war, since both know they would not profit from it. Hence, certainly, Pericles' refusal to get involved in Egypt, despite the (at least) local successes by rebel leaders, clear from the large gift of wheat by "King Psammetichus" (Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 119), which implies both control over a large wheat-growing area (presumably in the Delta) and a plea for support, probably leading to the debate reported by Plutarch.

However, what slender evidence we have noted suggests rather more.⁴⁸ There is no documented case of an attack by either side on territory actually held by the other. (In Egypt, of course, whatever the success achieved by rebels, it is clear that the King never came near to losing total control, as he did for two generations in the fourth century.) The fact that Pissuthnes, in the cases of Colophon and Notion, was not considered by anyone (with the possible exception of an interested faction at Notion) to be waging war against Athens cannot be wholly due to the fact that Athens did not want to fight him. In the case of Samos, we actually see him, while allowing those with whom he sympathized to help themselves to support, taking care to avoid intervening himself. He did not attack a government allied with Athens. Similarly, Pericles' Pontic intervention was not directed at any subject of the King under his control, and we have seen that he resisted calls to attack the King's coastline. The peace must certainly, like most such treaties in antiquity, have prohibited attacks by either party against allies and subjects of the other. It can be taken for granted that there would be no detailed schedule of the territories concerned—a conjecture improbable even in the case of the Thirty Years' Peace. The difficulties in compiling such a gazetteer, covering the King's territories from Egypt to the Pontus and the whole of the Athenian Empire in full detail, would be insuperable.

One might differ on the definition of *what* was under control, as in our own day, where legitimacy and effectiveness of rule are not always

easily decided. When a city successfully rebelled, it might be taken to have left its former master's control, so that it was not covered by the peace. Fortunately, we have a pointer to the importance of this question of legitimacy in the case of Colophon. We hear (Thuc. 3.34.1), no doubt on the basis of what Paches was told by the faction that called him in, that Itamanes had been summoned ἰδίᾳ during *stasis* at Colophon; i.e., he had not come after an appeal by the legitimate government. Whether or not the *ex parte* version is true, it nicely documents the importance of the distinction. Paches was being given grounds for intervention, to legitimize his (consequential) action at Notion. He might well, on the same grounds, have gone on to Colophon itself; but that would have been a waste of time, and his force was probably not strong enough.

If there was Persian aid for Caunus (which is not attested, as we saw), it would be on the same principle. Here, however, we paradoxically find the Athenians trying to use a Persian connection for their advantage: they hoped that Caunus, now without Athenian protection, would not dare to exclude a grandson of Xerxes.

Let us once more, as we end this part of our discussion, attend closely to the case of Samos, one of the best attested we have. As we saw, Pisuthnes was careful not to give official support to the oligarchic rebels, as long as a pro-Athenian democracy was in control. He had no instructions to involve the King in war. Once the oligarchy was reestablished, however, the situation was quite different: not only was it firmly in control, but it could claim continuity with what had, until Pericles' intervention, been the legitimate and recognized government of Samos. It was now Pericles and the Athenians who were trying to reimpose a rebel government, which they had imposed by force before. Pericles could claim no legitimacy for his intervention. As we have seen, it was this that led the Spartans to vote that the Thirty Years' Peace had been broken: an act that helps to impose on us the necessity of postulating a more general autonomy clause for that peace. A similar, though not precisely corresponding, decision had to be taken by the Persians, to whom the Samian government appealed for aid—apparently to the satrap of Syria. The appeal was taken very seriously by Pericles (Thuc. 1.116.3). It is often said that both Sparta and Persia merely considered breaking their treaties when it suited them. In the case of Sparta that can only be called manifestly absurd, given the Spartans' scrupulous attention to religion. But in the case of Persia too, such an interpretation rests on noth-

ing more than a superficial deduction from inaccurate and demonstrably misleading reports of treaties that we find in literary sources. Sparta clearly had a *prima facie* case to put to her allies. Persia had an equally good case to consider, certainly on her own reading of the treaty as we have disengaged it. No one could now reasonably argue that the legitimate government of Samos, reestablished after its overthrow by the Athenians, was appealing to the Persians ἰδύα. Pericles had every reason to be worried.

Nor will it do to suggest that Samian hope for Persian assistance was unrealistic, since there was no time to build a fleet and mobilize it. The Athenian attack could be foreseen as soon as the Samian government had been reestablished, and the Persian satrap of Sardis was in the middle of those events. A fleet, unlike a Grand Army, could be built and manned in Phoenicia in a matter of a few months, just as it could in Athens when resources were available. But it was for the King to decide. Whatever the justice of the Samian cause, the King had no interest in starting a war with Athens over saving the legitimate government of Samos—just as Athens had no interest in starting a war with the King over Egypt, whatever the state of affairs there. Here and only here do we get considerations of *Realpolitik*, deciding (as we have seen) when a presumed breach of the peace might be treated as such, and when legitimate action should risk the consequence of major war. As Lewis has suggested,⁴⁹ a bargain seems to have been struck. The King got some of his revenues back, with the Athenians giving up large parts of Caria, only recently organized into a separate tribute district; and the Athenians got Samos. At the next regular assessment, a year after the end of the war, the Carian district was abolished.

VII

We are now ready to approach the final and most complex question: what *was* the Peace of Callias?⁵⁰ There are at least two different questions implied in this: (1) if we were to find the stele seen by our fourth-century sources, as the “Decree of Themistocles” has been found, what could we expect to see? (2) whatever this turned out to be, how would it be related to the original text or texts? To complete the search, we must add a third question: how would the original text or texts be re-

lated to the action of concluding the peace? Answers will have to be speculative, of course, until a text is found, but speculation should at least be rational, and may be instructive.

First, there is the complication introduced by the "Peace of Epilycus": the peace, attested only by Andocides (3.29), which is said by that orator to have been made by his uncle (though we need not, of course, assume that Epilycus was the official leader of the embassy). I have nothing to add to the outline of the accepted interpretation of this: that the peace was a treaty concluded with Darius II, soon after his troubled accession, which (as those who accept the Peace of Callias add) renewed the Peace of Callias; and that this was particularly urgent because of recent Spartan diplomatic activity directed at Susa, of which Thucydides (for once abandoning his silence regarding Persian relations with the Greeks) informs us. Andocides tells us that the treaty made peace and friendship for all time; and there have been those who have made a good deal out of the "addition" of the friendship clause.⁵¹ But caution is needed on this. We certainly have no good reason to believe Andocides, but neither is there any good reason to doubt that "friendship" was a feature of the original terms negotiated by Callias. (We need not worry, or quibble, over its eternity.) As we have seen, the Athenians had heard of Spartan diplomatic activity and had wanted to send an embassy to Artaxerxes before he died. Their purpose will not have changed with the change of ruler in Susa. It was essential to prevent Persian support for Sparta; but there is no reason to believe that friendship had suddenly blossomed, nor does the fact that it is not positively attested for the Peace of Callias prove that it was not included. No positive co-operation between the King and Athens is attested at the end of the Archidamian War; above all, no Persian financial support, when Athens could have done with it. On the other hand, we shall see that, even were it not attested, it is difficult to conceive of any peace with the King as not including "friendship" at any time.⁵²

We may take it that the "Peace of Epilycus" was a renewal of the Peace of Callias. The hypothesis that it was a record of that peace which Theopompus saw (in "Ionian letters") and rejected has turned out implausible (see n. 34 with text): what he saw must have been a fourth-century reengraving, made soon after the King's Peace. Whether it was a copy of the earlier peace (which, as far as we can see, need not have differed in any respect from the later), we cannot know. Perhaps both were in fact mentioned. We can at any rate be certain that the fourth-

century document would not be an archivally accurate reproduction. The “Decree of Themistocles” has shown us what we might expect to find: an adapted copy, with at least a modernized prescript, perhaps (like the Themistocles stele) stating a purpose and perhaps giving an archon date. That it claimed to give the terms agreed ἐπὶ Κίμωνος is surely clear from the fact that the fourth-century sources refer to that peace. However, the renovated prescript might well refer also to the renewal of Epilycus: as we shall see, that is suggested by Theopompus’ comment, and it need not surprise us.

Before we try to recover and to evaluate some of the features of the original document, we must first deal with the most difficult technical question of all: whatever the text said, how had it been arrived at and what actions, by both the contracting parties, led to its setting up? This problem is perhaps the only one that might lead us to doubt the possibility that such a peace existed; yet it has not usually had much attention.

More than twenty years ago, in a few incisive pages in *Museum Helveticum* (20 [1963] 230–33), the Swiss scholar V. Martin pointed out that the King cannot be imagined as swearing an oath, on equal terms, to a Greek city. He can send down an edict setting out his terms, as they “seem just” to him: indeed, this is the formal structure of the King’s Peace, on the Persian side, as reported by Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.1.31): βασιλεὺς νομίζει δίκαιον. There have been scholars who have disbelieved it, and who have preferred to believe that the King swore to that peace, distrusting Xenophon and accepting an assertion in a solitary Athenian inscription.⁵³ But we must again beware of the *Studierzimmer*. The scene has only to be envisaged, for its absurdity to be patent: Athenian (or, for that matter, Spartan) ὀρκωταί arriving at Susa and, after admission to the August Presence, where they would perform the *proskynesis* on which we know the King insisted, intoning for repetition by the Vicar of Ahura Mazda and Hater of the Lie the formula calling his god’s curse upon himself and his country if he should break his oath. . . . How could the King of kings, King of the countries of all races (as the official title has it), submit to this? Nor would much be saved by the speculation that he would empower someone else (totally unattested and beyond our ability to specify) to take the oath on his behalf. It is best to admit that inscriptions, even contemporary ones, are not the vehicles of divine revelation. Like historical accounts, decrees are written by men of flesh and blood, who are no less likely than a historian to be

mistaken; especially where (as is the case of Xenophon and the Persians) the historian concerned is very familiar with the society about which he is writing, while the composer of the document must inevitably see it all as a world of faery.

We now know that Xenophon's account is here fully supported by the Persian sources, demonstrating the King's concern precisely with justice, in the image he presents to his subjects. The second inscription on Darius' tomb at Naqsh-i-Rustam devotes the first half of the text (the whole of the "moral" section) to precisely the King's justice. (The second half, down to the final allocution to the subject reading it, is devoted to the King's physical prowess.) That text can now be paralleled (but for the allocution) in an almost verbatim copy that stood in Xerxes' name, found at Persepolis some years ago. It has turned out to be another in the series of tralatitane Achaemenid texts, and it is no doubt mere accident that we have not recovered a copy set up by Artaxerxes I.⁵⁴ The Peace of Callias, like the King's Peace, must in some way have rested on an edict setting out what the King thought "just."

In the case of the Peace of Callias (i.e., the renewal of it, where we have at least a reasonably detailed report in Diodorus), the problem of the King's oath should never have arisen: no source reports the King as swearing to anything. However, several of the fourth-century sources report that it was a treaty *πρὸς βασιλέα*, and it can be gathered from Plutarch's account (*Cim.* 13) that this was what appeared on Craterus' copy. We must take it that it stood in the fourth-century prescript. It may even have been specified that the treaty was made with King Darius (which would apply to the renewal by Epilycus—whether or not the King originally concerned was mentioned); for it is a treaty with Darius that Theopompus saw and disbelieved.⁵⁵ As far as ordinary Athenians were concerned, that would in any case not be far wrong: a treaty made, by whoever it might be, "regarding the affairs of the King" might well be described, and thought of, as a treaty made *with* the King. We must not be unreasonable in our expectations of accuracy, when Persian diplomatic formulae are interpreted for, and by, the Athenian People, as we have seen in the case of the reference to the King's oath.

As it happens, at least some of that diplomatic formulary can be recovered. The well-known and (in other connections) frequently studied treaties between various Persians and various Spartans given, although in less than perfect transcription, in Thucydides Book 8, give precious information.⁵⁶ In the first of them, made with a Spartan who clearly had

no experience of diplomatic language and its implications (at this date surely not unusual for a Spartan), it is provided that "all the territory and cities held by the King and by the King's ancestors shall be the King's"; the Spartans and the King are jointly to prevent the Athenians from receiving anything from those cities and shall jointly oppose defection from the King or from the Spartans. This, before long, aroused highly adverse comment, as the implications began to sink in: it might—and by the King it would—be construed as including much of European Greece among the King's legitimate possessions, recognized and to be defended in his interest by Sparta. In the next agreement, this is considerably toned down. The Spartans still recognize the King's sovereignty over all the lands ruled by the King or by his ancestors, but they now merely agree not to attack any of those cities or to impose tribute on them: they no longer undertake to support and actually enforce the King's claim on them. This might be thought a not unreasonable compromise, if a Spartan were concerned less with language than with reality. For the verbal recognition of the King's claim, however construed, could do little practical harm, and Sparta at this point was in no position to impose tribute on any cities that had ever been under Persian rule.

However, it seems to have become clear to Spartans more concerned with the political than with the strictly military aspects of the war in Asia that the new treaty was still politically embarrassing for a power that had, both before the war and during it, been trying to build up the image of a liberator of the Hellenes. In the Ionian War, that image was as important as it ever had been. Lichas therefore refused to recognize the second treaty. At this point, Tissaphernes had had enough: not only had constant Spartan changes of mind made it impossible for him to know with whom he could deal as an official representative, but it was clearly difficult to find a compromise formula that both the Spartans and the King could accept, and discreet pressure would make the Spartans more likely to abate their pretensions. (Cf. 8.43.3; 46.) But after some time, realities (as Lewis has pointed out) had to be recognized, and a working arrangement was patched up.⁵⁷ We have it in the final treaty.

In the first two treaties the contracting parties had been specified as the Spartans and their allies on the one side and the King (in one case his sons are added, no doubt to imply permanence) and Tissaphernes on the other. (See 8.18.1; 37.1.) In the third, this is changed. The Spartans and their allies are still one of the parties, but the King is no longer the

other: those named on the Persian side are Tissaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnaces; and the treaty is said to be made “concerning the affairs of the King and of the Lacedaemonians and their allies” (58.1: Thucydides here gives a fuller prescript, providing the date by Darius and by the Spartan eponymous ephor). Unfortunately we do not know enough about Persian administrative prosopography to be able to identify all of those named on the Persian side. The eldest son of Pharnaces was Pharnabazus, satrap at Dascyllium; but the text shows that he must have had at least one brother in an official post, and so far we know nothing about him. About Hieramenes we know only that he was closely related to the King (as indeed were all the eminent aristocratic houses) and that about this time he is mentioned in a so far untranslatable Lycian document.⁵⁸ He was clearly holding an important post in Asia Minor. The Persians named are presumably an exhaustive catalog of senior Persian administrators who would come into contact with the Spartans. It is characteristic of our ignorance of Achaemenid administration even in this relatively well-documented area that we do not know what Persian administrative posts there actually were at the time, let alone the persons of their incumbents. Our Greek sources mention only the satraps of Sardis and Dascyllium. But it is clear that all the men listed in the prescript must have been stationed in Asia Minor: the diplomatic formula limits the operation of the treaty to those in Asia Minor, so that explicit reference to other areas, not to mention a generalized statement of the King’s claims, can be avoided. The opening clauses immediately make this clear, while preserving the King’s general rights. As we have them (58.2), they read: χώραν τὴν βασιλέως, ὅση τῆς Ἀσίας ἐστίν, βασιλέως εἶναι, καὶ περὶ τῆς χώρας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ βουλευέτω βασιλεὺς ὅπως βούλεται.

The first part of this is very strange. To stipulate that as much of the King’s land as is in Asia shall be the King’s is both tautologous and vacuous; it is also diplomatically inept, for it would at once concede that there was land in Asia that was not the King’s. It seems inconceivable that skilled Persian negotiators, dealing with a city that depended on their financial assistance, would start by making this concession. And not only is this the last thing we should imagine the King as allowing his representatives to swear to, but it is clear from later events that the Spartans saw no such concession in the treaty, even where it would have very much suited them to do so: in fact, they had to admit, by their own actions, that the major concession had been on their side. The case of

Miletus (Thuc. 8.84.5) shows that the Greek cities could not, under the treaty, be considered to be outside the King's land. The only explanation seems to be that our text is wrong; and the fact that (as we saw) the Spartans knew perfectly well what the treaty in fact stipulated seems to show that the error is not due to the author (e.g., to his having been given a propagandist translation or revision), but is a simple textual error calling for emendation. I think we must read: χώραν [τὴν βασιλέως] ὅση τῆς Ἀσίας ἐστίν, κτλ. The claim is limited to Asia, but within Asia it is total, as indeed it always was to remain, throughout future Persian dealings with the Greeks. The second clause, however, goes on to make a general claim, *not* limited to Asia, though (obviously) immediately applicable to what has just been mentioned: the King reserves his right to rule *all* of his land without interference, even though only Asia has been specified. The concession to Spartan sensibilities (or rather, political necessities) consisted in this very fact of the absence of further specification. Even so, as we have seen, the immediate application was brutally clear, to them and to all concerned. The nonaggression clause follows, concerning (as usual) the two contracting parties; but the mutual defense clause (previously such a stumbling block) is now limited to the two contracting parties' undertaking to oppose any attempt by anyone *from among their own ranks* to attack the other party. Absent from the second treaty (at least as we have it), perhaps because a compromise along different lines was being attempted (and proved unsuccessful), it is now reinstated in minimal and unobjectionable form: the Spartans are no longer committed to aiding the King against rebellion (e.g., by other Greeks), but merely to policing their own allies. Essentially, of course, the compromise was unsatisfactory, like (in recent times) Henry Kissinger's diplomatic formulae: it left difficulties unformulated and unresolved, in the hope that they could be settled as and when they arose, or perhaps in the wish-dream that they would never arise. Needless to say, they normally do, and what was avoided at the time of discussion as being too difficult turns out to be no easier in the heat of conflict. It could not long be forgotten or disguised that some of the King's subjects, in what he now claimed as his own unencumbered territory, were at the moment allies of Sparta. But that was for the future.

What concerns us here is that the King clearly had his rights to all of Asia recognized: the actual course of events forces us to correct a faulty text. Moreover, while graciously acquitting the Spartans of the need to

defend him against rebellion by Greek cities under his control (e.g., Magnesia), let alone enforcing his rights in (say) Thessaly, he in no way disavowed any of his rights: he merely refrained from specifying, and demanding recognition of, the extent of his claim, as he had previously done. Nonetheless, we note the startling fact that the King and his sons can no longer personally commit themselves to a treaty even in this (as it would seem) innocuous form, diplomatically reserving all his rights: he could accept nothing short of explicit recognition of those rights. The formula patched up by Tissaphernes and his advisers (no doubt after consultation with the King by express messenger, which is why some time had to elapse before the treaty could be concluded), although it gave nothing away, was permissible only in a form that made Tissaphernes and the rest assume full and sole responsibility, dealing in their own names “concerning the affairs of the King.”

We are fortunate to have this precise illustration of the working of Persian diplomacy in what must have been rather unusual circumstances: it shows both the flexibility of Achaemenid diplomatic categories in dealings with powerful “barbarians” and the limits of what was considered acceptable for the King. We may thus dispose once and for all of the suggestion that the King can have sworn to the terms of the Peace of Callias. Since it clearly gave away (at least *de facto*) a good deal of what belonged to the King, it cannot possibly—fifty-odd years, or even thirty-odd, before the paradigmatic exposition we have just studied—have been accepted in any form by the King himself in a public document. It can only have been made by his satraps, acting (with his consent) “concerning the affairs of the King”: indeed, if this formula had been worked out long ago, that would explain how it could be got ready so quickly when the need for it arose, unexpectedly, in negotiations with the Spartans. If in the fourth-century prescript (and perhaps even in the fifth century, in a document or at least popularly) the peace was considered a peace “with the King,” that was of no interest within his dominions. The niceties of formal diplomacy and the precise implications of its terminology were no doubt unfamiliar to the average citizen, especially in the fifth century. For all we know, the Spartans, reporting on the treaty they had concluded, may have described it in the same terms to the authorities at home.

We have already noted that our narrative (such as it is) of the peace concluded c. 449 does not refer to any personal commitment by the King. Having improved our understanding of the King’s claims and dip-

lomatic methods by study of much better evidence, we may now turn to inspection of Diodorus' account of that peace. In Diodorus 12.4, the scene is set at a time when the Athenians have not yet won a decisive victory in Cyprus. The King, after deciding to conclude peace, "wrote to his commander and satraps around Cyprus [i.e., presumably, those taking part in the campaign on and off the island] the terms on which they might conclude a settlement with the Greeks." The negotiations that follow and the treaty finally concluded are, in Diodorus' account, between the Athenians and "Artabazus and Megabyzus"—apparently the commanders in Cyprus and Cilicia respectively. Callias' embassy, sent we do not hear where, is probably seen by Diodorus as going to those commanders. There is no mention of Susa. How much of this goes back to Ephorus and how much is due to compression and reconstruction, we cannot tell. Diodorus is not to be trusted in detail. It is well known that (e.g.) in the Ionian War he confuses Pharnabazus and Tis-saphernes—an error not likely to be due to his source, which knew Thucydides. In this case, the explicit statements—the King's orders to the commanders, and the negotiations between them and the Athenians—should no doubt be accepted. Our study of the treaties in the Ionian War has shown us that this, and its culmination in a treaty between the Athenians and the satraps, is precisely what ought to be expected. We must be grateful to find it. What must *not* be assumed to follow is what has bedeviled the whole study of the Peace of Callias: the negative consequence (which no scholar would explicitly admit) that what is in Diodorus comprises the whole truth, and that what he fails to mention did not occur.

It is at once clear, in this instance, that the names of the Persian commanders are quite likely to be correct (though, in the light of the parallel of the Ionian War, we cannot be sure), but that the list cannot be complete. Nor are they necessarily assigned to their correct posts, which surely meant nothing to Diodorus and may not have been known even to his source. We have no idea who Artabazus is, though he should probably be accepted as taking part in the war, and certainly as taking part in the treaty.⁵⁹ Megabyzus, however (to give him the more common modern form of his name), is well known, and surely in his proper place. We know him from Ctesias (*FGrHist* 688 F 14, *ad fin.*) as (of course) a member of one of the great noble houses allied by marriage with the King (we have noted his son Zopyrus); and he was at the time satrap of Syria ("Across the River," in Persian terms). As such, he was

presumably in charge of the Cilician coast. Whether he had *ex officio* responsibility for Cyprus itself, we do not know. Indeed, it is sad that, at the crucial point, we have only Diodorus to inform us. If we had an account corresponding (even) to Thucydides Book 8, despite that author's obvious lack of interest in Persian affairs, it might tell us a great deal about Achaemenid administration and about Persian administrative prosopography in the western provinces. It is interesting, at least, and on reflection not surprising, to see the satrap of Syria—one of the most powerful figures in the kingdom, and one of the closest to the King—concerned in the fighting and in the negotiations leading to the peace. To complete the list, we must at least add the satraps of Asia Minor: their participation in a peace between Athens and the King is obviously necessary. Diodorus presumably omitted them because there had at this point been no fighting in their territory.

Having supplemented one gap in Diodorus' account, we must now (as I have indicated) also reject his implication that Callias did not go to Susa. (It is only an implication, since we are not positively told where he went.) After all that had gone before—the negotiations by Callias in Susa and, as I have tried to show, the actual conclusion of a peace, which was soon broken; the Athenian disaster in Egypt; and now Cimon's renewed intervention both there and in Cyprus—after all of this, the conclusion of a new peace could not be a routine matter. If it was necessary for Callias to go to Susa on the earlier occasion, as Herodotus attests, it would be inescapable now. Indeed, as we have seen, this was the obvious reason for the choice of Callias, personally known to the King and quite possibly his *xenos*. The King would have to be convinced that, this time, Athens could be trusted. And it would not be easy. If a lasting peace was to be made (and we have seen that Pericles, no less than the King, now wanted this), Callias had to go to Susa. Moreover, it will become clear that the King himself had a vital role to play in any agreement that might be concluded, even though he could not be expected to swear to it along with the Athenians.

The chronology offered by Diodorus should be accepted. He put the peace under the archon of 449/8, and that fits in with other dates that we can work out. As a matter of fact, although Diodorus' chronology is notoriously unreliable in general, his record on peace treaties is good. He has the correct dates for the Thirty Years' Peace (12.7), the Peace of Nicias (12.74.5), the treaty of 404 (14.3.2), and the King's Peace (14.110); and these are only the outstanding examples. He must have

taken particularly careful notes on peace treaties when collecting his data. The year may therefore be regarded as certain. The precise time within it, of course, will have to be worked out in other ways, and there has been much discussion on it, especially since the editors of *ATL* made it crucially relevant to their explanation of the “missing tribute quota list,” which, on their view, is the list for 449/8. I give my own reconstruction of the chronology in the Endnote.⁶⁰

Diodorus’ confusion between the early and the final parts of the expedition leads him to put the actual conclusion of peace before the return of the Athenian expedition; once it is seen that the battle of Salamis belongs to the return voyage of the expedition, it is clear that this cannot be correct. Negotiations may have started in spring 449, but the conclusion of the peace must come after the return of the expedition. Since no new principles needed discussion, as this peace would be only the renewal of one already negotiated at an earlier time, we need not allow much time for Callias’ actual negotiations with the King. But the question that cannot be answered is how long he had to wait until he could see the King. It is well known that over the summer the King went to his mountain palace at Ecbatana, and there is no record of any Greeks (or, for that matter, other embassies) as being taken to see him there. If Callias arrived in the summer, it is very likely that he would have to wait at Susa until the King returned, i.e., until some time in the autumn. I do not see how peace can have been formally concluded—in Susa, Athens, and at whatever points in between were concerned—until well into the next archon year: perhaps at the very end of 449, more probably early in 448. The ceremonies at Athens and in the satrapal capitals concerned can only have taken place after the King had been consulted and had played his own part (on which more below). Diodorus, of course, puts the whole of the negotiations (and much else) in 449/8. But as usual, he probably did not mean to mislead, but is following his practice of narrating a connected historical account under what he regards as the key event—here beyond any doubt the conclusion of peace. At any rate, by early 448 we may take it that all was complete.

The formal peace, as Diodorus implies, was concluded between the Athenians and the western satraps—we may now add, “concerning the affairs of the King and of the Athenians and their allies.” It is fortunate, in a way, that in his concentration on the actual area of hostilities he omits the satraps of Asia Minor: at least we can supply them for ourselves, and no one is likely to doubt that they had to be included. Had

he omitted the satrap of Syria (the great Megabysus), we might have *guessed* that he was also included, but it could not have been proved—and it would have been bound to be denied, by less perspicacious scholars, without fear of refutation. As it is, we do have that vital information. We may take it that in the original peace, the satrap of Syria (whose fleet, presumably, was the one directly concerned in the action at the Eurymedon) had also been included. He, no less than the satraps of Asia Minor, is needed for the peace to make sense.

We have already seen that, as far as the structure of the peace is concerned, we must be guided by the information provided in Thucydides Book 8. Even though in Greek circles it would be described as a peace “with the King” (as presumably the Spartan treaties were described as treaties with the King), the King cannot have formally taken part in an agreement that gave away many of his rights over his possessions. The outlines of the main territorial terms are well known and need not be rehearsed here.⁶¹ The *Fahrtgrenzen*, as we have seen, were unilaterally accepted by the satraps concerned, in return for security from Athenian attacks on their territories; but apart from that, we are reduced to guessing. As in all cases where we have only literary sources on a treaty (although in this case we are fortunate in having literary sources that show remarkable agreement on what they mention), even quite important clauses are only hinted at, or not mentioned at all. A nonaggression clause, as we have seen, is to be expected, and should be accepted in the light of the actual events (and particularly of the supposed instances of aggression by both sides) that we have looked at. We have also seen that not all Greek cities in Asia, or even near the coasts of Asia, were freed. Thus the two Magnesias remained under the King. And it is in this connection that we incidentally have what I think perhaps the strongest argument for the existence of a formal peace.

We have seen (p. 3 above) that the first specific reference to a text that could be seen on a stele comes in Isocrates’ *Panegyricus*, who invites his audience to compare this peace with the King’s Peace recently concluded. In his own summary comparison (117ff.), he picks out some terms for specific mention. One of those terms is that the Athenians “assessed some of the tributes” paid to the King (τῶν φόρων ἐνίοις τᾶπτοντες). Ever since Wade-Gery (*ATL* III 275) recanted an untenable earlier suggestion, this has been rightly understood to mean, not (of course) that the Athenians positively assessed any cities for the King, but that he agreed to leave the tribute of the Greek cities over which he

retained control unchanged, presumably at the level set by Artaphernes.⁶² Now, it seems to me difficult to believe that those cities were not actually named on the stele, for their protection. But they must at least have been listed as a class, like (before the actual list of names) those which the Peace of Nicias protected from increase in tribute after they were surrendered by Sparta to the Athenians (Thuc. 5.18.5—mentioning the tribute of Aristides, even though it is unlikely that all those particular cities, or perhaps any of them, were assessed by Aristides). At the very least, therefore, we must supply some such phrase as “the Greek cities paying tribute to the King.”⁶³

Thus Isocrates’ ἐνίκους, intended to boast of Athens’ past power, coyly disguises a list, or at the very least a definition, of Greek cities that remained subject to the King in full form. It must surely be asked: if the stele seen by Isocrates and others in the fourth century was an invention for the glory of Athens, as the opponents of authenticity would have it, why should such a clause be on it? Why should a putative forger admit that there were Greek cities which the Athenians did not succeed in “liberating,” but for which they at most extracted a special privilege? The contrast with the Spartans, who had left all the Greek cities of Asia in the King’s power, would surely have demanded a formal statement that *all* the Greek cities of Asia were to be free. It is a question that the opponents of authenticity have never properly addressed. Isocrates, however, was faced with real facts: he had to make the best of an uncomfortable truth, that Athens had by no means succeeded in liberating all the Greek cities, as anyone who could read could see. He decided to gloss over the uncomfortable fact and stress its glorious aspect, with convenient vagueness of actual definition. It is perhaps no wonder that that clause is ignored by those who later referred to the peace.

We must presume that this was again a unilateral concession: it is clear enough from later events that Athens did not feel bound not to increase the tribute of *her* allies in Asia. Whether autonomy was actually stipulated for the Greek cities we do not know; but it is quite likely, since we know that the King, in principle, was not opposed to granting autonomy to the Greek cities under his rule.⁶⁴ There is a further reason for believing that autonomy may have been provided for, even though Isocrates, for reasons that should be obvious, could not make any reference to this. We have already seen that the Peace of Nicias contained a provision combining subjection to Athens with a guarantee of autonomy and an unchanged tribute: indeed, this tribute is called the tribute

of Aristides, even though the term was not strictly appropriate. It might be noted that the Peace of Nicias was sworn only a few years after the renewal of the peace with the King by the embassy of Epilycus. But we should probably go further back. As we have pointed out, an autonomy clause of some kind, and covering at least some cities paying tribute to Athens, must be presumed to have been included in the Thirty Years' Peace (see n. 40 with text, above). *That* peace, however, not only followed within a few years upon the (renewed) Peace of Callias with the Persians, but it was itself negotiated by the same Callias. It is not extravagant to suggest that a diplomatic category that he had developed (perhaps first many years earlier) in negotiations with the King—Greek cities that were autonomous and tribute-paying, on set terms—was now transferred to treaties between Greek states. The tribute of Aristides is widely agreed to have been identical (in cities that had been under the King) with the tribute that followed the survey by Artaphernes (see, e.g., Meiggs, *Athenian Empire* 61). The Peace of Callias (it may be suggested) therefore has a hitherto unrecognized importance in the development of Greek diplomacy, and in the events that led to the Peloponnesian War.

The report that the satraps agreed to withdraw their forces beyond a day's ride, or three days' march, from the coast of Asia Minor (the original distance was presumably expressed in parasangs and had to be translated into Greek) presents us with another example of the inaccuracy of literary tradition. It cannot be correct as it stands, for much of the coast of Asia Minor—e.g., most of the north coast and the south coast east of Phaselis—in no way concerned the Athenians. Even within the small western strip that did, there were (as we have seen) Persian-held cities whose territory must have stretched to within those limits. The most reasonable reconstruction of this clause is to suppose that it was expressed in terms of the territory of Athenian allies, which, along the western coastline in particular, would in many cases add up to a continuous stretch of coastline, and would extend a fair part of the stipulated distance into the interior. Whether this clause established a "neutral zone," as the editors of *ATL* thought (i.e., whether, unlike the *Fahrtgrenze*, the obligation was reciprocal), we cannot tell. It is quite likely that in this case the Athenians had to concede it, since the territory of some important Persian cities (e.g., Sardis itself) might be within that zone. On the other hand, since that territory was secured by the non-aggression clause, it is possible that here too the Athenians did not give

a reciprocal assurance. The agreement not to cross the Halys, which Isocrates mentions (though not in 380), was correctly explained long ago and should be accepted.⁶⁵ Wade-Gery got the main point right: the royal army was not to enter Asia Minor again. Of course, this did not mean (as he thought) that only “token forces” were permitted there: there is no mention, even in our oratorical sources, of any limit on the satrapal forces, and we know that the satraps continued to use both native levies and mercenaries (including Greeks) as they saw fit. The purpose of this clause must have been to ensure that there would be no preparations for an invasion of Europe: historically, that was the only purpose for which a royal army had ever appeared in Asia Minor since the completion of the Persian conquest, and the only conceivable purpose for which it would be needed. If the King ever broke that undertaking, the breach would be spectacular and significant. No one could fail to know, and there would be adequate time to make preparations. In fact, the “natural frontier” of a river can here be seen to fulfill its usual function, not as a barrier (which it never is), but as a boundary marker, which could not be inconspicuously crossed in force. We may also accept the modern conjecture that the walls of the cities in Asia Minor were demolished, since we have ample evidence, often rehearsed, that both the King and Athens preferred to have their subject cities unwallled. There would be no opposition to this from either side, and the Athenians might claim that it was a necessary concession to the King.

We can at once see that the clauses we ought to accept were largely, but not entirely, within the competence of the satraps. The clause about the royal army involved the King. The most the satraps could have undertaken would be not to *ask* for a royal army; but that would be far from adequate protection. And if this clause might still be explained away, we have no such option for the clause involving the exemption of the allies of Athens from paying tribute to Persia (that they had to pay to both Persia and Athens is an idea that no longer needs refutation) and, if we accept its existence, for the autonomy clause; nor, most strikingly, for the guarantee of a fixed tribute to be paid to the King by the Greek cities over which he retained control.

That the King remitted the tribute of the cities that had to pay to Athens, and that we have evidence for this when, in the winter of 412/11, Thucydides records (8.5.5) that he had “recently demanded that Tissaphernes pay him the tribute of the Greek cities in his satrapy, which he had not paid because the Athenians had prevented its collection”—

this has long been recognized by all who are not blindly opposed to the authenticity of the Peace of Callias. (We note again, incidentally, the easy rhetorical misrepresentation in a literary source, for the Athenians had obviously not prevented the tribute of *all* the Greek cities in his satrapy from being collected.) Meister (p. 41) claims that this *proves* ('beweist') that the King had never abandoned his claim to that tribute—hence it is another argument against the existence of a peace. But it cannot prove anything of the sort. As we are told by Andocides (3.29), though characteristically not by Thucydides, the Athenians had, not long before (though the exact date is not clear), broken the peace so carefully negotiated by his uncle by supporting the revolt of Amorges, which made the King angry. Most scholars have rightly concluded that the demand of tribute was the King's reaction to that provocation, for support for that rebellion could almost certainly not be justified by any interpretation of the terms of the peace—and if it could (in the Athenian view), then the peace was not worth maintaining. The Athenians had finally done what Pericles, as we saw Plutarch stresses, had long restrained them from doing.⁶⁶ We do not need an abacus to work out that, had the King (as Meister supposes) demanded that Tissaphernes pay him all the tribute of the cities that had been paying to Athens ever since 448 (if not earlier), Tissaphernes would have had no recourse but either to make his escape or to rebel. Even a satrap's purse was not bottomless. The debt he in fact owed, perhaps slightly backdated, was manageable; indeed, Tissaphernes presumably had enough money to pay it, since he remained uncontestedly in office; and he clearly had enough money left over to support a Spartan force before long. By his standards, the amount cannot have been large. What made action urgent was the prospect for the future: if he could not collect and had to go on paying year after year, that would be a constant drain on his fortune, and that had to be prevented, even at some immediate cost.⁶⁷ It would therefore be simply a sound investment for him to pay a small Spartan mercenary force for a short time (as he no doubt thought) in order to drive the Athenians out. The King's demand meant that the peace no longer had to be observed.

This little item of information, fortuitously supplemented by Andocides, helps to tie together much that we have had to work out, with great effort, from scattered evidence, because of Thucydides' unhelpful silence as regards relations with the Persians. Indeed, but for the information provided by Andocides, we could not with real assurance have

used even the casual remark about the King's demand for tribute that Thucydides tosses at us. As it is, we see the King's involvement in, and importance to, the making and the maintenance of the peace illuminated by this sudden flash. Unfortunately, we are left to deduce the precise nature of that involvement for ourselves. But the King's Peace provides the clue: the King's participation, in the formal sense, can only have consisted in an edict (or more than one) setting out, most probably, what he thought just. We might imagine an edict thinking it just that the allies of Athens should have the tribute paid to the King remitted, and one granting autonomy to all the Greek cities (and presumably a limitation of tribute to those which were not allies of Athens). It is harder to visualize an edict covering the promise not to send an army across the Halys line, and some Athenian "interpretation" must be assumed in Isocrates' rendering. I suggest the King might state (e.g.) that the satraps of Asia Minor were to be (solely) responsible for defending their satrapies. The King's edict was in principle irrevocable: it is the biblical "law of the Medes and Persians" as referred to in the books of Esther and Daniel. In the former (the more reliable witness), the reference to the unalterable nature of the "law" is precisely and explicitly to a royal edict.⁶⁸

In fact, the King stood at the center of the whole process and of its preservation. It was he who had instructed the satraps to make peace, certainly in 449 and presumably also after Eurymedon, and it was he who would have to guarantee that the peace they had made would survive (as in fact it did) the death or removal of one of the satraps concerned. Presumably, royal edicts could also be formulated to endorse the terms of nonaggression and perhaps the *Fahrtgrenze*, with due praise for the Athenians as loyal friends of the King. As we saw, Andocides (3.29) fortunately attests the existence of a "friendship" clause, at least in the "Peace of Epilycus," and there is no reason to regard it as a novelty.

We can see why a visit to Susa was essential, even though the King could not swear to the treaty and could not formally give up any of his possessions. Both the King and the Athenians had never before the first peace faced the problems caused by the incompatibility of the two systems, and the solution—whatever it was, in detail; but in outline no doubt as here deduced from the only relevant evidence we have—must be recognized as a major accomplishment on both sides. It attests the sophistication reached by Athenian diplomacy under Cimon's leader-

ship, after only a decade or so as an imperial power, as well as by the Achaemenid Kings, despite their implied claim to universal rule. It is reasonable to assume that much of this structure was the work of Callicias son of Hipponicus himself—the man who later renewed it after it had been shattered by irresponsible politicians, and who seems to have applied its lessons, insofar as they were applicable, in what may have been an almost equally masterly document (to judge by what little of it we can reconstruct): the Thirty Years' Peace with Sparta, destined in its turn to be shattered by irresponsible politicians.

The way in which the King stood at the center of the diplomatic construction was obviously beyond the understanding of the ordinary Athenian voter. It is not at all surprising that, as far as we can see, it was presented to him (and by him) in a conveniently simplified form. But Athenian politicians were probably well aware of it: hence the nervousness with which they regarded any Spartan approach to the King and the eagerness to establish contact with Artaxerxes' successor.⁶⁹

It is easy to see what the Athenians got out of the peace, and why Pericles was ultimately as eager as Cimon had been to accept it. The change in the vision of empire implied in his Citizenship Decree made peace imperative: Athens could not, in the long run, go on defending allies who were not unanimous in being willing to be defended; on the other hand, only peace enabled Pericles to intensify the process of exploitation, which he regarded as the legitimate profit of empire.

As for the King, he had rid himself of Athenian harassment and aggression. He had gained security against Athenian interference in trouble spots like Egypt and Cyprus, and security of commerce on the seas that was the foundation of the prosperity and the loyalty (and, not least, the tribute) of the Levant. But we have not yet clearly defined the price he had paid. The tribute of the Greek cities was a relatively minor sacrifice, in return for security in all the rest. But there is still an important formal point to be considered. We saw, when discussing the treaties in Thucydides Book 8, how difficult it was to arrive at a diplomatic formula, once the Spartans obstinately refused to recognize the King's sovereignty over all that he and his ancestors had ruled; and we saw how the formula finally arrived at explicitly guaranteed him Asia (with which, in fact, he would henceforth always be content) and allowed him to state the rest of his claims without explicit acknowledgment. If these difficulties are demonstrable in 411, it is inconceivable that the King could have allowed his satraps to make peace "regarding the affairs of

the King” a generation earlier in such a way that the renunciation of his sovereignty over most of the Greek cities of Asia was acknowledged, let alone that his own edicts that held the peace together could have indicated any such acknowledgment. Obviously, there must up to a point have been an evasive formulation, such as ultimately satisfied the two sides in 411. But the difficulty of arriving at it on that occasion, even for the limited purpose of collaboration for the common advantage in Asia, suggests that it had not been done in precisely the same way before, even though the Peace of Callias obviously supplied certain guidelines. The bare statement that the Greek cities of Asia were to be autonomous and (if allies of Athens) exempt from tribute might have amounted to a renunciation of sovereignty, which the King could not have allowed. Elucidation may come from an interesting passage involving later negotiations.

In 411, Alcibiades pretended (so Thucydides tells us) to be negotiating with Athenian envoys in the name of the King, and on that basis the Athenians made various concessions. In fact (we are told), he wanted to drive them into breaking off negotiations, as he had no real influence with the satrap; so he finally produced a demand that they regarded as so intolerable that they indeed gave up. That demand was the stipulation that (to follow the only acceptable version of the text) the King should be allowed *παραπλεῖν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γῆν* at any time, with a fleet of any size.⁷⁰ How was this related to the *Fahrtgrenze* of the Peace of Callias and Epilycus? As we have seen, that was unilateral. But what had the satraps (and perhaps the King by edict) actually promised? I would suggest that the wording had been exactly parallel: that the King’s ships would *not* *παραπλεῖν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γῆν*. We may compare 8.58.2 (treated pp. 44–45 above). In other words, this clause, like the exemption from tribute for some and “assessment” of it for others, and the autonomy clause, must all have recognized the King’s continuing sovereignty by implication. He could not formally abdicate it. And the Athenians were sufficiently instructed about diplomatic necessities to realize that, if they wanted peace, they could not have got it on any other terms. Whatever form of words was finally agreed to could be regarded as no more than a sop to the King’s vanity. As we have seen, peace was very much wanted by Cimon and, after his change of policy, by Pericles. And the terms finally agreed upon could no doubt be presented to a Greek public as an acknowledgment of defeat by the King, and as concessions made because the King thought them “just,” as gifts to his new

friends, to the King's subjects far from the Mediterranean coast. But we now begin to understand the opposition to the peace terms in Cimon's day, and above all the reluctance of our fifth-century sources, no doubt familiar with the precise terms, to mention them in historical works written for the glorification of Athens. The terms simply did not bear close scrutiny—and this should have been clear to anyone who is familiar with the structure and the ethos of the Achaemenid monarchy. When the King's Peace provided an opportunity to contrast the Athenian hegemony with the Spartan, the terms, surprisingly faithfully reinscribed (as we saw, concessions were clearly not deleted), but now used mainly by orators and rhetorical historians, could be presented as characteristic of a golden age of Greek superiority over the Barbarian.

It is time scholars stopped disputing the authenticity of the peace at excessive length and started discussing its cardinal importance both in the history of relations between the King and the Greeks and in the history of Athens and, in particular, of the development of Athenian and of Persian diplomacy. This article, which has necessarily been long enough in any case, has perhaps given some indications of the questions that might be pursued.⁷¹

ENDNOTE

Cimon's Cyprian Campaign and the Renewal of the Peace

The authors of *ATL* put Cimon's campaign in 450, as most other scholars had done, since the term of Cimon's ostracism, on any reasonable interpretation, would expire in 451. (For another view see n. 25 above, with my comments.) After his return, the expedition would still have to be prepared. Since the authors wanted tribute collection in the Athenian Empire to be cancelled for the year 449/8, and realized that this ought to require a previous announcement, so that the cities would not collect the sums due, they had to posit the conclusion of the peace in the first half of 449, contrary to Diodorus' date; moreover, this clearly did not allow enough time for the final fighting and the negotiations at Susa. Meiggs, who wanted to retain the cancellation of tribute in that year, tried to deal with the serious difficulties caused by the *ATL* chronology by moving the whole of the Cyprian expedition to 451 (first *HSCP* 67 [1963] 11ff.). The wish again tended to be father to the thought: cf.

Athenian Empire 125: "The advantages of dating Cimon's death in 451 are considerable." But this merely substitutes an impossible rush in 451 for an impossible rush in 449, and it still fails to account for Diodorus' date.

As usual, Thucydides is here no use for precise chronology, in view of the vagueness of his terminology. But some conclusions can be attempted. He tells us (1.112.1) that three clear years after the last fighting in Greece a truce was made for five years (he does not connect the truce with Cimon), and that Cimon then set out on the expedition. We can deduce some information regarding the expiry of that truce from another passage. When Megara, in 446, decided to rebel against Athenian control (1.114.1), it was some time after the beginning of the campaigning season, for Euboea had already rebelled and Pericles had crossed to regain it. At that time, Megara gained the support only of its Peloponnesian neighbors. It was only later in the season (114.2) that the full Peloponnesian army at last appeared, some time after Pericles had returned and was ready to face them. By then, at a conservative computation, it must have been midsummer. The only plausible reason for the delay in the invasion is the precise duration of the truce, which the Spartans clearly observed with their usual scrupulous precision regarding oaths, whereas the Corinthians and their neighbors were a little less scrupulous (as one might gather from the preliminaries of the Peloponnesian War), or perhaps did not consider themselves bound by the truce at all (cf. the Peace of Nicias). The truce, therefore, belongs to (at the earliest) midsummer 451; and not unreasonably, if indeed it was negotiated by Cimon after he had regained his full rights earlier that same year. (His ostracism should belong to the eighth prytany of 462/1, the year of Ephialtes' reforms.) But by midsummer of 451 it would be far too late to mount a major campaign in Cyprus and Egypt, let alone for Cimon to die on it, as Meiggs would want. The campaign must be left in 450–449.

The chronology of the campaign itself is confused by Diodorus' conflation of minor fighting at the beginning with the great naval battle fought after Cimon's death, when the force was returning. (See Gomme, *HCT* I 330.) The Cimon myth tended to attract the victory to his lifetime, hence (since it was known that he died in Cyprus) to an early stage of the war. That the actual war lasted over the winter into 449 must be regarded as certain. Thuc. 1.112.4 reports famine among the besiegers of Citium after Cimon's death, which suggests winter and difficulties

over supplies. As often, text critics have been engaged on unnecessary emendation, here converting λιμοῦ into λοιμοῦ, and even suggesting that Cimon died of the "pestilence" thus introduced. However, Thucydides plainly states that the famine came *after* Cimon's death (Κίμωνος δὲ ἀποθανόντος καὶ λιμοῦ γενομένου) and the whole of this speculation (for which Beloch seems to deserve the credit) should be abandoned. As it happens, the date of the battle of Cyprian Salamis can be disengaged: see E. Badian and J. Buckler, *RhM* n.s. 113 (1975) 235ff. It took place on Munichion 16, i.e. in the spring; and since the fleet was on its way home, in the spring of 449. It is possible that it could not return earlier in the year. Plut. *Thes.* 18 connects the procession of maidens to the Delphinion with the departure of Theseus on that date (Munichion 6), and the standard scholarly view, that major naval expeditions were not launched before that date (even though ships might in principle set sail after the Dionysia: Theophr. *Char.* 3.3) is quite likely to be correct, in view of the date of Munichion 10 for the departure of a fleet that was obviously regarded as needed as early as at all possible, in *IG* II² 1629, 170ff. (See F. Graf, *MH* 36 [1979] 6–7, with references for this view, which he opposes: I should like to thank my colleague Albert Henrichs for this reference.) We need not doubt that, after a disastrous winter, the fleet left Cyprus as early as possible, and the date of the battle and the standard view regarding the festival procession may be taken as supporting each other.

Peace can only have been negotiated after the return of the fleet, which confirms Diodorus' date of 449/8 for its conclusion. If one wishes, one may say that tribute was simply not collected in the spring of 448, after the allies had got it all ready for transportation. (Thus Eddy, *CP* 68 [1973] 241; though, as will be clear from much of the argument in my text, I cannot accept his further hypothesis that it was reinstituted in the following year owing to concentrated Persian acts of blatant aggression in the year immediately following the peace.) But the problems of the "missing quota list" and of the historicity of the "Congress Decree" are probably not directly connected with the renewal of the Peace of Callias and in any case cannot be pursued here.

APPENDIX
On the Untenability of Some Arguments
against a Peace with Persia in the 460s B.C.

*Ich bin der Geist, der stets verneint!
Und das mit Recht; denn Alles, was entsteht,
Ist werth, daß es zu Grunde geht;
Drum besser wär's, daß nichts entstünde.*

As far as scholarly publication is concerned, many of us will have felt that the gentle spirit has a point. It is not surprising that he tends to be particularly active in that area. Of the essays here collected, the one on the Peace of Callias is the only one that has been out long enough to attract his activity. Since I saw the first two protests against my suggestion only after I had already finished my revisions for this volume, I preferred not to deal with them in the new text, but to reply to some of the arguments (some of which I think unacceptable, but from which I have to some degree profited) in this place. Detailed discussion would have called for as much space as the authors had at their disposal, or even more, since disproof (especially of unsupported assertions) is longer than the actual assertions. I have tried to be selective and have confined myself to what I think the most important arguments.

II

The spirit's most confident and pugnacious manifestation is in an article by P. J. Stylianou, unfortunately (for it is worth reading) in a rather inaccessible publication.⁷² It does not quite try to deliver what the title promises; in particular, the positive arguments for a peace after Eurymedon and before the reforms of Ephialtes are on the whole not dealt with. What the author (henceforth S.) tries to do, in a highly charged style,⁷³ is mostly to show that the suggestion (most fully argued by Klaus Meister and on the whole accepted by me) that the fourth-century tradition and those who draw on it later put the peace straight after the battle of the Eurymedon is wrong (in this, as will emerge, he has a point, though perhaps not quite the point he tries to make), and that in fact that tradition puts the peace at mid-century (in which, as will appear, he seems to me to be totally wrong).

In a systematic examination of Meister's collection of passages, he

tries to show that every single one of them in fact implies the opposite of what Meister (and others) thought. Apart from the fact that he approaches those texts, not with an open mind, but with a mind fully shaped by the modern tradition in which he has apparently steeped himself (this appears certain, in view of some important premises, stated dogmatically without reference to sources and without argument), he seems to have committed a pervasive methodological error, which I hope will, once pointed out, dispense me from going over all of those passages once more. I should add that recognition of this has enabled me to see my own corresponding error, which I shall here have to admit.

One type of argument may as well be eliminated at once. S. frequently tries to argue that anyone who refers to “a” Peace of Callias is testifying to the fact that there was only one. For this, see (e.g.) his final paragraph (p. 371), where he thinks that this kind of reference will “make it even plainer that the ancient world knew of *one* Peace of Callias (not two) which, concluded with Artaxerxes (not Xerxes), brought the war against Persia to an end.” He there quotes three extracts, one of them Pausanias’ remark that “most Athenians” told him the peace had been made with Artaxerxes—a statement inviting obvious questions (on which, see n. 55). But it seems not to have occurred to S. that, in a general and informal reference (not a work of technical history), it would be pedantic to mention more than the last and lasting peace, whether or not one knew of more. If we say that Europe knew half a century of peace after the defeat and exile of Napoleon, we are not necessarily denying (or ignorant of) Elba and Waterloo. If we say that, had the Turks not been turned back at Vienna, much of Europe would now be Muslim, we are not necessarily denying that there were two sieges of Vienna, a century and a half apart. Such failure to see the obvious invalidates many of his arguments.

He again and again states that speakers who regard the Peace of Callias as the end of fighting between Greeks and Persians *must* be referring to the peace at mid-century, even if in fact they put the peace after Eurymedon. A refinement of this is the case of Isocrates, who (I am now persuaded) does clearly imply in the *Panegyricus* (delivered in 380) that the Peace belongs to a period before Ephialtes and the turn to more open democracy. Now, Isocrates says that the King, after his signal defeat by Athens, remained inactive “until the collapse of Athenian power gave (the Persians) their chance” (p. 343). For one thing, Isocrates is clearly prevaricating for the sake of effect: for the revival of Persian power that he alludes to was manifested, not in a naval war against Athens, but

(still according to him) when a Persian fleet, commanded by the Athenian Conon (as he naturally fails to note), attacked and defeated the Spartan fleet at Cnidus. But in any case, S. proceeds to argue that the reference to the King's remaining inactive shows that the peace at mid-century must be intended, for Isocrates "was well aware of the campaign to Egypt in the 450s and of the one to Cyprus in 450/49 (cf. *On the Peace* 86)"—hence the period of inactivity must come after 449. What Isocrates knew twenty-five years later is in any case not relevant to what he may have assumed in 380. But the real problem with this (as with all the similar analyses by S.) is that we simply do not know what Isocrates "knew" about the Egyptian and Cyprian campaigns. S. tries to validate the testimony of these orators by insisting that several of them were born in the fifth century: "The memories of these men stretched well back into the 5th century, while those of their families went back well before the Peace" (p. 339 n. 8a).

But this is just the trouble. He has (it seems) forgotten the case of Andocides. That orator, born in the 440s and thus older than any of them except perhaps Lysias, came of one of the oldest families in Athens—descended from Hermes and famed for outstanding public service through the generations, including actual participation in the conclusion of the Thirty Years' Peace. (See, briefly, Andoc. 1.146ff. and Davies, *APF* s.v.) Yet his ignorance about fifth-century history, including events in which his grandfather had prominently participated, is notorious: see Andoc. 3.3–12, the famous passage of confused pseudohistory that apparently entered the school textbooks along with the speech and was repeated almost verbatim by Aeschines 2.172–76 nearly fifty years later—each of them speaking, of course, to an audience that knew no more than he did, and not in the least afraid of ridicule and failure. Even in Rome, the memories of the historically very conscious upper class addressed by Cicero went back no more than two generations. In Athens, even the immediately preceding generation left only the very dimmest image, except for professional historians, whom (obviously) few people read. It is clear that S.'s assumption that, if (say) Isocrates or Lycurgus "knew" certain events in fifth-century history, they knew them in the same way in which he himself knows them is naive and invalid.⁷⁴

Plato's *Menexenus* provides interesting background to this. I accepted, from my predecessors, the argument that, since he puts the peace before the outbreak of the war in Greece that led to the battle of Tanagra, he must be referring it to the Eurymedon and its consequences. S. rightly points out that Plato also alludes to later campaigns. In fact,

he refers to the Eurymedon, the Cyprus campaign, and the Egyptian campaign (in this order), followed by peace and the outbreak of war in Greece. If Plato had any actual dates in mind for all this, it looks as though he thought of the conclusion of the war with Persia, which precedes the war in Greece, as somewhere around 460, with the battles against the Persians preceding and the Tanagra campaign following the interval of peace. "It should not be necessary" (S. rightly warns) "to emphasize that no faith can be placed in the chronology of such a witness." He fails to draw the inevitable conclusion that the example of Plato (born in the third quarter of the fifth century!) and of Andocides (born a few years after the final peace with Persia) *prima facie* suffices to extend the warning to all their peers, whom he chooses to trust.

And this is where I must confess how much I profited from reading his essay. I am now convinced that the orators' belief (which I still think most of them show) in a peace after Eurymedon is worth equally little. My earlier use of that evidence, which I preferred not to obliterate above, must be retracted.

What seems to have happened in the course of the fourth century is that the battle of the Eurymedon entered the realm of Athenian myth-history, as marking the final defeat of the Persians. The battle of Cyprian Salamis, which had originally (and deservedly) held that position, was forgotten and absorbed into Eurymedon: I do not recall its being named by any actual fourth-century source (though, of course, it survived in the historical tradition). Isocrates and Plato at least still knew of a "Cyprian" and an Egyptian campaign. For Isocrates, the "Cyprian" campaign had turned into a disaster comparable to the Egyptian (8.86), and as I have said, we have no idea how he dated them. Yet Salamis had in its day been as celebrated as its Saronic homonym. It was one of the very few fifth-century victories in whose honor the Athenians set up a festival (to Artemis, whose light had apparently helped them)—and, of course, quite deservedly so, since after Eurymedon a Persian fleet could again oppose the Athenians within a few years, while after Cyprian Salamis no Persian fleet ever did so again.⁷⁵

This brings us to S.'s main display piece: his discussion of the well-known epigram quoted by Diodorus (11.62.3) and in the *Anthology* (AP 7.296) and, with variations, by Aelius Aristides and his scholia. As quoted by Diodorus and, from an independent source,⁷⁶ in the *Anthology*, it refers to a victory both by land and by sea won at (on and off) Cyprus: ἐν Κύπρῳ, at the beginning of line 5, is in fact the only evidence tying it to a specific location, as has often been pointed out. How-

ever, in Aelius and his scholiasts, we find the words ἐν γαλῇ substituted for the specific phrase. It has normally been held that the phrase in Diodorus is the original and the one in Aristides an inferior substitute,⁷⁷ though one or two scholars (including Wade-Gery) have unsuccessfully toyed with the idea that the intended reference (at least of the first quatrain) is to Eurymedon. S. reverses the traditional judgment. He claims (he does not say on what grounds) that “the impartial reader” would certainly believe it referred to the Eurymedon rather than to Cyprus (p. 354). In fact, the impartial reader whose mind is not fully made up (as S.’s clearly is) would see nothing to help him decide: both these successes consisted of both naval and land actions, and although the Eurymedon ultimately ousted Cyprian Salamis in folk memory (as it has in S.’s), we have seen that this was not originally so: characteristically, we find Cimon’s name associated with the Cyprian victory (won after his death), and we find Cimon, in the Eurymedon campaign, credited with a naval success off Cyprus—a distance, so S. informs us, of 250 kilometers (p. 363)—often on the same day.⁷⁸

Of course, on S.’s unfounded assumption that the epigram *must* refer to Eurymedon, the phrase ἐν γαλῇ must be the original one and the specific location a corrupt substitute. How could the substitution have come about? That is quite a problem for S. His rather evasive answer will hardly convince “the impartial reader” who does not share his need to account for the change. “One possible explanation is that of a mistaken marginal gloss which at some stage of the tradition replaced ἐν γαλῇ in line 5” (p. 358). This is later expanded by the suggestion (p. 369) that it may be due to a blunder on the part of Diodorus himself, though the possibility of putting the blame on “an editor or a copyist” is kept open.

This rather nonchalant treatment of texts parallels that of what they are trying to communicate. If a marginal gloss accounts for Diodorus’ text, what about that in the *Anthology*? Did the anthologist in fact take the epigram from Diodorus? S., who ascribes quite extraordinary popularity to Diodorus in the Roman Empire (on p. 369 he toys with the idea that Frontinus got his version of Eurymedon from Diodorus!), thinks it possible (p. 370), though he also admits the possibility that both got it from a Hellenistic handbook. (He does not say where Aristides got *his* version.)

The textual variants are conveniently displayed by many authors cited by S. If he had considered them with due care, he would have seen that the suggestion that the anthologist got the poem from Diodorus

cannot stand. The text in the *Anthology*, although it several times agrees with Diodorus, stands on its own: it sometimes also agrees with Aristides, and at times has no known parallel. The difference between the two phrases at the beginning of line 5, though it happens to be important to us here, is no more significant as an indicator of the textual transmission than several other differences.

Of course, S. is right in saying that the text of Aristides is in as good order (at least) as that of Diodorus and that of *AP*. But he seems to have missed the point. No one would hold that the difference is due to a scribal error, and the idea of a marginal gloss substituting the specific for the general reference is difficult to defend. (If the impartial reader inevitably takes the poem to refer to Eurymedon, why should a simple scribe, or even a simple compiler, dig up a specific reference that no one who had not read Thucydides was likely to think of?) I see no convincing alternative to a version of the standard hypothesis: that the specific ἐν Κύπρῳ was the original phrase, going back to a time when the importance of that campaign was recognized and celebrated—perhaps the poem was even engraved on a monument: Friedländer tried to show that this was technically possible.⁷⁹ Later, like so many other monuments and inscriptions, this one was destroyed in the troubles at and after the end of the Peloponnesian War. It was then reengraved in the fourth century, when the old Athenian glory was recalled for propagandist purposes, at a time when the significance of Cyprian Salamis had been forgotten and Eurymedon had absorbed that campaign; hence the lackluster nonspecific phrase was substituted. Aristides clearly got his general tradition from the fourth century, especially the orators: he will have got this text in the same way. Indeed, S.'s acute remark that Diodorus' text contradicts his narrative points in the same direction. On the general principle sometimes called that of the *difficilior lectio*, it is difficult to postulate that any scribe would have changed a textual transmission that made sense to one that clearly did not—and perfectly easy, therefore, to believe it authentic.

Let us turn to the more important evidence. I do not know whether Ephorus told the story of the "long race" (as Aristides calls it) between Pamphylia and Cyprus that was to become standard by the time of Frontinus and Aristides: S. has done commendable work by banishing it (as what I call "history from square brackets") from the supposed Ephorus Papyrus (*FGrHist* 70 F 191). I feel certain (though I cannot prove it) that Ephorus did not have the further development of it that turns the Eurymedon victory into a farce of disguises. Although it seems

certain that Diodorus took the outline of his story (at this point) from Ephorus, I would not hold too strictly to an *Einquellenprinzip*, especially in the insertion of effective anecdotes into the narrative. I doubt, e.g., whether the Themistocles myth in 11.56–57 comes from Ephorus. (Even Diodorus' latter-day equivalent, A. J. Toynbee in *A Study of History*, will occasionally enrich the single source he is following for a given period.) Nor can I claim to be able to explain how Diodorus' absurdity on this issue arose, except by the suggestion that he contaminated Ephorus with a source that was already based on the absorption of the Salamis campaign into the Eurymedon campaign.

But I still believe that Ephorus is likely to have been the common source of Aristodemus and the *Suda*—for a common source they certainly had (see p. 23 above, which S. does not try to refute), despite a possible (though by no means certain) difference between Aristodemus and Ephorus on Themistocles that S. points out.⁸⁰ However, it is in his discussion of the passages from the *Suda* and from Plutarch that S.'s *parti pris* most flagrantly diverts him from understanding what these authors are actually saying.

He is right to insist that the entries on Callias and on Cimon in the *Suda* must be read together: I have now quoted the relevant parts of both, having myself come to the same conclusion. Let me briefly summarize those reports. Under Cimon we are told that after the victory of the Eurymedon *he* (οὗτος) “also set the limits for the barbarians” (the usual terms cited from the Peace of Callias follow). Note both the pronoun (οὗτος) and the little word καί, often ignored by careless readers. It surely means that Cimon, after winning the victory, also imposed the terms of the peace. This is reinforced by the specific statement in the Callias notice, that Callias “confirmed” (or “secured”) the limits of the treaty of the time of Cimon. Nothing could be plainer—so the “impartial reader” would think. Here, however, is S.'s exegesis: “How did Cimon ‘fix the limits’ which Callias later ‘confirmed’ (i.e., *included in the framework of a formal treaty*)? By beating Persia to a standstill, of course, and forcing the Great King to parley. . . .” (my emphasis). For once, I think, argument is truly superfluous. Cimon's attested treaty is spirited away by simple denial.

Similarly Plutarch. His plain statement that it was the victory at the Eurymedon that forced the King to make peace is “interpreted” (p. 348) in a complicated fashion, with the conclusion that Plutarch merely wanted to defend the historicity of the peace against Callisthenes and was not concerned to date it: “its correct chronological context . . . mat-

tered less to him." Moreover, "it is to be greatly regretted that Plutarch did not try to be more precise." In fact, S. seems to regret that Plutarch was here *very* precise. He would have been easier to interpret away if he had not been. (On Callisthenes, see now Bosworth, discussed in section III of this Appendix. Since he did not deny the historicity of the peace, Plutarch cannot have defended it against him.)

So far, the case for a peace after Eurymedon remains basically intact. Nor, of course, is it relevant that epitomators like Aristodemus and Diodorus omit it.⁸¹ Epitomators *have* to omit, and if they are at all thoughtful, they will omit what was ephemeral and stress what was of lasting interest. (Of course, their judgment may not coincide with ours; but neither do we wholly agree, much of the time, with the omissions in a Condensed Reader's Digest volume.) I can only point out once more that the important attempt to make peace in 392/1 at Sparta would, but for the survival of Andocides' speech, have been almost unanimously denied as late fiction, since for good reasons of their own neither Xenophon nor Diodorus mentions it.

Finally, and perhaps most important: the evidence of Herodotus on the Argive envoys at Susa. S. revives the theory that, since they asked whether the King maintained the friendship for them which they had concluded with his father or whether he thought them enemies, the embassy must be dated after Argos had become an ally of Athens, at that time fighting the King. This, of course, could be at any time after 461, and Meiggs thought it was at once, in view of the Argives' evident concern about Persian friendship. S., brusquely rejecting that view, prefers to date it in 449, where it "makes excellent sense" to him.

I think Meiggs' view makes much better sense than the hypothesis that the Argives would only be concerned about Artaxerxes' attitude to them fifteen years after his accession and twelve years after becoming allies of Athens, having (as is clear from the text) not bothered to send an embassy to him in all these years. But the whole premise on which this argument is based seems to me misconceived. We nowhere hear of Argives having actually fought against the King as allies of Athens. Far more probably, the question has no such specific reference. The Argives are merely reminding the (new) King of their friendship with his father: "Do you still regard us as friends or do you (just because we are Greeks) consider us enemies?" One could not be sure of a new King's attitude, or that of his advisers. The sooner the question was asked, the better. This is why embassies so often flocked to a new king's court after his

accession. The view advanced by S., implausible in itself, is not needed. And we must not forget the Argives' own worries about this time, which must have made them think the Persian connection particularly important.⁸²

It will be clear that I have learned from S.'s discussion and revised my opinion as a result of reading it. But it seems to me that most of his positive suggestions rest on weak foundations (sometimes on no more than his personal preference) and that his methodological inadequacies invalidate the case he is trying to make.⁸³

II

Our spirit's most attractive production is the book *Athens from Cleisthenes to Pericles* (Berkeley 1991) by Charles W. Fornara and Loren J. Samons II, a judicious mix of the conventional and the idiosyncratic, which will no doubt be much discussed. I must confine myself to some pages strictly relevant to our topic. My main problem with the book is that I cannot always follow the way in which the authors interpret Greek texts and contexts. Let me look at two instances, not uncharacteristic.

On pp. 67ff. (et al., in passing) they discuss the dating of Pericles' law introducing pay for jurors. They start by stating that the language used by the sources "is susceptible to more than one interpretation" and then quote *Ath. pol.* 27, the only important source. (I accept their exclusion of Plutarch's version as derivative.) The structure of the chapter may be summarized as follows. After his Citizenship Law (451/50) Pericles became *dēmagōgos*. He had first prosecuted Cimon as a young man. Then the constitution became more democratic, for he removed some of the Areopagus' powers [as an associate of Ephialtes: the authors flatly deny this] and encouraged Athens' reliance on the navy, which increased the power of the *dēmos*. In 432/1 the Peloponnesian War broke out [the author proceeds to comment on some results]. Pericles was the first to provide pay for jurors, "using demagoguery in opposition to the wealth of Cimon": Cimon used his wealth in private generosity and Pericles had to counter by bribery from public funds. (The author goes on to develop the theme of their rivalry at great length.)

The authors opine that "Aristotle . . . sets the introduction of *misthos* into a narrative context of which the *terminus post quem* is the citizen-

ship law of 451/50 . . . and the notion that it is all a flashback and that Aristotle went backwards in time to a period before 462/1 is supported neither by Aristotle's explanatory allusion to Pericles' first attack on Cimon . . . nor, *more important* [my emphasis], by the indications of the narrative method he follows in this section of the *Ath. pol.*" What is "more important" is obviously the authors' interpretation that they have chosen to put on the narrative in the source. Shorn of this deconstruction, what we actually find is the following sequence: first, the Citizenship Law of 451/50; then a flashback to Pericles' prosecution of Cimon (in the 460s) and the reforms of Ephialtes (462/1); next, a general statement about his reliance on the navy and its political effects (presumably after 462/1), followed by the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (432/1) and its constitutional effects. At this point there is a break, and the author starts on Pericles' earlier career once more. There is, in fact, most certainly a "flashback," or rather a return to the tale of Pericles' rivalry with Cimon, which the author had interrupted in order to trace the increase in "democracy" past the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. In fact, we turn back to where this excursus started—Pericles' prosecution of Cimon. We now hear how Pericles carried on his struggle with Cimon, perhaps after, perhaps even both before *and* after that prosecution, for the rivalry described is timeless, while the prosecution marks a point *within* that rivalry. I see nothing here that supports the authors' guess that the author means to date the introduction of jury pay after the time of the Citizenship Law. On the contrary, this is improbable. Before that time Cimon was ostracized: he could not engage in political rivalry between 461 and 451. And when he came back, he almost at once left for Cyprus and died there, which again precludes political rivalry. Unless we want to confine the rivalry to a few months in late 451 and early 450 (which the author's language and treatment surely make highly unlikely), there is no place for it except in the 460s. It is only our authors' unwillingness to allow Pericles (on a priori grounds, quite unsupported in *any* source) any prominence at that time that makes them pursue their paradoxical argument.

Next, their Appendix 7, devoted to refuting the suggestion of a first Peace of Callias in the 460s. They have one attractive suggestion (pp. 174–75): that Herodotus' reference to the contemporaneous appearance of an Argive and an Athenian embassy at Susa may mean that the Argives, newly allied with Athens (c. 461), were trying to mediate peace between Athens and their old ally Persia. (The date, in fact, is due to

Meiggs' suggestion, infinitely preferable to Stylianou's guess of 449, on which see above.) This, of course, omits the reasons the Argives may have had for seeking to reestablish their connection with the King rather earlier (see n. 82 and the text above): indeed, the authors are not aware of Peloponnesian history during those years and state (p. 175): "... there is no substantive reason to assume haste. . . . Argos stood in no danger that Persia was in a position to alleviate." But for this error, Meiggs' date and their consequential conjecture are worth entertaining.

Unfortunately for it, and them, there is other evidence. They must first try to argue it out of the way. They discuss (pp. 173–74) the evidence of the *Suda*, arriving at strange interpretations, based on such strange statements as "βεβαίουν [*sic*] regularly takes a dative" (!) and, on τοὺς τῶν σπονδῶν ὅρους, "Not even tragic diction would happily invent this phrase to mean 'the boundaries (arising) from the peace.'" Apparently, plain linguistic usage is irrelevant. The verb βεβαιοῦν, just like its English equivalents "secure" or "confirm," does not "take a dative": it is transitive, with what is secured in the accusative (in this case "the limits"). Of course, the person(s) *for whose benefit* it is secured may or may not be expressed; in English we should say "for So-and-so"; Greek would use the dative for this. But there is, in principle and in observed fact, no need for this to be expressed. Next, "tragic diction" would certainly not "invent" such an ordinary and unpretentious phrase as τοὺς τῶν σπονδῶν ὅρους, which simply means "the limits laid down in the treaty" (common subjective genitive). Have the authors never used phrases like "the Versailles borders" of Germany? It is clear that their further development of that argument to misinterpret the *Suda* entry under Καλλίας (p. 174) needs no refutation. And some of their conjectures (e.g., that "the later peace was . . . associated with [*sic*] the earlier accomplishment at the Eurymedon") have already been treated in Part I of this Appendix, where a more serious and careful argument for such a view is discussed. Unlike Stylianou's, this work presents no case against the "first Peace of Callias" that would call for long discussion.

III

The article "Plutarch, Callisthenes and the Peace of Callias" by Albert Brian Bosworth, in *JHS* 110 (1990) 1–13, does not really belong in this

company. I mention it chiefly in order to retract an error of mine which, for reasons of historical integrity, I decided to leave in the version of my article in this volume. Bosworth shows, quite conclusively, that we have all been guilty of misunderstanding what Plutarch reports Callisthenes as saying in this context: he reminds us that if it is said of an author that he οὐ φησὶν something, it need not (though it often does) mean that he actually denies it; it may mean, literally, that he does not assert it. In other words, the phrase never loses its ability to correspond to our “does not say” (as distinct from “denies”). It is another example of how traditional interpretations are lightly accepted in translating Greek authors. Bosworth also conclusively argues that the context in which Callisthenes “did not say” that the King swore to a formal peace is to be sought, not in the *Hellenica* (Bosworth here has some salutary comments on the extent to which our interpretation of fourth-century pan-Hellenism was shaped by pan-Germanism), but in his work on Alexander, where Alexander’s achievements could thus be glorified by contrast with the Athenians’. So far I totally agree with him.

He is less happy (I think) in some asides tossed off along the way, and especially near the end of the article: that the “peace of Epilycus” is “unlikely” to have been a renewal of the Peace of Callias (he does not say *why* renewal on the accession of a new King should be unlikely: one might compare the Argive embassy to Artaxerxes, on which see above; he compares, instead, the totally irrelevant changes in the three treaties between Sparta and the King’s representatives in Thucydides Book 8); that it does not follow from Plutarch’s report of what Callisthenes said about the naval sweeps by Ephialtes and Pericles that they did not land on the coast and take booty (why should either Callisthenes or Plutarch, trying to stress the King’s meek acceptance of provocation, have deliberately omitted this extreme of it while reporting a rather harmless example?); that Theopompus did not deny the historicity of the Peace of Callias (this seems merely paradoxical). While reporting on the great merit of Bosworth’s article, it seemed proper also to report some of his less happy (and, on the whole, unargued) *obiter dicta* and to counter them with questions of equal brevity. At least he never obscures the thin, but important, line between a scholar’s reasoned case and his incidental comments on things outside that case.

Toward a Chronology of the
Pentecontaetia down to the Renewal
of the Peace of Callias

It is clear, and generally agreed, that a full and detailed chronology of the “almost fifty years” (118.2)¹ between Xerxes’ retreat and the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War cannot be established. No such chronology, in fact, existed even in antiquity. Thucydides wrote his sketch of the period late in life, apparently as an insertion within his first book, which—at least in the form in which we have it—was itself composed near the end of his life.² By that time, close to the end of the century, precise dates on events two generations earlier were not easily to be had by the examination of witnesses, which was the only method he used.³ Hellanicus, who had published his history (whatever, in detail, it looked like) not long before,⁴ was clearly not much better off: in fact, Thucydides, in the first instance we have of what was later to become a commonplace of professional jealousy, blames him for (i.a.) inaccuracy in his chronology. There is, of course, no indication that Thucydides himself—not to mention anyone else—had taken any notes during the “Fifty Years” or considered writing the history of that period at the time: he plainly tells us that it was at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War that he recognized its likely importance and started on its history (1.1), and the thought of adding the excursus on those years probably did not occur to him until, revising his first book as a full preface to the war, and, after defeat and revolution, worrying about

how it all came about (just as Germany, after similar events in 1918, began an interminable discussion of the *Kriegsschuldfrage*), he found that he needed a selective sketch of that period in order to establish his thesis of Sparta's responsibility for the war and the correctness of Pericles' vision.⁵

It is significant that we have no precise statement on lapse of time until 101.3, where we are told, nearly thirteen chapters and over fifteen years after the beginning of the excursus, that Thasos surrendered in the third year of the siege. After this, and as a counterpart to it, we hear that the Messenians at Ithome surrendered in the tenth year of their siege (103.1)—a statement that, as need hardly be illustrated, has caused a lot of trouble for some modern scholars who approach Thucydides with preconceived theories.

We soon have two further examples of intervals, uniquely measured in days: 105.6 the Corinthians, twelve days after a defeat, try to set up a trophy, but are driven off by the Athenians; next, 108.2 gives us an interval in days between two major battles. The examples are instructive: the unexpected precision must surely be due to the fact that an unusual, and unusually glorious, event was precisely remembered by responsible contemporaries and had not faded from memory fifty-odd years later. Other intervals, on the whole, simply were not—or at least not with the kind of reliable precision that would enable the historian in search of *akribeia* to trust his witnesses and commit himself.

The impression that Thucydides, on the whole, gave us precise intervals when he could be sure of them, for events that he thought important (which would be the only events over which he would go to the trouble of making those difficult enquiries), is strengthened by the fact that such intervals and durations now, after the middle fifties, become noticeably more common (though not as frequent as we should like), even where the historian's own memory cannot be involved. The very first in this series of statements concerns the expeditionary force in Egypt: the siege of Prosopitis lasted a year and six months (109.4) and the whole Egyptian campaign six years (110.1). We then return to Greece, where Thucydides himself could no doubt remember with occasional precision, though again it is clear that he also thought he had got reliable information where he was not present. We have a chapter (111) on assorted actions in Greece, followed by what appear to be three whole years without (at least significant) military action by either

side, formalized by a five years' truce (112.1). After another bout of intense action when this expires, and with no further precise times given, we hear of the Thirty Years' Peace (115.1) and, in the sixth year of the peace (115.2), of the beginning of the Samian War. Here Thucydides again has, and provides, precise information. The Samians at one point gained control of their own waters for about fourteen days (117.1), but, unable to face the full strength of Athens and her main allies, they had to surrender in the ninth month (117.3). Surprisingly, Thucydides does not try to tie this last event discussed in the excursus into his main narrative: he merely tells us that the events concerning Corcyra and Potidaea (themselves, of course, not all that close to each other) which immediately led to the war came within "a few years" after this.

This last statement illustrates the fact that we simply cannot fully account for Thucydides' choice on what precise chronological statements to give us: it is clear that he could have worked out the actual interval from the end of the Samian War to the appeal of Corcyra to Athens, had he chosen to do so. He evidently did not think that it mattered. We must remember that he was not writing a history of those years: he was writing a history of the Peloponnesian War, and the excursus on the Pentecontaetia had got into it, as it were, only at two removes—as an insertion within a preface. As Gomme and others have pointed out, he never gives us archon dates, even where (as for the Thirty Years' Peace: cf. 87.6 and 2.2) he could easily have worked them out. It is not precise dates, but sequence, that he seems to be mostly concerned about. Our initial impression that he tells us what he knows, though (I think) still correct in its negative form, must be modified accordingly. His interest in precision appears to be limited, even where it was attainable: confined, on the whole, to details of sieges and (as we saw) a significant sequence of battles, to the proposed duration of truces, and to events that were clearly unusual and therefore worth detailing as (we might say) *paradoxa*: the longest overseas expedition ever known, ending in the most memorable disaster; or an unusual lengthy stretch without a truce, yet without military operations worth mentioning. The principles of selection, now that we have established them, are not what we should expect, even against the background and the genesis of the excursus. But it is useful to have established them, above all (perhaps) because it helps once more to underline a fact too often forgotten in dealing with this

author: that both his purposes and his methods are not those of a modern historian—indeed, in their way they are probably more remote from ours than those of Herodotus.

What, we must now ask, is the point of his criticism of Hellanicus? For apart from being motivated by *odium academicum*, it must have a point. I think the chronological constituent (which alone concerns us here) can be disengaged from the context. For straight after the comment on his predecessor's chronological inaccuracy (97.2), he proceeds to list, in careful order, the first operations of the newly formed league: Eion, Scyrus, a lengthy war against Carystus; then the revolt of Naxos (98) "after this" and (after an excursus on revolts and the tightening of Athenian control, sparked off by the fact that he has come to the first of them) "also after this" (i.e., after the settlement with Carystus) the battle of the Eurymedon (100.1);⁶ and the record continues with the revolt of Thasos, "some time later" (100.2).

It seems clear that what Thucydides has been concerned about, and careful to get right, is the *sequence* of events: it is this that (in his opinion) Hellanicus must at times have got wrong. Unfortunately nothing of Hellanicus' treatment of this period survives, so that we cannot see for ourselves whether the criticism is justified (yet we must surely assume that up to a point it was, since contemporary readers would make the comparison), and how serious the errors were. But it is easy enough to believe that this polygraphic author, whose *Atthis* was only a small part of his work and whose treatment of this period would only be a small part of *that*, did not take as much trouble as Thucydides presumably did to establish the order of events in a generation beyond living memory, whether or not (as has been maintained) he in fact tried to introduce archon dating for this period.⁷

The actual sequence of the major events could almost certainly still be established, with sufficient diligence, at the time when Thucydides began to make his enquiries. We have no reason to think that he got it wrong where he chose to give it.⁸ Where he found that no precise sequence was obtainable, he merely put things at "about the same time," without committing himself as to which came earlier. But there were inherent problems in such a method, for events simply do not happen neatly in sequence: they are lines in time and not points, so that there is inevitably considerable overlap. Let us take the example of the revolt of Naxos and the battle of the Eurymedon. Thucydides puts both of them after the settlement with Carystus; since he does not tell us their se-

quence, it is quite possible that he had not been able to find out. However, a battle approaches being a point in time, while a siege does not: wherever we have the information (Sestos, Thasos, Samos, Mytilene—to mention only sieges conducted by the Athenians), a siege of a major city would go on for some time. This is not surprising. A major city would normally lay in stores to last it through the winter, when no food could generally be grown or even imported. Hence, unless the attacker surprised it before the harvest, a siege was bound to last at least until those supplies ran out, some time after the winter. A city actually expecting an attack, of course, could lay in extensive stores. Thus Thasos, despite defeats at the very beginning, which seem to have prevented the collection of any further food, managed to hold out through two winters. Naxos, undertaking a revolt and no doubt feeling strong enough to succeed, would have made good preparations, and we can be sure that its reduction took more than one season, although Thucydides is not concerned with the details and we do not know when it rebelled. Where, within the “line” of that siege (whether it went on over one winter or two), the “point” of the battle of the Eurymedon was to be placed, he may well not have been able to find out with real certainty: hence perhaps the uncertainty of his phrasing, not even explicitly relating the two to each other.

The battle of the Eurymedon, of course, seems to have been woven into Athenian legend at quite an early stage, and this no doubt made it harder to get accurate information by the end of the century. The version that amalgamated it with Cimon’s Cyprian campaign at mid-century and that appears (even though Ephorus probably did not pick it up)⁹ in some of our later sources, was integrally tied in with the story of Themistocles: it was Artaxerxes, planning the counterattack that led to the battle of the Eurymedon, who called on Themistocles (who, in this version, may have arrived in Asia under his predecessor) to make good on his promises and lead the attack against the Greeks; the result of which was Themistocles’ suicide by drinking bull’s blood. Since the story of the suicide was known to, and rejected by, Thucydides (1.38.4), together with at least the general motivation supposed to have led to it, it is likely—and the case has recently been strongly argued¹⁰—that it all goes back to the fifth century: an illustration of the difficulties that Thucydides would have to contend with when he came to look for accurate information about famous events of no more than a couple of generations back.

Not that we have in fact been unaware of them. It is well known how, about a decade later, a politician and member of an old political family, who was himself active in the years when Thucydides gathered his information, could present an utterly garbled version of much of fifth-century history, including some of his own lifetime and some in which his family had taken part, and expect no superior standard of knowledge from his audience: what is more, how Andocides 3.3ff. became a classic presentation of the whole period and was later used almost verbatim by Aeschines (2.172ff.). Eduard Meyer long ago noted that this proves "wie gänzlich unfähig die mündliche Tradition ist, auch nur die Hauptpunkte einer historischen Entwicklung festzuhalten."¹¹ What has not always been appreciated is that this kind of "oral tradition" was all that Thucydides and others had to go on when they came to write the history of this very period. It is not surprising that Thucydides could not supply precise dates or intervals for much of it, or that an outsider like Hellanicus, for whom this was only a very part-time interest, might make mistakes that Thucydides could justly reprove. That there were plenty of documents available (even after the destruction due to the long war and the revolution) is beside the point: had they thought of it, Thucydides and his contemporaries could have written their history of the Athenian Empire infinitely better than we can, and with no worry about the shape of the letters on the documents. However, they did not think of it. Despite some beginnings of the inspection of monuments in Herodotus, Thucydides never mentions them when he propounds his methods in the first book, and it is clear that, apart from treaties—and not many of *them*: there is no reason to believe that he ever looked at a stele of the Thirty Years' Peace, which Pausanias still saw at Olympia (5.23.4)—he never considered documents as sources for historical information. We need hardly doubt that he was not alone in this.

Once he felt confident of his facts (as he seems to feel where he gives them), there was still the problem of presentation.¹² We have already touched upon the problem of overlap: an important situation will not usually be completely resolved before the next one starts happening. Every historian has to face the technical problem of how to deal with this elementary fact of his material. Nowadays, of course, our technique is flexible enough for us to be rarely conscious of the problem at all. For Thucydides it was a really major problem in his account of the actual war, where he wanted to report strictly by seasons, and he consistently tore his history to shreds in order to achieve such precision. But in the

Pentecontaetia there was no real need for him to do this. As we have seen, he was obviously aiming at getting the sequence of events right; but he was not dividing his account into even and historically arbitrary sections (years or seasons), and so there was no objection to finishing off a story that he had begun in its right place, even if he then had to go back for the beginning of the next item he chose to report. Fortunately, Greek campaigns (the main stuff of what he chose to report) were short and did not overlap, though they might (of course) coincide (in which case they could be marked as having occurred “at the same time”). But some of his events did overlap; noticeably sieges, one of which went on for over nine years, and the Egyptian expedition. His technique appears clearly in both cases. The Egyptian expedition is treated in just two chronological slices (roughly at its beginning, 104, and at its end, 109). The first one probably does relate only the events of the first season, but the second quite explicitly takes in a space of several years, indeed strictly speaking all the remaining five years. It is quite clear that we are not meant to deduce that events in Greece stood still during those years. Similarly Ithome: his famous statement that the siege ended in the tenth year (103.1) must be taken to anticipate, no matter how we use our abacus on the Messenian Revolt—hence, of course, the long tendency to emend, among those who fail to see the author’s general practice in such (admittedly few) cases. Indeed, we might note that within the chapter that tells of the end of the revolt he has incorporated an earlier event: the oracle already in the possession of the Spartans which, although it did not really fit the case, they apparently chose to apply to it when the gods were clearly against them.¹³

As a matter of fact, the fundamentalist position, that Thucydides always puts things in strict chronological order, has fortunately now been proved wrong, even for the narrative of the Peloponnesian War itself. In 4.50 he tells of the capture of the Persian envoy Artaphernes, sent by the King to Sparta, in the “winter” of 425/4. After some discussion of his message, he continues (s. 3):

τὸν δὲ Ἀρταφέρνην ὕστερον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀποστέλλουσι τριήρει ἐς Ἑφεσον καὶ πρέσβεις ἅμα. οἱ πυθόμενοι αὐτόθι βασιλέα Ἀρταξέρξην τὸν Ξέρξου νεωστὶ τεθνηκότα . . . ἐπ’ οἶκον ἀνεχώρησαν.

It should be obvious to any unprejudiced reader that this section points forward to an undefined future (“later”) and that nothing can be

gathered from it regarding the date of Artaxerxes' death. However, since Thucydides continues (4.51) with events in "the same winter" and, at the beginning of the next "summer" (4.52.1), tells of an eclipse that we can date to March 21, 424, it was universally held, since Eduard Meyer propounded that view almost a hundred years ago, that the adverb ought to refer to an event that took place still during the same winter, so as to preserve the continuity of Thucydides' chronological narrative. Artaxerxes' death was therefore put early in 424 (with further consequences for some other dates). This could be argued to fit in with all the Greek evidence; though even then Meyer knew that Babylonian tablets indicated a later date. (He explained this away by an elaborate ad hoc hypothesis.)

It is now clear from several texts in the Murašû archive that Artaxerxes' death took place between late December and early February of 423 (or, to be precise, that this is when it was known in Babylonia). The section in Thucydides has been explained as "a chronological parenthesis" and must refer to some time not earlier than early 423, even though it is followed by events that precede it by a year or so. From a different point of view, we may say that Thucydides finishes off a story with a brief reference to its outcome, before going on with his main narrative.¹⁴

The importance of this is that, if Thucydides will write like this even within the strictly chronological narrative of the war, he must surely be judged all the more likely to do so in his (clearly) not chronologically precise introductory book. His reference to the end of the Ithome war (1.103.1) and to Drabescus (1.100.3) should no longer be misinterpreted to fit in with a view of his technique that is now known to be mistaken.

As we have seen, the nature of his material, as he interpreted and selected it, fortunately saved Thucydides from having a large number of such problems. But there is indeed another instance, where the technique has usually been misinterpreted and the finishing of a story has been taken to be sequential narrative. And here we come to the next problem. There is, for Thucydides more than for most authors, a tendency to make him say what he clearly does not; this is in part due to his being a genuinely difficult author, on whom very little of the basic grammatical and stylistic work has yet been done, even though books have appeared in plenty,¹⁵ and in part to a natural tendency to get as much as possible out of the most reliable source, for a period where

there is on the whole regrettably little to be got. But we must read him patiently, as indeed we must every source, and (to the best of our, at present limited, ability) take the text and meaning as we find them, except for the few cases where emendation is necessitated by nonsense—avoiding the temptation to read what is not there.

The disaster of Drabescus is twice mentioned by Thucydides. In 100.3, a colony is sent to the site of the later Amphipolis as soon as the Thasian fleet has been eliminated and the Athenians are on the island, at the beginning of its revolt; he tells us that the settlers, proceeding inland, were destroyed by a combined Thracian force. In 4.102, in connection with Brasidas' capture of Amphipolis, he gives (presumably from local records) a history of attempts to colonize the site, with precise intervals, but no dates: first, by Aristagoras, "fleeing from King Darius"—destroyed by the Edonians (the site was in their territory: 1.103); thirty-two years later, by the Athenians, with ten thousand settlers (here he reports that anyone who wished could join, whereas in 1.100 it was only Athenians and allies—a difference that has exercised Thucydidean fundamentalists), who were destroyed by the Thracians at Drabescus; finally, in the twenty-ninth year after that, Hagnon succeeded in founding Amphipolis. A scholiast on Aeschines 2.31, listing nine disasters the Athenians suffered at this site, incidentally supplies several dates from an Atthidographic source, two of them relevant here: the destruction of the force under Leagros (the name is variously corrupt in the MSS, but known from other sources) is dated under Lysicrates (453/2) and the founding of Amphipolis under Euthymenes (437/6). The latter, for what that is worth, coincides with Diodorus 12.32.3 and has not been doubted. The former has never been taken seriously, except in infelicitous attempts to *distinguish* it from Drabescus. Unz, recently summarizing the *communis opinio*, is representative: "Thucydides says that Drabeskös took place twenty-eight years before the successful founding of Amphipolis." (He adds the date from the scholiast.) "... this dating places Drabeskös in the archon year 465/4, and indeed this date (or one in the two preceding archon years) is supported by the scholia."¹⁶ As it happens, the years 467/6, 466/5, and 465/4 do supply three similar archon names,¹⁷ although only one of them (465/4: Lysitheus) can be reconciled with Thucydides' intervals; for although the date of Aristagoras is conveniently flexible, the twenty-ninth year before 437/6 lands us firmly with Lysitheus. It is, in fact, a key date, in that it gives us (within a year, at any rate) a date for the outbreak of the Tha-

sian revolt. But it is clear from Thucydides' presentation, on each occasion, that what he is dating is the attempts to found a colony on the site, and that what happened to the colonies that failed (that of Aristagoras and that of the first Athenian settlers) is only incidental, explaining why another foundation became necessary.

Mabel Lang's demonstration of this point twenty years ago has had no effect on the fundamentalists and their adapters. Thucydides simply does not imply that the colony was wiped out in the year when it was founded. He is merely finishing off the story. Diodorus 11.70.5 tells us that the colonists were for a while successful in controlling the Thracians, but when they "later" proceeded inland into Thrace, the invaders were destroyed by the Edonians. (Pausanias, in a brief summary, 1.29.4, adds that they were destroyed in an ambush.) All this has been ignored by those who try to fit Thucydides' account into preconceived theories. Indeed, it has even been said in an (at one time) authoritative account of work on this period that the date of Drabescus is among only five firm dates in the whole of the Pentecontaetia!¹⁸ We have seen that, in this respect, nothing had changed by 1986.

Those who retail this error can hardly have properly envisaged the founding of a colony. This, with its survey and distribution of land, the building of a city wall (no doubt after an initial defeat of the barbarians, as implied by Diodorus), and the sowing and harvesting of supplies to store against the expected attacks (not to mention varied religious business), was not a job for one season. Those considering the matter might do well to ponder (e.g.) the history of the early settlers in Massachusetts. The colonists would not dump their rucksacks under a token guard and proceed on a long and difficult march inland without even a rest.¹⁹ It was only after the colony was settled and appeared to be secure that a large force of the settlers could leave it on a march to seize gold mines far overland. It was too ambitious an undertaking, and the disaster left the colony too weak to defend itself. The later Amphipolitans learned the lesson and never tried to seize those distant, but perhaps tempting, mines.

Obviously, much depends on where we think Drabescus was. I have so far assumed that it is on the site marked as Daravescus on the Peutinger Table, the present town of Drama. This has indeed been the opinion of most scholars (e.g., Meiggs and Hammond, in recent major works). More recently, the *communis opinio* seems to have turned toward a site about ten kilometers north of that of Amphipolis, apparently named

Sdravik.²⁰ Brief argument is needed, to show that the matter is not as certain as has been alleged.

Isaac cites but (with the exception of Appian) does not quote the sources. (His discussion contains some inaccuracies, one of which will have to be pointed out below.) All would agree that Thucydides “must be considered authoritative on this matter” (Isaac): he knew the area well, commanded a naval force there, and had property there. Let me therefore start by quoting Thuc. 1.100.3:

τῶν μὲν Ἑννέα Ὅδων αὐτοὶ ἐκράτησαν, . . . προελθόντες δὲ τῆς
Θράκης ἐς μεσόγειαν διεφθάρησαν ἐν Δραβησκῷ τῇ Ἡδωνικῇ
. . .

Meiggs (cited by Isaac) was surely right in arguing from this that Thucydides must have thought of Drabescus as at a considerable distance from Ennea Hodoi (hence presumably Drama). Isaac objects: “But this does not mean that Drabescos was in the interior. It means that the Greeks were marching inland.” He cannot have read the Greek with proper care. The aorist προελθόντες makes it clear that the colonists *had* advanced into the *mesogeia* before they were annihilated. In other words, we must deduce that Drabescus was in what he called the Thracian *mesogeia*. Would a march taking them about ten kilometers (a total of about twelve and a half kilometers from the coast) take them into the *mesogeia*? I think this is very unlikely. There are few, if any, demes in the much smaller *mesogeia* of Attica that are so close (by road) to the coast, even in the east, where they come closest. Thucydides himself regards Stratus as being in the *mesogeia* of Acarnania (2.102.1: just possibly also Coronta, which is indeed much closer—but probably not, since it is implied that the Athenians took it on their return from Stratus to the sea). He appears to regard an area not too far from Aegitium as being in the *mesogeia* of Aetolia (3.95). These places are a considerable distance from the coast. (His other uses of the word are unfortunately not illuminating.) Enlarge the picture to the scale of Thrace, and the use of the term for a place so close to the coast seems inconceivable. This, of course, is why the standard older identification is by no means “inexplicable.”

Appian (the only author quoted by Isaac, with wrong references) gives a detailed description of the plain of Philippi (BC 4.105.439ff.). He had never seen it, and although he had an excellent source, his description clearly does not make perfect sense as it stands. He takes the

plain of Philippi in the west “as far as Myrcinus and Drabescus and the Strymon River,” which may indeed suggest a site on the river. However, I am not sure he has got it right. There is little point in mentioning two places very close together and the river they are on: it has usually been assumed (and I still think it possible) that he found the plain defined by its northeasterly point (Drama) and its southwesterly point (Myrcinus on the Strymon) and confused this, as he has confused other details of the topography.

Of Strabo’s account of this area we unfortunately have only fragments. They show some peculiarities: e.g., the Strymonic Gulf is defined as extending as far as Neapolis (7 fr. 32); from the Athos peninsula as far as the Nestus (7 fr. 35); and from Galepsus (!) to the Nestus (7 fr. 41). He names Myrcinus, Argilus, Drabescus, and Daton (in this order) as cities “around the Strymonic Gulf” (fr. 33), and he is the only one to place Daton on the coast (explicitly fr. 36). Of tribes he names the Edones, Odomantes, and Bisaltae as near Daton, beyond the Strymon, and then tells us that the Bisaltae are above Amphipolis (fr. 36). Quite apart from his peculiar use of the terms “Strymonic Gulf” and perhaps “Daton,” which may be his own, there must have been some confusion due to the excerptor.

Apart from this, and Diodorus (discussed above), there is above all Herodotus 9.75, where, in the course of a eulogy of Sophanes, we are told that he was one of two commanders who fell in a battle over gold mines at Datus. The information no doubt came from the man’s family and must be regarded as accurate. It has been suggested (thus Isaac, following a suggestion by Gomme) that this battle should be distinguished from that of Drabescus. But it is difficult to assume, in addition to the colonists’ early success, documented in the sources, a second major disaster in the same area at about the same time, of which we happen to hear in this casual way and which is not mentioned elsewhere. (That it was a major disaster is certain, since two generals were lost.) Isocrates 8.86 (misreported by Isaac) certainly took the reports to refer to a single disaster, as he notes the loss of ten thousand men (i.e., as reported for Drabescus) ἐν Δάτῳ, combining the reports in Herodotus and in Thucydides. Moreover, to link them firmly, there is Pausanias. He actually saw the funeral monument with the names of the dead inscribed (1.29.4): he names Leagrus and Sophanes as generals (confirming Herodotus) and puts the defeat at Drabescus (as in Thucydides: it is not certain that this was on the monument). The idea that these are different battles must be wholly rejected.²¹

Thus Drabescus was certainly ἐν Δάτῳ. The name "Datus/um" was rather unstable in its application. At one time the name of the city later renamed Philippi, we later find it (in Strabo, as we have seen) used as the name of a prosperous coastal city. And all along, it seems to be used for an area, no doubt corresponding to the later *chora* of the city once the city was founded. It must be in this sense that Herodotus uses it, when he puts Drabescus ἐν Δάτῳ. We must now ask: how likely is it that the area, essentially the *chora* of later Philippi, extended through the whole of the plain described by Appian, right to the river Strymon? I do not think it very likely. Certainly, no source we have suggests anything like that extent, whereas there cannot be much doubt that a place as close as Drama would be included.

However, Strabo certainly and Appian possibly make Drabescus a city near or on the coast, contrary to what Thucydides and probably Herodotus imply. It must be suggested that there were in fact two places by that name. Before this is dismissed as an *ad hoc* hypothesis to deal with refractory evidence, let us remember, first, that there really does appear to be contradictory evidence, and that the earliest authors are supported by the latest evidence, the Peutinger Table; second, that duplication of names in this general area is not unparalleled. We have seen the example of Datus. Let me now add that of Galepsus.²² In these cases, the duplication has been amply established, has been taken for granted, and has caused no difficulties. Further examples may readily be found. One might think of Ganus and Gantias, of Serrion and Serrion Teichos. But it should in any case be clear that the battle was fought near modern Drama, about forty kilometers from Amphipolis. Hence—and this is the point of this lengthy argument—there is no reason to reject the date offered by the scholiast, and every reason to accept it.

That the colony survived for at least a few years can be shown even independently of all this. Thucydides tells us that it was established as soon as the Athenians had landed on Thasos (i.e., no doubt the decision to send it out assumed the successful setting up of the siege of the city, which indeed came about). On his return to Athens after the fall of Thasos, two years later, Cimon was prosecuted for not having invaded Macedonia when it appeared "easy" to do so (Plut. *Cim.* 14.3). That charge would hardly have been made if the Athenians had just suffered, in that same area, much the worst disaster in their history to date.

It is clear that the only date for Drabescus that we have is the one (453/2) given by the scholiast. Now, a scholiast may, of course, get an archon's name wrong: in this particular note, the last of the five is in fact

wrong—but it is a scribe's error, for we have gibberish (Καλαμινος for Καλλιμήδους) and not another name. Until we have a better date to set against it, we should surely accept the date he gives us, which gives the colony a perfectly plausible life of about twelve years, instead of proposing emendations that, whatever their paleographic plausibility, do not make historical sense.²³

Another case where Thucydides has been similarly treated is that of Pausanias. Not too long ago, few scholars doubted the statement in Justin (9.1.3) that he stayed in Byzantium for seven years after “founding” it. Thucydides does not contradict this. In the Pentecontaetia excursus he tells us nothing about Pausanias after Sparta's decision not to send him out as commander in chief again (95.5–6): his later actions were not relevant to Thucydides' theme in the excursus. It is only in the detailed Pausanias story that we learn of his sailing unofficially, on a trireme of Hermione, to Byzantium, to continue the Hellenic War (128.3; 131.1: in Thucydides' opinion, of course, to continue his plotting), until he is expelled by the Athenians, who take the place by siege. He then withdraws to Colonae and continues his intrigues, until the Spartans send him an ultimatum and force him to return. The length of his stay at either place is not mentioned: it may have been weeks or years, for all we can tell.

It has been shown, especially by Fornara, that the events ascribed to his first stay (quite apart from the inherent implausibility of the reported correspondence) cannot be fitted into the few months that is all we can allow for it on the strength of Thucydides 1.94–95. Moreover, Cimon's capture of Byzantium (as also of Sestus, apparently about the same time) is attested in a well-known story told by Ion of Chios and popular in later writers (see Plut. *Cim.* 9.2–3). Thucydides' firm statement that Eion was the first operation of the new league shows that no capture of Byzantium or Sestus by league forces can be put before it, i.e. at once after Pausanias' arrival. (In fact, his seizure of Byzantium was no doubt made easier by the fact that the allied fleet had left.) After this, the list of operations in Thucydides is clearly selective: only Scyrus and Carystus are mentioned before the Naxian revolt, which cannot have ended before the mid-sixties. (See below.) Thucydides certainly excluded operations that merely retook what had been taken before and then lost. Both Byzantium (although not first taken by the Athenians) and Sestus might be excluded by this criterion, and we do not know how many other cities may have been retaken by the Persians (or rejoined them) so

that they had to be “liberated” afresh. The remarkably thin record of the league, at a time when one would expect Cimon to be winning major successes, is probably to be explained along the lines suggested by the casual attestation of the sequence for these operations, and the only relevant figure we have—Justin’s for Pausanias’ stay in Byzantium—should be accepted, at least until we can improve on it. It presumably derives from local sources, where the record of the *ktistes* would be kept.²⁴

The question of how the Athenians could tolerate Pausanias’ presence there for so long does not, strictly speaking, concern us here. But an indication should be given if the date is to be acceptable. First, as has been widely recognized (and was stressed by Fornara), Pausanias’ departure may have been unofficial, but he claimed to be returning to lead the Hellenic War (he would hardly be returning to it as a private in rank), and he had his *skytale*, which seems to show him a commander on active service. Moreover, it is clear that he had much support at Sparta, even though it was not judged politic to try to impose him on the Greek allies again. (Indeed, he evidently still had some support after his second return to Sparta.) There can be no doubt that his occupation of Byzantium, although a thorn in Athens’ side, was at least unofficially (and perhaps quite officially, once he was there, whatever the manner of his departure) supported by Sparta, where not all were happy to see the increasing and unchecked power of Athens’ new league:²⁵ after all, the *skytale* recalling him could have been sent at any time, had the ephors chosen to do so; but no college did, as long as he was in Byzantium. It is clear that he could not have been expelled except at the risk of grave offense to Sparta (which Cimon would not be prepared to give), or even a war.

In 471/70 (if the seven years are counted from his first arrival) the Spartans allowed Cimon to expel Pausanias from Byzantium, but allowed Pausanias to settle at Colonae. We obviously have not nearly enough evidence to penetrate behind the secrecy of whatever negotiations must have preceded this major event. It cannot be that the Spartans (or the great majority of them) had been genuinely convinced of his Medism, else the interlude at Colonae would not have been permitted. But we do not know how long he stayed at Colonae. In Sparta policy could change with the election of a new board of ephors, and the simplest view is that, within a year or two, ephors hostile to him were in a majority and thus sent the ultimatum to Colonae that recalled him. But

the final recall no doubt also had something to do with the need for help from Athens after the earthquake and the helot revolt: we shall consider these matters very soon.

471/70 was also the year of Themistocles' ostracism, at least as Diodorus found it dated in his source. Unfortunately we have no idea how Ephorus arranged his history (except for the unhelpful statement that it was by subject matter),²⁶ but we have no reason to believe that he gave no dates at all. Diodorus, following him, at times has obvious difficulties in slicing his model into plausible annual layers, but much of the time he seems in fact to have a key date and, probably quite consciously, arranges a large and coherent body of narrative around it. This is what he does under 471/70, when he tells the whole tale of Themistocles' last years, clearly without being under the impression (or trying to convey it to his readers) that all those events took place in a single year: like Thucydides (at times), he is merely telling a coherent story, attached to a crucial date. *What* he here found dated is not difficult to see. For one thing, it is quite clear from Thucydides (and it should never have been doubted) that the actual conviction of Themistocles, promptly followed by the demand for his extradition, found him still based on Argos (135.3); whatever political events may have taken place at Argos during this time (and some of the speculations linking Themistocles with anti-Spartan movements in Peloponnese, and trying to trace political events at Argos itself, may well be correct),²⁷ it is clear that he did not give up his Argive domicile until the demand for extradition made it unsafe.

After this, he first turned to the west—a sure indication that there was no foundation for the charge of Medism. (Indeed, we may well believe that there was a prize set on his head by the King, as Plutarch tells us [*Them.* 26.1].) He found no safety at Corcyra, which was open to pressure from Athenian ships, and fled overland to Admetus; there he may have been safe for a while, but before long (137.1) the envoys calling for his extradition caught up with him. From there he went overland to Pydna and then by ship straight to Asia Minor. Since he arrived in Asia some time in 465, and his journeys must have taken at least several months (we may conjecture that he was safe at Admetus' court over the winter) but not more than a year, his conviction, and final departure from Argos, must come in 466. Hence what Diodorus found under 471/70 was his ostracism. Diodorus himself actually makes this plain to the careful reader: at the end of his whole story, which has led him to Themistocles' death, he comments on how strange it is that his city (this

must be understood as the subject) chose to deprive itself of such a man (11.58.4–5).²⁸ The date should be accepted, and some connection with the expulsion of Pausanias from Byzantium in the same year is an obvious possibility, in view of the attested later connection between the fates of the two men. Moreover, it is possible—although, as so often, we cannot be sure that we can separate truth from later embroidery—that Themistocles was ostracized after an attempt to prosecute him had failed: this, at least, is stated by Diodorus (11.54); Plutarch seems to have a similar story in his source, but found this unsuccessful prosecution after the ostracism (*Them.* 23.4ff.: after Pausanias’ death—but the presentation is not very clear, and Plutarch seems to be trying to make sense of two different sources that he remembered). In any case, further speculation would be pointless: whatever in fact happened, there was no one to record it. The return of Pausanias from Colona, however, may with some confidence be put in 468 (469/8 or 468/7 and his death in 467/6, not later than early spring 466, if we are to have time for the evidence against Themistocles to be “found” and transmitted to Athens and for the trial and conviction there to be arranged, all by the middle of the year or not long after (see above).

Finally, the only other problem that needs extended discussion is, of course, that of the Spartan earthquake and the helot revolt. I avoided discussing it when writing about the Peace of Callias (Chapter 1 above), since the views I tried to develop on that issue do not depend on the way one chooses to resolve this problem. However, let me now say that it seems to me another case where Thucydides’ admittedly idiosyncratic way of telling his story in the excursus has been misunderstood. Hammond’s attempt to disentangle the evidence, reinforced by Sealey’s analysis of Thucydides’ text, has been comfortably ignored by the fundamentalists, and will no doubt continue to be; but it is obviously necessary to draw attention to the facts in this context, and above all to proper ways of approaching the evidence.

Hammond started by noting that Plutarch’s accounts of two different Athenian expeditions in connection with the revolt, which had always been written off as doublets due to his inability to handle his sources, are in fact clearly differentiated. For the first expedition, which Plutarch places when Archidamus had just saved Sparta from being overrun by her subjects after the initial disaster of the earthquake, he not only uses the evidence in Aristophanes’ *Lysistrata* 1137ff. (which we also have in full) where Pericleidas is shown as a suppliant sitting at the altar and

appealing for help, and Cimon is said to have marched out with four thousand hoplites and saved Sparta, but he also had a reported speech by Ephialtes in opposition to aid, and Ion's report of Cimon's famous metaphor of the yokemates (*Cim.* 16), both implying that Sparta was in serious danger. (As we can see in the case of the *Lysistrata*, the whole contexts would probably make this point even clearer than Plutarch's excerpts do.) It is on his return from Peloponnese "after aiding the Spartans" that Cimon has a brief altercation with the Corinthians. There is then another appeal to the Athenians, this time to aid Sparta against the Messenians and helots at Ithome (clearly the appeal mentioned by Thucydides), and this time the Athenians are soon sent back and regard this as an insult, so that they now adopt an anti-Spartan policy.

The date of the earthquake and (by implication) the first appeal is unfortunately not to be gathered from Plutarch. He puts the earthquake in the fourth year of Archidamus; but the dates of the Spartan kings at this time and their treatment in ancient lists are a notorious crux, and we do not know what dates he had for the reign of Archidamus. Diodorus, as is well known, consistently gives dates that are several years too early, even though they conflict with his actual narrative: thus Archidamus is made to succeed in 476/5 (11.48.2) and to die in 434/3 (12.35.4), but he then quite properly appears in the Archidamian War. We cannot tell whether Plutarch had what appears to be the true date, six years later than Diodorus'. He certainly tells the story of how the king saved Sparta in almost the same way as Diodorus.

Diodorus has the account of the earthquake and its consequences under 469/8 (11.63–64): once more, he includes the whole story under that year, saying at the end that the war at Ithome lasted ten years. He gives only one appeal to Athens, but seems to imply that the Athenians stayed for some considerable time before they were sent home (64.2): two stages are distinguished, first a successful one, later one in which the Spartans began to suspect the Athenians and finally sent them home. We cannot argue from his silence, of course. We must always remember that what an ancient writer (be he Thucydides or Diodorus) chooses to omit or to include may not accord with what our own choice would have been; and Diodorus was, after all, a large-scale epitomator, who had to find space for the outline of the story, plus his doses of moralism which he considered his important contribution, by omitting some things. I have previously tried to show that he omitted the Peace of Calias negotiated after the Eurymedon, either because he genuinely did not

realize that there were two such treaties at different times or (more likely) from choice, since the first one was soon broken and had no long-term effect.²⁹ *Mutatis mutandis*, similar arguments may explain why he might choose to report only one appeal, even if his source gave two. His date for the outbreak is slightly impugned by his later putting the end of the war “about the same time” as the *periplous* of Tolmides, under 456/5 (11.84.8). But this is a piece of background to the settlement of the Messenians at Naupactus, which he ascribes to Tolmides, and the chronological phrase is almost certainly his own addition—comparable with the view of some modern scholars who also have thought that the settlement of the Messenians must immediately follow the end of the Ithome war. We may confidently take it that 469/8 was the date that he found for the earthquake in his source, attaching the whole account to it in his usual fashion.

As has often been pointed out, there is support for that date. A scholiast on the *Lysistrata* passage we have noted in fact dates the lemma *Kimón* (line 1144) to 468/7, in two convergent ways. He tells the story of the earthquake and the revolt “until Cimon came because of the appeal and saved them” (repeating the poet’s words). The scholia get their dates from the *Atthis* tradition, and the author just mentioned in another connection is in fact Philochorus. The *Atthidographers* undoubtedly used archival material, and their dates are usually regarded as good tradition. There is no reason to doubt that this date should be accepted. (Of course, it is not a date for the earthquake: what the *Atthidographer* would find dated was the Spartan appeal and Cimon’s expedition, and indeed the date, as we have seen, is attached to Cimon’s name.)

The date would normally have been accepted as a matter of course. But we note with surprise (or perhaps no longer with surprise) that in this instance it has been thought to contradict Thucydides and has therefore been almost unanimously ignored by the fundamentalist tradition. (I have noted two exceptions *honoris causa*.) What date does Thucydides give?

He does not give a date at all, of course, any more than for anything else. Any dates derived from his *Pentecontaetia* excursus are put in by modern calculation and argument, based on certain principles of interpretation of Thucydides and occasionally on evidence from other sources, which is readily accepted if it does not seem to contradict that interpretation. (We have commented on the colonies in Thrace and the date of Drabescus, one of the best illustrations of this modern method.)

Thucydides brings up the earthquake in a peculiar way, in a context intended as a showpiece of his theory in Book 1, that Sparta was responsible for the war and was constantly plotting and intriguing against Athens, long before she thought the time ripe for starting it.³⁰ It comes into the notorious promise to aid Thasos by invading Attica (100.2), which Sparta is said to have formally made, and have been preparing to carry out, but which the consequences of the earthquake made it impossible to fulfill.

The story is strategically placed in his argument. Chapter 99 makes the case that the Athenians, although strict taskmasters, did nothing illegal to the allies, and that the allies were themselves responsible for their enslavement; 100 starts with the great victory at the Eurymedon, the greatest achievement of the Athenian alliance, and goes on to register the revolt of Thasos, for reasons that are obscurely and ambiguously worded. Then (101) comes the appeal to Sparta, which the Spartans unhesitatingly accept (keeping it secret from the Athenians): as we have seen, they are on the point of carrying out their immoral promise when the consequences of the earthquake make it impossible; and in the next chapter (102) the Spartans appeal to Athens for aid, under the terms of the very alliance that they had been on the point of breaking.

This remarkable concentration of special pleading must make us look at the text with special care: any author trying so hard to palm off an essentially implausible argument is likely to use obscurity of expression in the service of the cause, just as Thucydides can in fact be seen doing in the case of the revolt of Thasos.³¹ Yet many have believed the story of the Spartan promise, about to be carried out (it may be said to have become the test case of diehard fundamentalism: parallels in other fields will readily occur); and those who have not have tried to preserve Thucydides' innocence and his competence—no easy task, in this instance—by a variety of arguments and have not drawn the necessary conclusion from the implausibility that they refuse to accept.

It was the singular merit of Raphael Sealey, in an unpretentious note, to draw attention to Thucydides' phrase, that the Spartans were prevented from carrying out their promise ὑπὸ τοῦ γενομένου σεισμοῦ. Sealey showed, by analysis of Thucydides' usage, that this must mean "by the earthquake which had (previously) happened"—the obvious *prima facie* meaning for (say) an elementary student of Greek, but rejected by his betters because they preferred to know what Thucydides "must have" meant. Indeed, the application of standard philological

method to the phrase thirty years ago, which would normally have been accepted as decisive, has in this case been largely ignored, or even rejected with arguments that illustrate the victory of prejudice over method and linguistic training.³²

Sealey's note ought to have marked a turning point in discussion of this matter, and ought to have opened up more general questions regarding Thucydides. It is time to rescue the argument and to put it within its context: only thus can the strictly chronological problem be approached. Thucydides is indeed saying that the Spartans were prevented from carrying out their nefarious promise "by the earthquake which had (previously) happened"—i.e. (to follow Sealey further) by the consequences of that earthquake, which (as was surely well known) had happened some time before the Thasian revolt: after all, in its religious context (see, e.g., Paus. 4.24.6; Aelian, *VH* 6.7) as later interpreted, it was indeed, as Diodorus describes it, *μεγάλη καὶ παρὰδοξος συμφορὰ*, and such things were precisely what would long be remembered. But everyone presumably also knew that the immediate consequence of the earthquake, which flattened much of Sparta and seemed to leave her helpless, had been an attack on the city, which was saved by the resolution of Archidamus and by the loyalty of Sparta's allies. All this is not mentioned by Thucydides, in his search for a good reason for the Spartans' failure to fulfill the promise. What he does say is that they were prevented by the earthquake which had happened, "*when the helots . . . went to Ithome in rebellion against them.*"³³ In other words, Thucydides has not mentioned the first and most dangerous consequence of the earthquake (no doubt well known to his contemporaries), because he did not need to use it in this context.³⁴ As throughout the excursus, he only selects and presents to us what will contribute to his thesis. Surely not even the fundamentalist should be surprised at the omission of what was not relevant to the immediate point. As in many such cases, his contemporaries would know, and later generations, for his purposes, did not *need* to know. Having made his actual point, he goes on to hammer it home (101.3): "Against those at Ithome a war had developed for the Lacedaemonians; but the Thasians, in the third year of the siege . . . (surrendered, on terms)." It was the unexpected long-term consequence of the earthquake, the war at Ithome (a war that, as he next goes on to say in 102.1, became drawn out), that is connected with the failure to fulfill the promise to Thasos.

It is the best that Thucydides could do to resolve the problem he had

created for himself with the promise to Thasos—not a perfect solution, because we must surely suppose that the Spartans making the promise knew that the war they were fighting at home was by no means finished, even if they were later surprised by the resistance at Ithome. Perhaps Thucydides missed a chance of implying that the promise was not made in good faith toward the Thasians. But that would merely have weakened his case: what he wanted to show was that it was a flagrant piece of treachery toward *Athens*, followed by the flagrant piece of hypocrisy of the appeal; so the intention to carry it out had to be stressed as genuine and unalloyed. Suppressing the well-known immediate consequence of the great earthquake helps to give the impression that the development of the Ithome war was indeed something new and unexpected, sufficient to account for the fact that the Spartans evidently did *not* aid Thasos, and yet making the report of the promise to do so (and the positive preparations implied) acceptable to those who wished to believe. That those who did not know the facts (or Greek grammar) might also be misled into thinking that the earthquake itself intervened, and that the withdrawal of the helots and their allies to Ithome was in fact its immediate consequence, would (if he ever considered it) be irrelevant to what he wanted to convey—or might be all to the good.

To sum up: nothing in Thucydides should prevent us from believing the well-attested date for the great earthquake, followed by the acute danger to Sparta, which we might well have imagined for ourselves, but which in fact happens to be amply attested. It did not last very long, and it was followed by the withdrawal of the rebels to Ithome, where a reasonably mobile war (with the rebels, we are told, terrorizing the countryside from their secure base) seems gradually to have developed into a *Stellungskrieg*, tying down much-needed Spartan forces without hope of progress. The circuit of Ithome was simply ample enough to enable the rebels to grow their supplies, and the war thus settled down to a stalemate. The withdrawal to Ithome as a base can probably be dated with some confidence. If Cimon's expedition took place in 468/7 (see above), i.e. presumably in the spring, it is likely that the rebels were beaten out of the open country by the end of that season and fortified their position at Ithome in the winter of 467/6. In the end the Spartans decided that the situation must be resolved, and this could only be done by a direct assault. For reasons not entirely clear to us, the Athenians—so Thucydides (102.2) and Herodotus (9.70) concordantly tell us—had a reputation for skill at assaulting walls (τειχομαχεῖν).³⁵ We do not

know what happened—whether assaults were tried and failed, or whether the Athenians decided it was not worth attempting (after all, they had just gone through a siege of over two years, rather than try a costly assault, and they were not likely to take greater risks for the sake of Sparta). In any case, the Athenians' performance was disappointing, and this must be the factual background to Spartan dissatisfaction. The plain fact was that, since it was customary for the ally calling in aid to pay for the expenses of those who followed the call, the Spartans would see no reason to keep the large Athenian force there if they had failed in their main purpose of ending the war by an assault. The reason they are said to have given for sending the Athenians home (102.3 *fin.*: that they did not need them any longer) may be taken as literally true, although put with the Spartans' customary lack of diplomatic finesse. Sparta had no great public wealth and literally could not afford to feed useless allies.

Thucydides' explanation of the main reason for the Athenians' dismissal (102.3: taken over by Diod. 11.64.3), that the Athenians were suspect as being audacious revolutionaries and alien in race (ἄλλόφυλοι), is not easily believed. As to the former, it involves the belief (based on Plut. *Cim.* 15.2) that Ephialtes had passed his laws in the fortuitous absence of Cimon and his supporters in Peloponnese (a belief common in modern scholarship); yet in that case it seems absurd that the Spartans should hold those Athenians whose absence had made the "revolutionary" legislation possible responsible for it: their trusted friend Cimon would have every opportunity of explaining the facts to them. Indeed, it has even been suggested that Cimon himself was eager to leave, when he heard that the laws of Ephialtes had been passed, and that he hoped to have them repealed. But that clearly will not do either: it does not account for the Athenians' resentment. A voluntary departure could not have been distorted into a mortal insult by the Spartans. As to the Athenians' being alien in race, it makes no sense to allege the fact that the Athenians were Ionians (and I do not want to deny that that difference may at times have been important) as making them more likely to support Dorian Messenians against Dorian Spartans. Thucydides' "explanation" of the dismissal is pure fiction. The Athenian democracy obviously found it irreconcilable with its self-confidence and its self-esteem (not to mention the image it wanted to project abroad) to acknowledge the truth of Sparta's reason for the dismissal: that the Athenian soldiers had been brought in to storm the enemy's fortifica-

tions at Ithome and that they had failed, hence were not needed any longer and could not be permitted to be a burden to the Spartan treasury. Yet in the light of Thucydides' own narrative, this is the only explanation that makes sense.

The propagandist version retailed by Thucydides, incidentally, helps to mitigate the fact that it was the Athenians who broke the treaty with Sparta, the validity of which they had just recognized. That uncomfortable fact no doubt also helps to account for the invention of the Spartan promise to support Thasos, just before Sparta came to beg for Athenian aid. The universal acceptance of the propagandist version by modern scholars is one of the most striking examples of the way in which the fundamentalist attitude to Thucydides has succeeded in stifling all critical evaluation of what he offers.

Let me finally add that I think the story of the passing of Ephialtes' laws in the absence of the army—a story based on Plut. *Cim.* 15.2, which I regard as spun out of Thucydides' version of the Athenians' dismissal—rather unlikely. Legislation opposed by one leading politician and supported by another is more likely to be passed after an ostracism than before: compare the case of Aristides and Themistocles in the 480s. I would therefore put the passing of the legislation after Cimon's return, and most probably after his ostracism (though a date *just* before cannot be excluded): it was a result of the resentment at the dismissal of the Athenians, which turned the Demos against Cimon as the author of the policy that had led to that dismissal, hence should be regarded as another manifestation of that change in Athens that led to Cimon's ostracism.

Having presented my personal views on what seem to me the principal problems—both general methodological problems and some detailed problems concerning particular incidents—in the chronology of this period, I can now proceed to set out a tentative chronological list of some major events. It will not aim at including all—or even all important—events. Thus it will omit practically everything that is only epigraphically attested. Even though such contemporary attestation is in principle superior to (e.g.) Thucydides, it is well known how parlous the dating of inscriptions of this period at present is, and it would take me much too far to discuss it. Almost the only secure date for a major event during this period provided by an inscription is the date of the first payment of Athena's quota of the tribute of the allies, which must (although this has actually been doubted) give us the date when the league treasury

was transferred to Athens. That date, at least, is secure, as are the very few dates (I think) that go back to the archival researches of the Attidographers of the fourth century, as collected for us (usually) by Philochorus, who seems to have been the source of most of the scholiasts for dates, where they give any explicit source reference at all. Other dates can usually be only tentative: we have seen that even Thucydides could not easily discover them, and that he did not agree with what Hellanicus claimed to have been able to do.

Where I think a problem has been adequately (for chronological purposes) discussed above, I shall not give the same references again. In some other cases, brief annotation will be offered. One problem that I have found totally intractable is that of the battle of Oenoe. It will be recalled that it is known to us only from two different references in Pausanias (1.15.1 and 10.10.3): in Athens it is said to have been depicted in the Stoa Poikile (in fact, it seems to have been the only nonmythical battle apart from Marathon—the foundation myth of Athenian greatness—depicted there), as a battle between Athenians and Lacedaemonians; at Delphi, the Argives commemorated it as a victory by Argives over Lacedaemonians, although they acknowledged some Athenian aid. The Athenian commemoration was unique, the Argive one perhaps uniquely lavish: bronze statues of the Seven Against Thebes, and (so Pausanias adds) perhaps the Epigoni as well, though he apparently found no clear evidence (such as a dedication) for this. Yet the battle is not mentioned in any historian. Needless to say, it has been all the more discussed in modern times, but not to much effect, since the data make the problem at present insoluble. Most of the explanations offered have suggested that Pausanias must be mistaken: perhaps the battle depicted in Athens was not that of Oenoe at all (which would certainly be helpful in explaining Thucydides' silence); perhaps it was the brilliant victory of Oenophyta—a site dedicated to a nymph called Oenoë; or perhaps it was really a mythical battle.³⁶ Meiggs, in the most sensible discussion to be found,³⁷ has collected the main views expressed down to about twenty years ago. His own suggestion avoids paradox: he thinks it was a minor engagement, soon after the Athenian treaty with Argos around 460, which at the time seemed important and memorable, but was almost forgotten by the time Thucydides wrote his excursus. It nonetheless remains surprising that the Athenians should have so strikingly commemorated a minor battle in which they played only a minor part (for the Argive version is surely to be preferred, since Oenoe was an

Argive village), and ignored the real victors; and that (even if Thucydides chose to omit it, for whatever reason—perhaps precisely because it was not really an Athenian battle, but wrongly claimed as such—in his brief account of Athens' rise to greatness) Diodorus did not find it celebrated in Ephorus. After all, it must have been the one battle, apart from Marathon, which everyone living in Athens or visiting the city could literally never overlook.³⁸

An important article by Francis and Vickers (amplified by another article, trying to interpret what was actually depicted in the Stoa)³⁹ suggests that the Argive dedication at Delphi was a response to the Spartan dedication recording the victory of Tanagra at Olympia (Paus. 10.14.3)—as they point out, the opposite can also be argued, and has been. But against that, we must remember that it is the glorification of Oenoe that needs explaining, not that of Tanagra. They also make clear that the subject of the Argive dedication (the Seven Against Thebes, and perhaps the Epigoni as well) makes more sense as celebrating an Argive victory in Boeotia (i.e., Oenophyta, if Argives assisted the Athenians) than one in Argos. Unfortunately, there is no positive evidence for Argive participation at Oenophyta, as we have noted. But the comment on the subject of the dedication is just, and it justifies the conjecture. It may lead us further.

It has been noted many times (see, e.g., Meiggs' treatment, *Athenian Empire*) that the design of the decoration, as described by Pausanias, suggests that the depiction of Oenoe was added later—an afterthought, and not an inherent part of the original mythological paintings. It may be suggested that, although Stier's thesis must be rejected, the *influence* of the battle of Oenophyta may be retained. Oenophyta, as Stier pointed out, was named after the nymph Oenoe, who was no doubt its patron deity. After the victory, the nymph who had presided over the victory at Argive Oenoe may have got the credit for the greater victory as well. The Argives, in particular, would celebrate their role in the victory of Argive Oenoe by honoring its nymph with a monument alluding to the greater success: the symbolism would be apparent, especially to contemporaries (by Pausanias' day the battle of Oenophyta had apparently been forgotten), even as the dedication referred to the lesser and earlier of the two. I suggest that this inspired the Athenian painting. Wishing to answer the Spartan dedication for Tanagra (which, after all, had not been a great victory), they saw no point in depicting a victory of their own over Boeotians: only a victory over Spartans would be a proper

reply—and there were surely not many to choose from. Hence the choice of Oenoe, which had indeed been (though only in part) an Athenian victory over Spartans, and which might (again for contemporaries) convey the allusion to a greater victory, presided over by the same nymph (who was no doubt shown in the painting: this may in fact have been how the scene was identified), over a lesser enemy, not worth depicting.

No explanation is ever likely to be fully satisfactory. But I think it is helpful to allow for the multivalence of symbols, which may apply to the painting in Athens no less than to the groups of statues dedicated at Delphi.

I have also ignored some of the events attested for Peloponnese, as in most cases dates are impossible to obtain with any degree of confidence. And I must again stress that the table that follows is intended only as a working model: few of the dates are intended as precise, although I should be surprised if a great deal of change were possible in most cases.

List of Events

DATE	EVENT	NOTES AND REFERENCES (where not discussed above) ⁴⁰
478–477	Pausanias' campaign and recall; Delian League founded.	
477	Pausanias' acquittal and return to Byzantium, where he is received into the city. ⁴¹	
477/6	Cimon's capture of Eion, the first operation of the league (Thuc.).	Both Diod. 11.60 and <i>FGrHist</i> 70 F191 (an Ephorus epitome?) put Eion and Scyrus straight after the capture of Byzantium (hence 477?).
476/5	Attempted colonization and disaster at Eion. Capture of Scyrus. (Probably) Transfer of "Theseus' bones" to Athens. Cleruchs sent.	Schol. Aesch. 2.31; Plut. <i>Cim.</i> 7. Plut. <i>Thes.</i> 36.1. ⁴²

List of Events (*continued*)

DATE	EVENT	NOTES AND REFERENCES
?	Agreement with Carystus.	Thuc. 98.3 puts this straight after Scyrus, but speaks of a long war, settled by agreement.
	(Operations to recapture cities lost to Persian counterattacks are likely at this time: see text, pp. 86–87.)	
471/70	Ostracism (after unsuccessful prosecution?) of Themistocles. Expulsion of Pausanias from Byzantium (he moves to Colonae). Recapture of Sestus by Cimon. ⁴³	
469/8	Great earthquake at Sparta, followed by attack on the city.	If Diodorus (Ephorus) had evidence for this date. (He may have deduced it: cf. 468/7.)
468	Recall of Pausanias to Sparta.	
468/7	Pericleidas' mission to Athens. Cimon's expedition to Laconia (spring 467). Battle of Dipaea?	
	Argive war (assisted by Tegea and Cleonae) against Mycenae.	Diod. 11.65 (when Sparta could not help because of the earthquake; the war seems to go on into the next year); cf. Str. 8.6.19; Paus. 7.25.5–6 (Mycenaeans expelled).
467/6	Battle of "the Isthmus": Messenians and their allies withdraw to Ithome. Revolt of Naxos. Investment of city. Death of Pausanias. Conviction of Themistocles.	Probably in autumn, after defeat by Sparta's allies, fortifying the site over the winter. ⁴⁴
466	Battle of Eurymedon.	
466/5	Peace negotiations between Athens and Xerxes. (Spring 465) Peace of Callias?	See Chapter 1 above. (Also for relevant items below.)

List of Events (*continued*)

DATE	EVENT	NOTES AND REFERENCES
465	(Early summer?) Themistocles' arrival in Asia. (August) Death of Xerxes. Artaxerxes gradually confirms his control. Fall of Naxos (after midsummer).	
465-463	Naval expeditions by Ephialtes and Pericles	
465/4	Athenian war against Aegina?? ⁴⁵ Revolt of Thasos. Investment of city. Colony at Ennea Hodoi (later site of Amphipolis).	The supposed appeal to Sparta (perhaps genuine) and the Spartan promise (certainly not) should be put here.
464	(Summer?) Callias' mission to Artaxerxes.	
463	Fall of Thasos.	
463/2	(Winter) Prosecution of Cimon.	
462	(Spring) Cimon's Ithome campaign.	
462/1	Reforms of Ephialtes. (Spring 461) Ostracism of Cimon, after struggle over the reforms. Death of Ephialtes.	The reforms fall in autumn 462, if Plut. <i>Cim.</i> 15.3 can be accepted; but perhaps rather after Cimon's disgrace, connected with anti-Spartan reaction. (See discussion in text.)
461/60	Alliance of Athens with Argos and Thessaly.	Thuc. 102.4.
460/59	(Spring) Expedition to Cyprus, later to Egypt.	Thuc. 104.
459	Megara joins the triple alliance. ⁴⁶	Thuc. 103.4; Diod. 11.79.
458	(Spring) Battles of Halieis and Cecryphalaea.	Thuc. 105-6. (Note that a force that had fought at Halieis was sent to strengthen besieged Aegina.)

List of Events (*continued*)

DATE	EVENT	NOTES AND REFERENCES
	(Autumn) Defeat of Aegina and allies. Investment of city. ⁴⁷ Peloponnesian invasion of Megarid; victories of Myronides with "oldest and youngest." Phocian attack on Doris. ⁴⁸	Diod. 11.78-79.
458/7?	End of Ithome war and departure of Messenians. ⁴⁹ (Winter) Athenians begin to build Long Walls.	Thuc. 107.1.
457	(Spring) Spartan invasion of central Greece with large force: defeat of Phocians and establishment of Theban power. Battle of Tanagra (May-June?) and Spartan withdrawal, followed by four months' truce. Surrender of Aegina (June?). Recall of Cimon? ⁵¹	Thuc. 107.2-108.2; Diod. 11.79.5-80; and cf. 81. ⁵⁰
	(Autumn) Myronides' campaign in central Greece.	Plut. <i>Cim.</i> 17.8; <i>FGrHist</i> 115 F88. Thuc. 108.2-4; ⁵² Diod. 11.81-83.
456	<i>Periplous</i> of Tolmides; capture of Naupactus and (or, if Naupactus already held, <i>at least</i>) settlement of Messenians from Ithome there. ⁵³	Thuc. 108.5; Diod. 11.84 (details differ); Paus. 1.27.5 (showing Thuc. is very sketchy).
455/4	(Autumn?) Attempt to restore Orestes to Pharsalus.	Thuc. 111.1; Diod. 11.83.3-4: joined to Myronides' campaign of 457. (Myronides' name should be correct.)
	(Spring?) Pericles' campaign in northern Peloponnese and Acarnania. (Presumably before news of the Egyptian disaster reached Athens.)	Thuc. 111.2-3 ("a short time after" the Thessalian expedition); Diod. 11.85.1 (cf. 88.1 and Plut. <i>Per.</i> 19). ⁵⁴
454/3	Egyptian disaster (late 454).	

List of Events (*continued*)

DATE	EVENT	NOTES AND REFERENCES
453/2	Disaster of Drabescus.	Schol. Aesch. 2.31; see pp. 81ff. above, with notes.
451	Cimon's (official?) return; five years' truce with Peloponnesians (midsummer or autumn).	Thuc. 112.2; cf. n. 51.
450	(Spring) Cyprian-Egyptian campaign.	Thuc. 112.1 ff.; Diod. 12.3; Plut. <i>Cim.</i> 18.
450/49	(Autumn) Death of Cimon. (Winter) Supply difficulties and decision to abandon Cyprus. (Spring) Battle of Cyprian Salamis.	Thuc. 112.1 ff.; Diod. 12.4; Plut. <i>Cim.</i> 18–19. (On all this see End-note to Chapter 1 above.)
449?	"Sacred War" over control of Delphi.	Thuc. 112.5; Plut. <i>Per.</i> 21. (Not really datable, but some time before late 447 [?—see Thuc. 113.1].)
449	Renewal of Peace of Callias.	See Chapter 1 above. ⁵⁵

APPENDIX

While reading the proofs of this book, I was able, for the first time, to look at volume V of the new *Cambridge Ancient History* (Cambridge 1992). Since that work is likely to remain authoritative for a generation or longer, I ought to comment briefly on one or two points relevant to the first two chapters of this book.

On the Peace of Callias, I am surprised that my article, published in 1987, does not seem to have been known to D. M. Lewis when he wrote his chapter, which includes a long discussion of the Peace (pp. 121–27). No notice is taken of my main arguments, and two footnotes with incidental references to minor points are obviously late additions. One of them (p. 122 n. 4) again claims that the Argive embassy to King Artaxerxes that coincides with Callias' makes good sense "after they had been allied to Athens for a decade," in 450/49. The wording (why should the Argives have waited ten years, since they were obviously so much concerned about retaining the King's friendship?) brings out the

weakness of that case. (See pp. 68–69 above.) It should be emphasized that Lewis is (in another context) well aware of the events in Peloponnese that might have caused the Argives to reassure themselves regarding the new King's friendship in the sixties.

As regards my study of the chronology, more needs to be said. First, Lewis (always at his best where epigraphical evidence is concerned) has decisively (I think) used changes in tribute to date Pericles' Chersonesian expedition after 449 (p. 128). This was known as the most likely date (see n. 54 above) and securely puts the expedition outside the period surveyed in my study.

Lewis is less successful in his treatment of the *agōnes* of Tisamenus (see n. 44 above). He supplies much interesting topographical and numismatic information about Peloponnesian events in the 460s, but the list of the *agōnes* must remain the principal evidence, and he does not treat it coherently where he alludes to it (pp. 104ff.) and does not in fact date all the battles it includes. His suggestion that the battle of Dipaea should not be dated after the earthquake but on the occasion of "a raid to support pro-Spartans at Mantinea" seems to me fanciful speculation, and other dates, where he gives them, are naturally dominated by his views about the earthquake, which I do not share.

On the earthquake (one of the crucial chronological puzzles of the 460s and the key to any historical interpretation of the period) the traditional chronology is adopted, defended (as far as I can see) only by two very inadequate arguments.

P. J. Rhodes, in an incidental reference (p. 69), tries to explain the attestation of two separate Athenian expeditions in the sources (see my treatment above) by postulating "rival accounts with different chronologies" in antiquity. Apart from doubts one might have regarding the origin of such rival chronologies, that view is put out of court by the plain fact, stressed long ago by Hammond, that the two expeditions are set in very precise and entirely different contexts as regards events in Peloponnese. No one trying to formulate a rival chronology to one already in historical works would have *invented* an entirely different historical framework for it: like modern scholars putting forward a new theory, the claim would probably have been that it offered a better explanation of the known historical context. Moreover (and above all), both expeditions, as we saw, are attested by what one must consider sources writing in the next generation (though, of course, not contemporary with the events): the earlier by Aristophanes, the later by Thu-

cydides. It seems easiest to account for the two reports by accepting the fact that both expeditions are historical, but that none of our sources except for the biographer Plutarch, writing a life of Cimon, had occasion to mention both of them. This is the argument put forward in my discussion above.

Lewis presents a different argument, in a selective chronological note (pp. 499ff.), and one that he has unfortunately made it impossible to deal with. He argues that the date for the earthquake and revolt in Pausanias (4.24.5) “obviously rests on calculation” (it comes to 464/3) and that the date in the *Atthis* (which he admits was 469/8) was arrived at by calculation as well, i.e., by counting ten years “back from the point at which Thucydides appears to put the end” of the revolt; the only “obviously independent dating” is the one to the fourth year of Archidamus in Plutarch (*Cim.* 16.4). He himself puts the beginning of the revolt (by calculation from Thucydides!) in the winter of 465/4. He rejects the linguistically correct translation of Thucydides’ phrase introducing the first mention of the (obviously known) earthquake (see n. 32 with text, above) as “not a likely interpretation of Thucydides”: unfortunately, for purposes of discussion, he, unlike some other scholars, cautiously avoids giving us his own interpretation. In the circumstances, it is methodologically necessary to accept Sealey’s until it is refuted by argument.

Worse still—and this makes serious examination of more than one of his chronological remarks impossible—he nowhere discusses the question of Spartan regnal dates: he merely calls it, perhaps correctly, “an insoluble problem” (p. 499). How, then, are we to tell whether his calculation for the beginning of the revolt actually coincides with what he considers the one independent attestation, by regnal years of Archidamus? The implication is that he takes Archidamus to have come to the throne in 468/7. Diodorus twice assigns Archidamus a reign of 42 years (11.48.2 and 12.35.4: the actual dates are wildly wrong). Lewis does not even tell us whether he accepts the figure. He puts Archidamus’ death in 427 (he gives no reason for this), specifying that we cannot tell in which part of the year (i.e., whether 428/7 or 427/6: see p. 403). If we accept the 42 years, then the date of his accession is, on Lewis’ calculation, 470/69 or 469/8. As we have seen, neither of those dates will give us, by the only “obviously independent dating” in our tradition, the date he wants for the outbreak of the revolt. Perhaps he rejects Diodorus’ date. But then he ought to have told us, and indicated on what he

bases his own calculation of those regnal dates that are so important for dating various events in the fifth century. Discussion, as I remarked above, has become impossible, and his statements must be regarded as mere dogmatic assertions.

It is quite clear, of course, that Plutarch's date by the fourth year of Archidamus tells us nothing unless we discover when *he* dates Archidamus' accession. A complex argument, which cannot be developed here, may lead to 471/70, which was probably also the date in Diodorus' ultimate source. (His immediate source may already have had the mistaken dates that he himself gives.) But this assumes what ought first to be proved: that the date cannot "obviously rest on calculation"—like (according to Lewis) the dates in Pausanias and in the *Atthis*. He does not tell us why it should "obviously" be superior to them. The date calculated from Thucydides could as easily be a year earlier than Lewis' own (i.e., winter 466), which would indeed fit in with another calculation from Thucydides, that of Archidamus' death in 427, which Lewis also makes.

On the other hand, his suggestion that the *Atthis* date of 469/8 was arrived at by calculation (see above) rests on the unargued premise that scholars in antiquity, like many in modern times (although not actually Lewis himself), for no visible reason assumed that Thucydides narrated all events in strictly chronological order. Indeed, an eminent modern scholar, U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, in his famous work *Aristoteles und Athen* (Berlin 1893), arrived at that same date by explicitly making that calculation on that premise (II 295). Perhaps this inspired Lewis' suggestion. But again: to make it plausible, he would first have to establish the premise.

I regret to say that his rather casual discussion of this important problem seems to me disappointing. And it is all nugatory, in view of the evidence of our actual sources, which clearly distinguishes two Athenian expeditions and their two different occasions. (See my comments on Rhodes, above.)

Finally, the date of Drabescus, treated at length in my study. Here the CAH is even more disappointing, in fact literally useless.

Rhodes (p. 45) states that "the Aeschines scholiast dates the unsuccessful colony to the archonship of Lysicrates [453/2] and the successful [i.e., Amphipolis] to 437/6." This is simply false. The scholiast does not date the unsuccessful colony at all: he dates the disaster at Drabescus, as the second in a series of nine disasters suffered by the Athenians in

that area as the result of a curse. It is only at the end, in what one may call a footnote, that he gives the date of Hagnon's successful foundation of Amphipolis. It is not surprising that Rhodes, while citing my discussion in a footnote, in his text plays the usual game of emending archons in order to fit the disaster into the same year as the colony on which I commented above. For any reader who is misled by him into thinking that the scholiast dates the establishment of the colony, my argument will (needless to say) be totally unintelligible. Hence the error must be put on record.

Lewis dogmatically states (p. 13 n. 51): "The date of 453/2 [i.e., the scholiast's date for the disaster] cannot be right, despite Badian 1988." He gives no reason for this statement, but the alert reader can find it for himself. On p. 500, in his chronological note, Lewis mentions "the colony [*sic*] at Drabescus which he [i.e., Thucydides] seems to have dated to 465/4." Thucydides, of course, explicitly puts the colony (which he does seem to put in that year) at Ennea Hodoi, the site of the later Amphipolis, and the disaster at Drabescus: this, of course, is the basis of my argument. It is a pity that that argument was rejected by Lewis, in an authoritative work, on the basis of a false memory of a text that he obviously knows and that he ought to have checked. When that error is eliminated, as it no doubt will be in a future reprint (now that it has been pointed out), the reader will no longer be able to find out, or even to guess, the original basis for that dogmatic rejection, which will no doubt remain in the text—and, on the author's well-merited reputation, he will presumably take it seriously.

Plataea between Athens and Sparta:
In Search of Lost History

THE little debate between Archidamus and the Plataeans, which introduces the first act of the tragedy in a prelude and three acts that Thucydides chose as his form for recounting the fate of Plataea in the Peloponnesian War, has been surprisingly neglected by his commentators. The two principal speeches take up the better part of two chapters (2.71–72), and after some action offstage the act concludes with the formal invocation of Archidamus to the gods (74.3). A recent collection of essays entitled *The Speeches in Thucydides* contains no discussion of this debate;¹ indeed, the only reference to it appears in a note by the compiler of the list of Thucydides' speeches, Professor William C. West III, who points out (p. 5 n. 1) that these speeches (together with a few others) appear in his list, whereas they were entirely omitted by Blass. The very comprehensive bibliography of work on Thucydides' speeches over a century (1873–1970), by the same thorough scholar, finds no work devoted to this debate; and not much has changed since that book was published. Yet the debate is of considerable interest not only for the study of Thucydides' attitude and technique, but for the light which it throws both on the period of history in which it is set and—even more so, and more unexpectedly—on events of some generations earlier, about which we are very dimly informed. It is worth rescuing from its neglect.²

II

When the Peloponnesian forces under the command of Archidamus invade the territory of Plataea, the Plataeans try to halt the invasion by reminding Archidamus of the rewards given to their ancestors by the Spartan commander Pausanias, after the battle against the barbarians fought at Plataea, for their ἀρετή and προθυμία. After sacrificing to Zeus Eleutherius in their agora, they say, he summoned all of the allies who had taken part in the battle and ἀπεδίδου (the word had better not be translated at this stage)³ to the Plataeans their land and their city, to hold and αὐτονόμους οἰκεῖν; and he proclaimed that no one was ever to wage war against them unjustly (i.e., a war of aggression) or in order to enslave them: if anyone did, all the allies there present were to come to Plataea's aid with all their resources. This (as we hear only by implication, in 2.71.4) was confirmed by oaths, and to these oaths the Plataeans now appeal against the Spartan intention (as they claim) of breaking them.⁴

It is easy to believe that these were special rewards for the Plataeans, in view of their special connection with the site of the decisive battle; just as various honors and duties were assigned to them, increasingly in later tradition, for this reason. Had Thucydides stopped at this point, that would certainly have been the preferred, probably the unanimous, explanation. Even though—fortunately for the historian—he did not, scholars who presumably did not attend to what follows have advanced precisely this interpretation. We may compare the case of Aegina's autonomy, where we are less fortunate in our evidence. Since Thucydides happens (once) to mention Aegina's complaint that her autonomy, guaranteed under the terms of the Thirty Years' Peace, had been violated (1.67.2), scholars have constructed an ad hoc clause in the Peace, specifically guaranteeing Aegina's autonomy, even though other well-known evidence seems to call for a more general (and more plausible) clause.⁵

Any such impression is quickly removed by Archidamus' reply. He points out to the Plataeans that, if they wish Pausanias' decision to be valid, so as to enjoy the autonomy he granted them, they must also, according to his proclamation, help Sparta in liberating those of the allies who swore the oaths at that time, but who are now enslaved by Athens and whose liberation is the purpose of Sparta's war. It is precisely by sharing in Sparta's effort (ἥς μάλιστα μετασχόντες) that they (the Plataeans) too must now abide by those oaths. However, he clearly

realizes that this is too much to expect. He therefore now repeats, as a special concession, an *ex gratia* offer that Sparta had apparently made to them before, although the historian has not bothered to report it: let them proclaim themselves an open and neutral city, admitting all except for purposes of war, and Sparta would regard this as sufficient (τάδε ἡμῖν ἀρχέσει).

It is important to be clear on the nature of this offer, which the wording leaves in no doubt. Archidamus had made it quite plain what, in his view, the oaths sworn in 479 actually demanded: nothing less than participation in the liberation of any of those who swore those oaths and who were now oppressed. But he now shows himself willing to abate the rigor of that demand, evidently in accordance with a Spartan policy earlier decided upon, and to accept something less than strict fulfillment. It would presumably follow that the gods by whom the oaths had been sworn would also be satisfied, for it was accepted procedure that an agreement sworn to could be revised with the consent of both parties.⁶ It is also important to note that at no stage do the Plataeans deny Archidamus' interpretation of the oaths: in their plea to him they had naturally taken out, for their own benefit, the part that might be invoked to protect them in the present situation; but when reminded that those oaths imposed duties as well as benefits on them, they obviously had to admit the truth of this. The limitation of the oaths to Plataea is not claimed by the Plataeans themselves.

During further negotiations Archidamus' offer was modified in detail, for practical reasons: he had made it clear that Sparta would be satisfied with any arrangement that did not leave Plataea in her way as a hostile outpost of her enemy. In its final form, the offer was conditionally accepted by the Plataeans, provided they could persuade the Athenians to agree (73.1). For this there were obvious practical reasons, which must have been known to Archidamus: the women and children of Plataea had been evacuated to Athens and were now hostages in Athenian hands. But the Athenians refused to agree. Without explicit comment, Thucydides makes it clear that for the sake of a relatively trivial advantage, until Plataea inevitably fell, they forced the Plataeans to sacrifice their city and (many of them) their lives, with a formal promise of aid which they well knew they would not be able to give. We are offered a first glimpse of the changes in Athens that Thucydides wants us to ascribe to war and the end of Pericles' dominance.

Once it is clear that the Plataeans, despite what they obviously

wished, cannot accept Archidamus' terms, we reach the impressive apostrophe that concludes the episode. Turning to the local gods and heroes, Archidamus solemnly calls upon them to bear witness to the fact that only after the Plataeans had broken their oaths had he invaded their territory as an enemy; just as earlier the Plataeans had called on those same gods to witness their plea to him not to break those same oaths. He proclaims his awareness of the debt owed to those gods by him and his city, and he explains to them that his actions will not be unjust (i.e., deserving punishment) since all his reasonable offers had been refused after the Plataeans' breach of their oaths. He therefore invokes their consent (ξυγγνώμονες . . . ἔστε) to the punishment of the unjust (the Plataeans) and the success of the righteous avengers.

Thucydides duly relates this ceremony in all its solemnity. But it is clear that to him it is all rhetorical display. His contempt for established Greek religion is well known as a major part of his historical approach,⁷ and he has often been commended for this "rationalism" (which is not quite the right word for his atheism). It has not so often been observed how it frequently impaired his historical judgment, with serious consequences for our own. The fact is strikingly demonstrated by his treatment of the attack on Plataea by the Thebans, which was the beginning of the war and, in particular, the prelude to his Plataean tragedy. There (2.2ff.) he nowhere mentions the fact that the attack was timed to take place on a Plataean festival day; that fact is incidentally revealed much later, when the Plataeans, in the speech that he has composed for them, use it before the Spartan judges (3.56.2) to heighten the heinousness of the Theban offense: the point appears as rhetoric, not as an important historical event. Thucydides must obviously have known the fact from the start, but his prejudice blinded him to its historical importance, which to us seems obvious: for this timing gave the Thebans a good chance of finding the city unable to defend itself at short notice and of rounding up plenty of hostages outside the walls. Thucydides' failure to appreciate this was the penalty that he paid (and that *we* pay) for his freedom from the superstition of established belief. Moreover, it would obviously be important to the reader trying to gauge public attitudes to religion and their effects on events to know precisely what the festival was: was it merely a local Plataean one, or a Boeotian one in which Thebes also ought to have shared? We have no way of even making a reasoned conjecture. But for Thucydides the point did not arise. In his view *all* politicians were merely using religion for opportunist purposes:

transferring his own atheism to his actors, he simply does not acknowledge the existence of religious limitations on *Realpolitik*. It is not by accident that, as we have seen, the matter of the Plataean festival is, to him, a point of rhetoric and not a point of history.

That he applies this to Sparta and, in particular, to Archidamus is apparent throughout his account of the Pentecontaetia, and nowhere more so than in the preliminaries to the outbreak of the war. The case of the arbitration clause in the Peace of 446/5 will serve as an illustration.⁸ It is in the light of this attitude of Thucydides to Sparta and to Archidamus that we must naturally interpret his evaluation of the same Archidamus' invocation of the gods of Plataea.

We can now proceed to the verdict of the Spartan judges in the last act of the Plataean tragedy. It is described by Thucydides in a way that makes it appear as, at best, self-delusion tinged with hypocrisy, and in this—such is the overwhelming power of his name—he has most often been unquestioningly followed by modern scholars.⁹ The sentence (3.68.1) reporting the judges' self-justification in their private deliberations is almost untranslatable, except that Thucydides' δῆθεν stresses his lack of belief in whatever he is reporting.¹⁰ In any case, we are now told that Sparta had given the Plataeans the chance of "remaining neutral according to the ancient oaths of Pausanias after (the battle against) the Mede" (κατὰ τὰς παλαιὰς Πausανίου μετὰ τὸν Μῆδον σπονδὰς ἡσυχάζειν), and (if that is what the words mean) that their refusal to do so ended Sparta's obligations under those oaths. However, we must recall that Archidamus had clearly labeled that very offer a concession and an abatement of what the oaths required, and that the Plataeans had not contradicted this interpretation. What are we to believe? Here again, scholars have readily accepted the *prima facie* implication that Archidamus was simply lying.¹¹ However, strict attention to the nature and reliability of our information is a primary duty. Thucydides must have had excellent and immediate reports of what Archidamus had initially said and of the Plataeans' response, since Plataean envoys at once went to Athens to report on those negotiations in order to obtain Athenian approval for their decision to accept the terms. On the other hand, it is clear that he cannot have had any source at all for the private deliberations of the Spartan judges: they must be regarded as a concoction of what he regarded as τὰ δέοντα.

A parallel again lies to hand in his report on the outbreak of the war. There, the motion on which the Spartans were finally asked to vote,

after all the oratory had run its course, is clearly formulated by Thucydides: that the treaty had been broken and the Athenians were at fault (λελύσθαι τὰς σπονδὰς καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀδικεῖν—1.87.2). Here again, he had excellent information on the wording of the motion, which was at once communicated to the Athenian envoys, who no doubt carefully reported it to the People on their return to Athens. The words would not soon be forgotten. Yet when he comes to relate this motion in his own terms (88), he reports it as a vote for immediate war and underlines its importance by dating it (note τὰς σπονδὰς λελύσθαι καὶ πολεμητέα εἶναι: the last three words a gratuitous addition, not based on anything in the motion).¹²

In the case that concerns us, we must again surely prefer the better information to the worse—or rather, authentic information to the historian's edited version based on it and (as far as we can tell) on nothing further. The reflections of the Spartan judges may not be used as evidence for historical facts. Archidamus' uncontradicted testimony must be accepted, especially as it is supported by his appeal to the gods. We have already seen that Thucydides' implication that the Spartan king shared his own atheism, hence used religion unscrupulously for political purposes, must be viewed with caution.¹³ Even if Archidamus had personally held the views that Thucydides by implication ascribes to him, he was speaking to the gods in front of his officers and his whole army, at least some of whom must have known the tradition about Pausanias' oaths. It is totally inconceivable that, if the king in fact was bringing a solemn curse upon himself, his city, and his army, none of them would have intervened to protest, and no murmur against him would later have been heard at Sparta. Archidamus' version of the oaths of 479 must be accepted by historians, just as it was by the Plataeans and (apparently) by the gods and heroes to whom he appealed.¹⁴

II

Two consequences of this secure result may be briefly dealt with, since detailed exposition would take us too far in this context.

First, the significance of what we have observed for Thucydidean studies should be noted. It is nowadays generally recognized that Thucydides' speeches are normally to be read as ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης (i.e., as close as his information allowed him to get,

in each instance, to the precise intention) of what was actually said, as filled out, in different proportions, by what he invented in order to make the speakers τὰ δέοντα μάλιστα εἰπεῖν, as indeed he clearly tells us in 1.22. The times when fundamentalists like Gomme could believe that practically every word was authentic are fortunately long past. But we have now incidentally seen the wide range of possible approximation to truth and authenticity that has to be considered, in the light of the information presumably available in any particular instance. The result is that speeches range from what is surely no more than fiction based on his evaluation of situation and character, as in the reflections of the Spartan judges, to a few instances of what must be almost verbal authenticity: cases where a short speech was at once reliably reported, in words not to be forgotten—or lightly altered. We have also been able to observe, in two of these rare cases, how the historian's own version (whether in direct speech or in the form of a summary) can misinterpret and mislead. The warning should not be forgotten in the interpretation of other Thucydidean speeches and the use made of the "facts" they allege. Most of the time, his prejudices here have full play to impose those "facts" on the unsuspecting reader as authenticated by the very actors in the drama.

Next, a historical conclusion not unrelated to the historiographical one should at least be briefly indicated.¹⁵ We must take it that the oaths sworn after the battle of Plataea indeed guaranteed the freedom (whether or not the word αὐτονομία was used: we have no way of checking whether Thucydides' word is here modernized)¹⁶ of all the cities that had taken part in the battle. It follows (since even Thucydides' Plataeans do not contest it) that the Plataeans were indeed bound to aid any that had been enslaved, and that the Spartans were indeed free to treat Plataea as no longer protected by the oaths that she had broken and to follow their own political interest when Plataea could not be recalled to them; just as (e.g.) the Athenians were in dealing with Mytilene or Scione, after they had broken the oaths that bound them to Athens. Whatever moral revulsion the modern reader may feel for the ancient laws and practices of war, the actions of the powers concerned in these cases were in full conformity with those laws and practices, on a strict interpretation.

We might also ask: which were the cities concerned, whose liberation Archidamus may here have been alluding to? Three obvious ones occur at once: Aegina, Megara, and Potidaea. Perhaps it is more than coinci-

dence that it was Athens' treatment of these three cities that did more than anything else to bring about the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Scholars' unwillingness to attend to Archidamus' words has led to a failure to recognize this. The oaths to which Aegina is said to have appealed when she secretly complained to the Spartans are ultimately the oaths sworn at Plataea. Megara and Potidaea were protected by those same oaths.¹⁷ The autonomy granted to Aegina and Potidaea in the Thirty Years' Peace had not been a special concession on Athens' part, but the reaffirmation of a sworn obligation dating back to 479. The attempt to deprive them of that autonomy was therefore all the more heinous. Needless to say, it would be contrary to Thucydides' attitude and purpose (for which, see Chapter 4 below) to make any explicit mention of this.

III

We now come to the final question, and the most important in this context, which arises out of what we have learned regarding the oaths sworn after the battle of Plataea: what was the status of Plataea at the time when Pausanias guaranteed its autonomy, along with that of the other allies?

The principal source is Herodotus' well-known passage (6.108), where he reports that, after Cleomenes, to whom the Plataeans applied when they were threatened by Thebes while he happened to be in that area, turned them down and suggested they should apply to Athens (Herodotus ascribes a sinister anti-Athenian motive to him), they ἐδεδώκεσαν σφέας αὐτοὺς τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι; and he in fact twice repeats the verb διδόναι. After the story of Cleomenes, he tells that of the Corinthian arbitration between Athens and Thebes, and of the successful battle that won Athens the Asopus boundary between Plataea and Hysiae on its side and Thebes on the other. It looks (although, as often, Herodotus gives no actual date for the flashback) as though he imagined these incidents as taking place after the expulsion of the Pisis-tratids; for in the story he mentions no feeling of loyalty on the part of the Plataeans toward Hippias, who, before that expulsion, would have been the one who actually received them. There would certainly have been no inclination to take it as referring to the days of the tyranny, had not our text of Thucydides put the beginning of the connection between

Athens and Plataea in 519 (3.68.5). As it is, scholars have not reached agreement on what to believe, and the debate continues without much hope of a final answer.¹⁸

If this question cannot be finally settled, another surely can, without great difficulty: what did Herodotus mean when he said that the Plataeans had “given themselves” to the Athenians? Oddly enough, there again appears to be *prima facie* disagreement between the two historians on this point, since Thucydides, who tells us nothing about the origin of the connection, describes it as an alliance (ξυμμαχία): we shall have to return to this (which, I think, has been needlessly felt to be puzzling) after examining what exactly Herodotus means. This can be disengaged (fortunately, for once, with clarity beyond contradiction) from his use of the same verb elsewhere. In fact, he invariably uses it of the surrender of an inferior to a superior (normally a king, twice a god), thus into a condition that would be technically described by Greeks as δουλεία.¹⁹ Whether we believe it or not, there can be no doubt as to how Herodotus meant us to understand Plataea’s action. That he conceived of Plataea, at this period, as actually belonging to Athens is clear from his statement elsewhere (5.74.2) that Hysiae and Oenoe were at that time “the outermost *demoi* (not, of course, “demes” in the Cleisthenic sense) of Attica.” Simple geography makes it clear that he must have thought of Plataea as also annexed to Attica, and his story of how the Asopus boundary came to be established confirms this interpretation, since in this no distinction is made between Hysiae and Plataea.

Herodotus’ view that Plataea’s status was technically one of “slavery” is, of course, fully confirmed, as against any theory based on Thucydides 3.68.5 that it could have been an alliance,²⁰ by the well-known fact that after the battle of Marathon the Plataean dead were buried in the same mound as the Athenian slaves. The mound was still seen by Pausanias (1.32.3) and it presumably, in Pausanias’ day and quite probably from the start, bore an inscription identifying it for what it was, just as the Athenians’ mound was inscribed (in this case, quite evidently from the start) with the names of all the Athenian dead. There should never have been any dispute about the fact that the Athenians regarded the Plataeans as in some sense δοῦλοι, and that this fits in precisely with the words that Herodotus uses for their “surrender” to Athens, on the attested facts of his word usage. Partly because of Thucydides’ apparent contradiction and partly (it must be suspected) because of our horror for the idea of slavery, this plain convergence of evidence has rarely been

accepted, and all kinds of attempts have been made to deny it. It would perhaps become emotionally more acceptable if we anachronistically used the term "subjects," which is close to the political meaning of the Greek word: the Plataeans chose to become subjects of the Athenians, on whatever precise terms, in order to avoid becoming subjects of the Thebans, which at the time was the only real alternative.

The list of attempts to evade the plain meaning of the evidence is a long and far from glorious one.²¹ In particular, ingenuity has been needed, and used, to explain the attested burial of the Plataeans with the Athenian slaves. Perhaps the slaves had been freed before the battle and technically ranked as metics. (But Pausanias, clearly, knew nothing of this, for he would certainly have made it clear if he had known.) Perhaps the point of the distinction was merely a distinction between Athenian citizens and "the rest." (But in that case, why were free allies lumped together with slaves, surely inconceivable in a slave-owning and slave-conscious society? And it would in any event have been easy for the Athenians to construct *three* separate mounds, if they had merely wanted to keep the dead sorted out.)²² The Athenian action was deliberate and implied a public statement regarding the status of Plataea; and it is clear that the Plataeans had no objection to this. Herodotus' interpretation is thus confirmed by the agreement of the two parties concerned.

The subjection of Plataea left Eleutherae encircled by Attic territory, and at some time it drew the obvious conclusion and also joined Athens, though apparently on better terms than its neighbors had got: the Eleutherans became citizens and served alongside the other citizens (there was no question of burying them with the slaves), although they did not gain admission to the system of Cleisthenic tribes.²³ The date of their incorporation is not recorded and we are reduced to conjecture. It has generally been put before that of Plataea, without much discussion—indeed, often even assigned to Pisistratid times (by some of the same scholars who would not accept the incorporation of Plataea at that time, as being too much of a provocation to Thebes), on the strength of a cult image of Dionysus, the transfer of which from Eleutherae to Athens is reported by Pausanias.²⁴ Pausanias stresses that the town was not conquered, but opted for Athenian citizenship because of hatred of Thebes, and he does not say that the cult image was "removed" but merely that it was "carried" (ἐκομίσθη) to Athens. Athenian tradition had it that the god Dionysus (ὁ θεός—presumably this

cult image) was introduced to Athens by Pegasus of Eleutherae, in accordance with a Delphic oracle (Paus. 1.2.5). Although tradition, as often, may have become confused with legend (see, e.g., Schol. Aristoph. *Acharn.* 243), there can be little doubt that Pegasus was a historical character, and that it was the image from Eleutherae (not the actual cult of Dionysus, which may have existed long before) that this Eleutheran brought to Athens as a sacred and much appreciated gift. It will be clear that this action need not be chronologically connected with the political union of Eleutherae with Athens. Pegasus, obeying the convenient oracle, may have brought the god at any time, thus securing undying gratitude for his little town, and assured protection against Thebes. The chances are, indeed, that the gift preceded the incorporation (for after it Eleutherae would have much less to gain by it), and that it helps to account for the favorable terms on which Eleutherae later gained incorporation.

As for this step, all we can say with some assurance is that it happened after the organization of the Cleisthenic system: the reformer who was to acquire a reputation for filling up his tribes with *xenoi* (see *Ath. pol.* 21.4; Arist. *Pol.* 3.1275b) would hardly have left actual citizens outside when they could easily have been fitted in as part of the whole process. On the other hand, after the establishment of the system, we do not know of any case of the incorporation of a community into it: although there were probably no insuperable difficulties that would have prevented turning a small village into a deme and attaching it to a *trittys*, it was never done. The best guess for the incorporation of Eleutherae is in 506/5, when the decisive defeat of the Boeotian attack (Hdt. 5.77; cf. Meiggs-Lewis, *GHI* 15) had made the Asopus line irreversible, permanently (so it seemed) cutting Eleutherae off from Boeotia. As we have seen, it is likely that a friendly connection had existed earlier, which now secured the Eleutherans better terms than their Boeotian neighbors, even though the Plataeans, certainly (we do not know about the others), had also joined the Attic state without compulsion.

We have now reached a point where we can consider the action of Pausanias at Plataea against its full background. Let us therefore return to Plataea in particular.

When, after the battle, he ἀπεδίδου Πλαταιεῦσι . . . αὐτονόμους οἰζεῖν, and anchored that autonomy, like that of all the allies who had fought the battle, in a solemn oath, the effect of this on the Plataeans was very different from its effect on the others. The Plataeans were in

some sense part of the Attic state. In their case, as we can now see, the word ἀπεδίδου must be translated "restored": unlike the others who swore, they now received back an autonomy that, by their own choice, they had given up. We may say that Pausanias, standing in the place of a Spartan king, undid what an earlier Spartan king (Cleomenes) had done.

However, he naturally had no intention of handing them over to their Theban enemies. At the time, Thebes was in disgrace: indeed, it was not yet certain that the city would be allowed to exist, since the allies had sworn to destroy the cities of the Medizers. We may take it that Pausanias had already decided that he could not leave a power vacuum in the heart of Boeotia, and that Thebes must be allowed to survive, though with reduced power. He therefore had to make sure that the newly liberated Plataea was strong enough to resist Theban pressure: for one thing, he did not want it, at some future time, to see its only safety in rejoining the Attic state. He seems to have increased Plataea's territory, so as to give it its own limited power base within Boeotia and to enable it to act as a strong buffer (and perhaps a bone of contention) between Athens and Thebes, without having to submit to either. In the fifth century, at any rate, we find Plataea at the center of an assemblage of villages, which most prominently included Hysiae.²⁵ No one tells us what in fact happened to Hysiae: it was not important enough to attract Herodotus' notice at this point. But it is certainly never again a *demos* of Attica, and there appears to be no other suitable time when it could have been transferred to Plataean control.

As for what happened to the relationship between Plataea and Athens, we do not know in detail, except that Thucydides' allusions to it, half a century later, imply no (or at any rate no long) interruption. We may take it as certain that a friendly relationship continued or was at once resumed, with no ill feeling on either side over the change that had come about and that was not the fault of either of the parties, and—more surprising, perhaps—with no resentment on Plataea's part over the *douleia* from which it had just been freed. We may fairly conjecture that, as soon as it became clear that it was not Pausanias' intention to destroy Thebes, the Plataeans recognized that Athens was still their only real guarantee against their powerful and hated neighbor. The general oaths had to some extent changed the situation since Cleomenes' day, but the geographical factors that he had pointed out to the Plataeans were unchanged: it was unlikely that Peloponnesian allies would be of

much help to Plataea in case of a sudden attack, even if they were inclined to fulfill their obligations. Athens was still the only city that could render effective aid, and that could be relied upon to do so, in order not to allow Plataea to become part of a Theban hegemonial orbit.

As for Athens, the liberation of her advanced Boeotian outposts must have been a bitter blow, especially after the leading part the city had played in the war against the Medes. The “euphoria of victory” would in no way make it easier to bear. What the “euphoria of victory” did was to make it impossible for Athens to protest: on the very site chosen by the gods for the final victory, Pausanias knew that opposition to his plans was impossible.²⁶ Had the final battle been fought (e.g.) at Chaeronea, much in the future history of Boeotia and perhaps of Greece would no doubt have been different.

As it was, the battle had been at Plataea, and Plataea reaped the reward. It emerged as the guardian of the sacred rites for the fallen and of the cult of Zeus Eleutherius: it could no longer remain a “slave” city. Athens had to recognize that. On the other hand, as soon as it became clear that Thebes would survive, Athens must have welcomed the chance of again, although in less direct form, having a frontier on the Asopus. In the end, Pausanias’ intervention probably made little difference to the historical situation, except (and this was not unimportant) to make further Athenian expansion into Boeotia, with her Boeotian outposts as starting points, impossible.²⁷

One result, however, must have been to arouse Athenian suspicion against Sparta. When Sparta next ordered the defenseless city not to rebuild her walls, Athens’ leaders were unanimous in resisting: Themistocles, the man most trusted at Sparta and the most likely to match what was seen as Spartan trickery, was sent over to gain time while the walls were rebuilt.²⁸ As a result, although friendship and alliance formally continued, the clash of interests between the two great powers was henceforth clear. Pausanias, of course, was particularly hated. Within a short time, “many Greeks” were complaining about him at Sparta, with the result that the only person who might have prevented the establishment of Athenian hegemony over the Ionians was recalled at the crucial time and, although acquitted on the (clearly trumped up) charge of Medism, was given no further chance of reasserting Spartan leadership. Meanwhile the Athenian leaders, still acting with remarkable unanimity, had succeeded in persuading the Ionians that their future lay with Athens.²⁹ Pausanias’ future had been destroyed, and Sparta was forced

to retreat into its Peloponnesian fortress, which no doubt satisfied the lesser ambitions of many Spartans.

In Greece itself, where Pausanias had set the precedent by allowing Thebes to revive, Athens now stole his policy of forgiveness and became the champion of the Medizers. Themistocles prevented the Spartans from expelling Thessaly, Thebes, and Argos from the Delphic amphictyony (Plut. *Them.* 20.3), asserting Athens' championship of smaller cities against great powers (i.e., in the circumstances, Sparta) in the process.³⁰ And it was probably Themistocles who used his enormous reputation and favor among the Greeks attending the Olympic Games of 476 to urge the claims of Alexander, king of Macedon and *xenos* of Athens, for recognition as a Hellene and admission to the games, thereby laying the foundation of the northern policy of Athens' expanding ambitions.³¹

Once Athens' hegemonial position had been established and defined, and Sparta had given up the dream of pan-Hellenic hegemony, which had probably never had very wide support, it was time for the two allies to draw together again on a new basis. Their leaders now sealed the restoration of friendship by overthrowing both Pausanias and Themistocles, who could conveniently be saddled with the entire blame for the policy of suspicion and intrigue in which the two cities had indulged against each other after the battle of Plataea. Collaboration between them was never proved (although it was alleged: Thuc. 1.135.2) and is difficult to believe, but strict judicial proof appears to have been irrelevant in the story as Thucydides tells it: the downfall of the two old opponents seems to have been due to a coincidence of domestic and foreign realignments in the two cities, which was to remain a stable, and stabilizing, factor in Greece for a decade.

IV

As usual, it is difficult to say how much of all this would in any case have happened, even if Pausanias had not decided to use the victory of Plataea to deprive Athens of her Boeotian outposts. No doubt the rise of Athens to prominence would in some form have taken place in any case, and Sparta might in any case have ineffectually tried to prevent it. It is not for historians to speculate about what did not happen. But there can be no doubt that it was Pausanias' decision after the battle of Plataea that caused these things to happen in the way they did.

Thucydides, who gives us the evidence that enables us to reconstruct the story, does not himself seem to have been aware of it. It has often been noted how little he knows about events in the early years of the Pentecontaetia. It can be taken for granted that he would have told us if he had known, for it is one of his main aims in Book 1 to demonstrate a long series of Spartan intrigues and treacherous plots against Athens, which culminated in the decision to attack Athens in 431.³² But he knows nothing before the attempt to prevent the building of the walls (and he makes the most of that: see 1.90, throughout stressing Spartan duplicity). In fact, he seems to have no accurate knowledge of the precise status of Plataea before 479: although he states (and lets this appear in the speeches before the Spartan judges, 3.55.3; 63.2) that the Plataeans had at some time had Athenian *politeia*, this is never explained in detail; and as we have seen, in his epitaph on the relationship between the two cities, he calls the whole period of their association an alliance (3.68.5).³³ There was, of course, no need for him to go into details at this point, and the use of the most general term need not be taken as contradicting Herodotus. But since he is clearly summing up the whole period of the association, one would still have expected him to have noted that the Plataeans had for many years been fellow citizens (or some such term) and then allies: enhancement of the closeness of the association would have increased the rhetorical effect.

As we have seen, it is easiest to interpret the two expressions he uses as referring to the same event: the initiation of Plataea's connection with Athens. He had presumably heard it described δουλεία; he will have known the mound at Plataea and will have read Herodotus' account, drawing what conclusions he could from that evidence. But it was clearly not subjection like that of the allies in the Athenian Empire, who would never have been buried together with Athenian slaves and who were technically allies, though affectively described as δοῦλοι. He compromised by avoiding the opprobrious term and, as we saw, using two different status terms on the two occasions on which the issue came up. He probably could not properly classify the status of the Plataeans after 519 any better than we can. We must never forget that Thucydides decided to become a historian only at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (1.1.1) and did not work from full records of the past. We must be grateful that he preserved for us what he himself did not fully understand.³⁴

Thucydides and the Outbreak
of the Peloponnesian War:
A Historian's Brief

THE purpose of this study is a very limited one. It is not another investigation of Thucydides' philosophy, let alone of the problem of composition, which, a few generations ago, used to be *the* "Thucydides problem" par excellence. As for the latter, I must obviously state my position, so far as it is relevant. I agree with the great majority of scholars, who have always recognized that the first book, at least in the form in which we have it, was written after the end of the Peloponnesian War. This seemed obvious to Eduard Meyer ninety years ago,¹ and Eduard Schwartz,² dissecting the work into layers of composition, clearly saw that the first book received its final form after the war. Just as in Germany the *Kriegsschuldfrage* became a persistent topic of debate only after defeat and its consequences, so Thucydides' preoccupation with the question of responsibility for the outbreak of the war would not have arisen even during the Peace of Nicias. It belongs, at the earliest, to the last years of the war, and far more probably to the time when Athens, and Pericles in particular, had to face the retrospective attacks of the victorious Spartans, the liberated allies, and, above all, Athens' own oligarchs.

In a well-known article,³ W. R. Connor noted what he described as a generational change in attitudes to Thucydides: the scientific, Hippocratic historian, aiming at the elimination of his own personality and the

attainment of objectivity, was being replaced by a Thucydides who was personally committed and perhaps above all an artist. The former view certainly dominated scholarly interpretation, especially in English, for many years, and those of us now middle-aged or older were brought up to take it for granted. As often, it is best illustrated from the writings of a derivative author, at one time much recommended to students:

The *Histories* of Thucydides represent an attempt to apply to the study of social life the methods that Hippocrates employed in the art of healing, and constitute an exact parallel to the attempts of modern scientific historians to apply evolutionary canons of interpretation derived from Darwinian science.⁴

It was perhaps rather extreme to ascribe to Thucydides the kind of faddish imitation of ideas that happened to be popular in one or another field of "the sciences," which is so characteristic of some historians in our own century; but the complimentary intention is as obvious as (to us) is the naive misconception.

As so often, the tradition of the objective and scientific historian was taken over from German scholarship. Eduard Meyer, who had in his school days been imbued with an admiration for Thucydides that he never lost, decided to formulate it in those grim days after Germany's loss of the First World War, which reinforced the identification of Prussia with ancient Athens that had been traditional in Germany since the eighteenth century. In his Inaugural Address as Rector of Berlin University on October 15, 1919, he devoted much of his time to a eulogy of his distinguished predecessor, who had lived through, and written about, a period remarkably similar to his own. Meyer was too much of a practicing historian to believe that objectivity is possible, but he claimed it as Thucydides' ideal: he compares Ranke's famous statement that he (Ranke) aimed at extinguishing his own person and "letting things speak for themselves."

Unlike his more naive followers, Meyer realized that Thucydides in fact did not suppress his personality, but produced a highly personal and committed work. Connor's "modernist" Thucydides turns out, as so often in these cases, to be a thoroughly traditional figure, with respectable antecedents in scholarship, coming into fashion again after a period of neglect. Meyer thought that Thucydides used the speeches for self-expression, while maintaining detached objectivity in his narrative. Somewhat regretfully (it seems), he added that nowadays "objectivity"

is such that this method can no longer be used: “Wir sind zu objektiv geworden, um dies Mittel noch verwenden zu können.” He appears to imply that it is for this reason, at least in part, that Thucydides’ *History* remains the unsurpassed ideal of the genre.⁵

What “modernist” interpreters have at last dared to say is that Thucydides’ method is not closely related to that of what we regard as historians at all. Meyer was aware of the fact that Thucydides, for all his objectivity, forces his views on the reader: “Durch sein Verfahren zwingt er den Leser unter seine Auffassung; dieser kann sich dem, was der Darsteller als die Wahrheit erkannt hat, garnicht entziehn.” Meyer tried to escape the inherent contradiction of his view by ascribing this powerful effect to the speeches. It was this that enabled him to salvage his admiration for Thucydides.⁶ It is now quite widely seen that Thucydides in fact offers the reader no alternative to his own view in his actual narrative. The point was clearly made in one of the earliest of “modernist” interpretations, by W. P. Wallace:

It does not occur to him as possible that any serious student would ever really consider him mistaken. . . . The modern reader . . . does not wish to accept everything he is told; his own judgment is not in suspense; he demands that doubtful points should be discussed, and that serious difficulties should be indicated.⁷

Wallace goes on to note that Herodotus regularly does this, while Thucydides does not.

It might be said that, in modern terms, Thucydides’ method of presentation is much more like that of the journalist than like that of the historian. He allows only “edited” material to reach the reader, the facts that he regards as “fit to print” and that will leave the reader no choice but to accept his own conclusions implied in the presentation. Like the journalist working for a paper that regards advocacy as an integral part of its business, he will at times give evidence that might contradict the conclusion to which he has been leading us. For this he has been highly praised: Thucydides, whose account cannot often be checked,⁸ can at times be corrected or reinterpreted from his own evidence. It is worth asking when he is likely to do so. We may again compare the journalist working for, say, the *Washington Post*. He will normally present evidence running counter to the conclusion toward which he wishes to direct the reader in two cases: first, where the facts are so well known that they cannot be suppressed without arousing general distrust (and here,

of course, the modern journalist, whose target has multiple means of information, some of them independent, as his disposal, is more constrained than Thucydides was, so that the *Washington Post* does indeed give the reader more information contradicting its editorial policies than Thucydides does); and second (with a partial overlap with the first class), in cases where facts in apparent contradiction with the writer's thesis can ultimately be put to good use and claimed to reinforce it.

Since Thucydides wrote his work over a long period of time, allowance must of course be made for genuine changes of mind, and this has been the staple of Thucydidean strata research.⁹ But as far as Book 1 is concerned, we shall see that significant instances will fit into one or both of these categories. We must never forget that Thucydides, although aiming to leave a work for eternity, was in the first instance writing for a public (and, in particular, an educated Athenian public) of his own day.

As far as the thesis of Book 1, as we have it in its final shape, is concerned, recognition of its apologetic character is no modernist heresy. Eduard Schwartz summed it up seventy years ago, his vision sharpened (even more than Meyer's) by contemporary events: in Book 1, he said, historical presentation has turned into apologia.¹⁰ What is odd is that "modernist" interpretations do not seem to have followed this up. (Schwartz did not regard it as his purpose to base his view, which seemed obvious to him, on detailed analysis of the book.) They have, perhaps quite naturally, been more concerned with Thucydides' practice in the main body of his work, the history of the war itself, than with his complex and, as we have it, rather unwieldy preamble. It is the aim of our present investigation to follow up Schwartz's insight. It will become clear that it is Thucydides' main aim, in his account of the origin and outbreak of the war, to show that it was started by Sparta in a spirit of ruthless *Realpolitik*, and that this was the culmination of a long series of attempt, unscrupulous and at times treacherous, to repress Athenian power, on several occasions when opportunity seemed to offer, between the withdrawal of the Persians and the final vote for war.

It is no accident that the modern interpretation that prides itself on most closely following Thucydides comes to precisely this conclusion: the Marxist Geoffrey de Ste. Croix found a strangely kindred spirit in the upper-class Athenian, who believed in democracy only when it was working under proper guidance.¹¹ What was "least talked about" (1.23.6) was not so much that fear of the growth of Athenian power

had finally drive Sparta to start the war, but that Sparta had been jealously watching that growth ever since the withdrawal of the Persians, trying occasionally to check it, but prevented by circumstances from decisive action (cf. 1.118.2), until in the end a favorable conjunction of all prerequisites—the enthusiastic support of the allies who mattered, a plausible cause to present to the Greeks and their gods, and (although Thucydides does not mention this) a long period of unimpaired prosperity without loss of manpower—came together and provided an opportunity that could not be missed. It is this picture that Thucydides and his modern follower wanted to impress upon the reader, to counter what was being said after 404. It was for this reason, no doubt, that Thucydides found it necessary, when revising his account at that time, to add the brief excursus on the Pentecontaetia and (at least in the form in which we have them) the biographical sketches of Pausanias and Themistocles, in addition to whatever other revision not traceable to the modern reader he may have thought necessary.¹²

II

When we first see the Spartans in action, after Thucydides' summaries of earlier history and of his methods, their entry into the *History* proper is an inglorious one, showing their *prostasia* over their allies as ineffective (28.1): when their ambassadors try to persuade Corinth to submit her dispute with Corcyra to arbitration, they are ignored. Like everything else in this carefully written book, this way of introducing Sparta is not unintended. It at once introduces the first motif.

The second is introduced on the Spartans' next (vicarious) appearance,¹³ in the debate between the Corcyraeans and the Corinthians at Athens: it is that of Sparta's eagerness for war with Athens, brought up by the Corcyraeans (33.3); and in an almost symphonic manner it is skillfully interwoven with the first motif by the Corinthians. The Corinthians, in fact, softly echo the second: they nowhere deny Spartan bellicosity, but discreetly admit it in principle by stressing that "the future outbreak of the war with which the Corcyraeans frighten you . . . is still wrapped in obscurity" (42.2)¹⁴—whereas they strongly reinforce the first by twice reminding the Athenians of how their own opposition at the time of the Samian War reduced the Spartans to impotence (40.5, 41.2; cf. also 43.1), which is precisely the way in which this motif was

originally introduced in 28.1. The Corinthians, with conspicuous loyalty to their *hēgemōn*, do not mention Sparta by name in either context; but the reference is nonetheless obvious, as is the implication that Corinth alone will ultimately be able to decide whether the war becomes reality.¹⁵ These two motifs, of course, later dominate the debate at Sparta, with much repetition and powerful orchestration. Thucydides may be said to anticipate musical theory still unknown to his age.

II

We are now ready to trace chronologically how the contrasting pictures of Sparta and Athens at this period are developed.

Straight after the Persian retreat, we are given the first instance of Spartan plotting and deviousness—the famous story of how the Spartans tried to prevent Athens from rebuilding her walls, and were defeated only through the chance of Athens' possessing, in Themistocles, a man who could match Sparta trick for trick (90–92). The Spartans, outwitted, had to grin and bear it: they remained outwardly friendly, but were secretly resentful (92). The story, with its final comment, sets the tone for their behavior over the next two decades, until that resentment could come out into the open.

There follows the account of how Sparta lost her *prostasia* over the Ionians. We are told that the reason was the “violent” behavior of the Spartan regent and Hellenic commander in chief Pausanias, which made the Ionians spontaneously turn to Athens, since they trusted the Athenians; after Dorcis, whom the Spartans sent out as commander, had been rejected by the allies, the Spartans voluntarily acquiesced in the situation and yielded the *prostasia* over the Ionians to Athens (95). This story may be called the foundation myth of the Athenian Empire. It is frequently hammered into the reader's mind, for example—openly as the Athenian version of events—by the Athenian embassy at Sparta (75.2),¹⁶ and Thucydides, as we shall see he tends to do in such cases, repeats it as fact in his summing up of these events after telling the story (“After the Athenians had taken over the hegemony in this way, with the agreement of the allies because of their hatred of Pausanias . . .”—96.1). Yet even in his account we can see that the Athenians had prepared the ground by their winter siege of Sestos at the head of the Ionian allies (89.2), and his story of the recall of Pausanias may make the criti-

cal reader suspicious. It was his recall, of course, that removed the only man with the power and standing to try to prevent or reverse the Athenian coup; he was recalled (we are told) precisely when the Athenians had accepted the allies' appeal to receive them into their own hegemony and to resist Pausanias if he should try to use force, to which the Athenians agreed, preparing "not to permit it" (i.e., to lead open rebellion against him). The timely recall (95.4), which relieved them of that necessity and perhaps saved them from open conflict with Sparta, was due to complaints against Pausanias by "the Hellenes who arrived there" (95.3—we are not told whether these were casual visitors or official envoys, but probably the latter).

There must certainly have been some basis for the complaints about his arrogance. But that more serious charges were deliberately added, in order to ensure Spartan action, emerges from what follows: Pausanias, we are told (95.5), had above all been accused of Medism; and of this he was acquitted by the Spartan court. Thucydides, characteristically, adds that "the case seemed to be very clear"—but it seems highly unlikely that, at this particular time, just after the bitter fighting and the losses due to the Persian invasion, official Sparta would have deliberately connived at Medism. The more obvious conclusion is that the charges were invented to facilitate the Athenian seizure and retention of the hegemony. It is in any case unlikely that the story of Pausanias' complex communications with the King, as later told by Thucydides (128.4ff.), can be true.¹⁷

It should be noted that Thucydides' account—difficult to accept on its own terms, as we saw—of the entirely voluntary and innocent acquisition of the hegemony on the part of the Athenians stands alone in the ancient tradition. Most of that tradition, of course, is later than Thucydides and is probably based on Ephorus; thus, almost certainly, Diodorus (11.44.6; 46.5) and Plutarch (*Aristides* 23—the same basic source, with much embroidery), detailing Aristides' intrigues. What makes it worth our attention, besides the fact that the picture of Aristides as the arch-intriguer is entirely contrary to the standard myth of his "justice" and thus perhaps inherently more trustworthy, is the fact that it seems to be supported by Herodotus' brief reference to these events. Herodotus, while recounting the (no doubt mythical) Athenian abandonment of all claims to naval hegemony in the Persian War and submission to Sparta's command, continues (Hdt. 8.3): "When they had driven out the Persian and were now fighting over *his* territory, they took Pausanias'

arrogance as a pretext and took the leadership away from the Spartans." Although this was outside Herodotus' purview, so that we cannot tell precisely what he had picked up, it is clear that the actual Athenian tradition, on which his interpretation undoubtedly depends, made no effort to deny that it was Athenian intrigue that had led to the allies' "voluntary" submission to Athens and that Pausanias' behavior was used as a convenient pretext. In Herodotus' day the Athenians were probably rather proud of it. Thucydides' account is intended to *contradict* this accepted version, and it is clearly his own opinion: not only is it highly unlikely that he actually had different information from Herodotus', but, as we have seen, there are elements within his story that point to purposeful Athenian action. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that it was, in particular, the charge of Medism (which was what ensured his recall and of which he was acquitted) that was launched against Pausanias by the Athenians, when his overbearing behavior (which must be accepted as true) gave them the opportunity.

After a sketchy account of the league's early campaigns, for which Thucydides could clearly not get precise details or a precise chronology by the time he wrote, he sets out to show (99) that the conversion from league to tightly controlled empire was essentially the allies' own fault. If the charge that the Athenians had "enslaved" their allies could not be denied (as it clearly could not), it could at least be mitigated by a historical explanation: the result had been produced without malice aforethought. Thucydides' explanation is that the Athenians merely exacted what the allies had promised to give, and that this was the principal cause of revolts. So far, the explanation sounds in part credible. But he next goes on to say that the Athenians' increase in power and their ability to subdue revolts was due to the allies' own actions: most of them, through unwillingness to face the hardships of personal service (which, of course, the Athenians willingly undertook), had converted this to payment of money, and so they increased the power of the Athenian fleet and lost their own military tradition, with the result that they could not resist Athenian power.

It is a well-planned piece of apologia, for there is enough of a substratum of truth to make it acceptable to the uncritical reader: witness the fact that generations of scholars and teachers have lauded it as an example of Thucydides' gift for profound analysis. As we have already seen, the basic facts are true: the allies did object to continuing to contribute forces when the purpose of the fighting changed from war

against the Barbarian to the expansion of Athenian power and wealth. Only a single revolt (that of Naxos) probably precedes the battle of the Eurymedon, after which fighting against Persia ended. (We know nothing about its causes or its course.) The next major revolt (that of Thasos) arose out of what appears to have been a piece of imperialist aggression by Athens against an ally: Thucydides' neutral wording about a "difference" (100.2) disguises what must be an Athenian attempt to annex the profitable Thasian *peraea*.¹⁸ And most further fighting, in which the allies were expected to fulfill the obligations originally undertaken, was against Greeks, with only a single major exception, unlikely to have aroused much enthusiasm: the disastrous six-year campaign in Egypt.¹⁹ Whether the Athenian claims or allied resistance to them was legally correct we cannot tell, since we do not have the wording of the original treaties. If they were indeed sworn "against the Barbarian" (as Thucydides tells us, 96.1), and perhaps even with the avowed purpose of "laying waste the King's land" (*ibid.*), then the allies were undoubtedly right in limiting their contributions to fighting on those terms; if, on the other hand, the words merely represent what was said at the time, without binding force, then we may assume that the treaties were eternal. However, it is worth nothing that when Thucydides takes the latter situation for granted, in chapter 99, this is in apparent conflict with his own account of the foundation of the league. In view of the nature of that chapter, and the general tendency of his apologia, the claim that the Athenians were technically justified in their exactions cannot be lightly believed.²⁰

His treatment of the allies' conversion of service to tribute and its consequences, however, is patently dishonest. First, he has again (as in the case of the formation of the league) suppressed the positive Athenian encouragement of such conversion, explicitly attested for Cimon by Plutarch (*Cim.* 11). But above all, his statement that it was the allies' neglect of their military competence that made them helpless against the Athenians is absurd. By far the largest number of allies, as we know from the assessments and the quota lists, were small to minuscule places; in many cases, we know no more about them than that they paid tribute to the Athenians. Even at the time of the battle of Lade (*Hdt.* 6.7–8), when the Ionians and Aeolians mustered their fleets, "leaving behind not a single ship," the number of cities participating was very small, and apart from the three large islands (Chios, Lesbos, and Samos) and Miletus, no city provided a formidable contingent. The majority of

tributary allies, as we know them, could not have provided a whole trireme and crew even at the beginning, and few would have contributed more than one or two. That the diligent cultivation of this military skill would have enabled, say, Erythrae or Siphnos to resist the full might of an Athenian attack is too absurd to merit contemplation. On the other hand, those major naval powers (Thasos and Samos) which might have had a hope of defending themselves did maintain their forces and traditions—and they were defeated by the Athenians when they challenged Athenian power or resisted Athenian aggression. Thucydides' analysis of the reasons for the growth of Athenian power turns out to be an edifice of apologia built up by misinterpretation of facts known to be true. It is the technique of counsel for the defense, and should be judged as such.

That Thucydides makes no mention of the peace with the Barbarian which might lend some justification to the allies' interpretation of the original treaties can, in the context, not be regarded as surprising. What is surprising is that eminent scholars continue to urge his omission of the peace as an argument against its authenticity. As I have tried to show, the authenticity of the peace is not very difficult to prove, to a degree of probability that at least matches what the historian of Greece is accustomed to; moreover, the fact that, by contemporary standards, it was not a very honorable peace, since it made major concessions to the King, already provides sufficient reason why Thucydides might have chosen to omit it, just as Herodotus had tiptoed around it. Detailed scrutiny of his purpose and methods in Book 1, however, can leave no doubt that this peace simply had to be omitted if the apologetic thesis of chapter 99 was not to be negated.²¹ Were it not for the despised Andocides (whom some have tried to explain away), we could not have guessed—or if we had, no one would have believed it—that for half a century Athens was officially a “friend” of the King.²²

We have seen how the motif of Spartan treachery is introduced at the time of the Persian Wars, in the case of the walls of Athens, and reinforced by the display of Spartan hypocrisy in the acquittal of Pausanias, manifestly guilty of treason to the Greek cause that the Athenians were defending; and how, to counter current interpretations, Athenian innocence in acquiring the empire and in tightening control over it are emphasized. The next interaction between the two powers brings us to the first clear example of what must be called disinformation. We are told, as plain fact, that at the time of Thasos' war against Athenian aggres-

sion Sparta promised her support by means of an invasion of Attica, and that the Spartans were indeed about to fulfill that promise when the unexpected development of the helot revolt due to the great earthquake prevented it (101).²³ What is more, we are told that all this took place without the Athenians' becoming aware of it—an essential qualification, since at the very beginning of the next chapter (102.1) we find Sparta appealing to Athens for help against the helots, on the strength of the very treaty which the Spartans had just unscrupulously promised to break, and we find Athens loyally sending that help in the form of a large hoplite force under Cimon. The story again neatly interweaves the two leitmotifs: Sparta's unscrupulous treachery, constrained only by her lack of full control over her own hegemonial sphere.

It would be pleasant to say that few historians have believed this artful tale. In fact, the great majority have taken the historian's word for it without a thought; of the few who did think, nearly all have at most thought Thucydides slightly misinformed. Nowhere has diehard fundamentalism been more conspicuous, and lack of critical thought more obvious.²⁴ Thucydides himself is unlikely to have believed the story he told. He, of all people, well knew that Sparta could not make such a promise: if it was indeed made, she was deceiving the Thasians as well as her own ally. Yet it suits his case to stress only the latter aspect. It is from Thucydides himself that we know the workings of the Peloponnesian League when it wanted to declare war. Both at the time of the Samian War and before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War we hear of the same procedure: a meeting of the full league, at which a Spartan proposal was debated and voted on—rejected in the former instance and (we are told) accepted in the latter. In the former case it is implied, and in the latter set out at length, that Sparta, as *hēgemōn*, had summoned the meeting after deciding her own policy. We do not know much about the history and development of the Peloponnesian League, and we cannot be sure that precisely the same procedure was in use twenty years earlier, though we have no reason to think that it was not, and we cannot think of any occasion during those years when it might have been introduced. Thucydides, certainly, gives us no indication of such an innovation. We should therefore assume that he himself believed that, before starting out on an invasion of Attica, Sparta would have had to consult her allies.

However, no matter what the "constitutional" position, it was clear to all Greeks, not least to the Thasians at the time and to Thucydides

later, that Sparta could not launch an invasion of Attica without the cooperation of Corinth. No Greek aware of the major events of history in the previous generation could fail to know what had happened to Sparta's plans to invade Attica in order to restore the tyranny.²⁵ If Corinth were to object from the outset, Spartan forces would not even be able to get near Attica. The story of the promise to Thasos, perhaps credible to most Greeks in 404 and (so it might be hoped) to posterity, cannot have been believed by Thucydides, and the promise itself is highly unlikely to have been believed by the Thasians at the time. As for the vague further statement that the Spartans were about to carry it out (what precisely were they about to do?), and all this without any rumor of the preparations involved reaching Athens, this merely helps to bury the unhappy invention and to make it almost impossible to believe that the author was innocently mistaken.²⁶

Significantly, after the Thasians, abandoned by the Spartans, have had to accept unfavorable terms, we at once hear that the Spartans, prevented only by accident from attacking their ally, appeal to that very ally for help, which the Athenians supply in innocent good faith (102.1).²⁷ The Athenians, in fact, break their alliance only after they have been treated with contempt by the allies they came to assist: the Spartans curtly dismissed the Athenian force after a failure to take the Messenian position by storm, because they feared that, owing to their revolutionary temperament (hardly conspicuous in the Athens of Cimon and the Areopagus) and to their being Ionians, they might join the Dorian Messenians against the Dorian Spartans. The unmerited slight, administered to loyal allies in front of the other allies, is made to seem an adequate justification for Athens' breaking the alliance: the Spartan promise to Thasos had apparently not been discovered even by the Athenian forces in Laconia, in the course of a whole campaign.

I have pointed out in another context²⁸ that the offensive motive ascribed to the Spartans is Athenian apologetic invention. The truth, as so often, appears to have been much simpler: the Athenians had been summoned on the strength of their reputation in taking fortified places by storm, and when they failed to do so, the Spartans saw no reason to go on paying for their prolonged presence. They could hardly afford to. The Laconic reason Thucydides reports them as advancing—that they “no longer needed them”—should be accepted as simply true even though Thucydides tries to submerge it. Yet to be sent home because they had failed was not an acceptable reason for Athenian tradition,

hence (after the Ephialtic reforms) the more acceptable motive, apparently based on pure invention, reported by Thucydides. The fact that in the end Athens had broken her sworn treaty with Sparta and not vice versa could not be denied. It could only be palliated by first featuring Sparta's unfulfilled treacherous promise, contrasting it with unquestioning Athenian loyalty, and then adding an unmerited slur on that loyalty before all the allies.²⁹ This also introduces the motif of Sparta's disregard of oaths and the gods except as instruments of *Realpolitik*; we shall see a great deal more of it.

III

After this glimpse of Thucydides' aims and methods, we can proceed to look at the first of our main topics: the Thirty Years' Peace. Since the terms of this peace are basic in the developments of the 430s that led to its breakdown, and in particular to the *aitiai* presented by Thucydides, one would expect the historian to start with a clear exposition of the relevant terms. There were many facts in the Pentecontaetia which, by the time Thucydides wrote, had probably disappeared beyond recall, but the peace of 445 was not one of them. Centuries later, the traveler Pausanias still saw the stele setting out its terms at Olympia (5.23.4) and recorded a clause that apparently surprised him. However, Thucydides gives us nothing except the territorial clauses (1.15.1), which were never a subject of dispute. Other provisions appear in later debates, told in such a way that, with two exceptions, it is impossible for us to reconstruct the clauses on which discussion is based or to assess the justice of the claims made.³⁰

The first of these clauses incidentally mentioned is the one allowing cities not listed in the treaty (40.2, showing there was an actual schedule), presumably as allies of either party, to join either alliance (35.1; 40.2). The converse obligation is implied and was no doubt also expressed: neither side was allowed to receive a city listed as an ally of the other into its own alliance. This, of course, was the main purpose of the peace: the two great powers guaranteed each other's hegemony.

Next, autonomy. Here Thucydides has made things particularly difficult for us: he not only (as we saw) fails to mention an autonomy clause when reporting the conclusion of the treaty, but he does not vouchsafe us any statement of the nature or extent of this clause. All that we are

allowed to know is that Aegina complained about the violation of its autonomy as being contrary to the peace (67.2). It appears to be the standard modern explanation that there was a special clause in the treaty guaranteeing the autonomy of Aegina. But there is nothing in Thucydides to support this “minimalist” interpretation, and there are indications that it should be abandoned.

First, perhaps, Potidaea: at the very time of Aegina’s complaint the Corinthians complained that the Athenian attack on Potidaea was a breach of the treaty (67.1). The Spartans themselves were apparently of the same opinion, for when envoys from Potidaea appealed to them for protection, they promised to invade Attica if the Athenians attacked Potidaea. Thucydides reports the fact without comment. It has usually been taken (and it is possible that we were *intended* to take it) as a promise to launch an immediate invasion (obviously with Corinthian approval) if Potidaea were attacked; and since Sparta did not do this, it has been thought to follow either that her magistrates were wantonly egging Potidaea on to resistance, with little intention of assisting her, or that a “peace party” prevented them from later carrying out their promise. The promise as such must be believed, for there is no suggestion, this time, that it was kept secret, and it was perhaps specially publicized in order to make the Athenians think twice about launching an attack. But there can be no doubt that, after the Samos affair, the functioning of the Peloponnesian League was well known. Corinth’s support should, this time, suffice to assure the league’s agreement; but neither Sparta nor Potidaea can have expected reaction to an attack to be immediate. The naive reader is meant to regard this promise (known and public) as no more justified than the secret promise to Thasos of which it is meant to remind him: another instance of Sparta’s readiness to break her oaths. Any hint of justification, even as alleged, is avoided. But the reader alerted by the doubts felt over Thasos will beware of writing off this real promise as based on mere opportunism and the Corinthian complaint as mere fiction. Could it be that Potidaea’s autonomy had been guaranteed under the treaty, as we know Aegina’s had been?

Let us turn to Samos. It follows from the Corinthians’ speech in Athens (40.5) that Sparta herself had decided on action after the Athenian attack on Samos: the parallel of the antecedents of the Peloponnesian war makes it clear. Ste. Croix follows Thucydides’ invitation to interpret it as one more piece of unscrupulous Spartan opportunism;³¹ For Thucydides again gives no explanation, indeed he does not even explicitly mention a Spartan vote. Let us consider the case more carefully.

We know that Samos was one of the few remaining autonomous allies of Athens: a relic of the original league.³² What if this autonomy had been guaranteed in the peace? Yet, if so, on what grounds did the Corinthians oppose intervention? Their ambassadors in fact clearly tell us (40.5; 41.2; 43.1): they chose (for reasons of their own, as is generally recognized) to depict the Samian War as an ally's rebellion against Athens: on that premise, Athens was entitled to punish the ally, and the league had no right to give it aid. An autonomy clause in the peace could appear to conflict with the clause forbidding the acceptance of an ally of the other party into one's own alliance. The Corinthians, needless to say, nowhere say or imply that Sparta's action was a breach of the treaty. They merely report a difference of opinion, apparently legitimate.

Who was right? We obviously cannot judge, since we have not been given a detailed account of the outbreak of the Samian War or of the Thirty Years' Peace. Corinth (it must be admitted) was quite capable of mere *Realpolitik* without regard for oaths. As far as we can tell from Thucydides' own account (115.2–3), it was clearly a case of Athenian aggression. Samos had not been called on to answer the Milesian charges and may not even have known of them. The Athenian invasion came as a complete surprise to the Samian government and the invaders easily seized the island, as Pericles had no doubt foreseen. The contrast with the war later fought against a well-prepared city under its restored oligarchic government is striking and revealing. All in all, we must conclude that, on the evidence available to us, Sparta had a good case for arguing that our postulated autonomy clause had been broken by an Athenian attack.

If we can now apply this knowledge to Potidaea, it should be noted that, although not autonomous in the same sense and to the same extent as Samos (for she paid tribute), Potidaea certainly had a special status within the class of tribute-paying allies that raised her well above the class of "enslavement" and might well be said to amount to autonomy. She had her own city walls (unlike, for example, the cities of Asia Minor that we know about—3.33.2), and this, although perhaps not a mark of autonomy since other cities in the Thracian area shared it, shows some favored status.³³ Above all, we suddenly and casually hear (56.2) that she received some of her annual governing magistrates (*epidēmiourgoi*—we do not know whether the prefix implies that they were superior magistrates or merely additional ones) from Corinth, and this unusual privilege implies a very high degree of independence from Athenian control.³⁴ The sudden Athenian withdrawal of this special status,

which seems to have gone along with a two-and-a-half-fold increase in tribute³⁵—and none of this for any previous disloyalty to Athens, which Thucydides would not have suppressed—would again infringe the autonomy clause of the peace which we have been able to disengage in spite of Thucydides' significant silence.

It may be asked why we do not hear of the autonomy of these two cities as one of the *aitiai*, and whether this is not an argument against the existence of such a clause. Against this, we must bear in mind that, apart from the complaint in 67.2, we never hear of the autonomy of Aegina. On the other hand, Sparta's apparent judgment that Athens had broken the treaty of 445 by attacking Samos and Potidaea is confirmed, in a peculiar manner, by a phrase in the final speech assigned to Pericles by Thucydides—the speech that is intended to leave the reader under the spell of the perfect exposition of the “facts” from the Athenian point of view and from Pericles' own. There, in his response to the Spartan demand that the Athenians grant autonomy to all the Greek cities under their control (on the circumstances of this demand, see p. 157 below), Thucydides' Pericles replies as follows (144.2): “As to the cities, we shall give them autonomy if they were autonomous under our command at the time when we made the treaty.”³⁶ In the light of our analysis, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Pericles was well aware of the existence of the autonomy clause in the treaty, but is trying to deny that Athens had any obligations under it.

His words in fact enable us to define the provisions of that clause with unexpected precision. It apparently stipulated that cities autonomous at the time the treaty was sworn were to remain autonomous—we must obviously add, “provided they fulfilled existing treaty obligations.” This would protect the members of the Peloponnesian League as well as those of Athens' allies considered to be autonomous. An obvious parallel is not difficult to find in a clause of the Peace of Nicias in 421 (5.18.5): there, the cities handed over to Athens by the Spartans were to remain autonomous provided they paid the tribute to Athens; to save face, the Spartans stipulated that those cities were not to be “allies” of Athens, but that Athens should be entitled to “persuade” them to become allies. Those cities were listed, whereas it is clear from the debate over autonomy in Thucydides that there was no list of autonomous cities in the treaty of 445. Nonetheless, it is also clear that Pericles was prevaricating when (in his speech in Thucydides) he claimed, by implication, that Athens had had no autonomous allies at the time. It must

make us more suspicious of other—unverifiable—statements ascribed to him by Thucydides in that speech.³⁷

As I have pointed out elsewhere,³⁸ the category of cities paying a (fixed) tribute while “autonomous” was not new in 445: it was a category found in the Peace of Callias for the Greek cities remaining under the King’s suzerainty. Callias, who had presumably helped to create this category in the sixties and had certainly confirmed it in the final version of the Peace of Callias in 449, was the chief Athenian representative in the negotiations that led to the peace of 445 with Sparta (Diod. 12.7).

Recognition of the autonomy clause in the peace of 445 puts Athenian action against Potidaea, and Sparta’s immediate reaction to it, in a very different light—as also in the case of Samos. In that case, Thucydides, who labored hard to hide its existence from the reader—and indeed he had to, for recognition of it would have totally undermined the interpretation of the origins of the Peloponnesian War that he was trying to build up—found himself in a dilemma. Sparta’s decision, frustrated by Corinth, was the most striking and impressive instance of the two motifs he was trying to weave together—Sparta’s unscrupulous aggressiveness and her weakness within her own hegemony—provided he could suppress the justification for Sparta’s action. However, in the case of Samos this presented almost insuperable difficulties. In the earlier case of Thasos (which, in any event, preceded the peace of 445), no debate or discussion within the alliance was alleged; in the later case of Potidaea, there was much discussion but no debate, since there was no essential disagreement. But if the case of Samos had been given the importance it deserved, at the center of the history of Greece between the wars and of Thucydides’ case, it would have been impossible to omit the debate, and the Athenian infringement of the autonomy clause in the peace would have had to be mentioned. Thucydides was therefore compelled to give up any full treatment of that notable incident and decided to bring it in obliquely, from the perspective of the Corinthians: we hear of it only (and repeatedly) in the speech of their envoys in Athens. This device enabled the historian to omit the case the Corinthians were responding to and to give only their own argument; as a result, although Sparta’s helplessness within her hegemony is fully exposed, her aggressiveness can only be glimpsed, since her Corinthian allies could not openly accuse Sparta of unjustified aggression, nor (of course) could they be permitted to mention the justification. One of the most important incidents in the Pentecontaetia, which ought to have been central to

the account of it on any reasonable assessment, had to be totally banished from it, and an unsatisfactory substitute put in its place, in order to prevent the divulgence of (perhaps) the one clause of the peace that Thucydides desperately wanted to suppress. It is surprising that this most striking indication of his aim and method in this book has never aroused the interest or attention of his modern readers.

IV

Next, the arbitration clause. Here Thucydides' treatment turns out to be no less peculiar. We first hear of it when the Athenian envoys at Sparta remind their hosts (78.4) that compulsory arbitration of differences was provided for by one of the clauses in the treaty, and that Athens was now quite prepared to comply with this if the Spartans had charges to bring forward against her. Thucydides does not tell us how the Athenian embassy, which was in Sparta "on other business," presumably not connected with the differences that led to the war, had the authority to make this statement, which seems to commit Athens to the acceptance of arbitration. It seems very doubtful that the statement can actually have been made at this point. As we shall see, Thucydides needed it for compositional reasons, and he quite probably introduced it here from his knowledge that Pericles was prepared to offer arbitration. Later, in his great final speech written to impress the Athenian case on the reader without further contradiction, Pericles insists on this (144.2) as full justification of Athens' position, in contrast to Sparta's refusal.

We soon see how Thucydides chose to employ the introduction of arbitration at this point. For the Spartans are now depicted as conspicuously unaware of this clause. Sthenelaidas, in his speech advocating war, naturally dismisses the possibility of legal proceedings (86.3), without referring to the sworn obligation. But one would have expected Archidamus to make the most of it in his speech opposing immediate war. There could hardly be a more powerful argument, and (as we have the story) the Athenians had just reminded the Spartan assembly of it. Yet, straight after that reminder, Archidamus conspicuously ignores it—or rather, he manages to "disinfect" it so as to prevent its having its full effect on those who had just heard it. He cannot ignore the *issue*, of course. But what he says is that it would not be in accordance with

customary Greek rules of behavior to treat one who has offered arbitration as manifestly guilty (85.2)—not a word about the sworn obligation of which his audience had just been reminded.³⁹ Thucydides' art is here at its most purposeful: he had carefully calculated what he wanted to convey. The first appearance of Archidamus, a king introduced (perhaps ironically) as a man of understanding and prudent moderation,⁴⁰ is deftly used to depict him as a pure *Realpolitiker*, devaluing sworn oaths to mere customary practice. As we have seen, this fits in with the picture of Spartan leadership and Spartan treatment of oaths throughout this book. It was made clear in the case of Thasos that Sparta thought of oaths as of no account when inconvenient, but to be appealed to when advantageous. As we have also seen, Thucydides carefully contrasts this picture with that of the Athenians' scrupulous adherence to their oaths—whether in assisting Sparta until provoked to break with her or in the treatment of their own allies, who bring misfortune on themselves by not fulfilling their own sworn obligations. This is the contrast now confirmed by the treatment of the arbitration clause; Thucydides throughout carefully avoids undermining it by the emergence of inconvenient facts. Indeed, we shall soon see how it is later reinforced.

It should hardly need saying that this is contrary to all that we know (outside Thucydides) about Sparta's simple religiosity at this time. After all, it was not Sparta that had experienced the "Sophistic revolution" and the associated "Enlightenment," as some (though by no means all) Athenians had. Yet Thucydides has gone to extraordinary lengths to depict the Spartan ethos as essentially similar to that of part of the educated upper class in Athens. The lesson is reinforced much later: Thucydides often takes up the themes he has introduced in Book 1 and develops and reinforces them, as we have seen in the case of the speech assigned to the Mytilenaeans at Olympia (n. 16 above). After a small Athenian incursion had led to the renewal of war, we are told (7.18.3–4) that the Spartans were glad that this time the Athenians had been unambiguously guilty of breaking the treaty, since they were aware that they themselves had broken it the first time—i.e. by refusing arbitration; and they had later come to think this the cause of the disasters they had suffered, especially at Pylos. In other words, we are meant to see the Spartans as developing a conscience only when things begin to go wrong—a fitting complement to their refusing to take cognizance of their sworn obligation in Book 1.

In fact, it is clear that Spartan behavior was far from godless. As soon

as Sthenelaidas' resolution (on which more below) had been passed and there was a prospect of war, the Spartans sent an embassy to Delphi to enquire whether they should start a war (118.3)—and it was only after the god's enthusiastic reassurance (far beyond the usual formula) that they proceeded to summon the congress of their allies for the next stage in the process that might lead to actual war. Now, there can be no question that Apollo had the power to interpret sacred obligations: with his approval, the Spartans were fully entitled to feel sure that they were not in breach of sacred law. As for what came later, it is not surprising that, when something went seriously wrong, some of those simple souls began to wonder whether they had not perhaps misunderstood the god: had they perhaps not asked the right question or fully explained the situation?⁴¹ It is easy for religious people to develop irrational feelings of guilt, but it would be a serious mistake for the historian to accept such feelings as evidence for the facts. Thucydides, as is his usual technique, does not permit any doubt. The treatment of the Spartans and of their cynical indifference (later regretted) to their oaths must, once more, be called disinformation.

V

Finally, in our survey of the Peace of 445, the question of Megara.⁴² Aristophanes' almost contemporary evidence fortunately helps to supplement Thucydides, who fails to tell us that Pericles was personally responsible for at least the final form of the boycott legislation, and who is misleading on the actual purport of it. According to Thucydides (67.4), the Megarians complained that they were personally excluded from trading in Athens and her empire, and that this was contrary to the treaty. The latter claim is denied by Pericles, in the great final speech whose purpose we have already noted (144.2); and the Megarian Decrees are presented as parallel to Sparta's occasional expulsions of foreigners, about which we know nothing in detail. The parallel, even within the framework set up by Thucydides, is obviously misleading: this hardly needs discussion. But it is the framework itself that needs careful scrutiny. For once, as we have seen, Thucydides can indeed be checked, and the check helps to reveal his technique.

Aristophanes, of course, is being satirical; but the facts on which he bases his satire must be true, since they were known to his audience.

The passage we are concerned with is in *Acharnians*, produced only a few years after the outbreak of the war. Aristophanes vividly describes sycophants sniffing out innocent goods and claiming they are contraband Megarian imports; then comes the exchange of kidnappings of *pornai*, and it is after this that Pericles, like Olympian Zeus, thunders forth his laws forbidding the Megarians' finding a place on earth, in the sea, or in heaven. In other words, an embargo on Megarian goods (no matter by whom imported) was already effective before the final incident that led to the exclusion of Megarian persons.⁴³ Although the Megarians are said to have protested against the exclusion of their persons, the two must be taken together: there can be no doubt that it was the embargo that hurt a trading city most. And there is no evidence that Sparta ever imposed a comparable measure.

Whether or not any of this was contrary to the treaty we simply cannot tell. Thucydides, by withholding the terms from us, has made judgment impossible; and by letting his Pericles have the last word, in that overpowering final speech, he has practically forced the reader to accept Pericles' version. Was free access to cities bound by the peace guaranteed to all citizens of such cities? Pericles denies it; but we must remember that he also denies that any of Athens' allies were autonomous at the time of the swearing of the treaty, and we have seen that this is simply false. More probably, however, he is shifting the ground of the debate. Perhaps there really was no free-access clause, and it was the embargo that the Megarians were concerned about, as indeed they had reason to be. That might be covered by a kind of *asylia* clause, guaranteeing the property of all contracting cities from seizure in others. However, we can only consider possibilities: Thucydides has seen to it that we cannot know. Yet the attentive reader will do well not to dismiss the Megarian case outright: the Megarians are no less likely than Pericles to have spoken the truth; and at least we cannot catch them out in lies on other points. With that warning, we must leave the question open, with a clear recognition of why we are reduced to doing so.

VI

We are now approaching the decisive point, the votes for war and the negotiations that preceded its outbreak—the point where Thucydides was most concerned to demonstrate Spartan duplicity and Athenian in-

nocence, as background for the inevitability of the Athenian decision, inspired by Pericles, to undertake the war.

Before we deal with the actual incidents, we must clear up a preliminary point regarding Thucydidean speeches. In general, the speeches are plausible fiction, subject to each speaker's being assigned arguments that express the intention of his speech. In this, as I have said, we must agree with Ste. Croix, against such as Gomme, who thought them almost verbally acceptable evidence. Thucydides explicitly tells us that he is not going to report speeches verbatim, even (it is implied) where he can remember them (22.1). There are, however, some reported statements that we must accept as having a higher degree of authenticity. Memorable speeches in Athens might well include actual phrases that would be remembered by the audience as well as by the historian, thus circumscribing his freedom in stylistic adaptation; certainly, the details of the arguments in such speeches may be expected to be more true to the original. And there are short statements of such importance, and demonstrably so reliably transmitted to Athens, that they should be regarded as, in all important respects, verbally accurate. One such, with which we shall be concerned, is the speech formulating the vote put to the Spartan Assembly by Sthenelaidas (87.2): only twenty-six words long, and crucial in the events that immediately led to the outbreak of the war, it was certainly at once reported to the Athenian embassy waiting outside the assembly, which soon returned from Sparta to Athens, where it would, of course, at once have to report to the *Boule* and the People.⁴⁴ Speeches of this kind should obviously be used by the modern historian in a manner quite different from the limited use that can be made of the fictitious speeches.

Having clarified this, we can proceed to look at the historian's description of the debate and vote at Sparta.

Straight after the speech by the Athenian ambassadors, we are told (79.1), the Spartans held an assembly, and the majority decided that the Athenians were guilty (of breaking the treaty) and that Sparta must immediately go to war (ἀδικεῖν τε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἤδη καὶ πολλμητέα εἶναι ἐν τάχει). It is after this decision has already been noted that Thucydides artistically interposes a pair of contrasting speeches: first, a long speech by King Archidamus, urging them (as we have seen, without reference to their sworn treaty obligations) not to be hasty in taking this decision; next, a blunt "Laconic" speech by the ephor Sthe-

nelaidas, speaking in favor of immediate war. A vote is taken by shouting, and he then calls for a formal division on the motion.⁴⁵ (We are not told what was meant by the previous statement that there had already been a majority decision: we must suspect that there was no such earlier decision, but that Thucydides is by anticipation summing up the debate and vote that follow.) At this point we are given the terms of the actual motion (87.2): “Whoever among you, Lacedaemonians, thinks that the treaty has been broken and that the Athenians are at fault, let him get up and go over there . . . and whoever thinks that this is not so, over to the other side.” And we are told that there was a large majority for the affirmative.

As we have already seen, the terms of the motion must be accepted as historically accurate: no one in the Athenian Assembly at the time was likely to forget the ambassadors’ report. This is why the contrast between Sthenelaidas’ fictitious speech and the terms of his genuine motion is so startling. The speech calls for immediate war, and we are led to believe that this is what the Assembly was voting on by shouting. Yet the terms of the motion for the division are totally different: no mention of going to war, but a statement of record, that the Assembly considers the treaty to have been broken by the Athenians. It is utterly incredible that this is not identical with the motion on which the shouting vote was taken. In other words, we must take it that the Spartan Assembly twice voted on (and for) the motion as we have it. Thucydides, as we saw, could not conceal the actual terms remembered by many of his contemporary readers; in order to stress Spartan aggression, he therefore wrapped it round with his own comments and interpretations. As we have seen, he reports the Spartan decision to start the war even before the pair of speeches that precedes the formal motion. He then makes Sthenelaidas speak and call for a vote in favor of immediate war, contradicting the wording of the actual motion on which the Assembly divided. Straight after that division, he again adds his own interpretation: he sums up the vote by asserting (88) that its purport had been “that the treaty had been broken *and that war must be begun* (καὶ πολεμητέα εἶναι—the last three words, of course, are his own invention). With his usual art, he proceeds to impress this on the reader. He introduces a date: it was the fourteenth year of the Thirty Years’ Peace made after the war in Euboea; and he adds what he sees as Sparta’s motive for going to war: fear of increasing Athenian power. Thus we are made to

take it for granted that it was this vote that started the Peloponnesian War. The actual import of the vote—that the treaty had been broken by the Athenians—is not thought worth wasting a word on.

As we have seen, Thucydides does not make it easy for the reader to escape from his art and his misrepresentation: there is ample evidence that few have considered the vote as anything other than (at least virtually) a decision for war.⁴⁶ Yet there is all the difference in the world between a declaration of war and a vote recording the breach of the treaty and Athenian guilt. There is much to support the view that the Spartan vote was in fact correct in both its parts: that the treaty *had* been broken (by what was done to Potidaea, Aegina, and quite possibly Megara), and (inevitably) that the Athenians were the guilty party. I feel little doubt that Archidamus supported the motion: he nowhere defends Athenian actions as being justified. But a vote of record is not a declaration of war. It leaves the possibility of negotiations open. We shall see that negotiations did in fact follow. (Some of the more naive scholars have ascribed this to an increase in the power of Archidamus' party.) Nor is it difficult to see that the Spartans did not consider themselves at war. For one thing, they first had to consult their allies. But above all, as we have seen, they first decided to consult Delphic Apollo. That was probably traditional Spartan practice in any serious situation; and the god had proved a good friend to Sparta. But in this case, as we noted, there was indeed a matter of religious importance to be decided, and a mission to Delphi was an inescapable necessity. Such a mission, however, was far from comparable, say, to a request to the Pope to bless the armed forces of Italy—a model that may have unconsciously misled some modern interpreters. The Spartans had first to put the basic question to the god (118.3): whether “it would be better to go to war.”⁴⁷ The question helps, against Thucydides' strident distortion, to elucidate and confirm the wording and the true nature of the vote.

The mission to Delphi is reported after the long excursus on the *Pentecontaetia*. It is interesting to observe that, just before that report, Thucydides again quotes the words of the Spartan vote and again (in this case, before reporting it) interprets it for the reader as a decision “to attack and, if they could, destroy that power [of Athens]” (118.2). The reader is never to be allowed to see the wording without the gloss.

Thucydides himself was well aware of the difference between a vote that a treaty had been broken and a vote to begin a war. This can be demonstrated. During the long twilight of the Peace of Nicias, when

both sides were becoming increasingly hostile toward each other, the Athenians were at one point persuaded by Alcibiades to vote that Sparta had broken the peace treaty, and to record that vote: this was to serve as a reason for sending the Messenians back to Pylos, from where they had been removed under the terms of the treaty—a step bound to raise the international temperature. After passing the vote, they decreed that a note should be engraved at the bottom of the stele containing the treaty, recording their vote (Thuc. 5.56.3: winter 419/8); but they still did nothing to renew the war: τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἡσύχαζον. Nor did the Spartans, at that point or for a long time after, consider that they had a just *casus belli*. In fact, it was only when an Athenian force raided their territory at a much later date (6.105) that they considered they were entitled to begin a war and invade Attica.⁴⁸ It cannot be said that Thucydides' treatment of the vote at Sparta is an error arising out of genuine confusion.

We now come to the meeting of the members of the Peloponnesian League. As Thucydides tells the story, the Spartans wanted to put to them the question of whether to go to war (119.1; he goes on to say that most of the delegations spoke in favor of war). Next we have the bellicose and optimistic speech of the Corinthians, which at once reinforces the structure built up by Thucydides. It begins: "As regards the Lacedaemonians . . . we may no longer complain that they have not themselves voted for war: they have now assembled us for that purpose." It cannot be said (as might at first sight seem possible) that this is a distortion plausibly assigned to the Corinthians: we have seen ample evidence that it is Thucydides' own, which he omits no opportunity to repeat. The speech is followed (125.1) by the Spartans' putting the motion to the meeting, and we are told that the majority voted for war.⁴⁹

The report has the full authority of Thucydides behind it, and it has never been questioned. Yet after our analysis of his treatment of the vote at Sparta we must surely approach it with critical suspicion. As we have seen, the whole of his report of the vote at Sparta, with all references to it, is tailored to make it appear a vote for war. It is only the fact that he could not well escape revealing the wording of the actual vote that has rescued its true import for us. At the congress of the allies there were no Athenian ambassadors present. All the reports that reached the ordinary Athenian were probably filtered through the few men likely to get real information—chiefly, perhaps, the *Boule* and important men with important guest-friends. Thucydides did not have to assume widespread

knowledge of the details of what went on at the meeting, and certainly no vivid recollections of it. Here he does not give us the wording of the actual motion; we have only his interpretation. To put it concretely, in terms of our earlier analysis: we have what corresponds to 88.1 and cannot check it against what would correspond to 87.2. There is thus every reason to wonder whether the decision of the allied congress has been “interpreted” along the same lines as that of the Spartan Assembly. Further reflection turns suspicion into near certainty. For it is surely almost inconceivable that Sparta should have put to the allies’ vote a resolution different (and significantly different) from what had been decided by the Assembly of Spartiates. Nor is it likely that the actual motion was significantly amended (perhaps by Corinthian pressure) before being passed. It seems inconceivable that any hegemonial power in the ancient world would have allowed the allies under its leadership to impose on it a war that did not accord with its own decisions and preferences. Whatever the “constitution” of the Peloponnesian League, we are nowhere given any indication that, when Sparta consulted the allies, they had any right other than to accept or reject.

We can be all but certain, in the light of Thucydides’ practice as we have disengaged it, that the congress of the allies merely confirmed Sparta’s own decision and made it binding on the league: that Athens had broken the treaty. That would presumably imply negotiations to undo the wrong that had been done, and ultimately it would empower Sparta, if negotiations failed, to declare and begin war on behalf of the whole league. It might well be thought that a firm stand, and the very threat of war, would suffice to make the success of negotiations more likely.

If we correct Thucydides’ disinformation, what followed makes good sense; for we do indeed find that the vote at the congress was followed by negotiations, not by war. For Thucydides, this causes difficulties. He has to resolve them by alleging a truly Machiavellian scheme as part of the allies’ decisions. We are told (125.2) that since the league was not prepared for war, it was decided that the cities should without delay provide what was suitable (πρόσφορον) for it; yet Thucydides notes that it took almost a year for them to do so before they were ready to invade Attica and “openly begin the war.”⁵⁰

It is difficult to believe this. It was one thing for Archidamus to suggest (82.1) that Sparta should spend two or three years trying to gain the alliance of powers, Greek or barbarian, which might supply her with ships and money, and it has even been argued that this is what Thucy-

dides is here imputing to the Peloponnesian allies.⁵¹ Yet this is far from what he actually says. All that we are told was to be done, as fast as possible, was for each city to provide what was suitable (for the war); why, then, did it take nearly a year for them to do so? Did the hoplites have to order new suits of armor and the cavalry to breed new horses? Unlike a modern society, a Greek city did not have to change from mass production for civilian needs to mass production of munitions and war supplies. It always had to be ready to face war at short notice. And since the Peloponnesians did not have to fear invasion, there was not even any need for massive imports of food in advance. Thucydides' vague explanation of the delay helps to confirm the suspicion already aroused by his account.

During that year negotiations continued. After all, Potidaea was holding out and nothing irreparable had been done. It is pure fantasy to try to trace changes between a peace party and a war party in Sparta and to think of Spartan policy as vacillating. Naturally, in Sparta as in Athens some people were more and some less eager for war. But Spartan policy is consistent throughout—once we strip it of Thucydides' disinformation and glosses. As we have seen, the Potidaeans can only have been promised an invasion of Attica for the distant future. The vote at Sparta left the door open for negotiations, although the government was presumably empowered to go to war if they failed. The embassy to the god was needed to secure divine approval if war did become necessary, and to make sure that the refusal of arbitration was not a sacred impediment. And the vote at the allied congress, which must have been identical with that at Sparta, was also a vote for negotiations, with license to go to war if they failed. There was, of course, one problem about arbitration: who was to be the arbitrator? Obviously not a small city in Asia or the islands that was not an ally of Athens; obviously not Argos; and the neutral tribal organizations (Achaean or Aetolian) were hardly equipped to arbitrate, quite apart from any known sympathies they might have. Arbitration would turn out to be a farce if tried, and direct negotiations obviously seemed the only chance of avoiding war. The Spartans, never good at subtle diplomacy and always interested in the best way to achieve results, were throughout committed to this approach.

How was Thucydides to deal with this uncomfortable fact? He faces it at once. When the allies (as he tells the story) voted to begin war but to delay it until they were ready, they also decided (1.26.1) to fill the time

they needed to prepare with sham negotiations, so as to have a better pretext for war if the Athenians refused any of their demands (ἤν μή τι ἔσσεσθαι). The story has aroused doubts even among scholars, though by no means all. The fundamentalists have been enthusiastic in acceptance, and a prime example of seventy years ago is still worth quoting, since it brings out the full implications of what Thucydides is at this point suggesting:

The points in dispute were one after the other made the pretext of demands upon Athens, each one of which was more intolerable than the last, until in a final ultimatum, Sparta revealed her real purpose by demanding that Athens should at once surrender her empire as the condition of peace (i. 139.3). Thus, by her conduct, she exposed the utter insincerity of the profession that she desired anything short of the complete destruction of the Athenian empire.⁵²

As we shall see, this—stripped of Thucydides' art and subtlety and put in a naively forthright way—is precisely what Thucydides is trying to make us believe. Let us look at the facts.⁵³

VII

The first of Sparta's demands (126.2), for the expulsion of the "curse of the goddess" (in fact, of Pericles), seems to fit in with Thucydides' interpretation: it was obviously unacceptable and not intended to be accepted—or so Thucydides seems to imply (127). What he in fact tells us here must be regarded as somehow qualifying the picture of a firm decision for war that he has painted up to this point. He presents two alternatives: either Pericles would be expelled, and then the Spartans would be more successful in dealing with the Athenians,⁵⁴ or—and we are told that this is what they really expected—they would undermine Pericles' reputation in the city and make the Athenians think that his inherited curse was in part to blame for the outbreak of the war. In other words, Sparta's commitment to war was, after all, less than total. War was certain if Pericles stayed in power (and Thucydides goes on to tell us that Pericles was the most powerful man in Athens and that he was opposed to any concessions and was pressing for war); and in that case, it would obviously be to Sparta's advantage to weaken Pericles' position. The technique of undermining the standing of the leader of an

open society by well-designed propaganda, amply familiar in our own day, may well have been new at the time, and hence had to be fully explained. It did not prevent the outbreak of war, and Thucydides makes it clear that it was not expected to (note 127.2; ὥς . . . ἔσται ὁ πόλεμος). It was meant to make him a less effective leader once the war had started. Whether this plan was successful, Thucydides refused to let us see. He had no use for the conventional religion and does not comment on its effects even where they were of considerable historical importance.⁵⁵ But the attack had been well aimed. We know—though not from Thucydides, who refrains from mentioning the domestic opposition to Pericles—that Pericles had been under attack at some time in the 430s, and that he had been tarred with the brush of *asebeia*, a charge on which his associates had been prosecuted and, at least in one case, convicted.⁵⁶ The link between *asebeia* and an inherited curse may well have come up in the courts at the time and suggested the point to the Spartans. In any case, the reminder was timely, and bound to be powerful. Despite Thucydides' silence on the point, it is practically inconceivable that, when the plague struck the city, the accursed general was not assigned a large share of the blame by a large part of the believing Athenian public.⁵⁷

What is more interesting is the less likely alternative of Pericles' expulsion. There was obviously *some* hope that this might be achieved, though no real confidence; and in view of the attacks on Pericles, Thucydides' assessment may be taken to be correct, even though he suppresses the background for it. If Pericles were banished, it seems that Sparta had hope of success in the negotiations with Athens: Pericles alone, as Thucydides goes on to make clear, stood in the way. What is more, the contrast with the certainty of war if he remained (ἔσται ὁ πόλεμος) seems to show that, if he could indeed be removed, war would be avoided. Sparta's, and the Peloponnesian League's, commitment to war was obviously less than total.

In view of all that has been written about the "Thucydides problem," one must at least mention the possibility that this is a relic of an earlier "layer of composition," written when Thucydides' account was more objective. But even if that is so, the fact that he did not remove or revise it shows that he did not see any contradiction: Book 1, as we have it, shows no sign of being unrevised—indeed, it shows his art at its most purposeful. There is no doubt that the whole chapter is constructed so as to lead up to the revelation that it was the person of Pericles that

stood in the way of avoiding war. Far from denying it, Thucydides stresses it. The question that remains unanswered, at this stage, is: what kind of success in their negotiations with Athens were the Spartans hoping for if Pericles were expelled? It would have been readily understood, in ancient Greece as today, that any power that can fully achieve its aims by negotiation will prefer this to war. We had the lesson of Munich, half a century ago, to remind us of this obvious fact—that war, in the famous formulation, is merely the continuation of policy, resorted to only when policy, including the *threat* of war, fails. The qualification here introduced in no way changes the essence of the story Thucydides has been developing. One might say that it could always be taken for granted. The chapter not only does not contradict what we have been told to believe; it provides the key to Thucydides' final explanation by drawing our attention to Sparta's aims and to Pericles' resistance to them. After the intervention of the "double biography" of Pausanias and Themistocles, inserted both in order to suspend the action at a dramatic point and to contrast the guile and treachery of the Spartan with the innocence of the Athenian, whose misfortune is due to Spartan malignity and Athens' ingratitude toward her great men—after this purposeful interlude that complements chapter 127 in setting the stage for what follows and also points forward to a major motif in Book 2, we move swiftly toward (and through) the negotiations in which Sparta's aims are revealed.

In fact, we hear practically nothing about the course of the negotiations, which, as we were told, went on for nearly a year. There were frequent Spartan embassies (139.1: some scholars overlook this and speak of only three!), and we do not really know what detailed proposals and suggestions they carried. Thucydides moves through the whole of the prolonged process in part of one chapter (the other part is devoted to the preparations for Pericles' speech), about as much space as is devoted (say) to Pausanias' campaign and acquittal in 478 (95.1–5) in the brief excursus on the Pentecontaetia. We are not even given the outlines of the successive changes in Sparta's terms, though we may perhaps (as has usually been done) gather the principal ones. The full list of Sparta's demands, not unnaturally, comprised the reversal of the actions about which the embassies at Sparta had complained: the attack on Potidaea, the infringement of Aegina's autonomy, and the Megarian Decree. Since the Athenians never offered any concessions (so Thucydides tells us), it is to be presumed that successive Spartan embassies reduced the list, or

offered compensating concessions, for there was obviously no point in sending a long sequence of embassies repeating precisely the same terms. There is no indication that would permit even intelligent conjecture about this important point: the historian did not want us to know, and has made sure that we shall not be able to guess. He does tell us (since this was well known in Athens, as Aristophanes makes clear) that everything ultimately centered round the Megarian Decree. (His wording does not make it *quite* clear whether we should regard the embargo as being included.) “Above all, and most clearly, they announced [or kept announcing] that if the Athenians rescinded the decree about the Megarians, war would certainly not start” (μὴ ἂν γίγνεσθαι πόλεμον—139.1). But the Athenians merely repeated their charges against the Megarians and offered no accommodation. We are entitled to regard this final and most generous offer as the last in a long line of concessions, which (as we have seen) we are not allowed to trace.

Historians have, of course, generally recognized that this offer in fact would have led to difficulties with the Corinthians, whose interests were being surrendered. Sparta was quite willing to accept this, in return for preserving peace. The parallel of the Peace of Nicias obviously imposes itself: there too, Sparta was quite willing to sacrifice her allies’ interests and face the problems that would ensue, in order to obtain peace. The parallel deserves full consideration. For it follows, not only that the Spartans—contrary to what Thucydides’ disinformation and misleading interpretations have been trying to foist upon the reader—had by no means decided upon war: that much Thucydides had finally shown us in his comment on the demand about the curse; no, it follows that the Spartans had throughout merely used the threat of possible force in order to obtain peace on any bearable terms—and, to put it more precisely, that before the outbreak of the Archidamian War they thought peace just as important as when, at its end, it was a matter of getting back Pylos and Cythera and a hundred and twenty Spartiates.

But the offer to limit Athenian concessions to Megara deserves more detailed scrutiny. It must be noted that it would have conceded to Athens precisely that security in the full enjoyment of the empire and its profits which Pericles claimed was all that he wanted (141.1: “not to hold in fear what we have acquired”). For what Sparta was in fact offering was to annul (at least *de facto*) any provisions for autonomy set out in the Thirty Years’ Peace and to concede the principle that had been successfully urged by Corinth in the case of Samos: that each side

should be allowed to deal with its own allies without interference by the other, no matter (in practice) what the circumstances. If the Corinthians now objected, as they certainly would, Sparta would at least have a good case to put to them. The consequence was obvious: no ally of Athens would under any circumstances again appeal to Sparta for aid, no matter how unjustly and arbitrarily treated by the Athenians, whether as regards tribute or as regards confiscation of territory and revenue. In return, Sparta merely wanted recognition of her absolute right to protect her own allies.

The best way to sum up the import of the final offer is to say that Sparta was undertaking to change to a purely defensive posture toward the Athenian Empire. One might perhaps compare (merely by way of illustration) President Gorbachev's offer at the United Nations in 1988, which—also for the first time—explicitly undertook to change the disposition of troops of the Soviet Union and her allies in Europe, and of the arms with which they were provided, to one of pure defense. There can be no doubt that this implication must have been clear to a politician of Pericles' intelligence and sophistication. The fact that the offer was refused for formal and essentially trivial reasons shows, as perhaps nothing else can, that Thucydides was quite right in describing Pericles (as he had to) as "pushing the Athenians toward war" (127.3). For if he was genuinely afraid that this concession would be followed by demands for more, as he tried to persuade the Athenian assembly (140.5), the point was easy enough to put to the test—far easier than the genuineness of the recent equivalent to which we have alluded was at the time. All that Athens needed to do was to rescind the measures against Megara, calling on Sparta to see that Megara surrendered the fugitives she was alleged to hold and perhaps (though this was less important) came to terms over the disputed sacred land. If indeed Sparta's response was unsatisfactory, or if indeed further demands followed, then it would be just as easy to reimpose the decree. We must remember that we are still far from the fourth-century constitution, under which the power of the People to regulate all matters by decree might be limited. It is clear that there was no *valid* reason for not putting the Spartan offer regarding Megara to the test.⁵⁸

What follows is equally instructive. When it became clear that this last offer, which went as far as any power could go in both political and strategic concessions, was being turned down without any serious consideration—which meant that Pericles wanted war and would take

nothing short of it—the Spartans finally sent an embassy with a message that was indeed pure propaganda.⁵⁹ They asked the Athenians to give the Hellenes their freedom. The message has been described, by scholars too attached to Thucydides' interpretation, as an "ultimatum." The description must be resisted, for it implies that Sparta gave the Athenians a chance to accept or reject it, with peace or war the consequence. Anyone who has not uncritically accepted Thucydides' interpretation of the purpose of the embassies as a whole cannot fail to see that this was simply not so. The final embassy was born of legitimate despair of preserving peace at any reasonable price: it was a gesture and a proclamation, not an ultimatum. This was soon to become clear in Thucydides' own story. It is only for Thucydides—and for the reader who uncritically follows him—that this is an ultimatum: for him it is the culminating action, in which Sparta's bad faith at last comes out into the open and her real purpose, hidden all along, at last reveals itself.

As usual, Thucydides has used his art to impress his view upon the reader. A technical device again underlines the importance of the event. Just as we saw the vote in the Spartan Assembly emphasized by the addition of a dating device, so here the final embassy is presented as being the one that really mattered by the fact that Thucydides, who has given us no details whatsoever about the stream of preceding embassies, here gives the names of the three envoys: "In the end there came a final embassy from Sparta, consisting of Rhamphias, Melesippus, and Agesander, and they said none of those things which they [the Spartans] had been accustomed to say previously, but precisely one thing: 'The Lacedaemonians want there to be peace if you will let the Hellenes go free' " (139.3). All the previous pretenses have been dropped, and the truth is at last out.

It was at this point that Pericles decided to call an assembly to discuss the whole issue of peace or war, "deciding once and for all about everything." It appears that hitherto the various Spartan proposals had not been put before the People. They had presumably been heard, and curtly rejected, by the *Boule* alone.⁶⁰ In the *Boule*, of course, the *strategoï*, as *ex officio* members, exercised considerable influence. It is clear that Pericles, in view of his standing among the *strategoï* and his continuous membership of the *Boule* for over a decade (Plut. *Per.* 16.3), had far less difficulty in controlling the *Boule* than in persuading the Assembly. But the way in which he had apparently handled these important negotiations casts a rare beam of light on the manner in which he controlled

the Athenian democracy and helps to give substance to Thucydides' famous remark that the latter was in fact ruled by the first man (2.65.9): only the last, unacceptable, demand was heard by the People.

The moment for calling the assembly was well chosen from Pericles' point of view. Sparta's latest message could now be used to good effect, to persuade the People of precisely what Thucydides has tried to impress upon the reader: "As for the Lacedaemonians, it was clear before that they were plotting against us and it is very clear indeed now. . . . They want to resolve their charges by war rather than by words, and now they are here giving us orders and no longer merely accusing us" (140.2). The Spartans had at last dropped the mask.

Nonetheless, it is equally clear from Thucydides' account that Pericles could not altogether hope to get away with this. We have no reason to doubt Thucydides' statement that in the debate preceding his speech the Megarian Decree had been widely regarded as what really stood in the way of peace (139.4: many said that the decree should not stand in the way of peace, but should be rescinded). This opinion, of course, was to survive: it is what we later find in Aristophanes' *Acharnians* (515–38) and *Peace* (609ff.) and in the later tradition, whereas the final Spartan proclamation nowhere appears among the reasons for the war except when used by Sparta herself in propagandist contexts. Pericles, in spite of his purposeful timing, had to bow to the widespread recognition of the fact that the last embassy, painted by him and by Thucydides as at last bearing the true Spartan message, could be ignored for what it was, and that the real Spartan offer, that concerning Megara, still lay on the table.

However, we know that Pericles was ultimately successful. The habit of obedience to him was too strong in the end, and there were no doubt a number of Athenians who were indeed persuaded by his interpretation of Sparta's last embassy. In the end, he was successful in pushing the Athenians into the war that he had long been wanting.⁶¹

VIII

We must now finally ask: why does Thucydides, while consistently contrasting Athenian loyalty and correctness in behavior with Spartan hypocrisy and treachery, yet both admit and, in the end, demonstrate that it was Pericles who prevented the concessions that might have saved

peace and thus ensured that war would come about? Why does he make the admission that seems to undermine both his thesis—that Sparta was forced to start the war by fear of Athenian power—and his actual message—that Sparta had long been plotting against Athens and finally decided to start a war against her?

The answer is, as we indicated at the beginning, that the journalist has to allow for what his audience actually knows: he is not provided with a *tabula rasa* on which to compose his interpretation, but with existing opinions regarding the facts and their interpretation, which (if his journalism is of the “activist” kind) he must try to channel into his own. In order to create a work that would last forever, Thucydides had in the first place to make it acceptable to his contemporaries.

Two facts, in particular, were widely known and told against his interpretation: that of almost legendary Spartan *bradytēs* and that of Pericles’ resistance to all compromise and, in particular, to abrogation of the resolutions against Megara. The problem was how to save his case; or, if possible, how to use those facts to strengthen it.

First, *bradytēs*, perhaps the most talked-about quality of the Spartan character. It comes up in speeches throughout Book 1. Only once it is mentioned by the historian in his own person. In 1.18.2 he sums up the events of the Pentecontaetia in general terms: the Athenians had confirmed their *archē* and had advanced to great power. The Spartans, though aware of this, had until now kept the peace and had not tried to prevent it except “in short spurts” (ἐπὶ βραχύ; cf., e.g., 1.41.3). The question must be faced: why had Sparta done this? Thucydides has documented occasional efforts to intervene, from the attempt to prevent the rebuilding of the walls, through the promise to Thasos, the fighting in the war that ended in 445, and the attempted intervention in the Samian War. One reason why this never led to a major effort, we are now told, was that the Lacedaemonians were distracted by wars nearer home. We have heard how the helot revolt ultimately prevented them from fulfilling their promise to Thasos. Thucydides clearly stands by his account of that affair and here reminds us of it. But he has not told us of any other instances, and it is to be doubted whether he knew of any. Hence it is here, and here only, that he mentions Spartan slowness in going to war, in an attempt to explain why, despite the continuing malevolence toward Athens that he has amply documented, the Spartans never made a major and sustained effort to stop Athens’ rise to power. It was the only explanation available, and one that, in view of Sparta’s reputation,

was fully acceptable. Why, then, was the final instance different? Because now the Athenians were laying hands on the Spartan alliance, and that could not be tolerated.

Up to a point the analysis is valid. Attacks upon Sparta's allies had led to the "First Peloponnesian War," and since its end there had not been any more. The analysis is followed by a reaffirmation of the claim that now Sparta had decided "to start this war and . . . destroy Athenian power"; and the support of Delphic Apollo (related in this context) confirmed the resolve. Spartan *bradytēs* was needed to explain why the continuous malevolence had not led to a major and decisive effort earlier. It was well known in Greece, frequently stressed in Thucydides' speeches, and would be readily accepted. But it is made clear that, once the decision had been made, it was irreversible. As we have seen, the negotiations were all for show, not worth reporting in detail, except for the slim chance that the Athenians might allow Sparta to achieve her objective without war, if Pericles could be removed. This hope was not fulfilled, as had indeed been expected, and the final embassy revealed Sparta's real intentions with her final demand.

In fact, of course, Spartan *bradytēs* helps to show the genuineness of Sparta's will to preserve peace, hence the genuineness of the negotiations. As we saw, in the end Sparta was not concerned with her allies' interests or even with her own promises, let alone with the strict terms of the Peace, but would have been satisfied with the cessation of Athenian moves against her ally Megara. If the Athenians stopped laying hands on the Spartan alliance, they could have peace and security for the future. But the impression that Thucydides is trying to give us is the reverse. *Bradytēs*, for him, seems to mean slowness to change a resolution once made, no less than slowness to arrive at it in the first place. We might translate the term as "inertia." Once determined to start the war, Sparta could not have been deflected from her course by any Athenian concessions, short of granting what was Sparta's overriding purpose, as made clear in the final embassy. Spartans did not lightly change their minds. Thus Spartan *bradytēs* is by implication shown to support Thucydides' presentation of his case.

As for Pericles' responsibility for the war, let us first of all note that, although his driving the Athenians into war is in general terms admitted as known, it is obscured in detail wherever possible. We are not told that it was he who changed the mind of the Assembly over the treaty with Corcyra (though we fortunately know it from Plutarch).⁶² We are

not informed of the attacks on his friends which provided the background for the suspicion that he caused the war in order to reestablish his position and which certainly provided the background to the Spartan demand for his expulsion as tainted by a curse. We are not told of his personal responsibility for the decree against Megara (again, fortunately known to us from other sources) or for his very probable personal responsibility for the aggressive actions in the north (unfortunately not ascribed to him elsewhere), which led directly to the outbreak of war. Pericles' bellicosity, which could not be denied, is admitted only in the most general terms, but is suppressed in all its particular instances.

Above all, however, and even more than in the case of Spartan inertia, Thucydides has here turned necessity to advantage. As we have seen, his chapter 127 introduced two crucial points: first, that Sparta's determination to fight was not absolute, but that (as any reasonable person would expect) she would prefer to gain her aims by policy rather than by force; next, that it was Pericles who was chiefly driving the Athenians toward war and preventing any concessions. We are not at that point told what would have made Sparta opt for peace.

The answer is given in chapter 139, and we have already analyzed it in detail. The aim of Sparta, once all the pretenses are stripped away, is now seen to be the total disintegration of the Athenian Empire. As for Pericles' well-known responsibility for the outbreak of war by his refusal to make even the slightest concession and to test Sparta's good faith, it turns out in the end that he was right. War was indeed inevitable, in view of Sparta's long hostility and treachery toward Athens, which now culminated in the deceptive embassies. Concession would indeed have merely led to further demands, since Sparta's purpose was fixed and now stood clearly revealed. Fully committed to the destruction of Athens, Sparta in her *bradytēs* could not be moved or deflected. The defense rests.

The apologetic part of Pericles' final speech, which surely does represent his view of the chain of events that had brought Athens to the decision the People now faced in that Assembly (or perhaps, rather, the view that he wanted the People to accept in order to give him the decision at which he had for so long been aiming), sums up what Thucydides has been setting before the reader throughout his own account and leaves the reader, at the end, under the spell of two dominating personalities. As we have seen in our survey, details in Thucydides' presentation have

at times been disbelieved (and the list could easily be extended). But it is time, in our age more familiar with activist journalism that surrounds itself with the prestige of objectivity than were our predecessors who lived in the politically more direct days of a century or even a generation ago—it is time to appreciate the perfect skill of the advocate claiming a passion for objectivity; and, even though we often lack the evidence to restore the balance, to apply to Thucydides' account the same probing and critical analysis that we apply to the speeches of Demosthenes or Cicero.⁶³

Athens, the Locrians,
and Naupactus

καὶ αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναῖοι δεξάμενοι . . . ἐς Ναύ-
πακτον κατώκισαν ἣν ἔτυχον ἡρηκότες νεω-
στὶ Λοκρῶν τῶν Ὀζολῶν ἐχόντων.

(Thuc. 1.103.3)

When Athens settled the Messenians at Naupactus, the Athenians (so Thucydides is said to tell us) had only just captured the city from the Locrians, who had been in possession of it. This, in fact, is all that Thucydides tells us of these important events, and it has (i.a.) caused grave difficulties for those who believe that Thucydides tells all the events he records in strict chronological order. The interpretation of this passage is taken for granted and has not (to my knowledge) been discussed. Crawley, Smith (Loeb edition), Romilly (Budé), Landsmann (Artemis) will suffice to represent translation into various Western languages. Hobbes may be added, to show the respectable antiquity of this interpretation. It also seems to be accepted by all historians, certainly as far back as Grote (iv. 420), where their language is sufficiently specific to enable us to judge how they understand the passage.

Some scholars have paid attention to how and when the Locrians themselves gained possession of the place. This point seems to have been first raised by E. Curtius, in an incidental remark in an important article in *Hermes* in 1876, in the course of a discussion of the then recent discovery of a decree establishing a Locrian colony at Naupactus.¹ He seems to have been the first to connect the colony decree with the passage in Thucydides, and he suggested (pp. 238–39) that Thucydides’

phrase shows that the Locrians had seized the place and were now trying to colonize it: Thucydides' ἐχόντων (he thought) implied occupation in war, a usage he found in several other passages he collects. Discussing the incident in his *History*, he put the capture of Naupactus by the Athenians in 458, before the battle of Tanagra, and the settlement of the Messenians there (following Diodorus) after that battle and Oenophyta, as part of Tolmides' achievements on his *periplous* in 457.²

His interpretation of Thucydides found much support, thus by Classen in his first edition, by Croiset, and by Busolt (*Griechische Geschichte* III 1, 300 n. 2), even where his odd chronology was rejected and scholars preferred to follow Diodorus (11.84.7) and connect both the capture and the settlement with Tolmides' *periplous*. Then Eduard Meyer pointed to the hostages taken from the Opuntian Locrians after Oenophyta (Thuc. 1.108.3): "Wahrscheinlich bei dieser Gelegenheit verloren sie den Besitz von Naupaktos . . . wohin sie vor einiger Zeit, zusammen mit den Ozolern von Chaleion, Ansiedler geschickt hatten."³ Meyer does not expand on how he imagines the "Gelegenheit" in detail, e.g. whether he thought that Myronides captured Naupactus after a march (as improbable as it is unattested) through Ozolian Locris, and how he would explain Thucydides' mere reference to Ozolian Locrians.⁴

William Oldfather, whose article on "Lokris" in *RE* XIII 1 (1926) is probably his most important historical work, naturally presents a full discussion of the Locrian occupation of Naupactus. His treatment is in some ways rather odd. (It seems to show signs of undigested revision.) He at first puts the Athenian occupation in 456, the Locrian colony decree not long before (1194–95), and in an insertion in square brackets defends Curtius' interpretation of Thucydides' statement. A little later (1195) he puts the Athenian occupation in the summer of 457, after Tanagra. He presumably alludes to (but fails to explain) Thucydides' reference to "Ozolian" Locrians by stating that the Athenians expelled "die lokrische, vor allem [*sic*] die ostlokrische Bevölkerung" when Tolmides settled the Athenians there in "summer 455/4" (late summer 455 or early summer 454?). In his article "Naupaktos" (*RE* XVI 2 (1935), 1985–86), the foundation of the Locrian colony is assigned to "shortly before 457," with a reference to the earlier article, and the second account of the capture of Naupactus by the Athenians and the settlement of the Messenians is repeated verbatim (1986–87). He largely follows Meyer, whom he cites, in this interpretation, and he vigorously defends

the Athenian action: since the Locrians were incapable of holding the place, “lag es durchaus im allgemeinen Interesse, und nicht nur Athens selbst, dass die rohen, zahlreichen, und daher gefährlicheren Aitolier ein Seeräubernest dort einzurichten verhindert werden sollten.” (In this context it is worth recalling that Curtius, both in his article and in his *History*, thought that the Locrian occupation of Naupactus had been undertaken in the interests of Corinth, which wanted a base against Athenian expansion.)⁵ He concludes his arguments on this by asserting that the insecure nature of Locrian possession shows that the Athenian action was “eine weniger schroffe Verletzung des Völkerrechts” than it might otherwise appear.

It is worth looking at an eminent representative of the school that wants Thucydides to keep his story in strict chronological order (which, for the Pentecontaetia, he himself nowhere claims or implies to be his purpose).⁶ Gomme (*Commentary* I 304) has the expected difficulty in fitting in the date of the Athenian seizure of Naupactus, in view of the attested ten years’ duration of the siege of Ithome. But he partly follows Curtius’ interpretation of Thucydides by recognizing that his phrase “may easily imply *recent* possession of Naupaktos by the Ozolian Locrians.” (He gives a lengthy and very useful collection of references to Thucydides’ use of the verb ἔχειν in this and related senses, but agrees with Steup—see below—that it does not always have this meaning.) He rejects the relevance of the colony decree to this question, and in the end suggests (with surprising lightheartedness, in a Thucydidean fundamentalist who, e.g., refuses to admit any possible merit in Diodorus’ account of the events concerning Naupactus because Thucydides does not mention them):⁷ “Perhaps Thucydides has made a mistake in writing Ὀζολῶν.”

We have seen that scholars who have looked into the matter have found that ἔχειν quite frequently (though not invariably) refers to possession of a place that is implied to be temporary, or at least military and based on force. Steup (ad loc.) is really the only scholar who has tried to refute Curtius’ interpretation, stating (quite correctly) that such phrases can simply mean “eine Stadt, ein Land in Besitz haben.” He cites three passages for this meaning, one of them the very one on which he is commenting, a second (1.115.4) where the more general meaning is quite possible, but not certain, and a third (for which he goes to 3.39.2) where it is indeed certain (see below). On the strength of this rather small and rather mixed collection he concludes: “In ἔχόντων kann *also*

unmöglich [my emphasis] mit C. eine Bezugnahme auf den lokrischen Synökismos [*sic*] in Naupaktus gefunden werden . . . , *mag es auch aus anderen Gründen wahrscheinlich sein* [my emphasis], daß diese Inschrift der Zeit vor der Einnahme von Naupaktus durch die Athener angehört." (He also rejects Diodorus' connection of the capture with Tolmides' *periplous*.)

The claim of "impossibility," based on his evidence, is excessive. Evidence for the use of the verb in the meaning noted by Curtius is easy to come by, even if we exclude the aorist, where the nature of the form is likely to produce a meaning such as "seized." Evidence for a neutral use, although it certainly exists, is considerably less frequent. The verb is not infrequently combined with βίβη: thus 1.38.6 (the Corcyraeans holding Epidamnus, as seen by the Corinthians); 68.4 (the Athenians holding Corcyra, again as seen by the Corinthians). More frequently, seizure and occupation by force is implied: thus (again confining ourselves to Book 1) 107.3 (the Athenians holding Megara and Pegae); 111.2 (the Athenians holding Pegae); 113.1 (Boeotian exiles' seizure of Orchomenus and Chaeronea); 115.1 (Nisaea, Troezen, Pegae, and Achaea, "held" by the Athenians, returned under the Thirty Years' Peace). The concentration of passages where the verb requires this meaning in the history of the Pentecontaetia is worth noting.

Sometimes the implication is probable, though not certain; e.g. Byzantium "held" by the Medes in 478 (128.5); sometimes merely possible, though perhaps less than likely (115.4—one of Steup's passages cited against Curtius: Pissouthnes "then holding" Sardis). It should at least be suggested that Thucydides considered all lands "held" by the Medes to be under forcible occupation—and the King might not have denied this, in many cases. The difference, of course, would be that there were no νόμοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων to limit the King's actions, and probably no implied condemnation on Thucydides' part where the lands were not Greek. This might help to explain a striking use of ἔχειν in the treaty between the Spartans and the satrap (8.18.1), where the point of view and the language is, of course, that of the Greeks, although legitimacy of control is of the essence of the King's case: ὅποσαν χώραν καὶ πόλεις βασιλεὺς ἔχει καὶ οἱ πατέρες οἱ βασιλέως εἶχον, the King is to retain or recover as lawful property.⁸

The probability of the interpretation advanced by Curtius can be strongly supported, even though it does not amount to certainty. It therefore now seems quite likely, though not certain, that Thucydides

did mean to imply that the Locrian (and not the Athenian) occupation of Naupactus was “recent,” though in fact it appears that both were. This probability approaches certainty if we devote some attention to the adverb νεωστί, which has perhaps been unduly neglected in this debate. It seems to occur with ἔχειν only once, but that case is striking. In 3.30.2, various men are trying to persuade Alcidas (unsuccessfully, as it turns out) that the Athenians could readily be thrown out of Mytilene if he made the attempt, ἀνδρῶν νεωστὶ πόλιν ἐχόντων: they were likely to be caught off their guard. We may compare the adverb ἄρτι, very similar in meaning and used in a precisely similar context concerning Brasidas’ recent seizure of Amphipolis: τὴν . . . Ἀμφίπολιν Βρασιδᾶς ἄρτι εἶχε (4.106.4). There can be no doubt that the combination of ἔχειν with one of these adverbs implies recent seizure by force.

It is time to ask the decisive question. Historians approaching the matter on the basis of the purely historical evidence have found that Naupactus had not been very long in Locrian possession when the Athenians seized it. Can Thucydides be *proved* to be saying, not, as everyone has believed, that the Athenians had recently seized the place from the Locrians (though this too, of course, was true), but that the Athenians had taken Naupactus from the Ozolian Locrians who had recently seized it?

Once the question is asked, the answer at once emerges as practically certain. Bétant’s Thucydides lexicon quotes eleven instances of νεωστί. In *ten* of them it precedes the verb which it modifies. In only *one* (precisely 1.103.3) is it listed as following its verb—no doubt because that passage was “known” to mean that the Athenians had recently seized Naupactus.⁹

Now that the truth has been allowed to emerge, we might reflect on Thucydides’ possible motive for this rather strange emphasis. He *had* to report the Athenian capture of Naupactus and the settlement of the Messenians there, since it plays a very important part in the story of the war that he set out to tell. As we shall see, he tells us nothing about the way in which the Athenians came to hold Naupactus; why then does he insist on the fact (probably true in itself) that the Locrians had recently seized it? The answer can hardly be better formulated than in the words of Oldfather already quoted: “Die Besitznahme der Athener erscheint jetzt als eine weniger schroffe Verletzung des Völkerrechts.” He was not aware of the fact that Thucydides had anticipated his conclusion and

his implication. An unprovoked attack on a Greek city (possibly without even a proper declaration of war) would offend against the accepted νόμοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, which Greek cities were expected to abide by, though (as we have seen) barbarians in their dealings with barbarians perhaps were not. The little adverb, properly interpreted, provides one more instance of Thucydides' persistent apologia for Athens that characterizes his first book. It can be added to a long and already formidable list.¹⁰

All that remains to be seen is how the colony law fits in and (connected with this) why Thucydides says that the Athenians took the place from the Ozolians, when that law makes the foundation of the colony a mainly Opuntian affair.¹¹ The answer was glimpsed by Eduard Meyer, whose suggestion merely needs amplification.

After the battle of Tanagra, the Athenians marched out and won the battle of Oenophyta. After that they overran Boeotia and Phocis and (Thucydides reports) took the hundred wealthiest citizens as hostages from the Opuntian Locrians (1.108.3). He does not tell us why, when apparently no hostages were taken in Boeotia or Locris (for why should he have suppressed this if it had happened?), this strikingly harsh demand was inflicted on the Opuntian Locrians, whose cooperation in the Spartan campaign in central Greece he does not report and whose cooperation with their Phocian neighbors can certainly not simply be taken for granted.¹²

It ought to be suggested that the Athenians were even then planning the *periplous* of Tolmides in the following year, which was to end (so Diodorus tells us) with the capture of Naupactus and the settlement of the Messenians there.¹³ Whether it was already known in Athens that the Messenians would be available for settling in the place, we unfortunately cannot tell: no really precise chronology of these events can be worked out. But unless we follow Gomme in refusing to accept what Diodorus offers, however reasonable it seems to be and however well it fits together,¹⁴ we can now make some sense of this demand. The unique demand for these hostages, practically denuding the state of its leading citizens and putting it completely at the mercy of the Athenians, was clearly intended to operate for a short time: to keep the hundred leading citizens of the Opuntians in Athens for years was totally unimaginable.

It has never occasioned much surprise that Tolmides (or whoever else anonymously did so in Thucydides) was able, with a small force, to take a city that had recently been colonized and no doubt fortified by what

must have been perceived as an adequate number of settlers. Despite statements to the contrary in both Herodotus and Thucydides, we do not actually know that the Athenians were specially successful in storming walled cities; and there was clearly no lengthy siege here. But what if the Athenians ordered the Opuntians to withdraw their settlers (who, under a provision of the colony law, could return home if expelled) and took the hostages to make sure the order was obeyed? It would provide the most solid guarantee of Opuntian compliance, and the hostages would not need to be retained for long. Nor need we now assume any unreported previous hostility of a conspicuous sort on the part of the Opuntians. With the Opuntians removed, only the Chaleians would remain to occupy the place, and Tolmides will not have found their defeat—and, probably, some peaceful accommodation with them—particularly difficult.¹⁵ Thucydides therefore quite properly reports Athens' taking Naupactus from the Ozolian Locrians. Gomme's eccentric doubts were unjustified.

What stands out as remarkable, of course, is that Thucydides tells us neither how and when Naupactus was captured nor what the singular incident of the taking of these Opuntian hostages was intended to achieve. Perhaps the story can only be pieced together once the tone and the main purpose of his first book have been recognized.¹⁶

Thucydides and the *Archē* of Philip

Athenian relations with Perdiccas son of Alexander play an important and rather obscure part in the events that led to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Yet they, and the account of them that we have in Thucydides (which is our only account), have not attracted as much attention as the events concerning Greek cities, in which Thucydides was much more interested. The series of events that involved Perdiccas in the outbreak of the war centered on the *archē* of his brother Philip; and it is significant of the lack of interest shown by our sources in these matters that we do not even know precisely where it was or how far it extended. The purpose of the present study is historiographical rather than historical. There will be no attempt to deal with epigraphic documents like the treaty between Athens and Perdiccas and what has been regarded as a treaty between Athens and Philip.¹ The study will concentrate on the way Thucydides tells the story. And since the story does not quite end with the outbreak of the war, we shall have to attend to the campaign in which Sitalces tried, i.a., to restore Philip's son Amyntas to his rightful inheritance. It will be seen (I hope) that this rather neglected story throws unexpected light on the historian's attitudes and techniques. As an unintended bonus, however, we shall arrive at some reinterpretations of the actual historical events.²

II

We must start with 1.57.3: Perdiccas, who had previously been an ally and friend of Athens, had become an enemy (ἐπεπολέμωτο); the reason was that, when his brother Philip and Derdas (we are not told who he was) were jointly working against him (κοινῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐναντιούμενοις), the Athenians had made a treaty of alliance (ἔσυνμαχία) with them. We might note Gomme's comment (*HCT* I 201): "he chopped and changed all his life, as far as we can see to no very good purpose. . . ." (Gomme admits that he kept his kingdom.) As usual, we shall see that he has correctly interpreted what Thucydides wanted us to gather. The words are carefully chosen: note ἐναντιούμενοις. Most translators have understood it.³ The verb, used about twenty times by Thucydides, never refers to military action,⁴ only to political or diplomatic opposition. An alliance with them, therefore, did not constitute a breach of Athens' friendship and alliance with Perdiccas. It might be an unfriendly gesture, indeed perhaps a warning, but it was technically correct. Perdiccas, by initiating actual hostilities, was the one technically in breach of the treaty. (πολεμοῦσθαι, as Gomme points out, does refer to a state of war.) Hence, of course, Gomme's comment on Perdiccas. The historian's presentation should be seen against the background of his whole history of the events leading up to the war: it is throughout one of his main points that Athens was never guilty of breaking her oaths; if treaties were broken, this was always due to her enemies.⁵ Perdiccas, although not depicted as a wicked schemer (he is hardly of a stature to be compared to Sparta), can be seen in the same light as Athens' rebellious allies.

When we look at what Thucydides reports of Perdiccas' actions, we see that none of them amounts to a military attack. They are all diplomatic maneuvers. He tried to persuade Sparta to declare war on Athens; he tried to persuade Corinth to urge Potidaea toward revolt. (Are we to believe that Perdiccas actually caused the outbreak of the war? All that can be meant, surely, is that he expressed his *support* for Sparta's and Corinth's respective actions. At the meeting at Sparta his name does not even come up.) Unfortunately Thucydides' chronology is so vague that we simply cannot reconstruct the sequence of these actions except in a very general way: his embassy to Sparta must be early in 432, i.e., before the meeting of allies at Sparta; and his support for Corinth must have been expressed before Potidaea's revolt, but perhaps not before the

Athenian demands which led to it. Apart from this, he persuaded some of Athens' allies in the area to revolt. All these actions, so Thucydides tells us, he took out of fear of Athens (δεδιώς: 1.57.4). And he had good reason to fear. It is clear that the Athenians had already concerted offensive action against him with Philip and Derdas.

That Philip had an *archē* somewhere along the river Axios becomes clear only much later (2.100.3: see further below). That he had lost it by the time the Athenians made their treaty with him and Derdas is nowhere mentioned. Yet it may be deduced from what actually happened. Before the revolt of Potidaea or of the others whom Perdiccas was trying to persuade, we find the Athenians sending out a fleet with a thousand hoplites against Perdiccas (1.57.6: it was already near the area when ordered to deal with the revolts that had surprised the Athenians, and its size was nowhere near adequate for this). The contingent, clearly, was hardly of a size for independent action: we must assume that cooperation with allies was planned. When the expedition (after some delay) arrived in Macedonia (1.59.1), it found forces led by Philip and Derdas' brothers already in the country. So they pursued the war together with these forces, which had come from Upper Macedonia (ἄνωθεν). Thucydides' wording does not make it completely clear whether that phrase applies to both Philip and Derdas' brothers or only to the latter (whom it immediately follows). But since no point of origin is given for Philip, as it would have to be if he came from a different direction, we must take it that Thucydides meant the phrase to cover both contingents.⁶ In other words, Philip had by then lost his *archē* and had taken refuge with Derdas. It is unlikely that this can have happened in the winter between the conclusion of the agreement with Athens and the beginning of the fighting: we must conclude that he was already a refugee in Derdas' territory when the treaty was sworn. And as we see from what followed, the point of the alliance (a full *ἑσπέρια*, not an *ἐπιμαχία*) was a joint invasion of Perdiccas' territory, no doubt aimed at restoring Philip and saving Derdas from a similar fate. This is what Thucydides' disarming phrase about their "opposition" to Perdiccas covers. Since at this time the Athenians were "allies and friends" of Perdiccas, it should be clear who was in fact "chopping and changing" and, incidentally, breaking a sworn treaty. We have not enough information to be sure why the Athenians decided to turn against their ally. But it is possible that it was his expulsion of Philip and the implied threat to Derdas that led them to conclude that Perdiccas was simply becoming

too strong: support for him had obvious advantages (especially an assured supply of shipbuilding materials) and had been given while Macedonia was divided and weak; but a strong centralized power in the north would be an obvious threat to important Athenian possessions in the area. It was, as often in Athenian history, pure *Realpolitik*, comparable to the actions that led to the wars against Thasos and Samos during the Pentecontaetia.⁷

The Athenians soon sent another two thousand hoplites to the area. Thucydides' account (1.61.1–2) does not allow us to see what their plans were,⁸ but they in fact joined the earlier thousand in a siege of Pydna. They had no doubt hoped to capture Pydna before dealing with the situation at Potidaea, which one could already tell would be a lengthy and difficult affair. But as it turned out, they did not have time for that. Thucydides next tells us that that situation, and the arrival of Aristeus in the city, “pressed” (κατήπειγεν) them to conclude an agreement and an “enforced alliance” (ξύμβασιν . . . καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ἀναγκαίαν) with Perdiccas, whereupon they withdrew (ἀπανίστανται) from Macedonia. There is no explanation as to why the alliance was ἀναγκαία, but the implication must be that Perdiccas' actual support was needed at Potidaea.

II

And this brings us to the real puzzle. Having made this alliance, and withdrawing from Macedonia, the Athenians came to Beroea. Here the text must be quoted (61.4):

καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Βέροιαν κάκειθεν ἐπιστρέψαντες καὶ πειράσαντες πρῶτον τοῦ χωρίου καὶ οὐχ ἔλόντες ἐπορεύοντο κατὰ γῆν πρὸς τὴν Ποτείδαιαν. . . . κατ' ὀλίγον δὲ προῖόντες τριταῖοι ἀφίκοντο ἐς Γίγωνδον καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο.

Thus the text, which, in the first sentence, obviously cannot be correct as it stands. In modern editions an emendation long ago suggested by Pluygens has found universal acceptance: for ἐπιστρέψαντες read ἐπὶ Στρέψαν. The town of Strepsa is mentioned by Aeschines and in the Athenian tribute quota lists, together with towns or areas on the eastern side of the Gulf of Thermae. How did they get from Beroea, far from

the western shore of the gulf, to Strepsa, presumably across the gulf? And why should they, when “withdrawing” from Macedonia, want to start by marching first to Beroea (close to the capital Aegae), when they were in a hurry (as κατήπειγεν implies) to get to Potidaea, to which one could cross from Pydna by ship in a matter of hours? Commentators have tried to explain, none too successfully. Some have said there were not enough ships. But as Gomme pointed out (*HCT* I 218), they could have done it by a shuttle service, across that short distance. In fact, we are told that while they marched toward Potidaea, the fleet sailed along the coast, numbering no fewer than seventy ships (presumably triremes), and not carrying any troops. Others have posited a town called Beroea on the eastern shore of the gulf—a town totally unknown to ancient record, yet (it is implied) so well known to Thucydides that he did not even distinguish it from the well-known town by that name.⁹ However, the fact remains, and is known to all commentators (see Gomme p. 217 n. 5 et al.), that the ancient scholiast and the lexicographers read the text of Thucydides as we have it. The scholiast explicitly identifies the χωρὶον not taken by the Athenians as Beroea.¹⁰

The real problem appears to be totally different: modern commentators are unwilling to admit that, so soon after swearing to a treaty of alliance with Perdiccas, the Athenians could have tried to storm an important town in his kingdom, and that (as we have seen) Thucydides could then ascribe the breach of the treaty to Perdiccas (“for the second time”: 1.62.2). However, if we are to assume an unattested breach of the treaty before the Athenian attack on Beroea, it is difficult to find a time for it. Since the Athenians, on their march toward Potidaea, had some cavalry under the command of Perdiccas’ enemy Philip (and Pausanias, whoever he was) marching with them through Perdiccas’ territory (1.61.4), Perdiccas’ presumed breach must then be put before the Athenians set out on their march toward Beroea, i.e., straight after the conclusion of the agreement. We cannot guess in what such a breach could have consisted, or why he should have committed it. Thucydides’ interpretation, puzzling though it is, has simply been taken as incontrovertible fact. Thus Gomme, misreporting a German scholar whom he charges with believing in an unprovoked attack on Beroea (in fact, that scholar, Widmann in Boehme’s commentary [5th ed.] says the opposite: Perdiccas must have at once [“sofort”] broken the treaty since we *then* find the Athenians attacking Beroea): “as though Thucydides had said

that not he [Perdiccas], but the Athenians, broke the treaty" (p. 216).¹¹ To which we must reply: "as though, had it been so, Thucydides could be expected to tell us."

Strange arguments are summoned against the text and the scholiast's explanation. Let us hear Gomme again (p. 216): "the scholiasts—such is their nature—do not notice any geographical difficulty." And (217 n. 2): "Editors have noted that ἐπιστρέφειν is not elsewhere used intransitively in Thucydides." (For this discovery, see Steup *ad loc.* There are two [!] other occurrences in Thucydides, indeed transitive.) As for the geographical difficulty, the one caused by the *emendation* is seen by Gomme and discussed at length, but he finds no explanation. Geyer (see n. 11) had already noted that the obvious way to leave Pydna for Potidaea was by sea. He too found no satisfactory explanation. Gomme has to posit a sea crossing from Beroea (?) to Strepsa, "contrasting" with the land march to Gignonus—all without comment by Thucydides.

Let us take the text as the ancients saw it and as our manuscripts still show it: an eminent topographer has recently shown that it need not be emended. Some slight improvement is needed. As Gomme rightly notes (p. 216 n. 1): "no one writes, 'they went to X and returned, and having first tried to take it and failed, went by land to Y.'" But that is easy to cure: delete καί before πεῖράσαντες. The Athenians arrived at Beroea and, turning away from there (having first tried to take the place and failed), marched by land to Gignonus, in the direction of Potidaea.¹² The next question is: was such a march possible?

Geyer, who considered the possibility, estimated the distance at 120 kilometers and thought it impossible that this distance could be covered by the end of the third day. Hatzopoulos could not trace any roads back to the mid-fifth century, though he thinks it should be presumed that one of the routes later documented was being used at least by the fourth.¹³ That distance is given as 51 Roman miles on the *Antonine Itinerary*, which (as Hatzopoulos points out) corresponds to the 78 kilometers of the modern highway, between Beroia and Thessaloniki (Therme). From there to Nea Kallikrateia (the site usually accepted for Gignonus, though it has also been put somewhat closer to Therme) I had to measure the distance by mileograph: by two alternative routes (one a little longer but avoiding some of the hills) it comes to c. 34 to 37 kilometers.¹⁴ The total distance, mostly along Hatzopoulos' route, may therefore be put at between 110 and 115 kilometers, nearly all of it over fairly level ground. (There can at least be no doubt that the Athenians

would find the shortest route, with native contingents to guide them.) This is certainly much more than Greek hoplites would normally achieve, and for a reasonably sized army (three thousand Athenians plus “many of the allies”) it would seem too much. But we must recall (as both Thucydides and his readers would undoubtedly recall) the most famous forced march recorded in Greek history up to that point: the arrival of two thousand Lacedaemonians, rushing to aid the Athenians at Marathon but arriving just too late, *τριταῖοι* from Sparta to the borders of Attica—a distance that is anything up to 150 kilometers (especially if one has to avoid Argive territory), and over terrain that is far from level. One could not expect this of Athenian citizen soldiers; but the effort, as we have seen, is in fact considerably less.

But what about Thucydides’ statement that the march was “leisurely” (thus the Loeb translator—but there has apparently never been any doubt on this): *κατ’ ὀλίγον δὲ προϊόντες τριταῖοι ἀφίκοντο ἐς Γιγώνον*? Hatzopoulos cannot deal with this and has to have recourse to a suggestion by N. G. L. Hammond (in fact following Thomas Hobbes), that the phrase applies to the ships (*νῆες ἐβδομήκοντα*) just mentioned and not to the army (p. 55). But I fear that this is absurd. Even if one can say of ships that they *προϊόντες ἀφίκοντο* (of which I am not sure), it certainly cannot be said that they then “set up camp” (*ἔστρωτοπεδεύσαντο*): only men could do that.

I would suggest that, not for the only time, Thucydides has been misunderstood, and the misunderstanding has been taken over by successive generations of scholars. I do not know who first (clearly a long time ago) translated *κατ’ ὀλίγον* as referring to a slow pace, or what his evidence for this was.¹⁵ There is certainly none to be found in Thucydides. Its literal meaning, of course, is “bit by bit.” From there, we can get “gradually” (5.82.2: of the Argive *demos* gaining strength): that line is so thin that we cannot always distinguish (1.69.3: the Athenians extend their power in this fashion—probably to be taken literally, “one step at a time”). But when applied to armies or war, it always means “in parts” or “in detail” (4.10.4; 5.9.2; 6.34.4). This should surely *prima facie* be the sense here. The Athenian army marched divided into sections. It was perfectly safe, of course, since there was no formidable enemy arrayed along their route, and they had cavalry and allies (no doubt light-armed locals) to protect them from harassment.

Why was this done, and why does Thucydides report it? Once the meaning is recognized, the answer is not far to seek. It is a widely rec-

ognized military maxim, but let me quote the succinct formulation by Donald W. Engels: "Large groups of individuals move much more slowly than smaller groups. Likewise, large armies are slower than small ones."¹⁶

Having failed in their (probably ill-advised) attempt to seize Beroea, close to Perdiccas' capital of Aegae, the Athenians really were by now in a hurry to get to Potidaea. They could have done it by returning to the coast and being transported across on the ships available. That would have involved some marching and then a shuttle service which, for such a relatively large force (we must estimate it as at least five thousand men plus horses and transport animals), would have taken several days. Since time had already been wasted, the quickest route, by now, was probably by forced marches (divided into small and much more mobile groups) along the land route to Therme and south from there. As we have seen, the phrase never refers to slowness of action; nor could it readily be thus understood, in view of its original meaning, which never leaves it in actual use. We can now see that Thucydides has not only been misunderstood: his intention has been stood on its head. Writing for a public that took marches for granted and was tolerably familiar with at least the basic geographical configuration of the area, he was trying to stress the unexpected *speed* of the march, since the Athenians were in a hurry (κατηπείγοντο) to face Aristeus at Potidaea, and the way in which it had been possible to obtain such speed with such a large force. The whole march took less than three days.¹⁷

With the help of expert recent topography, and with careful examination of Thucydides' actual language, the problem, which Hatzópoulos still called "desperate" (p. 57), melts away. So, of course, does any justification for the Athenian action. With Perdiccas lulled (it could be hoped) into carelessness by the evident Athenian desire to be rid of the Macedonian War, and indeed the apparent "necessity" to enroll him as an ally, the failure to take Pydna might now be recouped by a brilliant stroke: the seizure of an unprepared city only a few miles from his capital Aegae. Had this succeeded, it would no doubt have removed Perdiccas as a potential antagonist for a long time. We must assume that the forced march along the land route was planned from the start: it would have been required whether or not the coup succeeded. Thucydides, as often, enables us to gather the facts (provided we are willing not to blind ourselves to them) while expressing his own bias in his formulation.¹⁸

In this case, again, the right answers could not emerge until the right questions, about Thucydides in particular, had been asked.

III

The story now continues in Book 2 (to which all citations will henceforth refer), with the Thracian king Sitalces' intervention in Macedonian affairs (95 ff.), "at the beginning of winter" 429.

He enters Thucydides' principal account (after a brief diplomatic appearance earlier in the book) when he decides to collect a large army from all the territories subject to him—which gives Thucydides a splendid opportunity to use his knowledge of Thrace in a most useful (and unusual) detailed account of the kingdom (96–97)—in order both to fulfill a promise he had made and to punish Perdiccas for not fulfilling one of his own (95). Thucydides' language in describing the latter, said to have been made at the time when Sitalces reconciled Perdiccas with the Athenians (who, incidentally, returned Therme to him: 29.6), is at its most peculiar. Not only are we not told what Perdiccas' promise had been, but the sentence is set out and cut off in a way that suggests that Thucydides is *avoiding* the inclusion of that information: ὁ τε γὰρ Περδίκκας αὐτῷ ὑποσχόμενος, εἰ . . . , ἃ ὑπεδέξατο οὐκ ἐπετέλει. The transitive participle is left hanging in midair, without an object, so that the reader expects an object clause after the conditional and as an apodosis to it; but the sentence ends abruptly without it. On the other hand, Sitalces' own promise (to the Athenians, to help them finish the war in Chalcidice) is clearly stated. It alone obviously provides a sufficient motive for the expedition, especially since the Athenians had sent ambassadors (it seems) in order to remind him of it. It is unlikely that, if Thucydides had been told what Perdiccas' promise was, he would have kept it from the reader; on the other hand, it is difficult to believe that he was told of the promise but not of its content, and did not try to find out: surely a remarkable lack of curiosity in a historian. We must therefore suspect that there was no such promise; that it has been made up, in part for rhetorical balance, but chiefly in order to reinforce the picture of Perdiccas as an unreliable liar which (as we saw) Thucydides has been implanting in his readers.

When the Athenians again accepted Perdiccas as an ally, they evidently abandoned their current (and entirely loyal) allies, including

Philip. This is fully in line with the callous *Realpolitik*, oblivious of moral or sacred obligations, that we have seen them following toward Macedonian "barbarians." Philip, with his son Amyntas, was apparently wise enough to seek refuge with Sitalces (cf. 95.2). Derdas (or his successor) would now be too weak to be relied upon, and if he fled to the Athenians, they might well surrender him to Perdiccas for some perceived momentary advantage, no matter what their immediate promises. Philip had got to know his Athenians. Perdiccas, unable to hope that Sitalces would surrender him, at least extracted a promise that Sitalces would not restore him. Sitalces did not hesitate to make that promise. He had no reason for investing a major military effort in Philip's restoration. Philip (and, after his death, Philip's son Amyntas) was more useful to him as a weapon held in reserve. We might compare (*si parua licet* . . .) the way in which, more than a century later, Seleucus treated the captive Demetrius, or, later still, Augustus treated various eastern princes.

However, here Thucydides misinforms us. He says that Sitalces undertook not to bring Philip back ἐπὶ βασιλείᾳ.¹⁹ But not only had Philip never had a *basileia* (merely an *archē*)—it is quite clear (in view of the size of the Athenian contingent supporting him) that, in his alliance with the Athenians, he had never envisaged a claim to the Argead throne. There is no reason to think that this had changed. Yet Thucydides' meaning is perfectly clear, and further clarified in the very next section (95.3), where we are told that Sitalces was bringing Amyntas, Philip's son, back ἐπὶ βασιλείᾳ τῶν Μακεδόνων. We shall soon see that Thucydides is as wrong about the aims of Amyntas as he was about those of Philip. Sitalces' main purpose was, as we have seen, to fulfill his promise to the Athenians to rid them of their Chalcidic war. Only on his way (and, as it were, ἐν παρόργῳ) would he make a brief detour in order to restore Amyntas to his father's *archē*, thus installing a reliable dependent at little cost to himself.

For the route followed by the Thracian army, we have Hammond for guidance.²⁰ The troops mustered in the plain of Doberus, between the upper Strymon and the upper Axios, along a river that would give them water and that was presumably fordable. Once the muster was complete, they made straight for the Axios, which they reached at Eidomene, then marched down the river, where most of the towns received them as friends, out of loyalty to the memory of Philip and (apparently) eagerness to have his son rather than Perdiccas as their ruler. But they

could not take Europus, on the lower Axios, the only town that would not admit them (100.3): Sitalces clearly did not want to waste time and be distracted from his main objective by engaging in a lengthy siege. They therefore seem to have abandoned the siege and turned, Thucydides says (100.4), toward the “other (part of) Macedonia, which is to the left of Pella and Cyrrhus.” As Hammond (perhaps for the first time) saw, Thucydides is describing the area from the point of view of the army marching down the river; i.e., it refers to the area between those towns and the river. This is clear from his further specification that the Thracian forces did not enter Bottiaea and Pieria (as well as, obviously, not attacking the two towns named).²¹ Instead, they now laid waste Mygdonia, Crestonia, and Anthemus; i.e., they crossed to the left bank of the Axios and entered the area north of Olynthus. Sitalces was fulfilling his promise to the Athenians.

Sitalces’ aims can be clearly disengaged from those movements. He made no attempt to take Pella, let alone march on the capital Aegae, but stopped just north of Pella and east of Cyrrhus (on the border of Eor-daea). He did not aim at the expulsion or annihilation of Perdiccas, which would have been a difficult undertaking even if he had no other objective. The whole operation was merely a diversion from his main expedition to Chalcidice, which promised him a much better return in Athenian friendship; and as we saw, he made for Chalcidice after a demonstration beyond the Axios, presumably leaving Amyntas somewhere in his *archē*. Indeed, it is the movements of Sitalces’ army that give us some idea of the extension of Philip’s old *archē*: it clearly did not include any major towns west of the river Axios, but was centered on the river. (How much, if anything, *east* of the territories of the towns named for us as within the *archē* it included, we cannot tell.) Nor can we be sure whether the area west of the river was included in Philip’s *archē* as far as the Thracians penetrated, or whether their brief invasion of those territories was meant to act as a deterrent.

In any case, having crossed into Chalcidice after this brief excursion, Sitalces waited for the Athenians to arrive with the large forces they had promised (95.3). In cooperation with those forces, it is possible that the war there might indeed have been concluded, except for the sieges of the strongest cities, Potidaea and Olynthus.

The Athenians had sent gifts and ambassadors to Sitalces, in order to move him to undertake the expedition, and had provided Hagnon, the founder of Amphipolis, as *hēgemōn*;²² but now they did not come. Why

did they miss this splendid chance, which it seems they had worked hard to create? "Because they did not think Sitalces would come," says Thucydides (101.1).

This is a little hard to believe. The preparations—the collection of the large army in the Doberus plain—must have taken some time; and after that nobody could doubt that Sitalces was serious. Hagnon was surely in touch with Athens and would inform the *dēmos*. Thucydides now tries, in two ways, to find some justification for the Athenians. First, he points up Sitalces' untrustworthiness. As soon as he got to Chalcidice (101.1), he began negotiations with Perdiccas about the objectives of his expedition (ὣν ἔνεκα ἐστράτευσε). Thucydides makes it quite clear that this was not connected with the Athenians' dereliction.²³ Moreover, Perdiccas, in addition, was secretly negotiating with Seuthes, Sitalces' nephew and (apparently) designated successor, and Sitalces was easily won over by Seuthes to abandon the expedition. If this is a little difficult to follow, Thucydides' second implied justification is even more so. At the end of his account (101.6) he tells us that the whole expedition had taken only thirty days, of which only eight were spent in Chalcidice, when he decided to lead his army home "at full speed." In other words, the Athenians, who might be excused for not fully trusting Sitalces in the first place, and not preparing a major expedition in advance, did not have time to send one, once they could actually see that he was going to act. This, of course, is fully accepted by Gomme.²⁴

Yet doubts arise. One wonders whether the negotiations that took place during Sitalces' stay in Chalcidice (so it seems) could have been fruitfully finished in eight days, which was apparently all the time during which Sitalces abstained from raids on Macedonia proper. Moreover, Thucydides' phrase regarding the length of time is surprisingly vague: μέινας τριάκοντα τὰς πάσας ἡμέρας, we are told. This should include the whole time he spent in Macedonia and Chalcidice (eight of the thirty, as we are next informed). It is in itself possible that the march down the Axios, the raids on Macedonian territory, and the actions in Chalcidice took no longer than that. It does not seem possible to hold that the time spent on mustering the army can be included—and indeed, the verb Thucydides uses (μείνας) does not imply this. However, as we have seen, the Athenians could certainly have known that Sitalces was launching a major expedition when they heard about that mustering. That would have given them plenty of time to respond.

Moreover, we are told that one reason (apart from the negotiations with Perdiccas) for Sitalces' speedy return was that his forces were suffering from lack of food and from winter. The former is possible, if all the supplies, in this fertile area, had in fact been moved into the cities and the Athenians were not supplying him by sea; although one wonders why an experienced commander (even a barbarian) had not arranged for food to be transported down the river from further inland. As for winter, that is a little harder to believe. They can hardly have suffered from serious cold (let alone snow) before late November or early December, if then. The mean temperature for Thessaloniki (which has probably not changed much since antiquity) is about forty-two degrees by December, still dropping through fifty degrees during November. November is in fact the wettest month, but rainfall for the month is still only just over two inches.²⁵ (This, of course, may have changed since antiquity; and one must always allow for an exceptional season.) It is unlikely, at any rate, that the army was seriously affected by "winter" before the dates I have suggested. Now this would mean that Sitalces started his expedition not earlier than near the end of October—probably later. This is hardly the action of an experienced commander (again, even if he was a barbarian); what is more, he could hardly expect an Athenian fleet to come up to support him in November; and if he did not know this, he had Hagnon to tell him.

I think we must conclude that Thucydides' report of the time the expedition spent, both as a total and, in particular, in Chalcidice, must be rejected. He has compressed it in order to give the Athenians a more convincing reason for not performing what they had promised; just as he has shown Sitalces to be weak and unreliable, in order to let the reader conclude that the Athenians were, at least in the first place, quite justified in doubting whether he would indeed turn up.

He also insists that the expedition was a total failure.²⁶ And it is in the context of all this that we should probably understand his distortion of Sitalces' plans for Amyntas. Amyntas, as we saw, was (at least for the time being) successfully installed in his father's *archē*, though not quite all of it could be retaken. But if Sitalces had originally planned to install him on the throne of Macedon, then this action too can be regarded as a failure. The barbarian king, like Perdiccas, was simply not allowed any redeeming features, in order to make Athens' attitude and policy toward him look less reprehensible.²⁷ The intelligent reader, of course,

is left to wonder how Sitalces, being the man he is depicted to be, had managed to gain the huge empire that Thucydides describes. But that question was not for Thucydides to answer.

I suspect that the real reason ("but least mentioned") for the Athenian failure to support Sitalces' massive endeavor was, as often, *Realpolitik*, which in the end turned out to be a serious error. When plans for aid by Sitalces were originally made (29.5), the promise was that he would "send the Athenians a Thracian force of cavalry and peltasts." What was in the end provided, however, was a huge mob of ill-trained and ill-equipped men, who by their mere numbers were nonetheless formidably effective (100.5–6). And, more serious still, they came under Sitalces' personal leadership. It would be clear to the Athenians that this was not the auxiliary force that had been promised and that they had presumably requested. That this was still what they envisaged is clear from the fact that Hagnon had been designated as its *hēgemōn*: this surely implies that, at that point, the Athenians had no idea that the king intended to lead his forces in person.

The terror caused by the Thracian army in Greece is vividly described by Thucydides (101.2: it even extended to the Thracians not in his empire, as we see in s. 3).²⁸ It was feared (we are told) that the Athenians intended to bring the Thracian forces into Greece to use against the Peloponnesians (s. 4). Of course, the Athenians had no such intentions. All that they had requested, under their alliance, was a force of auxiliaries that would be useful to them in Chalcidice. They must have shared much of the fear which they had inadvertently inspired. Above all, even if Sitalces' ambitions were limited to the area in which he was now stationed, the Athenians would at best find him an uncomfortable neighbor—far more formidable than a strong Perdiccas, whom they feared a few years earlier—and, at worst, one who would himself wish to keep what he had helped them win. It was obviously Athenian policy not to let such a situation develop.

In the end, therefore, the Athenians deserted Sitalces, as they had deserted and turned against Perdiccas earlier. This time, admittedly, they did not stab their ally in the back: there was no chance of doing so, since Perdiccas was already negotiating with him through his successor. But they ignored their treaty and their promises in his case as lightheartedly as they had ignored them in Perdiccas'; and, as in the incidents that led up to the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides has consistently tried to disguise this *Realpolitik* by selective omission and disinformation, and by

delivering his own interpretation of motives and intentions under the guise of facts. The study of events in the barbarian north adds depth to the study of his treatment of the origins of the Peloponnesian War.²⁹

It was in this manner that the Athenians deprived themselves of the chance, at one time welcomed and deliberately sought, of having a major Thracian ally to aid them in the most exposed part of their empire. In the late 420s, there must have been many in Athens who regretted the miscalculation.³⁰

Notes

CHAPTER I The Peace of Callias

1. *LCM* 3 (1978) 44.

2. Klaus Meister, *Die Ungeschichtlichkeit des Kalliasfriedens und deren historische Folgen*, Palingenesia 18 (Wiesbaden 1982) 124–30 (hereafter cited as Meister). Works not specifically devoted to this topic but treating it incidentally are listed p. 2 n. 3. His ample references to modern views have dispensed me from collecting them here, which would have doubled the length of this study. My references to modern works are very selective: chiefly to standard works, to points of significance not dealt with in my text, and to works not yet known to Meister.

3. *Ottava Miscellanea Greca e Romana* (Rome 1982) 125–52. Accame has since returned to the subject with an attack on Meister in *Nona Miscellanea* (Rome 1984) 1–8.

4. See especially Meister 5 n. 14.

5. Meister has collected 162 items referring to the peace, some of them containing more than one entry, down to 1982. Of those, about 26 are of the nineteenth century, 20 between 1901 and 1939, 4 between 1940 and 1945, and the rest since 1945. Of 151 whose opinions he has counted, 114 believe in authenticity and 29 deny it. (The rest express no clear opinion.) Significantly, 15 of those who deny authenticity are among the 26 listed for the nineteenth century, and only 13 of them are among the well over 100 since 1940. In other words: since 1940 nearly all scholars who have written on the peace have regarded it as authentic. In 1953 (printed in *Probleme der Alten Geschichte* [Göttingen 1963] 253) Hans Schaefer could say that “today, quite rightly, no one presumably doubts its authenticity.”

6. R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1972) 130. It was three years after this that I began to argue the case for acceptance of the fourth-century sources, which I have since done in numerous public lectures and seminars. Acceptance first found its way into print in J. Walsh, “The Authenticity and the

Dates of the Peace of Callias and the Congress Decree,” *Chiron* 11 (1981) 31ff. Meister’s independent and exhaustive discussion in Part I of his study is now, and will remain, definitive.

7. See R. A. Parker and W. H. Dubberstein, *Babylonian Chronology 626 BC–AD 75*² (Providence 1956) 17. They report an unpublished eclipse text that dates the murder of Xerxes between August 4 and 8, 465. About the same time, it was reported that in an unpublished tablet the scribe still dated by the 21st year of Xerxes in Kislimu (December–January) 465/4; while at distant Elephantine Artaxerxes’ accession was known by January 2–3, 464 (see *JNES* 13 [1954] 8–9 and for Elephantine A. E. Cowley, *Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century B.C.* [Oxford 1923] no. 6). M. W. Stolper, *JHS* 108 (1988) 196–97, has now published the relevant part of the eclipse text that dates Xerxes’ death within a few days in August 465 and has shown that the supposed reference to Xerxes as alive by Kislimu (December 465) rests on a misreading of a contract, which in fact does not mention a month or day at all.

8. A further revolt by an Artabanus in Bactria is reported by Ctesias (*FGrHist* 688 F 14 [35]), certainly before the Egyptian revolt of the late 460s in which Athens ultimately became involved, and so presumably connected with the early accession struggles centered in Artabanus the conspirator: he may have controlled, or been recognized in, some (but not others) of the satrapies. Eusebius (p. 110H) makes Artabanus the sixth Persian King, with a reign of seven months. This can hardly be wholly invented. The Bactrian “rebel” was most probably a relative who was on his side.

9. Since writing this, I have come to realize that Cimon’s plans for Thrace included, no doubt as one of his most important projects, the attempt to deprive Thasos of its very profitable *peraea*—an attempt wrapped in anodyne language by Thucydides (see p. 225 n. 18), but in fact almost bound to goad Thasos into the war that later broke out. Since terminology carries some interpretative implications, I now prefer not to describe the Athenian war with Thasos (or, for that matter, that with Samos) as a rebellion. I certainly no longer believe that Cimon could not foresee that war.

10. R. Unz, “The Chronology of the Pentekontaetia,” *CQ* n.s. 36 (1986) 68–85 (hereafter Unz). Violent measures have been necessary to maintain the claim of the fundamentalists, most notorious the emendation of a numeral at 103.1, which both removes a sound text in favor of an emendation not easily justified on paleographical grounds and impairs historical plausibility by separating the capture of Naupactus from the campaigns in central Greece and the *periplous* of Tolmides. (On this see Chapter 5 below.) The substitution of Thasos for Naxos (see text) is probably a similar case, though here the possibility that Plutarch’s text of Thucydides already read “Thasos” can be claimed to provide some plausibility. Thucydides himself never disguises the nature and limits of his chronological knowledge. Such phrases as κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους τούτους (107.1), οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον (111.2), and χρόνου ἐγγενομένου (113.1) make no claim to accurate knowledge and must not be stretched beyond what they claim. They contrast with precise information: δεκάτῳ ἔτει (103.1), ἐξ ἑτη πολέμησαντα (110.1), διαλιπόντων ἐτῶν τριῶν (112.1); once even δευτέρῳ

καὶ ἐξηκοστῇ ἡμέρᾳ (108.2)—which he obviously does not withhold when he has it.

11. Frank J. Frost, *Plutarch's Themistocles* (Princeton 1980) 211. A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides I* (Oxford 1945) 397–98 (hereafter *HCT*) expresses the same idea more verbosely. There is confusion in A. J. Podlecki, *Themistocles* (Montreal 1975), which contains much the best summary of the sources (38ff. et al.). On p. 197 Themistocles' "arrival in Persia can then be dated securely to late 465 or early 464 B.C."; on pp. 198–99 the Naxian War is "between 469 and 467," with a two- or three-year gap "between this and Themistocles' arrival in *Ionia* in late 465 or early 464" and in Susa a year later. No interval of this length should be assumed.

12. If Plutarch is right in putting Themistocles' Ionian landfall at Cyme, Ephorus should have had some local tradition about such an important event to follow. Certainly, nothing in Thucydides contradicts the report of his arrival *in Asia* before Xerxes' death: it must be stressed, against Unz and (long before him) Gomme, that Thucydides neither says nor implies anything as to the length of Themistocles' stay near the coast, except (as Gomme, but not Unz, saw) for the delay due to his having to get his money sent over from Greece. The various romantic tales regarding Themistocles' interview with Xerxes should certainly not be preferred to Thucydides' statement. (See, e.g., Diod. 11.57ff., little of it perhaps from Ephorus, and the reference to Phanias in Plutarch, mentioned in the text.) But they may be spun out of a genuine tradition that Themistocles did arrive under Xerxes and that Xerxes was informed of his arrival.

13. For detailed discussion of this see pp. 92ff. (chronology) and 134ff. (Thucydides' interpretation) below.

14. Meister 46–47, adding the Ceramicus ostraca with Callias' name as further evidence for the unpopularity incurred by his mission to Susa. (I do not think that the ostraca can be dated.) As a point of method, it seems unjustified to accept Demosthenes' story of the conviction and reject the report of the conclusion of peace on which Demosthenes in fact bases it. The rejection seems to be based solely on Meister's view that the peace was too glorious for conviction to be conceivable. We cannot tell whether the story of the fine is authentic or a fourth-century moral tale. If it is authentic, the trial and conviction should be set in the context of the Ephialtic reforms which led to the overturning of the peace itself (see next section). Since the events would be only a year or two apart, slight foreshortening, a century later, would easily abolish the interval and misinterpret the context. In any case, the facts connected by Demosthenes must be either accepted or rejected *in toto*.

15. On this (not important in detail here) see *Ath. pol.* 25ff. (confused); *Plut. Cim.* 14–15; *Per.* 7 and 9 (embroidered). *Ath. pol.* is so ill informed that the statement that the prosecution was at Cimon's *euthynai* may be a mere guess. Plutarch's statement that Pericles was chosen as prosecutor by the People does not merit any more confidence. It is clear from his account how the story of the first clash between the two men was later adorned with romantic fiction. Precise details may not have been known by the middle of the fourth century.

16. The chronological problems connected with the revolt and the Athenian

expedition(s) are well known and need not be discussed here. If there were two Spartan appeals, as Hammond has argued, then the first must be placed earlier and might lead to an earlier date for Eurymedon; only the second would come in 463-462. See further pp. 89ff., with notes (below) and, for the introduction of pay for jurors, Appendix, section II (below).

17. Meiggs, *Athenian Empire* 79. Unz, strangely, shows no interest in these actions, any more than in the Peace of Callias, even though they are surely important for any scheme of chronology proposed for the Pentecontaetia. The lists in C. W. Fornara, *The Athenian Board of Generals from 501 to 404* (Wiesbaden 1971), do not include Ephialtes at all, and Pericles only in 454/3. Since Pericles was in his thirties by 463, there is no reason why the date suggested by the link with Ephialtes should not be followed. D. M. Lewis (*Sparta and Persia* [Leiden 1977] 60 n. 68—a book to which I owe a great deal) is not at his best on this. He does not mention Ephialtes and, as regards Pericles, writes: "I find it impossible to believe that Pericles was general in the 460s" (he does not tell us why); he goes on to suggest that the right context for Pericles' naval sweep is the Samian War: "the difference between Kallisthenes' 50 ships and Thucydides' 60 is hardly important" (*sic*)!

18. Plb. 2.13.7 (explicit); cf. 3.27.9. On this see my comments in *Miscellanea Eugenio Manni* (Rome 1980) 159ff. Walsh's idea ("Authenticity and Dates" [cit. n. 6] 46-47), in further refinement of this misconception, that the limit was imposed *only* on the Athenians and their allies and not on the Persians at all rests on a strange mistranslation of the Greek and, of course, runs counter to much of the other evidence regarding the peace.

19. Probably and not certainly, since our evidence on all these events is far worse than is often realized. Neither the date of Ephialtes' death nor the date when operations in the East began can be stated with real confidence. As to the former, *Ath. pol.* dates it "not long after" the reforms (25.5) and (later) in the sixth year before the decision to admit *zeugitae* to the archonship (26.2). Mnesitheides (archon 457/6) is said to have been the first *zeugites* elected under this law, which would put it in 458/7. But Ephialtes cannot have died before the year in which his reforms were passed (462/1), which is (by inclusive count) the sixth year before 457/6. Hence the author has (to us, inextricably) confused the date of the law with the date of the first tenure under the law. We therefore cannot trust him sufficiently to put Ephialtes' death before the end of 462/1. On the other hand, Thucydides is here at his most obscure. He tells us (1.104.2) that in what appears to be the spring of 460, when the appeal from Egypt came, the Athenians ἔτυχον ἐς Κύπρον στρατευόμενοι—it is not clear whether they were about to set out, or already on their way, or already there; nor, of course, whether this was the first expedition to Cyprus or whether there had been one before (e.g., in the previous year) which (like so many other events) he did not regard as sufficiently important to mention: it is mentioned here, clearly, because it is its diversion to Egypt that makes it important. Nor does his statement that they now "left" Cyprus (ἀπολιπόντες) securely tell us whether they were already on the island or merely abandoned it as a target. We cannot even be quite sure whether or not the invasion of Cyprus continued (on a reduced scale).

The fact that Thucydides never mentions it again is inconclusive: cf. the attack on Egypt in 450 (112.3), never again referred to except for its end. All this unfortunately makes it impossible to discuss the Eastern policy of the new leaders with real precision, although the general picture is clear enough.

20. Thuc. 1.102.4. This should not be dissociated from the attack on Cimon after his return from the north, a mere two or three years before.

21. Gomme, *HCT* I 306. It should be noted that in his actual discussion the facts force him into considerable qualification of this statement.

22. For some aspects of the law, see S. C. Humphreys, "The *nothoi* of Cynosarges," *JHS* 94 (1974) 88–95. A comprehensive general survey without profound analysis will be found in Cynthia Patterson, *Pericles' Citizenship Law of 451–50 B.C.* (Salem 1981).

23. It appears, in one form or another, in several sources. Unz (cit. n. 10, p. 76) cites Plutarch, Theopompus, Aristides, Nepos, and Andocides (in this order, and without discussion of precise relevance, relationship, or credibility). The statement that Andocides "says that Kimon was recalled from exile in order to make peace with Sparta and did so" is more misleading than the qualification regarding the orator's confusion admits: Andocides *in fact* says that Miltiades was recalled from his ostracism in Chersonese in order that he should be sent, as Spartan *proxenos*, to make peace with Sparta, and that he concluded the Thirty Years' Peace. Unz sums it up as "an overwhelming weight of evidence," and accepts all of it except for what does not suit his case (the connection with Tanagra attested by Plutarch and probably known to Theopompus).

24. The ἔντοια seem to include (or to be) Idomeneus, whom Plutarch rightly tells us to disbelieve. Unz thinks the part allegedly played by Pericles "especially supportive [of the story of the recall]: such an unlikely fact is not easily invented" (!). He does not mention the use of dramatic color in biographical and later historical tradition, nor comment on the part of Elpinice.

25. Unz tried to argue that a recall from ostracism presupposes a major emergency (which can be supported by the recall of the exiles at the outbreak of the war against Xerxes); and since Tanagra did not produce an emergency, he dates Cimon's recall after the Egyptian disaster, which clearly did. This would fit in with Diodorus' date for the five years' truce, but cannot be reconciled with even the minimal indications of date deducible from Thucydides. Nor will the chronology of the reported recall allow it, for Theopompus dates it to the fifth year after the ostracism, i.e., not later than 457/6 (even if we put the ostracism a year after the reforms of Ephialtes in 462/1 and not in the same year); and that corresponds well enough to a plausible date for the battle of Tanagra. If we believe the recall, it cannot be dissociated from its connection with Tanagra, even if the alleged immediate reason for it (that the Athenians feared a Spartan invasion and relied on Cimon to stop it) may be Plutarch's own idea. As for the supposed parallel with the Persian War, it is difficult to see one, unless indeed we think that Cimon was at this time the only Athenian in exile. The recall of one victim of ostracism is very different from a general amnesty for exiles and looks (as the sources indeed say) like a personal favor.

Theopompus' date seems to presuppose the Tanagra correlation. If (as sug-

gested in the text) Cimon's recall was enough to stop Spartan action against Athens at a critical time, this might later easily be confused with the five years' truce that Thucydides seems to put in 450 (see Endnote). Unz (79 n. 48) thinks the dates "can be accommodated." First, Cimon has to leave for Sparta as late as spring 461, with Ephialtes' reforms following still before midsummer; then Cimon has to stay in Sparta "for seven or eight months" after the reforms before being sent home, in order to make it possible for him to return to Athens "too late for the first round of the ostracism vote of 461/0" [which the new leaders, with unusual courtesy, apparently delayed until his return home with his presumed supporters]. Thus the ostracism is finally voted only in the eighth prytany of 460/59, and Cimon then left "within a few weeks of the end of the 460/59 Athenian political year," with the result that it was only the next year (459/8) that was "traditionally recorded as the first (full) year of his ostracism." After this, the recall can be placed in 455/4, in the early summer of 454, conveniently already after the Egyptian disaster. Further comment seems superfluous, except that it should perhaps be noted that Unz does not mention that Theopompus connects the recall with the "outbreak" of war with Sparta.

26. See the epigram in Diod. 11.62.3, which is generally agreed to refer to this occasion. Cf. E. Badian and J. Buckler, "The Wrong Salamis?" *RhM* 118 (1975) 226–39, and, for the chronology, my Endnote. Cf. also Appendix, section I.

27. Plato, *Charm.* 158a ("whenever" he went). That he went to Susa together with Callias has been suggested and, of course, is quite possible; but it is only a guess. We must not underestimate the number of such embassies during the time of peace (see n. 29 and text).

28. Athen. 9.397c; cf. Ael. *HA* 5.21 (the admission charge). By the time of Aristophanes, peacocks had become the standard gift and status symbol of ambassadors to the King: Dicaeopolis says he is getting tired of them (*Acharn.* 63). J. K. Davies (*Athenian Propertied Families* [Oxford 1971] 330 [hereafter, *APF*]) describes the peacocks as a *symbolon*—a term correct in principle, but presumably not to be taken literally. On peacocks, their introduction into Athens and their social importance, see now M. C. Miller, "Peacocks and *Tryphe* in Classical Athens," *Archaeol. News* 15 (1989), 1–10.

29. For the *phiale* see Lys. 19 (*Aristoph.*) 25—fortunately making it clear that it was a personal gift to Demus, not inherited from his father. See further M. Vickers, "Demus's Gold *Phiale* (Lysias 19.25)," *AJAH* 9 (1984 [1990]) 48–53. For the King's *xenoi* in general, see Hdt. 8.85.3 and cf. Nymphis, *FGrHist* 432 F 6.

30. Davies, *APF* 259 (with all the source references). For Callias as the negotiator of the Thirty Years' Peace see Diod. 12.7. Davies accepts (with proper misgivings) the modern story that Callias had at some time divorced Cimon's sister Elpinice, since this substantiates his "shift to the Left." It is based on nothing more than her burial not far from her distinguished brother, which may be explained in any number of ways. We do not hear of Callias' marrying anyone else, and we do not know whether he survived her.

31. Jacoby, *FGrHist* IIC p. 320: "irrtümer und verschiebungen sind ebenso

häufig, wie in den späteren chroniken, daten fehlen ganz, und der autor hat offenbar nur eine sehr dunkle vorstellung von der chronologie.” As for his date, Jacoby’s “in späthellenistischer und römischer zeit” (ibid. 319) is still all that can be said, unless *POxy* 2469 indeed uses Aristodemus and indeed dates from the second century A.D. (the editor finds the hand very hard to date).

32. See Jacoby, *FGrHist* IIC p. 319: “daß auch Ephoros zu den grundquellen gehört, ist an sich wahrscheinlich und scheint durch die oft starke übereinstimmung mit Diodor und Justin bestätigt zu werden.”

I was mistaken in charging Aristodemus with omitting Eurymedon. Since the error was reprimanded by another scholar (see Appendix), I have left the erroneous text unchanged.

33. A minor consequence is that Callias should be allowed his *strategia*, which has apparently not gained recognition from modern scholars. Thus Davies (*APF* 259) says that he was never a *strategos* and Fornara (*Athenian Board of Generals*, cit. n. 17) does not list him. Meiggs, in his selection of sources on the Peace of Callias (*Athenian Empire* 487–88), extracts the “sea limits” from Aristodemus, but perversely omits the reference to Callias’ *strategia*. Yet there is little reason to doubt it and none to ignore it. Cimon’s brother-in-law may well have served with him on Cyprus, or possibly on the expedition that went to Egypt. It was not uncommon for generals to go on important diplomatic missions in time of war; thus, e.g., Xanthippus (480/79), Aristides (479/8), Nicias, Nicostratus, and Autocles (424/3), and Alcibiades (418/7).

34. Cf. *IG II/III*² 1, nos. 1, 6, 8, 9, 12; I¹ 227–29 (227 with M. B. Walbank, *ZPE* 51 [1983] 183–84). Reengraving was suggested by S. K. Eddy, *CP* 65 (1970) 13; but he quaintly described it as a “sentimental” act after the end of the war. Recognition of the need to reengrave fortunately renders discussion of various hypotheses as to what Theopompus might have seen otiose.

35. A. R. Hands (*Mnemosyne* 28 [1979] 194–95) was right in his explanation of the article in τὸν πόλεμον, but failed to notice the simple grammatical explanation of the tense. His own explanation, however, may cause confusion.

36. See Kühner-Gerth, *Griechische Grammatik* II 1, p. 200, with numerous examples, some quite striking.

37. See p. 15 above.

38. For the flight to Asia see Podlecki (*Themistocles*, cit. n. 11). Davies (*APF* 215) carefully sifted the complex tradition on the date of death, in the end cautiously accepting 459. On Magnesia see *ATL* IV s.v. and Podlecki 107–8. For Themistocles and Lampsacus see the honors for his son Cleophantus, discussed *ATL* III 111 ff.: a claim inherited from his father is implied, and the latter’s generosity seems to be confirmed by implication. The reference in Themistocles’ pseudepigraphical letter (cited *ATL*) may well have been spun out of a local record. That Lampsacus and Myous were not in the King’s possession when he gave them to Themistocles (suggested *ATL*, and similarly Gomme, *HCT* I 292: “empty show”) is an odd suggestion: it would hardly confirm his loyalty at a critical time. The cities are said to have been given him for bread, wine, and ὄψον (fish?). It is interesting to compare the rations dispensed “on behalf of the King” and royal personages in R. T. Hallock, *Persepolis Fortification Tablets*

(Chicago 1969) 214ff. ("J texts"): they consist of food animals; grain or flour or bread; and wine (oil appears once). Fish would no doubt be substituted for a Greek more used to it than to meat.

39. Meister (67-78) makes much of contradictions in the literary sources on the peace terms. Meiggs (*Athenian Empire* 146-47) gives examples of inaccuracy in literary quotation of documents. I have noted two striking cases in the text. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix (*The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* [London 1972] 293) states that he knows "of no complete and correct account of the Thirty Years' Peace by any modern scholar" and proceeds to construct a version that he implies will remedy the deficiency. But this is pure delusion. The state of the sources is such that a complete account cannot even be attempted: the casual reference in Pausanias makes this amply clear. (For analysis of the accounts of the peace of 404, see W. E. Thompson, *Historia* 30 [1981] 175-76.)

40. For discussion of the evidence for an autonomy clause in the Thirty Years' Peace, see Chapter 4, section III, below. No doubt that autonomy was subject to fixed conditions in the case of cities in fact "allied" to Athens; we should compare the Peace of Nicias (Thuc. 5.18.5).

41. For full discussion, see Chapter 4, section VI, below.

42. On Thucydides' consistently hostile treatment of Alcidas, see J. Roisman, "Alcidas in Thucydides," *Historia* 36 (1987) 385-421: he suggests Brasidas or one of his circle as a source.

43. See (decisively) M. W. Stolper, "The Death of Artaxerxes I," *Arch. Mitt. aus Iran* 16 (1983) 223-36.

44. The chronology of Megabyxus is not easy to disengage from Photius' summary of Ctesias, which is almost the only evidence we have. (See *FGrHist* 688 F 14.) Lewis (*Sparta and Persia* 51 n. 5) tries to argue from Nehemiah that the revolt of Megabyxus in Syria was over by 445, but he (quite properly) does not express any great confidence in his argument: as he says, other scholars have expressed the opposite opinion on the basis of the same evidence. But it seems certain that Megabyxus must have lived more than five years (probably considerably more) after the end of the revolt, if all that follows is to be fitted in (Ctes. sections 39-41).

45. The fictions spun in *RE* s.v. "Zopyros 2" should be ignored. The author adduces no serious evidence for his reconstruction. Photius' summary does not specify the great benefit conferred on Athens by Zopyrus' mother, which gave him confidence in a friendly reception there when he decided to flee. *RE* suggests that it was an offering, as by a Hellenistic queen, in an Athenian temple. But that seems wholly inadequate and would not lead to long-surviving gratitude. It may be suggested that she prevailed upon her husband to have some of the Athenian prisoners released, or at least saved from death, after he captured them in Egypt. (Cf. the story in Ctesias, *FGrHist* 688 F 14, sections 39-40.) That was a benefit of which Athenians could be reminded. For the chronology of the revolt of Caunus, see S. K. Eddy, "The Cold War between Athens and Persia, ca. 448-412 B.C.," *CP* 68 (1973) 241-58, at 255-56. That article can be read with considerable profit, even though Eddy is too ready (like Meister

after him) to see Persian aggression where none is attested. (See, e.g., pp. 250, 254.)

46. Amisus is not connected with this in the sources. See *ATL* III 116.

47. See S. M. Burstein, *Outpost of Hellenism* (Berkeley 1976) 28ff. He assembles (27–28) the evidence for the status of the south Pontic cities: probably autonomous and certainly at one time under the King, which would mean that he maintained his claim. Astacus: *ATL* I 471–72. Diod. 12.34.5 (435/4) can be emended, in a context that demonstrably needs emendation of other names, so as to refer to a colony there. *ATL* III 116 regards Lamachus’ “adventure at Herakleia in 424 (Thuc. iv 75.2)” as involving an attempt to collect money in the King’s territory within the Black Sea, hence as contrary to the peace. This seems to be fiction. What Thucydides tells us is that, while two other generals were engaged in their legitimate business (including the collection of tribute) in the Hellespont area, Lamachus “had sailed into the Black Sea with ten ships” and, after seeking refuge from a storm (so it seems) in a harbor belonging to Heraclea, lost his ships and had to return overland. The purpose of his mission is not stated, but it can easily be conjectured as being support for Heraclea and Amisus, not long after Pericles’ intervention there. Thucydides, at any rate, makes no mention of any collection of tribute outside the Athenian *archē*. As we have seen, sailing into the Black Sea is nowhere stated to have been contrary to the terms of the peace.

48. Hypothetical cases of Persian aggression have been found by scholars, e.g. from scrutiny of the tribute quota lists. (See Eddy, *CP* 68 [1973] 241–42, 248–49.) If it is hazardous to draw any firm historical conclusions from such evidence, for which we lack all background, it is plain fancy to infer rebellion supported by Persian intervention. Even in the better-documented cases (Miletus and Erythrae), the documents do not make the sequence and precise nature of the events clear, and we certainly have no basis for judging how the question of legitimacy (of government or of intervention) might appear at the time. The case of Colophon and Notion should serve as a warning. In the end, we have to argue from the literary tradition, unsatisfactory as even that is.

49. *Sparta and Persia* (cit. n. 16) 60 n. 70. (But it will be clear that I cannot accept his unargued assumption that the Persians had no right to support Samos.)

50. This is similar to the question asked by G. L. Cawkwell about the King’s Peace in *CQ* n.s. 31 (1981) 69ff.; though there the evidence he found did not permit an answer.

51. Thus A. E. Raubitschek, *GRBS* 5 (1964) 155–59, suggested that the treaty in which Epilycus played his part was not a renewal of the Peace of Callias, but a “treaty of friendship” concluded around 415. This has not found much approval, but must now be mentioned because M. B. Walbank, “Heracleides and the Great King,” *EMC* n.s. 8 (1989) 347–52, has resuscitated it and made this treaty a serious contender for the one mediated by Heracleides of Clazomenae (see n. 52 below). I hope that proper consideration of what the Peace of Callias must have been like will put such views out of court.

52. On this see p. 55 below. On the "Peace of Epilycus" see Andoc. 3.29. Mattingly's attempt ("The Peace of Kallias," *Historia* 14 [1965] 273-81) to make this peace into the "true" Peace of Callias by changing the identification of Callias as the son of Hipponicus, surnamed *Laccoplutus*, which we see the sources provide, to one with a *bouleutes* of the right year is an ingenious fantasy. Admittedly, the name is common in Athens; but the Callias reported at Susa by Herodotus and again, with precise identification, by the Ephorus tradition cannot be simply turned into another man a generation later. A. Blamire, "Epilycus' Negotiations with Persia," *Phoenix* 29 (1975) 21-26, following other scholars, accepts Andocides' statement as to the nature of the treaty and elaborates at length. (Thus, it seems, also Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* 76-77.) For the nature of Andocides' evidence see A. Andrewes, "Thucydides and the Persians," *Historia* 10 (1961) 2-3. For the embassy to Artaxerxes see Thuc. 4.50. The precise chronology of the "Peace of Epilycus" is fortunately not relevant here. (See Blamire on this.) See also *IG I³* 227, with Walbank, *ZPE* 51 (1983) 183-84. This document (honors for a Heracleides) has since seen a great deal of discussion. D. M. Lewis has kindly let me see the new text and supplements for lines 20ff. and the additional bibliography that will appear in the forthcoming fascicule of *IG I³*. The details of the document do not concern us, but the identity of this Heracleides with Heracleides of Clazomenae is assured, and an attempt to refer the honors for him to the time of the King's Peace has been refuted by M. B. Walbank (see last note). Since the possibility of a "treaty of friendship" c. 415 is unacceptable (see n. 51 above), this means that the document should now be regarded as firmly attached to the renewal (with the help of Heracleides) of the Peace of Callias, by an embassy that included Epilycus.

53. Tod, *GHI* II 118. From this it has been restored in other texts—whether correctly is historically insignificant.

54. The text listed in Kent, *Old Persian Grammar*² (New Haven 1953) as DNB is now paralleled by what (to give it the most sensible name) should be known as XPl. See M. Mayrhofer, *Supplement zur Sammlung der altpersischen Inschriften*, *SAWW* 308 (Vienna 1978) no. 4.5 (pp. 21-25). The allocution has now been recognized as a separate document: see (on the Aramaic version) N. Sims-Williams, *Bull. of the School of Or. and Afr. Stud.* 44 (1981) 1-7.

55. As we have noted, the fourth-century prescript must not be imagined to have been a verbatim copy of the original prescript, as it stood on whatever stele was ultimately the model for the copy. That Theopompus saw a stele giving a treaty that claimed it had been made with Darius should be believed, even though the text of the quotation is corrupt. As we have it, it reads: αἱ πρὸς βασιλέα Δαρείον Ἀθηναίων πρὸς Ἕλληνας συνθήκαι. Some scholars have advocated the radical cure of deleting both Darius and the Hellenes, arguing that they cannot both be right and that there is no good reason to prefer one to the other. But as W. R. Connor pointed out (*Theopompus and Fifth-Century Athens* [Washington, D.C. 1968] 78ff.), there was no good reason for anyone to make up the reference to Darius by name, hence there is no good reason for deleting it. In fact, I should not be surprised if at some much later date there existed a stele showing the King's Peace as made with King Darius: Arrian twice

refers to it this way (2.1.4; 2.2: see Bosworth's *Commentary ad loc.*), and I think it unlikely that he made it up. It should, however, be pointed out that Pausanias (1.8.2) knew of a peace that Callias had made for the Greeks with Artaxerxes son of Xerxes. It is not impossible that the fourth-century prescript mentioned both the original peace and its renewal under Darius: as we can see from the Themistocles stele, there was no economy of words in these documents, and Theopompus (and even less the rhetor quoting his comment) had no reason to quote what he saw in full: such pedantry would not have suited his style, or his purpose. (See Wade-Gery, *HSCP Supplement I* (1940) 127 for a different suggestion.)

The phrase regarding the Hellenes undoubtedly needs emendation or deletion. Again, Connor noted that it is difficult to see how it could be a gloss (or on what), hence how it could have been erroneously added to the text. Emendation is therefore preferable. Of the various proposals known to me, the only one worth entertaining is Jacoby's περὶ Ἑλλήνων. (Alternatively, perhaps ὑπὲρ Ἑλλήνων, frequently found in such contexts.) For the idea, see Pausanias (*l.c.*) [Callias] πρὸς Ἀρταξέρξην . . . τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἔπραξε τὴν εἰρήνην. Pausanias, incidentally, says that he heard this version from "most Athenians": he does not say what the minority told him (perhaps Xerxes or Darius?).

56. See Thuc. 8.18, 37, 58 for the three treaties. Even if they are not all formal international documents fully sworn to, they are (at least as drafts) fully comparable with our treaty. (My rendering preserves the reference to cities and territory.) The importance of the prescripts was noted (perhaps for the first time) by Andrewes in his commentary, in A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, and K. J. Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides V* (Oxford 1981) 140. But he did not make the connection here attempted.

57. For a full narrative exposition and political analysis of the treaties, see Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, ch. 4. I have here taken out some points of interest for my purpose, but my formulation is not identical with his.

58. Lewis (p. 104) suggests that he appears in the treaty as "a visiting representative of the King." This seems unlikely, both because of his mention in the Lycian text (cited by Lewis) and because we must surely assume that the others mentioned have permanent posts in Asia Minor: indeed, in two cases we know this. Had he been a special representative, this ought to be somehow indicated, and he ought not to appear (as he does) between the regular satraps. It is best to admit that he had a position that we cannot define, owing to our ignorance of Achaemenid administration.

59. He cannot be fitted into the known stemma of the family with any approach to certainty. It is difficult to believe that he should be identical with the Artabazus somewhat earlier (477) known to have been based on Dascylium (Thuc. 1.129.1: appointed there to negotiate with Pausanias), even though Lewis identifies them without any discussion (p. 52). That Artabazus, son of Pharnaces, was a senior commander in Xerxes' invasion, a man even then "of much renown among the Persians" (Hdt. 7.66; 8.126), who led the remnants of the army in its hazardous retreat after Plataea. He is not likely to have been in active command in 449.

60. See pp. 58–60.

61. See, e.g., Thompson (cit. n. 39) 171. It should be added, however, that Aristodemus is the one who (oddly enough) seems to have recorded (from Ephorus, as we have suggested) the most precise version of the geographical points named. He gives the *Fahrtgrenze* “for the Persians” (a phrase that is also precise and, as we have seen, correct—though often ignored by scholars) as the Cyaneae, the Nessus River, Phaselis in Pamphylia, and the Chelidonian Islands. No one else mentions the Nessus, or any river that can reasonably be got out of it by emendation, anywhere near the mouth of the Bosphorus, as it presumably has to be (since the places are neatly divided into two pairs: one in the north and one in the south—again a point missed by distinguished scholars, who wanted to misidentify the Cyaneae). Thus no one could have made it up, even though we (not at all surprisingly) cannot identify it. (It is certainly not the well-known river in Thrace, but homonymity in rivers is common.) The precision of Aristodemus at this point must be borne in mind in any discussion of the peace of 449/8.

62. If it was still necessary to give a formal refutation of Gomme’s ill-starred attempt to deny the plain meaning of Isocrates, that task was elaborately and definitively performed by Thompson (cit. n. 39) 173.

63. The definition of what was a Greek city would not be easy, since many cities were of mixed population. It might depend on who did the judging, and for what purpose. Thus the “Greekness” of Aspendus, often doubted by scholars (especially in connection with Alexander the Great’s treatment of it), has been strikingly confirmed, from a friendly point of view, by the Argive decree honoring the Aspendians as συγγενεῖς, published by R. S. Stroud in *Hesperia* 53 (1984) 193–216 (text at p. 195) and dated by him around 300 B.C. Hence a precise enumeration seems a preferable hypothesis. The number concerned was not such as to make it impossible.

64. See Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.25, which should have been true at an earlier time. Thompson gives various reasons that might have prompted Isocrates to omit any reference to autonomy, but not the obvious and striking one (as I think it) implied in the text above. See also *Suda* s.v. Κίμων, quoted p. 23 above.

65. See, in general, Andrewes (cit. n. 52) 15ff.; Meiggs, *Athenian Empire* 148ff. The explanation is still sometimes missed; thus Thompson ([cit. n. 37] 171) calls this item a “wild exaggeration.” Yet note that it is mentioned by Isocrates both in the *Areopagiticus* (80) in the 350s and, near the end of his life, in the *Panathenaicus* (59). Presumably no one, during this time, had consulted the stele and contradicted him.

66. See Andrewes in Gomme et al., *HCT* V 16ff., with recent bibliography. Andrewes convincingly refutes some attempts at alternative explanations—advanced (I suspect) chiefly in an attempt to circumvent the obvious implication of the correct interpretation in confirming the authenticity of a peace treaty between Athens and the Persians.

67. I assume (as is generally assumed) that the satrap would be personally responsible for the tribute due to the King from his province, even though I do not know of any positive evidence for this. It fits in with the Persian conception of government in terms of personal relations within a hierarchic system.

68. I have discussed this in *Georgica: Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* Supplement 58 (1991) 38 with n. 28. This helps to explain why the King could not be asked to swear to one of his edicts: nothing would have been gained by such an oath.

69. See, e.g., Thuc. 2.67 (cf. Hdt. 7.137); 4.50.

70. Thuc. 8.56.4. For a defense of the reading of C (ἐαυτῶν) see M. S. Goldstein, "Athenian-Persian Peace Treaties," *CSCA* 7 (1974) 155–64. Against, see the strong linguistic arguments in *HCTV ad loc.*, by Dover and Andrewes. They also point out the isolated sense that the reading of C would yield, as compared with the historical plausibility of the sense yielded by the better-attested reading. We may note that the demands to which the Athenians were willing to submit had (as reported by Thucydides) concerned only the Ionian cities and the offshore islands: the better-attested reading fits in with these demands, but not with a request concerning Attica.

71. The views here collected have been presented, in various partial forms, in lectures given from Princeton to Perth and from Marburg to Melbourne, ever since I first advanced the basic outline at the University of California at Berkeley in 1975, to a large and helpful audience. As a result, I can no longer acknowledge the numerous individual suggestions which helped me in clarifying my ideas. In the particular form here submitted, however, the argument was first presented in a paper read to the Oxford Philological Society, and later at the Institute of Classical Studies in London, in the spring of 1985. The former occasion was followed, until late at night, by vigorous discussion, the impact of which will perhaps be recognized by some of those who contributed, although I suspect that neither they nor I have ended up by changing our basic opinions. The article was drafted in the ideal environment of Oxford, which I owed to the kindness of St. John's College and, in particular, to Nicholas Purcell. It forms part of the work done while I was on a leave partly supported by the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation. To those generous patrons, as well as to the unfailing courtesy of the staff of the Ashmolean Library, I owe gratitude that must at least be expressed, though it cannot be repaid. Last, but not least, I am grateful to the editor of the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, who accepted a work that had become ὑπερφυῆς μεγέθει, ingeniously fitted it into his limited space, and put up uncomplainingly with my revisions of the typescript.

72. P. J. Stylianou, "The Untenability of Peace with Persia in the 460s B.C.," in *Μελεταὶ καὶ Ὑπομνήματα* of the Archbishop Makarios III Foundation II (Nicosia 1989) 339–71. He writes as a member of the Foundation. I am grateful to Dr. Stylianou for sending me an offprint, just in time for it to be of use for this volume.

73. Note, e.g., his rejection as having "little to recommend it" of a very reasonable view by Meiggs (see p. 68 below); worse still, his comment that Paul Friedländer's argument, in his excellent linguistic and literary discussion of the Cyprus epigram (*SIFC* 15 [1938] 102ff.), is "all but nonsensical"—when he does not seem to have understood it.

74. This becomes striking in his treatment of Aristides. The orator refers to the περὶ Κύπρον καὶ Παμφυλίαν ναυμαχαὶ καὶ πεζομαχαὶ καὶ ὁ πολὺς δρόμος. The last phrase (correctly translated by S., following Behr in the Loeb

edition, as “the long race” between Cyprus and Eurymedon) conclusively shows that what he had before him was a version that took Cimon to Cyprus and back on the very day of the Eurymedon battle. (Whether that version included the disguise in the enemies’ uniforms we do not know: if he knew of this, it would have been inappropriate for an encomium of Athens.) But S. wants the passage to refer to a knowledge of two different campaigns, that of the Eurymedon in the 460s and that of Cyprus in 450/49. His only argument appears to be the plural nouns, which are simply due to the fact that, in the tradition, there are indeed two naval battles (and one could not easily have grammatically linked them to one land battle), and the well-known rhetorical figure of using plural for singular for simple rhetorical enhancement. (On the version concerned see below.)

75. This, as is generally recognized, is why the tradition later transformed the Cyprian victories into victories by land and sea won by Cimon before his death—a distortion helped, as I have suggested, by the fact that in each case a peace with Persia followed the victory, and the first was clearly remembered as “made by Cimon.” For the festival, revealed to us by Plutarch, see E. Badian and J. Buckler, “The Wrong Salamis?” *RhM* n.s. 118 (1975) 226–39. Although neither of the authors would by now hold to every detail of that exposition, I still regard our summing up (p. 237) as correct: “The first Salamis, and even Eurymedon, though great victories, had failed to dispose of the King’s fleets for more than a few years, while the men on Cyprus had won what for historical purposes one may call the final victory in that long war.” This is certainly what contemporary Athenians thought.

76. On the text see (briefly) below. It can be conveniently consulted in Page’s *Epigrammata Graeca*. (Page, incidentally, has no hesitation in accepting the traditional explanation.)

77. That view was fully developed by Eduard Meyer in his *Forschungen zur Alten Geschichte* II (Halle a. S. 1899) 7ff.

78. See nn. 74 and 75 above. Aristides, for further rhetorical effect, has the action off Cyprus fought “in the Egyptian Sea”—but he was not in the least concerned with real-life distances.

79. See Friedländer, cit. n. 73 above. S.’s denigration of Friedländer is a blot on his article. (“What is unacceptable is Friedländer’s opinion that the epigram graced a monument set up after the Cyprus expedition to celebrate the conclusion of the whole war. Indeed, with ἐν Κύπρῳ in line 5 the suggestion is all but nonsensical.”) In fact, after analysis of the solemnity of the language and especially of the final words, Friedländer concludes that this exceptional format (an epigram running to four distichs) was chosen to mark an exceptional occasion (p. 107): “So steht am Ende des Gedichtes, das den Abschluß jahrzehntelangen Ringens bezeichnet, das feierliche Wort für die siegreiche Entscheidung; . . . [p. 108] *Die Schlacht bei Cypern war oder sollte erscheinen als das Ende des jahrzehntelangen Ringens zwischen Griechen und Persern*” (my emphasis). In the light of this clear exposition it is surely Stylianou’s statement that might be regarded as “all but nonsensical.” It is based on regrettable haste in reading a great scholar’s work. (Friedländer’s essay is reprinted in his posthumously pub-

lished collection *Studien zur antiken Literatur und Kunst* [Berlin 1969] 222–27.) It may be worth noting that, in the very year in which this essay appeared in Italy (Friedländer was not allowed to publish in Germany), he was arrested and deported to Sachsenhausen, which he fortunately survived.

80. Plutarch, collecting various opinions as to Themistocles' arrival in Asia and Persia, names Ephorus among those who date his arrival while Xerxes was still alive. As I pointed out (see n. 12 above), if this refers to his arrival in Ionia (at Cyme, so Plutarch records!), it does not necessarily contradict the statement of Thucydides that, by the time Themistocles wrote a letter to Susa from somewhere inland, Artaxerxes was on the throne. Aristodemus dates his arrival in "Persia" under Artaxerxes and seems to confuse Persia with Asia in his condensation. We cannot be sure that he contradicted Ephorus on this. S. was right, of course, in finding my error in overlooking Aristodemus' report on Eurymedon reprehensible. But I do not understand why he thinks it important to my case. From that point of view, it is trivial, since it merely brings one epitomator into line with the other (Diodorus). I cannot see S.'s other "differences" between Aristodemus and the presumed Ephorus.

81. See my original comments, p. 24 above.

82. After profiting by Sparta's discomfiture in the great earthquake and destroying their pro-Spartan neighbor Mycenae, they saw (probably in 467: see p. 212 n. 44) Sparta regain control of all of Laconia and most of Messenia, and a demonstration of solid Athenian support for Sparta. By the time they heard of Artaxerxes' accession, they were unlikely to wait long before reinforcing the link with Persia, which was now their only source of support. In fact, if we may speculate, it is not impossible that they had decided to approach Xerxes and were prevented only by his death. It seems extremely unlikely that, at a time when they could not possibly foresee the quarrel between Athens and Sparta, which was to give them unhoped-for protection a few years later, they omitted this obvious diplomatic step that might relieve their isolation.

83. S.'s treatment of the naval sweeps by Ephialtes and Pericles (see p. 14 above for their importance) deserves brief mention (his p. 348). He cannot deny that Ephialtes' belongs before the man's death in 461; but he puts Pericles' "probably in 440," with a reference only to two modern writers (on Lewis see n. 17 above) and no discussion—rather cursory treatment for crucial evidence.

CHAPTER 2

Toward a Chronology of the Pentecontaetia down to the Renewal of the Peace of Callias

It is not my aim to give an extensive bibliography, in a field where so much has been written over so many years. The old masters (Busolt, Meyer, Beloch) are still worth reading. Among many more recent articles, I have learned a great deal from a few, and would here like to acknowledge the following debts, some to recognized classics, some to work unaccountably neglected.

From N. G. L. Hammond, "Studies in Greek Chronology of the Sixth and

Fifth Centuries B.C.," *Historia* 4 (1955) 371–81, I first learned to take Plutarch's report of two Athenian expeditions in connection with the Messenian Revolt seriously (it is a pity that that article was not included in the author's collection *Studies in Greek History* [Oxford 1973]).

From Raphael Sealey's note "The Great Earthquake in Lacedaemon," *Historia* 6 (1957) 368–71, I learned the correct and inescapable meaning of Thucydides' phrase ὑπὸ τοῦ γενομένου σεισμοῦ (1.101.2), and first saw that there could be a reasonable chronology on that basis (see his pp. 370ff.).

From Mary E. White, "Some Agiad Dates," *JHS* 84 (1964) 140–52, I learned that the death of Pausanias ought to be put later (she suggested 467/6) rather than about 470; and I was confirmed in thinking that, contrary to what had recently become fashionable, more than one campaign might be put in a given year (see her p. 148).

Mabel L. Lang, "A Note on Ithome," *GRBS* 8 (1967) 267–73, memorably made this important point (p. 268) by saying that events do not "occur like beads on a string"; in particular, she noted that the siege of Naxos may have gone on for more than one season, so that, if its outbreak precedes Eurymedon, its end need not (p. 271); above all, she seems to have been the first to see that Thucydides tells us nothing about the date of the disaster of Drabescus, but merely finishes off the story he has begun (pp. 269ff.)—an important point that seems to have been overlooked since.

C. W. Fornara, "Some Aspects of the Career of Pausanias of Sparta," *Historia* 15 (1966) 257–71, showed, perhaps for the first time in the English-speaking tradition, that Justin's story of Pausanias' seven years' stay at Byzantium after his return from Sparta must be taken seriously and is not contradicted by other reliable evidence; this seems to have been generally accepted by German scholars, from at least Meyer (*Forschungen zur Alten Geschichte* [Halle a. S. 1899] 132) to H. Schaefer, *RE* 18 (1949) 2572 ff.—but without much serious investigation, such as Fornara provided.

Finally one must mention that excellent Mary White thesis by Philip Deane, *Thucydides' Dates, 465–431 B.C.* (Don Mills, Ont. 1972), which sketches a way of reading Thucydides in the light of probability and without making him say what he does not.

I shall not repeat these references when I come to the problems listed above, and I shall not explicitly state the limits of my agreement with these various scholars, or particular points of disagreement, since I am chiefly concerned to state my own case in the light of the texts. I merely wanted to acknowledge the principal obligations of which I am conscious. Nor shall I refer to numerous other articles, in which I sometimes found little to learn or to agree with, unless a specific reference seems to me to be needed.

1. All references in this form will be to chapters and sections in Book 1 of Thucydides. References to other books of Thucydides and to other authors will be given in full.

2. I regard the late date of Book 1, at least as we have it, as one of the few

reasonably assured points in the old “Thucydides problem” (which I do not propose to discuss). As Eduard Meyer already thought (*Kleine Schriften* II [Halle a. S. 1924] 280), it is surely “über jeden Zweifel erhaben.” That the excursus on the Pentecontaetia is an insertion can be made probable in various ways. First, 89–118.2 could be excised, without disadvantage and with some profit, since 88 is not wholly consistent with 118.2 (the deciding motive there being the Athenians’ interference with Sparta’s allies) as they stand. Also, note that Pericles is formally introduced before his great speech (139.4), where he was presumably intended to appear for the first time, with powerful artistic effect. However, he appears with no annotation in 111.2; 114 (twice); and three times in the Samian War (116–17), as well as in 127.1—the story of the “curse” which serves as an introduction to the Pausanias-Themistocles excursus, again clearly an insertion. (In this case matters are more complicated, since we must assume that the curse, on each side, was briefly explained. But the duplicate explanation of Pericles’ position at 127.3, anticipating the artistically necessary and effective one at 139.4, shows that 127.3 is an addition in its present form.)

3. Cf. 20.1 and 22; and see further below.

4. See Jacoby, *FGrHist* IIIb Supplement I, pp. 2ff. (esp. 5–6); and see further n. 7 below.

5. For further development of this see Chapter 4 below.

6. This chronological indication has usually been misinterpreted. For full argument see my discussion pp. 7ff. above. Ron Unz, *CQ* n.s. 36 (1986) 70, argues that Naxos and Eurymedon cannot be in any sense contemporaneous, since Cimon could not have sailed to Asia Minor “while powerful Naxos was still holding out in his rear.” This seems to show lack of appreciation of some basic facts. Once the Naxian fleet had been put out of action, as that of Thasos was, and the land forces shut up within the city, with a siege wall completed from sea to sea, only a few ships and a screening force on land were needed to maintain an effective siege: indeed, a larger force would merely involve additional expense and difficulty over supplies. (At Thasos, a large part of the forces must have been detached to help the new colony founded during the siege.) It is difficult to believe that the Eurymedon campaign preceded the siege of Naxos *and that Thucydides knew it* (which is really all we can argue about). See further pp. 76–78 and n. 12 below.

7. Kurt v. Fritz, *Die griechische Geschichtsschreibung* I (Berlin 1967) ch. 6, building on what Jacoby had suggested, makes Hellanicus the first to attempt to set out the whole of Athenian history under archon years, going back to the beginning of the official list of archons. As far as I can see, this theory is based on two references (*FGrHist* 4 F 171–72) to adjacent archon years during the Peloponnesian War, which will hardly bear the weight of that construction. (Cic. *De or.* 2.51 ff. refers only to style and is irrelevant.) On the other hand, that the point of Thucydides’ objection to his lack of *akribeia* in the Pentecontaetia may have been (if I understand the argument correctly) that Hellanicus tried to attach archon dates to events where Thucydides knew it could not be done may

well be in part correct. However, we do not *know* of any events in this period (or indeed in most of what survives of his history of Athens) to which Hellanicus attached archon dates.

8. Although I am prepared to believe that Thucydides might distort mere facts for the sake of his main thesis, I think that J. H. Schreiner, "Anti-Thukydidean Studies in the Pentekontaetia," *SO* 51 (1976) 19-63, and "More Anti-Thukydidean Studies in the Pentekontaetia," *SO* 52 (1977) 19-38, goes much too far in charging Thucydides with wholesale omission and rearrangement of dates without any really adequate motivation, and in preferring the chronology he disengages from Ctesias (not a very trustworthy author) and later tradition. He fails to comment on the confusion in the oral tradition on the events of the Pentecontaetia that can be demonstrated by about 400 (see below), or to note the connection of one of his preferred chronological items (the Eurymedon campaign under Artaxerxes—deliberately misdated by Thucydides!) with plain myth. See next note, with text, and, for my own view on Thucydides' polemical treatment of this period, Chapter 4 below.

9. I hope to have established this. (See pp. 22ff. above.) I must, however, retract the statement that Aristodemus omits the battle of the Eurymedon: see p. 201 n. 80 above. My point that such major chronological confusion cannot properly be ascribed to Ephorus still stands. Aristodemus may here have contaminated Ephorus (whom he uses later, and indeed in much of his work) with another source, since he explicitly reports Themistocles' arrival at Susa after Xerxes' death (10.4), whereas Ephorus was one of those said to have reported an interview with Xerxes (Plut. *Them.* 27.1: if Plutarch's list of sources is complete, it would follow that Aristodemus here used Charon of Lampsacus). But see p. 7 with n. 12 and p. 67 above.

10. By Schreiner, "Anti-Thukydidean Studies."

11. Meyer, *Forschungen* II, 132. On some implications of this, see pp. 62-64 above.

12. Composition and artistic presentation were obviously important considerations for Thucydides. If one wanted to argue that the battle of the Eurymedon preceded the siege of Naxos and he knew it, yet deliberately reverses that order in his reference to the two events (for that suggestion see Unz, cited n. 6 above), one would do best to invoke a compositional argument: had he mentioned Eurymedon before Naxos, to which (as the first of the revolts) he had to attach his general consideration of revolts (ch. 99), he would have had to report the revolt of Naxos, insert the general chapter, and then proceed to the revolt of Thasos as his next item, which would not have been aesthetically satisfactory. Still, I do not think this sufficient motivation for his deliberately reversing the order in which he mentions the two events, which he describes as essentially contemporaneous.

13. The oracle, which Thucydides tells us had been given to the Spartans at an earlier time, was presumably among the collection kept by the kings. Since it speaks of "the suppliant [singular] of Ithomean Zeus," it was clearly intended for a man (perhaps an escaped Messenian helot) who had sought refuge at the altar of the god. Its application to the Messenian army that had defended the

mountain no doubt helped to save face. This, of course, does not exclude genuine belief at the time.

14. All this is clearly set out, with the full evidence quoted and discussed, in M. W. Stolper, "The Death of Artaxerxes I," *Arch. Mitt. aus Iran* 16 (1983) 223–36. D. M. Lewis had been suspicious about Meyer's hypothesis, but, not knowing all the Babylonian evidence, had accepted it in *Sparta and Persia* (Leiden 1977).

15. That general books on Thucydides appear at the rate of about one a year does not require demonstration. As in many other cases, it is easier to write another book of general interpretation than to do detailed and laborious work, which alone would make such interpretations genuinely valid and useful. That there is a dearth of work of the latter kind is unfortunately easy enough to demonstrate, in one striking instance. Nearly a century ago, Friedrich Hultsch (editor, grammarian, and metrologist) published a series of major studies entitled *Die erzählenden Zeitformen bei Polybios* (ASAW 13 [1893] 1–210, 347–468; 14 [1894] 1–100: occasionally obtainable bound together as a book). It is a classic of stylistic investigation and an essential tool for understanding Hellenistic prose—presumably helpful for Classical prose as well, since superficial observation confirms the existence of some of the phenomena he noted. But there is still no such work on Thucydides, whose "erzählende Zeitformen" are often cheerfully interpreted in its absence by those who write about him.

16. It is only a footnote that informs the reader of the reason for the remarkable uncertainty as to what the scholiast supports, namely that he in fact gives 453/2: Unz, art. cit. (n. 6), 71, with n. 19, which simply states that the scholiast's date "is apparently an error either for Lysistratos . . . , Lysanias . . . , or Lysitheos . . ." The "apparently" is not explained, nor is there any comment on the odd "fact" that the date gathered from Thucydides is "apparently" supported by the scholiast on only one of these three emendations, and contradicted on either of the others even if one chooses to emend.

17. Listed by Unz.

18. T. Lenschau, *Bursians Jahresbericht* 253 (1936) 128.

19. It is highly relevant that an earlier attempt to settle a colony in the area, at Eion on the coast, had been prevented by the Thracians, apparently even before the site was fortified to the necessary strength: compare the disaster at Eion, listed in the same Aeschines scholia under Phaedon (476/5), with Plutarch's statement, in praise of Cimon, that his capture of Eion (which should be put in the year 477/6) opened up a rich area for Athenian colonization (*Cim.* 7.3). The precedent was bound to be in the minds of the settlers of a neighboring site a few years later. (A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* I [Oxford 1945] 297, sees the difficulty, but his attempt to meet it is implausible.)

20. Benjamin Isaac, *The Greek Settlements in Thrace until the Macedonian Conquest* (Leiden 1986) 29–30, with bibliography; accepted (most recently) by Eugene N. Borza, "Some Toponym Problems in Eastern Macedonia," *AHB* 3 (1989), with further bibliography, at n. 11 (pp. 63–64). Borza calls this view "virtually certain" and adoption of the older view "inexplicable."

21. That the casualty list *IG* I² 928 refers to losses at Drabescus (thus still D. W. Bradeen, *Hesperia* 36 [1976] 321ff.: “only Drabescus will fit”) was shown to be impossible by R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1972) 416. For purely technical reasons this fighting must be earlier. The obvious suggestion is that it relates to the initial victory over the Thracians when the colony was founded, to which several of our sources refer: this is made even more likely by the addition of Eion as one of the places where fighting took place. (Isaac’s suggestion regarding this is overcomplicated.) The fighting at Sigeum, also recorded on the same list, is contemporary, but has nothing to do with the colony at Ennea Hodoi: it is probably an attack on (or defense against) an entirely different group of Thracians.

22. On which see Isaac, *Greek Settlements* 63.

23. That the commander in the disastrous battle was named Leagrus is proved by Herodotus and Pausanias. As we have noted, the name is corrupt in the scholiast referring to the battle: he perhaps meant to write Leogoras, a more common name. Now, strictly speaking, it may be maintained that there were two battles—one under Leagrus, known from all the sources we have surveyed (including Pausanias and the monument he saw), the other, an equally great disaster, under Leogoras, and known only from the scholiast, who however happens to omit the notorious disaster in his list. I am not aware that this view has yet been held in this form, though it comes close to Gomme’s and Isaac’s idea that there were two disastrous battles, which we have seen is difficult to believe. It may be as well to point out that, in this instance, emendation is a necessary answer in order to avoid producing nonsense. (It should also be noted that one of the MSS is reported to read Λεαγόρου.) Emendation of the archon’s name to one close to the foundation of the colony, however, will (as I have tried to make clear) have the opposite effect, of changing good sense to historical improbability.

24. Justin 9.1.3 describes Byzantium as *condita primo a Pausania*. The old emendation *capta* for *condita* is rightly now rejected, since Orosius, *Hist., adv. Pag.* 3.13, and Isid. *Etym.* 15.1.42 confirm the transmitted reading. *Primo* is an error, of course—no doubt Justin’s own interpretation of what he found in Trogus, who is less likely to have made this egregious mistake. (Isidorus has *primum*, no doubt from Justin.) But the statement that Pausanias was the “founder” of Byzantium is indeed highly plausible. The apparently rather elaborate explanation by Lehmann-Haupt (cited in *RE* 18 [1949] 2572ff.) is not needed. Especially in the view of the fact that Pausanias later established himself in Byzantium, the fact that he had liberated the city from the Persians would suffice to earn him that honor: compare the supersession of Hagnon by Brasidas at Amphipolis, once he had liberated the city from Athenian control and confirmed his own control. There is (incidentally) no reason to doubt that, whatever the truth of the stories of Pausanias’ affronts to the citizens during his brief first stay, the city freely admitted him when he returned with his single trireme. His presence may well have been regarded as a safeguard against enrollment in the Athenians’ new league. However, the recognition as *ktistes* must be due to the initial liberation. We should therefore count the seven years from his first

capture of the city, despite the brief absence due to his being summoned to Sparta for trial. (It can only have amounted to a few months at most. On this see W. T. Loomis, *Historia* 39 [1990] 487ff.)

25. Diodorus' statement that the Spartans were considering war against Athens in order to regain their lost *prostasia* and were dissuaded by one Hetoemaridas (11.50) may be elaborated in detail and is presumably put in the wrong year (475/4, when there was no reason for any such challenge), but that this picture of serious division of opinion within Sparta is formed around a kernel of truth should be obvious. It has been plausibly suggested—as far as I know, first by Mabel Lang, *CJ* 63 (1967) 79ff.—that a party at Sparta favored Pausanias' attempt to gain the King's support as a possible ally against Athens, but that that party lost power, so that Pausanias was conspicuously exposed as a scapegoat for their policy. The debate in Diodorus under 475/4 is probably connected with this. But even if we take that debate as marking the downfall of Pausanias' supporters, Sparta's abandonment of him cannot be dated as early as this: the date remains puzzling. Much of the consistent support for Pausanias must have come from Spartans who felt that he was right to have reasserted Sparta's claim. An armed attempt to expel him from Byzantium when he had never been officially disowned or recalled (no matter how he had got there) would have been seen as a major confrontation.

For a bibliography of some views on Pausanias, see Frank J. Frost, *Plutarch's Themistocles* (Princeton, N.J. 1980) 195–96, with notes. (It will be clear from my discussion in the text that I cannot accept Frost's own chronology of Themistocles' ostracism and exile.)

26. Diod. 5.1.4, implying that each book dealt with a single topic. This has been taken as the basis of all reconstructions of Ephorus' work. See G. L. Barber, *The Historian Ephorus* (Cambridge 1935), esp. chs. 1 and 2, with discussion of earlier treatments (including Schwartz and Jacoby). The conclusion sometimes drawn from this, that Ephorus wrote entirely without dating anything and that Diodorus had to make up all the dates that he gives us himself, clearly goes absurdly beyond the evidence and is in itself highly implausible. He probably dated (by Athenian archons) some crucial events in each of his connected topical accounts, if we may judge by Diodorus' technique sketched in the text. (And cf. n. 28 below.)

27. See especially W. G. Forrest, "Themistokles and Argos," *CQ* n.s. 10 (1960) 221–41, with mistaken chronology. Note, however, the warnings of M. Wörrle, *Untersuchungen zur Verfassungsgeschichte von Argos im 5. Jahrhundert vor Christus* (Diss. Erlangen-Nürnberg 1964) 120–22, showing the great uncertainty surrounding most of the evidence and the highly speculative nature of all such theories.

28. For details of my views on the chronology of Themistocles' arrival and stay in Asia, see pp. 6–7, 88–89 above. Unz (cit. n. 6 above) 68 once again may be taken as representative of the *communis opinio*, claiming to illustrate "Diodorus' *chronological blunders* . . . by a single example from this period. The single archon year of 471/0 is given over wholly to the narrative of the latter years of Themistokles . . . a span of perhaps twenty years" (my emphasis). He,

and those scholars whose views he repeats, would do better to read what Diodorus actually has to say on this excursus and in it, and try to understand what Diodorus tells us he is doing—an explanation that must be applied to his technique on similar occasions.

29. See pp. 24–25 ff. above, with notes.

30. I have discussed this pervasive aim of his in Chapter 4 below.

31. To repeat summarily what is developed in Chapter 4, the story of the promise to Thasos is implausible because it must have been well known (to the Thasians among others) that the Spartans could not carry out such a promise on their own. Even if we ignore the machinery of the Peloponnesian League, as we see it working in 440 and again in 431, it had been obvious ever since Cleomenes that Sparta's ability to act against Athens depended on Corinthian cooperation; and that could not be taken for granted. (Thucydides does not report the slight friction between Corinth and Cimon of which we hear in Plutarch.) What is meant by καὶ ἔμελλον is totally obscure: were they about to consult the allies? or to call out the ban? or are we still merely talking about a genuine intention? The vague phrase fits in well with the rest of this story.

32. For a striking instance of this, see the article by D. W. Reece, "The Date of the Fall of Ithome," *JHS* 82 (1962) 111–20, where (116–17) an attempt is made to refute Sealey, so as (i.a.) to be able to accept the promise to Thasos, which Sealey rejected. It is opined that the phrase ὑπὸ τοῦ γενομένου σεισμοῦ should mean "by the occurrence of the famous earthquake"—which shows, at the least, that the author had not read Sealey's argument, which demonstrates precisely that it cannot mean that. (The author also calls the theory of two expeditions by Cimon "a desperate remedy"—using the strong language, in lieu of argument, characteristic of the fundamentalist who sees his beliefs under attack.) This unfortunately needed setting out, as that article has sometimes been referred to with praise and agreement by those who share the author's attitude.

33. It should perhaps be explicitly stated, to prevent misunderstanding, that ἐν ᾧ cannot have σεισμοῦ as an antecedent and mean that the helots (etc.) went to Ithome during the course of the earthquake. The phrase must have its usual meaning as a temporal conjunction.

34. It is just possible that if he knew of Cimon's two expeditions (as I am suggesting), he omitted the first one not only because the whole of the first phase of the revolt was irrelevant to his point, but because it would perhaps have been too much to expect his readers to believe the hypertrophy of Spartan villainy suggested by framing the promise to Thasos between two Athenian expeditions to aid Sparta. However, the purely compositional motive suggested in the text, and fully in line with Thucydides' normal practice, suffices to explain the omission, though perhaps not the trace of ambiguity that has misled so many of his modern readers.

35. That τεichoμαχεῖν means "to assault walls (or fortifications)"—not, as it is surprisingly often rendered, "to besiege" (or variants)—is clear from all the occurrences of the verb in Thucydides and from its one use, plus two of the noun

τειχομαχίῃ, in Herodotus. The mistake over the meaning of the verb leads to failure to understand this whole episode.

36. The latter is the suggestion of L. H. Jeffery, "The Battle of Oinoe in the Stoa Poikile," *ABSA* 60 (1965) 50–57: asking some useful questions, and drawing attention to various interesting details, but not to be followed in her suggestion that Pausanias misreported the painting. There is little doubt, surely, that the paintings were properly inscribed. Of course, it could be argued that the mistake was official and had arisen during the centuries between the original painting and the time when Pausanias saw the picture. But it would have to be explained why an error should produce an otherwise totally unknown battle. It is also difficult to suggest (and she did not try to do so) what mythical battle would be depicted in the form of two lines of hoplites approaching each other, which is what the painting actually showed.

The idea that it is in fact the great battle of Oenophyta, which certainly deserved commemoration (we have seen that it is one of only two cases in which Thucydides found an exact interval in days remembered; and Diodorus indulges in a splendid piece of ecphrasis over this battle (11.82), explaining why he thinks it a greater feat than Marathon or Plataea, but with characteristic confusion in his actual account of the campaign)—that idea was, according to Meiggs (see next note), first advanced by a certain Löwy; however, its principal proponent, usually cited for it, was Meyer's pupil H. E. Stier, in an essay separately published and entitled *Eine Grosstat der attischen Geschichte. Die sog. Schlacht bei "Oenoë"* (Stuttgart 1934). His view aroused fierce controversy and gained prominence, and some acceptance, by the chance that it was picked up and endorsed by Lenschau in his survey of 1936 (see n. 18 above), though it was rejected by several reviewers, including Taeger. It is certainly at first sight an attractive solution. But as propounded, it involves a mass of improbabilities in detail, especially regarding Pausanias' supposed confusion. First, a battle he explicitly locates near Argos has to be transferred to Boeotia; next, the enemy whom Pausanias calls Spartans have to become Boeotians; finally (since the Argive dedication also has to be accommodated) the Argives have to be made to assist the Athenians at Oenophyta (for which there is no evidence), instead of (as they claimed at Delphi) having been assisted by an Athenian contingent in their own territory. The idea was therefore forgotten, but was bound to be revived, and now has been: by J. Busche, in the second of two studies, entitled "Untersuchungen zur Oinoe-Schlacht des Pausanias," published as a convolute in the series *Studienreihe Humanitas* (Frankfurt am Main 1974). He adds the further "proof" that Pausanias, when actually describing Oenoe in the Argolid, does not say a word about the battle. He does not seem to be aware of the fact that this is quite common in Pausanias; thus in his long description of Tanagra (9.20–22) he has not a word about the great battle, which he reports elsewhere. But we shall return to Stier.

37. Meiggs, *Athenian Empire*, devotes an appendix (Appendix 5: pp. 469–72) to this battle, collecting the various views on its date and nature, and showing the improbabilities in Jeffery's view in particular. Busolt's idea (see Meiggs

470) that the battle may go together with the capture of Troezen (also absent from Thucydides' account, though undoubtedly a major achievement) and would thus fall in the year after Tolmides' *periplous* is attractive: there is something to be said for a date after Tanagra. But it does not explain the (to us) paradoxical importance attached to the battle.

For newly found remains identified with the Stoa Poikile see T. Leslie Shear Jr. in *Hesperia* 53 (1984) 5ff. (chronology 13ff.): the remains fit in with the literary tradition, dating the building around mid-century. (Deposits dating from the second quarter of the century were used as a building fill.) He also gives the most recent opinions on the nature and placing of the paintings.

38. It is a separate question, of course, whether the original paintings survived, even in "restored" form, for the millennium from the time when they were first displayed to the time, just before the visit to Synesius (see, conveniently, Shear's account, cited last note), when they were removed. But this does not seem to be relevant to the problem of the battle of Oenoe.

39. E. D. Francis and Michael Vickers, "Argive Oenoe," *AC* 54 (1985) 105–15; cf. *ABSA* 80 (1985) 99–113. (I shall not deal with the latter article, since it will be clear that I think the authors' approach mistaken in method.) They conjecture that Pausanias was mistaken in his interpretation of the painting and that it in fact goes closely with the depiction of Marathon, showing the approach of the Plataean force to meet the Athenians. They admit (p. 106) that, if this is so, Pausanias' unquestioning acceptance of what he records for us is puzzling. As I have mentioned, I cannot believe that the battle, and the two armies, did not bear labels identifying them: nothing else can account for Pausanias' certainty. They compare the doubts about the scene of two armies about to meet, on the "chest of Cypselus" at Olympia, where (so Pausanias says) one could conjecture either a friendly or a hostile meeting, and he was given both accounts (5.18.6). But there were clearly no labels there (even though "most" figures on the chest had them, *boustrophedon*: 5.17.6), since the identities of the armies were in doubt. There was no such doubt in the Stoa at Athens. Moreover, the actual scenes must have differed: whereas on the chest Pausanias reports the armies "approaching" each other, in the Stoa they were shown—not at the height of the action (so he stresses), but with the battle (already) starting and the armies about to come to blows (*ἀρχομένη τε ἡ μάχη καὶ ἐς χεῖρας ἔτι συνιόντες*): the picture itself must have excluded the interpretation attempted by Francis and Vickers. (The merits of their article are acknowledged in my text.)

40. I shall normally give the main references and try not to clutter the page with late reports of no independent value. Where discussion is needed, it will be in the notes. Archon years will be given in the form 499/8; durations will be in the form 499–498.

41. In addition to the earlier discussion of this, we might note that there is no evidence that any Dorian cities were original (or early) members of the league. Meiggs (*Athenian Empire* 55–56) thinks that some were, but admits he has only "a little foundation" (55). The suggestion (by MacDowell) that Aegina was an early member is regretfully rejected by Meiggs (51–52). It is not worth serious

discussion. However, Byzantium, because of her strategic position, may well have been afraid of being forced into the league, as indeed she was as soon as she lost Pausanias' protection.

42. Plutarch's discussion of this is rather confused: there are contradictions between the mention in *Theseus* and that in *Cimon*. It is not clear whether, at *Cim.* 8, he wants to connect the appointment of the generals as judges in the theatre with Cimon's discovery of the bones of Theseus. The former is dated to Apsephion (469/8). The matter has been debated since the nineteenth century: Eduard Meyer thought there was a connection, Wilamowitz rejected it. For discussion of various possibilities, see J. D. Smart, *JHS* 87 (1967) 136–38, with an intriguing textual suggestion by H. B. Mattingly: that Apsephion's unusual name may have been corrupted to Phaion (whom Diodorus gives as archon for that year), with further confusion with Phaeton (476/5). (But Smart's chronology does not seem to me acceptable.)

43. The anecdote reported by Ion of Chios (see p. 86 above), linking the capture of Byzantium with that of Sestus and showing that Cimon was in charge of both operations, has been cheerfully rejected by scholars whose theories it did not fit. It should be obvious that the attestation is as good as much of what we have for this period, since Cimon himself is quoted for a matter that was presumably public knowledge, by one who claims to have heard him and who was certainly in his circle. The story cannot refer to the events of 478 (the first capture of Sestus and of Byzantium), since neither Cimon nor the Delian League had anything to do with those. It therefore attests a recapture of Sestus (as I have noted, it is not surprising that this is not attested anywhere else, since our record of all comparable events is thin and chancy) around the time of Cimon's capture of Byzantium from Pausanias. Presumably most of the Asian upper-class prisoners who provide the point of the story were taken at Sestus, which the Persians would have garrisoned. (The Athenians, after its first capture, did not, as the accounts both in Herodotus and in Thucydides make clear, and this is probably why it was lost again.) But it is not unlikely that Pausanias, who by this time was certainly on friendly terms with the Persians, used Asian troops. After all, he had no Spartans or (as far as we know) Greek allies available.

44. Since writing the original article, I have changed my mind about the *agōnes* of Tisamenus. (See Hdt. 9.35.2 for the list; from there also Paus. 3.11.7–8, apparently with a different text.) The list must be taken to be in chronological order: it begins with Plataea and ends with Tanagra. The three battles between these two are quite undatable. I originally tried to fit them all into the period after the earthquake, when Sparta was weakened and obviously open to attack. I now think that this will not work. At least the first of the battles, that against an alliance of Argos and Tegea, should go some time in the 470s (where indeed it has often been put). This leaves two: the battle of Dipaea against all the Arcadians except the Mantineans; and the mysterious battle against the helots "at the Isthmus" (to use the most plausible manuscript reading: Pausanias clearly had a different reading, but one which, to judge by his version, made no good sense). The battle of Dipaea was famous for the fact that Spartans won it even though their hoplite line was only a single man deep (Isocr. 6.99); hence it is

rightly assigned to a period when Spartan forces were overcommitted elsewhere, i.e. against the helots. It must therefore come after the earthquake. The battle “at the Isthmus” should be the battle that regained control of the countryside for Sparta and forced the rebels to withdraw to Ithome. That battle, as I have suggested above, should be assigned to the time when Cimon and his Athenians had come to aid Sparta in her danger, i.e. to the campaigning season of 467. (It was no doubt in part because of their success in that campaign that the Athenians were again invited to aid Sparta a few years later in the siege of Ithome.) This leaves the time immediately after the earthquake (468) for the battle of Dipaea. Diodorus assigns the Argive attack on Mycenae to 468/7, when the Spartans could not intervene because of the earthquake. It is very likely that in 468, as soon as the city had been saved from immediate attack by the rebels, Sparta had to face the Arcadian coalition, and that this was the occasion used by Argos for its attack on Mycenae. Once the Arcadians and the rebels were defeated, and the latter shut up at Ithome, the Spartans ought to have been able to help Mycenae. But Mycenae had probably fallen in 467, before the battle “at the Isthmus” regained the countryside from the rebels.

However, as I indicated initially, I do not feel sufficiently confident about these dates to insert them in the chronological table, along with Athenian dates for which we have much better evidence.

45. This is reported only by Diod. 11.70.2–3. It is usually ignored, and indeed one cannot feel entirely confident about it. But I am averse to postulating “doublets” in Diodorus as freely as has been the custom (they can often be differently understood by the attentive reader), and a flare-up between these two old enemies may have occurred at any time. Diodorus reports it under 464/3, just after his report (in one sentence) of the Thasian revolt, and he does not tell us its outcome. The date need not be correct, even if there was such a brief war. One might conjecture that the Athenians had to abandon it when Thasos rebelled—which might help to account for the later hope on the part of Aegina’s allies that they might again be forced to do so if attacked elsewhere (see Thuc. 105.3). Thucydides’ failure to report such a campaign has no bearing on its historicity: if it was abandoned, he would in any case almost certainly omit it.

46. Thucydides gives no date for this, but mentions it after telling of the end of the war at Ithome in the tenth year: that account (103.1–3) separates the alliance with Megara (103.4) from the alliances with Argos and Thessaly (102.4). A considerable interval may therefore be assumed. Diodorus puts it under 458/7, but this is not significant, since it occurs in the course of one of his long summaries of a historical development: what he is actually dating appears to be the Athenian victories under Myronides. (He supplies the name of the site of the decisive one—Cimolia—not recorded by Thucydides, and seems to have generally good information on these events.) The date of Megara’s accession must therefore remain doubtful, since the dispute with Corinth had obviously been going on for some years (cf. Plut. *Cim.* 17.2). But it is unlikely that the Athenians would wait very long after building Megara’s Long Walls (Thuc. 103.4) before starting on their own, and it is clear that at the time of the battle of Tanagra they had not controlled Pegae very long (see n. 50 below). The Cor-

inthian invasion probably followed not long after Megara's changing alliances, although this must be before the battle of Halieis (Thuc. 105.1). Some time in 459 seems indicated.

47. If Diodorus' statement that Aegina surrendered after nine months (11.78.4: again in an account of the whole war) should be believed. It has often been noted that there is no good reason why the precise statement should be discarded. If it is accepted, the investment of the city after the naval defeat should go in the autumn of 458, the surrender (straight after the battle of Tanagra showed the hopelessness of resistance) at the very end of 458/7. There is no difficulty in fitting the events into this timetable.

48. Presumably winter intervened before the Spartan attack on Phocis in major force (see below).

49. This date can only be approximate, as we have no precise date for the start of the Ithome war. Thucydides' (and Diodorus': 11.64.4) "tenth year" does not seem to refer to the whole of the war that followed upon the earthquake, but (in Thucydides explicitly) to the time since the withdrawal of the rebels to Ithome (Thuc. 101.2-3: see pp. 93ff. above). I have suggested that this may have taken place in 467/6, which would give 458/7 for the end of the revolt. In fact, Diodorus (the only source to give a date) mentions it under 456/5 (11.84.8), but in a context that makes it quite likely that this is only his own conclusion from what he did find dated in that year: the settlement of the Mesenians at Naupactus. Still, my suggested date is only put in *exempli gratia*, to show one of several possible reconstructions, all within narrow limits and all implying that Thucydides 103.1ff. is anticipating and finishing off his story.

50. Diodorus does appear thoroughly confused here. But his report of a Spartan plan to build up Theban power against Athens should be taken seriously. (The fact that he links it with the presence of a large Spartan army at Tanagra shows that it comes from a discussion of the Tanagra campaign, the only occasion when this was in fact so.) The size of the force sent across the Gulf of Corinth (1,500 Lacedaemonians and 10,000 allies: Thuc. 107.2) shows that it was not intended merely to deal with the Phocians, and that the decision to continue eastward was not due to the sudden realization that they could not get back, as Thucydides would have us believe. I am inclined to discount Thucydides' allegation that some Athenian oligarchs had promised to betray Athens to them (107.4), which appears in Plutarch in connection with the suspicion against Cimon's friends, disproved by their brave deaths. These are stock tools of propaganda (one might compare the charge of shield flashing against the Alcmaeonids), and no names are mentioned, nor (as far as we know) was anyone ever prosecuted after. The Athenian attack on the Peloponnesian force was not due to fear of treason at home: that is hardly a good, or even a relevant, motive.

It has often been pointed out (e.g. by Gomme) that the fact that the Athenians had to send ships round Peloponnese in order to prevent the Peloponnesians from recrossing the Corinthian Gulf (Thuc. 107.3) shows that they had no ships stationed at Pegae. This suggests that Megara's alliance was fairly recent. The idea (advocated by Gomme and other fundamentalists) that the Athenians al-

ready held Naupactus *as well* as Pegae and yet had no fleet in the Corinthian Gulf should hardly need refuting. The Tanagra campaign, in fact, gives us a *terminus post quem* for the seizure of Naupactus and this makes Diodorus' connection of it with the *periplous* of Tolmides very attractive. To the question of why Thucydides omits it on that occasion we might reply by pointing out that he also omits the important acquisition of Cythera, reliably reported by Pausanias 1.27.5. And see further Chapter 5 below.

51. There is little point in going over the confused tradition on this and the truce negotiated by Cimon with Sparta. For my general opinion, see pp. 17ff. above. I have got no further in sorting this out.

52. Thucydides' μετὰ ταῦτα (108.4) does not, I think, imply that the surrender of Aegina took place after Myronides' campaign. It is mentioned as *another* event (καὶ) which, *like* that campaign, followed upon the retreat of the Peloponnesians. (Compare the correlation of Naxos and Eurymedon, in relation to Carystus—though there the intention is made much clearer by the repetition of the phrase μετὰ ταῦτα.) Diodorus' attachment of the campaign on behalf of Orestes to the campaign in central Greece is implausible and almost certainly due merely to the fact that they occurred together in a list of Myronides' actions, as indeed Diodorus here uses them. The list has been inserted in the year after Tanagra (clearly in error), and the original association with the Tanagra campaign can still be seen. (See n. 50, *init.*.)

53. The scholiast on Aesch. 2.75 (Aeschines' absurd reference to a march by Tolmides through the middle of Peloponnese!) confirms the date of 456/5 for the *periplous*, no doubt from an Atthidographic source. That Tolmides captured Naupactus on this occasion, as Diodorus reports, is an attractive possibility. That he settled the Messenians there must surely be true, and should be accepted, since it is beyond belief that this story was attached to him when he had nothing whatever to do with Naupactus. And since, as we have seen, Naupactus cannot have been captured until after the Tanagra campaign, there was certainly no time for anyone else to settle them there, even if it had been taken previously, in some unrecorded earlier *periplous*. (There was no other feasible way for the Athenians to capture Naupactus.) Thuc. 103.3 does not say or imply that the Athenians already held Naupactus when they received the Messenians as refugees, although (of course) this is compatible with what he says, and he may even have thought so. (We have noted that he does not mention the actual capture of it. See further Chapter 5 below.)

54. This is one of the most confused episodes. Diodorus (11.88) associates Pericles' colonization in Chersonese with his attack on Peloponnese (under 453/2) after reporting what appears to be the same attack on Peloponnese by itself two years earlier (11.85). Plut. *Per.* 19 shows a tradition associating Pericles' campaigns in Peloponnese (and *periplous* of it) with his Chersonese campaign (though they are not put in the same year); Diodorus may have come across this and, as in the case of Myronides (n. 52 above), have been misled. He records Tolmides' establishment of colonies in Euboea and Naxos at the same time (453/2). Meiggs (*Athenian Empire* 120–21) thinks that Pericles' Chersonesian colonization cannot antedate 448 and he is inclined to reject the date for Tol-

mides' colonies as well. In view of Diodorus' manifest confusion, no firm judgment is possible, since there is no other relevant evidence.

55. I should like to thank the Clavel-Stiftung at Augst, and Professor J. v. Ungern-Sternberg, who mediated their hospitality for me and put the resources of his seminar in Basel at my disposal for putting this paper, long meditated but never written down, into some shape. Thanks are also due to Professors Latacz and Graf for encouraging my use of their seminar as well, during my stay at Basel. The paper has been considerably revised for this volume.

CHAPTER 3 Plataea between Athens and Sparta: In Search of Lost History

The original version of this paper was presented at a panel on Thucydides, organized by Professor Lowell Edmunds, at the Annual Meeting of the APA in 1974. Both he and others who heard it there had repeatedly urged me to publish it, and an invitation to the Congress of Boeotian Studies finally provided a welcome occasion for appropriate revision. Not much of special relevance to this topic had appeared in over a decade, when I came to revise; the most interesting contribution, Gordon S. Shrimpton's article "When Did Plataea Join Athens?" *CP* 79 (1984) 295–303, did not come to my notice until after I had finished my revision. He at last correctly interprets Herodotus' account of the original formation of the relationship between the two cities, and he also sees that an alliance (in the strict sense of the term) between Athens and Plataea was concluded only in 479. Some other points of agreement and disagreement will be noted below. It was not his task, of course, to discuss the debate between Archidamus and the Plataeans and its implications. I myself have since studied Thucydides' presentation of the events that led up to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in more detail and shall at various points refer to that study, reprinted as Chapter 4 below.

1. Ed. A. Stadter (Chapel Hill 1973).

2. The neglect of the debate is shared, even more surprisingly, by the much more elaborate and "Thucydidean" debate between the Plataeans and the Thebans before the Spartan judges, which forms the last act of the tragedy (3.53–67). West again found no specific discussion to list after reviewing over a century of scholarship, and the volume itself again does not contain such a discussion—indeed it contains no reference to the debate except for one or two odd sentences. C. W. Macleod, who discussed the debate before the Spartan judges from a rhetorical point of view ("Thucydides' Plataean Debate," *GRBS* 18 [1977] 227–46), noted its surprising neglect by modern scholars. His own article goes far to prove that that debate is largely fiction. (It does not overlap with mine in other respects.)

3. It can mean either "restore" or "formally grant": see Bétant's *Lexicon Thucydideum* s.v., with ample documentation for both meanings. Which of the

two meanings the word bears here will form a major part of this enquiry. To anticipate possible objections, I ought to point out that I am well aware of the fact that Thucydides here (2.71.2) uses the imperfect ἀπεδίδου and not the aorist, and that I am not really sure why he does. He obviously cannot mean that the action was not formally concluded (i.e., that the guarantees were only "offered"), since he at once proceeds to use aorists (71.3; 72.1) in referring to the same action and frequently mentions the binding nature of the oaths actually sworn. The schoolmaster's rule of thumb (useful as such), that in Attic prose the present stem of δίδωμι means "offer" and the aorist stem "give," obviously does not do justice to the full range of actual usage. As Kühner-Gerth put it (II 1, 140), the imperfect means "offer" ("darreichen"), without any presumption ("wobei es dahingestellt bleibt") as to whether the offer was accepted and thus became a "gift." (The imperfect, of course, was a common narrative tense in earlier Greek, and even in Attic prose is preferred as such in the case of many verbs.) It is clear that Thucydides frequently uses the present stem of this verb for the action of restoring or returning, not for merely offering to do so. (See, e.g., 5.21.1 and 35.3; 35.4; 42.1.) But as there is no study of Thucydides comparable to F. Hultsch's superb *Die erzählenden Zeitformen bei Polybios* (see p. 205 n. 15 above), it is difficult to be sure why. Perhaps the change in tense, like the change in prefix (ἀπεδίδου, ἔδοσαν, παρέδωκεν), is largely stylistic variation. More probably (I think), the imperfect is chosen for its power to convey vivid description of a scene: as Hultsch (I 29) says about one of many instances of such variation in Polybius, "der Schriftsteller will uns ein Bild . . . vorführen."

4. Thucydides, with his usual contempt for established Greek religion (see further below), is not clear about the relationship of the various deities concerned in the oaths. He appears to distinguish the θεοὶ ὄρχιοι from the local gods of Plataea and the ancestral gods of the Spartans, while identifying the last two groups. The phrase is θεοὺς τοὺς τε ὀρχίους τότε γενομένους . . . καὶ τοὺς ὑμετέροους πατρώους καὶ ἡμετέροους ἐγγωρίους. It is difficult to take this construction to mean anything other than what is suggested above: in particular, the τε excludes any possibility of taking the first καὶ to be explanatory, while the omission of the article before the second καὶ prima facie identifies the two groups. Archidamus' reply and invocation (see below) show that the local gods were very much involved, as indeed one would expect.

5. On Aegina, see pp. 137ff. below. For the view that the guarantee of autonomy in the oaths of Plataea was confined to Plataea, see M. Ostwald, *Autonomia* (Chico, Calif. 1982) 16-17, with notes.

6. See, e.g., Thuc. 5.18.11; 23.6. Strictly speaking, of course, all the parties that swore the oaths would have to be consulted. But Athens would obviously be consulted in any case, since the possibility of an agreement between Archidamus and the Plataeans was known to depend on Athenian consent (see below); and since Athens claimed to speak on behalf of the whole of her empire, while Sparta had undoubtedly discussed the matter before the earlier offer (referred to incidentally) was made, those two powers could certainly secure acceptance of an agreement by any cities that happened to be concerned in the oaths.

7. For a selective survey of modern views on Thucydides' attitude to religion, see Nanno Marinatos, *Thucydides and Religion* (Königstein 1981) ch. 1. The book unfortunately fails to make a clear distinction between what I have called established religion and the supernatural in general (including Tyche, stressed in F. M. Cornford's famous provocative essay, *Thucydides Mythistoricus* [London 1907], which Thucydides by no means excludes from his narrative and thinking). It also fails to present an exhaustive investigation of his attitude to established religion; thus, the discussion of the debate between the Thebans and the Plataeans (pp. 34–37) does not comment on the religious aspects, and there is nowhere any detailed discussion of Thucydides' depiction of Spartan attitudes to, and uses of, established religion. (Some striking aspects of this will be treated below.)

8. See pp. 142ff. below.

9. Gomme's confused rhetoric (*A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* I [Oxford 1945] *ad loc.*) may serve as an extreme example. But even level-headed historians like N. G. L. Hammond, *A History of Greece to 322 B.C.* (Oxford 1967) 329, and D. Kagan, *The Archidamian War* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1974) 172–73, accept Thucydides' picture without question.

10. The precise point of that affective particle does not appear clearly from the five instances in which he uses it (see Bétant, s.v.). But there is no doubt that irony is always intended. On the whole of this difficult passage, see Classen-Steup's analysis in their note.

11. See (precisely because of his normally critical attitude toward Thucydides, of which this is not typical), e.g., Kagan, *The Archidamian War* 102ff. Thus (103) Archidamus' reply is said to show "that sophistry was not foreign to Sparta"; and Kagan comments on Archidamus' demands (104): "There was, *of course*, nothing in the oaths taken in 479 that required the Plataeans to abandon their alliance with Athens, *which was already in effect*" [my emphasis]. That this view is oversimplified and does not correctly describe either the nature and circumstances of the oaths or the relationship between Athens and Plataea should become clear in our treatment below. But we must in any case note (as Kagan fails to do) the importance of Archidamus' appeal to the gods in front of his army, and especially the fact that, *ex abundante cautela*, he adds the local heroes to the gods, even though they were not mentioned by the Plataeans and it is unlikely that they were mentioned in the oaths. (It must be admitted that the invocation does not quite have the degree of authenticity that we must assign to the debate, since word of it was not, as far as we can see, at once carried to Athens. But if Thucydides was merely writing τὰ δέοντα, why did he add the heroes, whom he had not mentioned before?)

12. For full treatment of this, see pp. 146–48 below.

13. See further pp. 142ff. below.

14. At this point it should be clearly stated that the oaths here referred to have nothing to do with the much-debated oath before the battle of Plataea. (On this, see the full discussion, in the light of the well-known document, by P. Siewert, *Der Eid von Plataiai* [Munich 1972]—unfortunately at times guilty of this very confusion, e.g. pp. 81–82.) Any such oath (if there was one) would be either

supplemented or superseded (that would depend on the precise wording) by the oaths sworn after the battle. That it is only the latter that form the object of the debate between the Plataeans and Archidamus is clear from the whole context in which the swearing is described; and observe, decisively, the aorist in Archidamus' ὅσοι μετασχόντες τῶν τότε κινδύνων ὑμῖν . . . ξυνώμοσαν.

15. It is treated in its proper place, pp. 119ff. below.

16. There is no contemporary evidence on word usage that would allow us to decide this point. Ostwald, *Autonomia* (cit. n. 5 above), denies it (16 and n. 64), with references to Thucydides. He misattributes the Plataean claim regarding Pausanias' oath to the Plataean speech before the Spartan judges "in 429 B.C." (*sic*)—a serious confusion because of the difference in evidential status between the two occasions that we have noted in the text: the debate with Archidamus deserves a high degree of trust, whereas the speeches before the judges must contain a great deal of Thucydides' own writing of τὰ δέοντα (although not necessarily as much as the reflections of the judges themselves). In the end Ostwald prefers Plutarch's anecdote of a "treaty of Plataea" to the picture that emerges from Thucydides (p. 17). For reasons that will be clear both from the present study and from my essay on the Peace of Callias, I find Ostwald's study of the attestation of the term αὐτονομία in the middle of the fifth century (pp. 25ff.) oversimplified and unacceptable, with inadequate discussion of both the Peace of Callias and the appeal of Aegina in 432/1, which are crucial to the subject of his study.

17. Ultimately, but not directly. I have tried to show elsewhere (pp. 137ff. below) that the general autonomy clause was revived and refurbished in the Thirty Years' Peace, about which Thucydides tells us practically nothing, even though it was of vital importance for the understanding of the events leading to the outbreak of the war and to the αἰτίαι that he describes, in order not to impair the reader's acceptance of his own thesis regarding these events. The new element in the Thirty Years' Peace seems to have been that αὐτονομία was defined so as to be compatible with payment of tribute—the first time, as far as we know, that this modification, which went far toward turning the term into a mere slogan, appears in inter-Hellenic diplomacy. I have suggested (p. 52 above) that it was imported from the Peace of Callias.

18. Thucydides' text has not been convincingly emended. Shrimpton's suggestion comes closest to an acceptable emendation (see "When Did Plataea Join Athens?" *CP* 79 [1984] 295–303), but his interpretation which forms the background to it seems to me unacceptable. (See n. 33 below.) Grote (*History of Greece* IV.64) argued that Thucydides' date was unlikely. For a useful summary of the arguments against it, see now Shrimpton. The clearest brief statement of that case will be found in H. F. Bornitz, *Herodot-Studien* (Berlin 1968) 93 n. 168. R. J. Buck, *A History of Boeotia* (Edmonton 1979), accepts Thucydides, advancing as his principal argument the fact that Thebes turned against the Pisistratids before their fall and supported their opponents. He does not give any reference to attestation of that fact, and I have not succeeded in finding any. If it is indeed fact, it will obviously make it much easier to accept Thucydides' date. As far as I am aware, the first evidence of Theban hostility to Athens is the

attack a few years *after* the fall of the Pisistratids, in concert with Cleomenes. But if (as seems almost certain) Hysiae and Oenoe were won under the tyranny, then the argument of the tyrants' avoiding provocation of Thebes collapses. It must also be stressed that Herodotus gives no actual date for the incorporation of Plataea (see text). Shrimpton (following others) argues that there is no sign of Spartan hostility to the Pisistratids as early as 519, so that Cleomenes' sinister motive given by Herodotus for his advice (to embroil Athens with Thebes) is unacceptable. But this argument is circular: we do not know whether Herodotus' attribution of this motive was any more than what he either thought himself or picked up in late fifth-century Athens. Cleomenes' advice was quite probably given in good faith.

I would add a further point. Just as Herodotus' attribution of this sinister anti-Athenian motive need not be accepted, it is not essential to accept his statement that Cleomenes happened to be in the neighborhood when the Plataeans appealed to him. Knowing of Cleomenes' repeated presence there after 511, and inclined (as he seems to be: see text) to put the incorporation of Plataea after the tyrants' expulsion, he may well have added this bit of "scene painting" as he adds so much of that kind. I would suggest that the Plataeans, knowing him to be a king ambitious both for himself and for Sparta, sent to Peloponnese to make their offer to him. On this reasonable assumption, I see nothing that would contradict the likelihood of 519 for the incident.

19. See Powell's *Lexicon* s.v., p. 90 rubric 7a. He gives twenty instances. Six refer to the incident here discussed; of the other fourteen, two (2.113.2; 4.180.5) refer to giving oneself up to a god, and all the rest to surrender to a king (usually the Great King, but occasionally a king of Egypt), either after being his enemy (which, of course, was a surrender into literal slavery) or in the sense of attachment to his service (which would by Greeks be called δουλεία).

20. This is the only explicit statement on this point by Thucydides: the Plataeans and Thebans, in the speeches before the judges that Thucydides assigns them, seem positively to avoid any specification, except for the one discussed in n. 27 below.

21. There is no point in collecting examples, which will readily be found. Exceptions are worth a mention. F. Gschnitzer, who discovered the principle of political attachment of a weaker to a stronger city (*Abhängige Orte im griechischen Altertum* [Munich 1958]), lists the "Schutzherrschaft Athens über Plataiai" (p. 145), but does not discuss it. Hammond (*History of Greece* 193–94) rightly makes Plataea part of the Attic state, but lumps Eleutherae (certainly different), Plataea, and Hysiae together as receiving "military alliance and some form of citizenship"—which is not a satisfactory formulation and seems to rest on a misinterpretation of Thucydides. Shrimpton ("When Did Plataea Join Athens?" [cit. n. 18 above]) undoubtedly has the right general interpretation, but refuses to accept the idea of δουλεία and plumps for the idea that both the slaves buried in the mound and the Plataeans were metics. Even if anything like that status was known at the time, in its Classical definition, there is no reason to think that the slaves had been freed before the battle, rather than (as appears more reasonable) promised freedom after victory, if indeed any promise was

really made. (We do not hear of it.) We must firmly insist on Pausanias' statement that those who were buried in the separate mound were slaves.

The consequences of rejecting our evidence on a priori grounds can be serious. Thus K. A. Raaflaub, in his (excellent) work *Die Entdeckung der Freiheit* (Munich 1985), p. 19 n. 71 and p. 94 with notes, starts from the (unargued) premise that the relationship between Athens and Plataea at that time "wurde klar als Bundesgenossen- und nicht als Untertanenverhältnis verstanden" (my emphasis) and sees no indication that the Plataeans were regarded, or regarded themselves, as subjects of Athens: "Vielmehr spricht alles dafür, daß es sich in der Tat um ein . . . spezifisches Symmachieverhältnis handelte." ("Alles" is presumably Thuc. 3.68.5: he does not discuss Herodotus' numerous and clear references.) He then inevitably closes the circle of the argument by concluding—contrary to what Pausanias reports, and without discussing his report—that the distinction was merely one between citizens and noncitizens, the latter including both free "allies" and slaves. The consequence for his attempt to trace the origin to the political use of the terms "freedom" and "slavery" (= subjection) is that he fails to notice the convincing attestation of the term δοῦλοι (and we may safely conjecture that of the abstract δουλεία) as early as 490, with at least a possibility that it goes back to 519—from which it seems to follow that the opposites of those terms must have been used in a political sense at the same time, despite the argument (merely from silence) that he advances against such a use until much later. The meaning "subject" seems to be all that is intended at Thuc. 1.98.4 (Naxos). There is no implied disapproval anywhere in the context.

22. It is perhaps not altogether surprising that some scholars have gone so far as to mistranslate Pausanias and make his text refer to three mounds. This appears in the standard German translation of Pausanias, by the archaeologist Felix Eckstein.

23. Gschnitzer, *Abhängige Orte* 86ff., compares Roman *ciues sine suffragio*. The comparison is certainly illuminating, but must not be pressed too far. *Ciues sine suffragio* did not fight alongside full citizens in the legions; and we do not really know that Eleutherans were excluded from the Assembly, where membership of a deme, trittys, and tribe was in principle not relevant. Pausanias' statement that they became citizens (1.38.3) is confirmed and amplified by the inscription which shows them serving in the army, though not (it seems) in a tribal regiment. (See *GHI* 48 lines 96–97).

24. 1.38.8. For this interpretation, linked with the idea of Pisistratid sponsorship of the cult of Dionysus, see (e.g.) Busolt-Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde* II, 871 n. 1 ("wohl"); Hammond, *History of Greece* 192; Buck, *Boeotia* 99, 113. J. G. Frazer's idea that Eleutheræ joined Athens only in the fourth century (*Commentary on Pausanias* II.517–18) need not (I hope) be seriously considered. The transfer of the cult image need not coincide with the incorporation. One obvious way of dissociating them is suggested in the text. Pausanias does not say that Pegasus introduced the cult into Athens: only that he brought along "the god." The Delphic command alleged makes it likely that the version Pausanias heard referred to a much later (and, I would suggest, historical) incident than the legend preserved by the Aristophanic scholiast. There has recently

been a good deal of discussion of this, but it would take us too far to deal with it here. I have seen no reason to change my interpretation of the (admittedly unsatisfactory) evidence.

25. See P. Salmon, “Les districts béotiens,” *REA* 58 (1956) 54–55. However, he is confused regarding the position before 479, asserting that Hysiae at that time formed part of Theban territory (for which he gives no evidence, and I do not know of any) and taking Hdt. 9.25 to mean that it was “dans la Πλαταιΐς—which would mean that Herodotus was wrong, but which is in fact a misinterpretation of what Herodotus says.

26. “There is no need to assume that the Athenians, in the euphoria of victory, would have taken the loss of territory as an affront” (Shrimpton, “When Did Plataea Join Athens?” [cit. n. 18 above] 302). The phrase “the euphoria of victory” was first, as far as I can trace it, used in this context by M. Piérart and R. Etienne, *BCH* 99 (1975) 67. I find it hard to believe that a city that had played a leading part in the defeat of the barbarian invasion would happily accept being mulcted of territory by its allies as a reward. Ancient Greeks (and not only they) did not rise to such heights of national unselfishness. For the special responsibilities given to the Plataeans after the battle, see the convincing discussion by Piérart and Etienne, sorting out the authentic (the cult of Zeus Eleuthérios and care for the bones of the fallen) from later accretion.

27. The puzzle of the “citizenship” given to Plataea by Athens at some time (Thuc. 3.55.3; 63.2) must be mentioned, though it cannot be solved. Thucydides makes the Plataeans urge it as an extenuation for their loyalty to Athens, and the Thebans, without questioning the fact, turn it against them. In view of the fact that he omits it in his epitaph on Plataea, it is likely that Thucydides had no precise knowledge of what he was here talking about (see text below), and we cannot hope to get it right. W. Gawantka (*Isopolitie* [Munich 1975] 174ff.) has shown that there is no question of *isopoliteia* as it was known in the fourth century (though the idea keeps recurring, e.g. in Hammond). Gawantka conjectures an ad hoc category of “external” citizenship (which would be hard to make sense of) and thinks it was given not long before the siege. But this is not what Thucydides says. The speakers imply that the grant preceded the alliance. In fact, the surviving Plataeans were given Athenian citizenship only after the destruction of the city.

Since the speeches written for the two parties before the Spartan judges cannot be regarded as authentic, I would suggest that the reference to “citizenship” is an equivalent for what Herodotus (as confirmed by the facts) called δουλεία: a rhetorically, and psychologically, suitable euphemism, which should not be construed as a term of public law; and that it in fact refers to precisely the same occasion and status that Thucydides, in 3.68.5, calls an “alliance”: he had difficulty finding a “correct” euphemism and therefore toyed with two different versions. This conclusion is made almost inevitable by the fact that (as we have seen) neither party in Thucydides’ debate refers to an “alliance”—i.e., they both omit what must have been the crucial first link between the two cities, if 3.68.5 is taken as a technical term.

28. Plut. *Them.* 19; Thuc. 1.90.

29. I have treated this in greater detail on pp. 131-32 below. The unanimity in the Athenian leadership is strikingly illustrated, along with the existence of a more political and less idealistic version of the alliance with the Ionians even in antiquity, by such stories as the one told by Plut. *Arist.* 23. Since this contradicts the *topos* of Aristides' justice and shows him as a politician, it probably has a foundation of genuine tradition, despite the inevitable anecdotal additions. (See also Hdt. 8.2-3.)

30. The historicity of this episode was defended by H. Bengtson in "Themistokles und die delphische Amphiktionie," *Eranos* 49 (1951) 85-92, and has since been by other scholars. It is inherently plausible. Just as after 404 the Thebans, having failed to destroy Athens, had to choose accommodation with her in order to balance Spartan power, so in the 470s Athens, having failed to achieve the destruction of Thebes (which Pausanias did not want), had to secure Theban political influence as a counterweight to Sparta. Thessaly, linked to Athens (like Macedon) even in Pisistratid days, was essential for Athens' "northern policy" as a future great power. Cf. next note, with text.

31. This has been briefly argued in *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times*, ed. B. Barr-Sharrar and E. N. Borza (Washington, D.C., 1982) 34, with p. 45 n. 9. This is not the place to reargue that case in detail. Those who would put Alexander's admission much earlier tend to overlook the fact that he did not enter in order to win the race, but solely in order to achieve a major political aim: his official recognition as a Greek. I see no evidence for the view that the royal house of Macedon had been interested in this before 480, and much against.

32. This is shown in detail in Chapter 4 below.

33. Shrimpton, "When Did Plataea Join Athens?" (cit. n. 18 above), tries to argue that Thucydides is in fact only referring to the period of alliance, starting in 479, which it is his great merit to have recognized and separated from the period that precedes. But I find it inconceivable that, in this formal epitaph on Plataea and its relations with Athens, Thucydides would ignore a generation of total integration and limit himself to a later stage of looser association. We must start, as all interpreters have, from the assumption that he is here referring to the whole of the long period of association between the two cities. On Shrimpton's view, his failure to note an antecedent period of "citizenship" at this point, which in itself is not much of a problem (see text), becomes inexplicable.

I must here add that I find Shrimpton's attempt to date the beginning of the association to 506 unacceptable. His attempt to arrange the movements and diplomacy of that war to fit in with that view does not appear to me successful. Thus the real reason why the Thebans did not attack Plataea, but concentrated on Hysiae and Oenoe, was most simply that Plataea was too strong for a frontal attack and was best encircled first. But the movements of Cleomenes and of the Thebans, as described by Shrimpton, do not seem to fit in with Herodotus' account, and his argument that, when the Corinthians ἀπαλλάσσοντο, this does not mean that they went home (from near Eleusis!), but that they hung around long enough to be available for arbitration between Athens and Thebes some

time later, is particularly hard to accept. It seems to me that, although Shrimpton has made a positive contribution by recognizing the change in Plataea's status in 479 (the further implications and consequences of which it was not his task to follow up), his attempt to establish a new date for the incorporation of Plataea fails.

34. Since this article was first published, the volume (IV) of the new edition of the *Cambridge Ancient History* that deals with the events of 479 and their antecedents has appeared. (Volume V, which will include a treatment of the Peloponnesian War, had not yet appeared by the time of this revision.) It adds nothing to our knowledge of the relevant events described in this essay. L. H. Jeffery (p. 360) suggests that Cleomenes was indeed near the Isthmus in 519, trying to attach Megara to the Peloponnesian League. (This is possible, but why did Herodotus not mention it?) He thought Plataea too unimportant to enroll it in the league, and preferred "ingeniously" to sow the seeds of lasting hostility between Athens and Thebes by referring the Plataeans to Athens. (This is not new, but does not become more plausible with repetition.) J. P. Barron, in his chapter entitled "The Liberation of Greece" (in 479), deals with events after the battle of Plataea. He is inclined (p. 611) to accept Plutarch's story of Aristides' proposal to establish a permanent Greek army of ten thousand men and navy of one hundred ships (but he finally thinks it "not proven"), yet omits any reference to Thucydides' record of the oaths sworn after the battle. D. M. Lewis, in his chapter on the Pisistratids, briefly mentions the incident of the Plataeans' "offering themselves" to Athens (pp. 297–98), but does not discuss their status or the consequences. As far as the new *CAH* is concerned, it is fair to say that the subject of this essay is still largely "lost history."

CHAPTER 4

Thucydides and the Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War: A Historian's Brief

1. Eduard Meyer, *Forschungen zur Alten Geschichte* II (Halle a.S. 1899) 280: "über jeden Zweifel erhaben."

2. Eduard Schwartz, *Das Geschichtswerk des Thukydides* (Bonn 1919). The second edition (Bonn 1929) is practically a reprint. Although it is more readily available than the first, it is often preferable to cite the first, which puts the work in its proper historical context.

3. W. R. Connor, "A Post Modernist Thucydides?" *CJ* 72 (1976–77) 289; cf. now the introduction to his *Thucydides* (Princeton 1984).

4. C. N. Cochrane, *Thucydides and the Science of History* (Oxford 1929—as it happens, the year of Schwartz's second edition of a very different work). For a recent extreme instance of unqualified faith in Thucydides, with the consequences it can produce, see A. Powell, *AC* 49 (1980) 87–114.

5. Meyer's address is reprinted in *Kleine Schriften* II (Halle a.S. 1924) 539–67. The assessment here referred to is 547ff. Note his idealization of Thucy-

dides: “. . . das Geschichtswerk des Thukydides ist wie die Grundlegung so auch das Ideal der historischen Darstellung geworden, das bis auf den heutigen Tag von keinem andern übertroffen ist.”

6. I have quoted Meyer as an extreme, but not untypical, example of the conflict between realistic perception and quasi-religious belief that characterizes many scholars' attitude to Thucydides. One is reminded of Voltaire's famous comment: “La foi consiste à croire ce que la raison ne croit pas.”

7. “Thucydides,” *Phoenix* 18 (1964) 258–59.

8. This is generally recognized, and nowhere better put than by A. W. Gomme in the introduction to the first volume of his *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* (Oxford 1945) (hereafter *HCT*), expressing his own admiration for Thucydides and raising it to the level of historical method. See p. 29: “Thucydides has imposed his will, as no other historian has ever done. Yet in very few cases can we test the truth of his narrative.” And compare, for his method in doing so, pp. 84–85: “if Thucydides states or clearly implies something that contradicts a contemporary pamphleteer or a later historian . . . , Thucydides is to be believed.” He goes on to say that we can only contradict Thucydides a priori, and he quite rightly warns us to be careful about doing so. For some strange consequences of Gomme's method, see p. 165 with n. 7 below.

9. For an introduction to this, with some very sensible general questions and principles, see A. Andrewes (assisted by K. J. Dover), in vol. V (1981) of the (continued) *HCT* 384–89.

10. Schwartz, *Thukydides*² (cit. n. 2 above) 133: “Die geschichtliche Darstellung ist zur Apologie geworden.” The present study may be said to collect the evidence to assure Schwartz's view, two generations later, the credit it deserves.

11. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London 1972). His introduction criticizes modern views of the origins of the war as “disappointing in the extreme,” i.e., because scholars “have pulled their punches” in criticism of Thucydides where they have noted that his account is unsatisfactory: “at best incomplete, and perhaps even distorted and dishonest” (1). He himself, however, believes “that we can trust Thucydides to a very high degree for the events of his own day, and that . . . we shall find his account consistent, penetrating and very satisfying” (3). I should add that Ste. Croix has what seems to me by far the best analysis of Thucydides' treatment of speeches, and of how the modern historian should use them, in any recent study of Thucydides (see 7–12). See further n. 61 below.

12. See my brief comments on the Pentecontaetia as an insertion, p. 203 n. 2 above, also hinting at my belief that the dual biography is a later insertion as well: although something must have been said, even at the very first stage of composition, to explain the “curse” that comes into the preface to the final negotiations, the full-scale biographies are not a necessary part of its explanation.

13. The brief mention of the two hegemonial powers in 31.2 may be ignored for this purpose. [All references in this style will be to Book 1.]

14. The Corcyraeans, in accordance with the requirements of their case, had called the future war “about to happen and almost upon us” (36.1). It would

have been, correspondingly, in accord with the Corinthians' case if they had denied the possibility of future war for as long as they should be willing to prevent it. In the interest of Thucydides' own case, they fail to say this. See also next note.

15. In view of the vagueness of the Corinthians' promises and references to their power, as against the considerations of *Realpolitik* clearly advanced by the Corcyraeans, it is no wonder that the Athenian Assembly could in the end be convinced that war was indeed inevitable (44.2): the Corinthians' speech, no doubt through Thucydides' deliberate art, combines the first clear and full presentation of his own two principal motifs (see text) with the "dramatic" aim of giving the Corinthians an implausible and in the end self-defeating argument. For the reason why Thucydides treats the Peloponnesian debate over assistance to Samos in this allusive and inconspicuous manner and does not mention it in his long and detailed account of the Samian War, see pp. 141–42 below.

16. Compare the repetition of this (as of other Thucydidean interpretations borrowed from Book 1: see n. 21 below) in the speech of the Mytilenaeans, 3.10.2–3, with the added rhetorical invention that the original aim of the league had been the liberation of Greeks from the Persians. (On this, contrast the frequently discussed passage 96.1).

17. This was clearly shown by C. W. Fornara, in his important article "Some Aspects of the Career of Pausanias of Sparta," *Historia* 15 (1966) 257ff. One wonders what other "very clear" evidence Thucydides knew of: it must be suspected that his assessment is based on that fictitious correspondence, which he retails in the later biography (128–29) as the turning point in Pausanias' attitude and the occasion for his openly adopting a Persian life-style (130). As for the "Hellenes" who denounce Pausanias in Sparta, in Diodorus (11.44.6) they are ambassadors of the Peloponnesians, who have left Pausanias and gone home: this was presumably Ephorus' elaboration of Thucydides' account. (It also features the correspondence and its effect.)

18. Cf. n. 32 below. On Thasos and its *peraea*, see R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1972) 84–85. (Note Hdt. 6.46–47, claiming autopsy and putting the income of the mainland mines alone at eighty talents.) Thucydides does not tell us what rights the Athenians claimed in an area that had been under Thasian control even before Darius' invasion. Significantly, he does not accuse the Athenians of making any claims, but speaks of a "difference" that arose between Athens and Thasos about the mainland *emporion* and the mine, and ascribes the resulting war to a "revolt" by Thasos. I have myself used that term, since it has become universally accepted in modern accounts. But it was in fact an Athenian attack on Thasos, to be compared to the later Athenian attack on Samos (which is also, though not as universally, called a "revolt" by those who accept Thucydides' terminology and his interpretation).

19. One must add Cimon's brief and (despite a glorious victory) essentially unsuccessful campaign on Cyprus, which was meant to mark a conspicuous return to the league's original aims, as well as to wipe out the disgrace of the Egyptian campaign.

20. It is only a late tradition, connected with the wiles of Aristides, that re-

cords the sinking of lumps of metal in the sea, no doubt to mark the treaties as eternal. (The implication should be accepted, despite a recent attempt to question it.) *Ath. pol.* 23.4-5 tells the story without comment; Plut. *Arist.* 25.1 adds a tailpiece implying the Athenians later broke the treaties. The formula making treaties binding for eternity does not appear before the fourth century: see M. N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions II* (Oxford 1948), p. 15 (395 B.C.). The tale of the lumps is likely to be fourth-century invention. If the treaties had been sworn for fifty or a hundred years (which can be paralleled), one would expect this fact to have survived and to have preempted the need for the invention.

21. See my treatment of the Peace of Callias in Chapter 1 above; on Thucydides, especially 27-28 and what I call Herodotus' "coy refusal" (p. 12) to tell us what Callias and his colleagues were doing at Sardis in the 460s (Hdt. 7.151). It is strange that Thucydides' omission of the peace never ceases to turn up as a serious argument—supported, at times, by the "independent" evidence that the Mytilenaeans, in the speech written for them by Thucydides, do not mention it either! (They speak of the Athenians' "giving up their hostility toward the Persians" [3.10.3], which is a circumlocution perhaps reminiscent of the "differences" between the Athenians and the Thasians that describe Athenian aggression against that island; see n. 18 and cf. n. 16 above.) For the most recent instance of this argument, see EMC 32 (1988) 324, in an article discussing the methodology of treating the fifth century. The author (an excellent and perceptive scholar in most of his work) professes himself unable to see "how this passage [the Mytilenaeon speech] can continue to be virtually ignored."

22. See pp. 40 and 55 above.

23. On the interpretation of this, see pp. 89ff. especially 92-93, citing Sealey for the correct translation of the Greek.

24. For diehard fundamentalism, see, e.g., Ste. Croix, *Origins* (cit. n. 11 above) 179: "This is a definite statement which Thucydides would surely not have made if he had not been convinced of its truth on what he regarded as reliable evidence; and the doubts which have sometimes been cast upon its accuracy seem to me unjustified." He also defends Athens against the charge of being the aggressor against Thasos by suggesting (42-43) that Athenian intervention may have been "invited by one or more of the *emporía* in question, including Neapolis" and settles the point by noting: "At any rate, half a century later Neapolis clearly preferred Athens to Thasos." One may wonder how he would have reacted to an American attack on the Soviet Union provoked by an "invitation" by one or more of the Soviet satellites. Similarly, Meiggs sees "no good reason to reject this story" (*Athenian Empire* 87). (He does not survey the reasons that might be advanced.) Meiggs seems, however, to be aware of some of the difficulties and mitigates them by suggesting that the promise was not a public one, but made "privately by 'the authorities,' as the later promise in 433-432 to Potidaea." He does not explain the fact that in the later case Thucydides specifies "the magistrates" as making the promise, while in the former he ascribes it to "the Lacedaemonians." Donald Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, N.Y. 1969) 61 with n. 15, gives a bibliography of major

scholars' opinions on this question. He himself unreservedly accepts Thucydides (even though he is well aware—more than most scholars at that time—of Thucydides' at times questionable techniques: e.g., 367–68), pointing out that “no one has offered a reason why he [Thucydides] should have been either misinformed or biased on this point.” The statement was by and large true, and it is in part the purpose of this investigation to fill that void. However, Kagan, in his citation of precedent, misreports the most critical mind among those he cites: Busolt, Meyer, and others had indeed “accepted Thucydides without question,” as most still do; but Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* II² 1 (Strasbourg 1914) 149, says that the promise can at most have been made by the ephors, and his footnote concludes, “und es ist . . . sehr zweifelhaft, ob überhaupt an der ganzen Sache etwas Wahres ist.” The only scholar I know who has committed himself to reasoned rejection is Raphael Sealey (e.g., *History of the Greek City States* [Berkeley 1976] 253; cf. 257), with brief methodological discussion, though none of the Thucydidean context. I hope that the attempt to put the problem in that context will stimulate future critical reading.

25. See Hdt. 5.74–75 and 90–93 (where Corinthian opposition suffices to defeat Spartan plans).

26. As Sealey notes (*Greek City States* 253), we should believe Thucydides' statement that the Thasians asked Sparta for aid: this is not claimed to have been secret, and it was indeed an obvious move. But nothing follows about the attitude of Sparta (or any Spartans) to Athens at this time. Sparta was literally the only power that could possibly provide help, and the effort would be worth making, however slight the hope. (The Barbarian, if appeal to him could be considered, had just been eliminated as a source of aid by the battle of the Eurymedon and was negotiating for peace.)

27. The close proximity of Sparta's improbable promise and Athens' loyal aid should long ago have alerted scholars to what the purpose of the former story was. As we shall now see, it also helps to justify what was an undoubted and documented Athenian breach of the oaths of the old treaty, whose validity Athens had just recognized. The slight to the Athenian force at once follows, as an emotional justification though not a legal one. It is clear that, when the new regime in Athens changed its alliances and its foreign policy, the alleged Spartan promise was not yet known: Thucydides, who had every interest in calling attention to the matter, does not mention Athenian knowledge of it at that point. It is for the reader to make the moral judgment.

28. See pp. 95–96 above. The “democratic” explanation of Sparta's action may well be due to the same source that first invented Sparta's promise to Thasos (if indeed Thucydides found it in a source). In any case, it has been accepted even more uncritically than that fiction. This acceptance has been aided by a persistent mistranslation (I find it in all translations into English that I have looked at, both by translators and by historians) of Thucydides' remark that the Athenians were called in because they seemed good at *τειχομαμεῖν*. The verb is usually taken to refer to siege warfare in general, whereas it in fact refers to the operations connected with the actual storming of a walled place: cf. 7.79.2 (an unsuccessful attempt), 8.103–2 (explained by 8.100.5). The meaning is the

same in Hdt. 9.70.1-2 (the only instances of the verb or its noun), actually with the same contrast between Spartan ineptitude and Athenian skill at it. The choice of the verb makes the Spartan war plan clear: to finish the unexpectedly protracted *Stellungskrieg* against the helots by storming their defenses round Ithome. Athenian failure at this is clear from the event.

Attentive reading can gather this from Thucydides: he gives the fact that, had the Spartans been good at *τειχομαχεῖν*, they would have taken the place by force (*βίᾱ γὰρ ἂν εἶλον τὸ χωρίον*), as a comment on their calling in the Athenians, and their subsequent failure to take it by force (*ἐπειδὴ τὸ χωρίον βίᾱ οὐχ ἡλίσκετο*) as a reason for Sparta's dismissal of the Athenians (102.2-3). But this has tended to go unnoticed, as Thucydides apparently meant it to (cf. 102.3-4). Gomme, *HCT*, ad loc., deserves credit for understanding the meaning of the Greek, but completely misrepresents both the development of the whole war and the situation at the time, i.e. by postulating that the helots at Ithome had only a "palisaded camp" to be attacked, after years on the mountain. He does not tell us how he imagines they secured their food supplies year after year, or why a mere palisade proved impregnable for years.

29. Thucydides does not tell us how many appeals for aid in revolt Sparta *rejected* during the Peace. That would have greatly weakened his case. He incidentally alludes to one later (3.2.1; 13.1, on which see Ste. Croix, *Origins* [cit. n. 11 above] 204-5), but we have no reason to think it was the only one.

30. One might point to Books 5 and 8 to show Thucydides' awareness of the importance of the texts of treaties. But they have often been considered unrevised (and 8 is unfinished). It is unreasonable for Ste. Croix to complain (*Origins* 293) that there is "no complete and correct account of the terms of the Thirty Years Peace by any modern scholar": there is nothing close to such an account in any ancient source. He himself, claiming to fill the void, lists seven terms, six of them generally agreed upon, the seventh (his only original contribution: item 4) a fiction based on misinterpretation of 140.2 to mean that each party "was to keep what it possessed at the date of the conclusion of the treaty." The passage (from Pericles' speech) is shown by the context, devoted to Sparta's failure to accept arbitration, to mean that *if arbitration were appealed to*, each party was to keep what it held at the beginning of the process until a verdict was reached. The link by *μὲν . . . δέ* makes the connection with arbitration certain.

31. Ste. Croix, *Origins* 200ff. The section is headed "The Spartan 'hawks' again"—a reference to an earlier use of that term to describe the putative party at Sparta that tried to prevent the building of Athens' walls and that gave the promise to Thasos. Ste. Croix throughout posits ornithological continuity at Sparta over the generations.

32. The autonomy of those allies still contributing naval forces is generally recognized. See, e.g., Gomme, *HCT* I 225-26; cf. 7.57.4, on Chios. It is strange that the word "autonomy" is not in the index of Meiggs' *Athenian Empire*, which lists "probably"; nor is it mentioned in connection with the "Samian revolt," the origins of which he misrepresents. See p. 189: "Samos appears [i.e. to Meiggs] to have been the aggressor [against Miletus]," and cf. the special note p. 428, where the scholiast's comment that Miletus was trying to seize Priene

(independent at the time) is dismissed: “it is doubtful whether this is more than a guess.” Meiggs considers his own guess, that “Samos, taking advantage of Milesian weakness . . . , was hoping to coerce Priene,” to be “more likely.” (Thucydides does not say who was the aggressor.) Meiggs notes that the Athenians seem to have detached Marathesium from the Samian possessions on the mainland about 442 (as seen by Nesselhauf); it first appears with its own tribute quota in 442 or 441. If so, the tactics used against Samos should be compared to those earlier used against Thasos (see n. 18 above, with text), and the Samian War acquires a background far more sinister than mere opportunistic exploitation by Pericles of a chance to weaken a strong autonomous ally.

33. On city walls and Athenian policy toward them, see Meiggs, *Athenian Empire* 149–50. Thucydides attests that the Athenian subjects in Asia were without walls (3.33.2—early in the Peloponnesian War).

34. It should be mentioned that both the Potidaeans and the Aeginetans had fought at Plataea (Hdt. 9.28) and their names appear on the Serpent Column (Meiggs–Lewis, *GHI* 27). They were the only cities in the Athenian Empire which had taken part in that battle. They were therefore, at least originally, protected by the oaths that Pausanias made the victorious armies swear in the *agora* of Plataea after the battle and that protected and guaranteed the autonomy of all of them. For this, see Thucydides’ presentation in speeches on the occasion of the Spartan attack on Plataea: 2.71.2 for the Plataeans’ special pleading, and 2.72.1 for Archidamus’ correction of their version, confirmed by the solemn invocation and curse at 2.74.3 and therefore to be believed, despite Thucydides’ depiction of Archidamus as a godless and unscrupulous *Realpolitiker*.

No time limit is mentioned for these oaths. If there was one, it must have been a distant one, for they were still deemed valid in 429. (For discussion of this, see Chapter 3 above.) It is quite likely that they were reaffirmed in the Peace of 445, in addition to the general autonomy clause to be deduced from the case of Samos. But even if this was not so, those cities were certainly *deemed* autonomous in the Peace, since it is unlikely that either party would make public confession of a breach of the oaths of Plataea. The only cities represented at Plataea that had been attacked since the battle, and in fact destroyed, were Mycenae and Tiryns, which Sparta had not been able to defend. But their attacker, Argos, was not bound by the oaths of Plataea and was therefore not in breach of them.

35. For this, see Meiggs, *Athenian Empire* 528–29: the date is not quite certain, as the increased tribute quota first appears on the list for 432, but it has been suggested (by a plausible conjecture in *ATL*) for 434. The difference, unfortunately, is vital for historical interpretation, which, as so often, is not advanced by the uncertainty of the epigraphic evidence.

36. τὰς δὲ πόλεις ὅτι αὐτονόμους ἀφήσομεν εἰ καὶ αὐτονόμους ἔχοντες ἐσπεισάμεθα.

37. See, in particular, on the Megarian Decree, below.

38. See pp. 50ff. above.

39. ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν διδόντα (δίκας) οὐ πρότερον νόμιμον ὥς ἐπ’ ἀδικοῦντα ἰέναι. For the meaning of νόμιμος (= customary), see its other occurrences in

Thucydides (3.53.1; 7.77.2; perhaps 6.17.3). The sole exception is the superlative in 7.68.1, where it appears to mean "most legitimate." Even there, the legitimacy is clearly a customary one, not one imposed by positive law, let alone by a solemn oath. For the νόμιμα (or sometimes νόμοι) of the Hellenes, see, e.g., 3.9.1; 3.66.2; 3.67.6; 4.97.2. In no case is an oath involved. Sthenelaidas speaks on the same level, though on the other side: for him too, it is a matter of "lawsuits and words" (which he rejects as unsuitable), with no mention of the oaths of which the assembly has just been reminded.

40. 79.2 καὶ ξυνετὸς δοκῶν εἶναι καὶ σώφρων. It is perhaps worth noting that Archidamus, on his first appearance here, is the only individual in Thucydides who is described as σώφρων.

41. One might compare the well-known story of Xenophon's consultation of the god, *Anab.* 3.1.5ff. If Thucydides' formulation of the question is correct, there was no specific reference to the sacred impediment. But the question did not, like Xenophon's, foreclose the god's options.

42. We may ignore Ste. Croix's odd misinterpretation of the actual report (such as it is) that we have of the "Megarian Decree(s)" (Ste. Croix, *Origins*, ch. 7 [pp. 225ff.] and various appendices). No reviewer of the book (to my knowledge) has taken this very seriously.

43. The embargo on imports originating in Megara (no matter how they reached Athens) is clear from *Acharnians* 515-22: ἡμῶν γὰρ ἄνδρες . . . / . . . ἀνδράρια μοχθηρά, παρακεκομμένα, / . . . / ἐσυκοφάντει Μεγαρέων τὰ χλανίσκια· / κεῖ που σίκυον ἴσοιεν ἢ λαγῶδιον / ἢ χοιρίδιον ἢ σκόροδον ἢ χονδροῦς ἄλας, / ταῦτ' ἦν Μεγαρικὰ κάππερατ' αὐθημερόν. This embargo, which the poet expects all of his audience to remember, is not specifically ascribed to Pericles, who is mentioned only after the kidnapping of Aspasia's girls; and the war is said to have broken out over the decree arising from the kidnapping. But the latter, as has long been recognized, is a parody of the poetic tradition (imported into history by Herodotus) that ascribed the outbreak of major wars to such kidnappings of women. The embargo is clearly mentioned because it was in fact highly relevant—as the audience is obliquely reminded by the appeal to its own recollection. The narrowing of the cause of war, unexpected after the "economic" introduction—which is in fact reinforced by the reference to the Megarians as starving (535), to which the exclusion of actual Megarian individuals from Athenian territories is irrelevant—is practically marked out as a joke by *paradoxon*. The important question of whether this was contrary to the treaty is sometimes all too easily decided. See, e.g., R. Syme, in his lecture on Thucydides (*PBA* 1962, pp. 39-56): ". . . It is important to note that such a trade embargo did not infringe the terms of the peace of 445. Pericles was very careful in such matters" (50). (Syme admits that Pericles was "provocative.")

44. Another, which I have discussed elsewhere (see pp. 110ff. above) and from which we are entitled to deduce important historical information, is the speech of Archidamus at Plataea (2.72), at once reported to the Athenians by Plataean envoys.

45. Thucydides adds the ephor's motive: to make the assembly more eager for

war. H. D. Westlake, in his recent essay “Personal Motives, Aims and Feelings in Thucydides” (in *Studies in Thucydides and Greek History* [Bristol 1989]), claims to collect all passages in Thucydides that refer to motives (etc.) of individual persons. But in his treatment of Book 1 (p. 203) he finds only two such cases and strangely omits Sthenelaidas, the most interesting in the book. See 87.2: after the vote by shouting Sthenelaidas claims that he cannot tell which side won, “but wishing, by making them openly declare their intention, to render them more eager for war,” he puts his motion (discussed in our text) and takes the vote by physical separation. It would presumably fit into Westlake’s Group B or Group C (for his definitions see p. 202): the difference is not very clear. But as in many of his examples, the essential point is that it is all pure fiction—in this case, to be noted as another of Thucydides’ persistent attempts to distort the meaning of the actual vote (the wording of which, as we have seen, he could not change) and insist that it was a vote for war. Perhaps we need a Group D, for motives attributed in order to impress Thucydides’ polemical interpretations upon the reader.

46. See, e.g., Ste. Croix, *Origins* (cit. n. 11 above) 319: the meeting “which in effect declared war” (similarly elsewhere). This is followed (320ff.) by long speculation on the chronology of the election of “hawkish” ephors. Kagan, *Outbreak* (cit. n. 24 above)—here, as elsewhere in discussion of the events leading up to the war, balanced and sensible—recognizes that the vote was not a declaration of war (305; cf. 310); but he thinks it meant that “it would be very difficult, if indeed possible, to avoid a general war.” He does not discuss Thucydides’ deliberate attempt to mislead the reader; indeed, he seems throughout to be too willing to use Thucydides’ speeches as authentic and to argue from their wording. The vote, in fact, left the possibility of settlement by negotiation completely open. It is only Thucydides’ sleight of hand that has disguised this. Much the most careful and sensible discussion is still to be found in Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* III 2 (Gotha 1904) 838ff. He first (I think) noted that the terms of the vote contrast with what the speech had led the reader to expect, and that the vote did not establish a state of war but merely gave notice that Sparta no longer regarded the peace as valid in international law. It is a pity that Busolt, while recognizing this and complimenting Thucydides on the artistic construction of Sthenelaidas’ speech, was not moved to investigate Thucydides’ purpose and method.

47. For this, which may be called the standard formulation of questions for Apollo, see J. Fontenrose, *The Delphic Oracle* (Berkeley 1978), 67ff., item 14 (with table IV on p. 39). Spartan contacts with Apollo were thought to go back to Lycurgus and the Rhetra, and it is clear that the original Peloponnesian hegemony of Sparta had been built up under the god’s protection.

48. It is in this connection, in his later recapitulation (7.18.2–3: see p. 143 above), that Thucydides adds his disquisition upon Sparta’s feeling belated pangs of conscience over the outbreak of the Archidamian War.

49. It is sometimes said that it was a majority only of those cities which had sent delegates and that not all were represented. It really makes no essential difference, and there might well be cities that felt they wanted to (or would have

to) go along with Sparta's wishes and preferred to save themselves the expense of an embassy, which would merely assert a nominal right. But I do not think that Thucydides' phrase τοῖς συμμάχοις ἅπασιν ὅσοι παρῆσαν ἐξῆς καὶ μείζονι καὶ ἐλάσσονι πόλει (125.1) should be thus understood. The purpose of the orotund phrase is surely to convey solemnity. It may even come from a ritual formula used by the league to proclaim its decisions, duly recording that a majority of those present and properly asked had taken the decision. I doubt whether Thucydides was told who had been absent.

50. Thucydides' peculiar phrasing in giving the interval ("not a year was spent, but less, before they invaded Attica") suggests that he is here arguing against someone who had put the interval at a year—presumably Hellanicus, whom he charges with being "inaccurate about times" (97.2: I have tried to show that he is thinking of intervals and sequence; see above, p. 76) This obvious interpretation makes much of the traditional discussion of the phrase irrelevant.

51. See especially Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* III 2, 844: the league decided, "im Sinne des Archidamos," to use existing resources to equip a fleet. Archidamus had said what amounts to the opposite (82.1): "let us proceed . . . by winning allies to our side, barbarians as well as Hellenes, in the hope of obtaining from some quarter or other additional resources in ships or money" (i.e., he made it clear that the resources of the league alone were insufficient). The decision of the league, as reported by Thucydides, does not mention a fleet, but connects the preparation of supplies for the war with the invasion of Attica. Busolt recognized that ordinary preparations would not take the cities at all long and had to look round for reasons to justify the delay and Thucydides' statement. He came up with possible unwillingness by the allies to mobilize their forces until the following spring and the imaginary parallel with Archidamus' plan. Busolt lands himself in contradictions over the negotiations as well. Although he at times recognizes that the Spartan proposals genuinely tried to save the peace (he is cited for this by Kagan, *Outbreak* [cit. n. 24 above] 317), he reports Thucydides' alleged motive for the negotiations as plain fact at the beginning of his discussion (845). Kagan himself seems to doubt Thucydides, even though he reports the debate of the allies (including even the Corinthians' speech) as fact. Gomme and Ste. Croix do not appear to comment on Thucydides' interpretation. To judge by their attitude on other matters, this is presumably because they do not see any reason to doubt or even to discuss his view.

52. Cochrane, *Thucydides* (cit. n. 4 above) 78.

53. Kagan, *Outbreak* 317ff., has the most balanced and reasonable of recent interpretations. I shall not stress the points where I differ from him, except to say in general that I do not see the constant changes in Spartan "party" alignments, with a peace party and a war party alternately gaining the upper hand at very short intervals, which he (following some other scholars) posits. (But see p. 87 with n. 25 above). Both at Sparta and at Athens actual policy seems to me entirely consistent throughout the immediate crisis that led to the outbreak of war. Spartan policy, in particular, consistently aimed at preserving peace—as we shall see, at more than what one would call any reasonable price. Such belli-

cose manifestations as Sthenelaidas' speech are clearly contradicted by the very motion he put to the assembly; and before we make him a leader of the "hawks" (in Ste. Croix's parlance), we must remember that the speech allotted to him was written by Thucydides—the same historian who then turns the vote passed by the assembly into a vote for war.

54. ῥῆον (ἄν) σφίσι προχωρεῖν τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων (127.1). For the meaning of that phrase, compare the exact parallel in the case of the Mytilenaeen embassy to Athens at the outbreak of the revolt: οὐ γὰρ ἐπίστευον τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων προχωρήσειν (3.4.5). The exact nature of the success expected is not indicated, but in each case it clearly refers to success in averting war by negotiations. (See the contrast with the certainty of war if Pericles were not expelled, quoted in the text.)

55. The most striking example of this that I have found (and discussed in another context [p. 112 above]) is the fact that the Theban attack on Plataea took place at the time of a new moon festival, when it was certain that the greater part of the unsuspecting Plataean population would be outside the walls. That fact is nowhere mentioned in Thucydides' account of the actual attack; we only hear of it incidentally much later, in the Plataeans' defense before the Spartan judges—where the Thebans confirm it as true (3.56.2; cf. 65.1). It is characteristic of Gomme's attitude to Thucydides (and lack of basic understanding of that author) that he proposes to delete the latter passage and so accuse the Plataeans of lying, since if the fact had been true Thucydides would have mentioned it!

56. These attacks are recorded by Plutarch and are frequently discussed by modern historians. The chronology is unfortunately uncertain, and it has been easy for those that way inclined to dissociate the attacks from the events that immediately led to the outbreak of the war. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* II² 1, 294ff., accepts the ancient accounts, including Aristophanes' later charge that Pericles started the war in order to escape from his political difficulties. For the chronology, his discussion 295 n. 2 (-296) is well worth reading, though often ignored. Kagan, *Outbreak* (cit. n. 24 above) 193ff., dates all the attacks in 437/6 but admits a possible effect six years later. Ch. Triebel-Schubert, "Zur Datierung des Phidiasprozesses," *MDAI(A)* 98 (1983) 101–8, used Athenian epigraphic records to date the trial of Phidias in 435/4. But this has been contradicted by B. Wesenberg, *AA* 1985, 49–53, and by W. Ameling, *Klio* 68 (1986) 63–66.

57. For an attempt to reconstruct the basic beliefs of the believing Athenian public, see Harvey Yunis, *A New Creed: Fundamental Religious Beliefs in the Athenian Polis and Euripidean Drama*, *Hypomnemata* 91 (1988) Part 1, esp. 38–58.

58. Plut. *Per.* 30.1 reports a claim by Pericles that a law prevented him from abrogating the Megarian Decree. This is quite probably a much later invention, made up in order to lead up to the "Laconic" epigram that counters the assertion. Plutarch introduces it as a mere story ("they say"). It is ignored by D. M. Lewis in his study of "Entrenchment Clauses in Attic Decrees," in *Phoros. Tribute to Benjamin Dean Meritt* (Locust Valley, N.Y. 1974) 81–89, which covers

the literary tradition as well as the epigraphic examples from the fifth century. The dispute with Megara would not have been difficult to settle, especially with Sparta's aid, which would no doubt have produced the return of the fugitives held by Megara. As for the sacred land, the limited point might well have been settled by arbitration; alternatively, compensation for the goddesses in cash from the Athenian treasury might have been considered, in effect "buying off" the Megarian claim. It would have been considerably cheaper than the Peloponnesian War.

59. See Kagan, *Outbreak* 324ff., unfortunately adopting the term "ultimatum" from Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* III 2, 847, just as he follows him in trying to trace the intricate gyrations of the Spartan "war party" and "peace party" over these months. A few scholars have regarded the final message as a genuine attempt at negotiation, despite its context as it can be gathered from Thucydides. On this, Kagan's comment should be quoted: he regards it as "proof that any conceivable opinion on a subject in classical antiquity has been held by somebody" (325 n. 24).

60. This was recognized by Classen-Steup *ad loc.* Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* III 2, 847 n. 1, agreed. P. J. Rhodes, in his basic work *The Athenian Boule* (Oxford 1972) 57-58, did not find much material on the handling of foreign policy by the *Boule*. He is not aware of this instance, which ought at least to have been mentioned. In the fourth century we get at least one striking instance, the "secret much talked about" of Dem. 2.6. Failure to recognize the competence of the *Boule* in this field has led to misunderstandings of that incident: see especially G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, "The Alleged Secret Pact between Athens and Philip II concerning Amiphipolis and Pydna," *CQ* n.s. 13 (1963) 110-19, who denies it altogether. The Spartans themselves, offering to abandon their allies' interests for the sake of peace, would welcome such secrecy: compare, in a similar situation, 4.22.1-2, where the breakdown of the negotiations is due to Cleon's insistence on publicity.

61. In spite of Thucydides' admission (on which see further below) and the unanimity of ancient tradition, admiration for Pericles among scholars has produced a variety of judgments regarding his policy and responsibility. Thus the Imperial German tradition tends to take his responsibility for granted and tries to put a favorable interpretation on it. (Beloch, who accepts the charge that Pericles simply wanted to reinforce his failing power, is an exception: see n. 56 above.) Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* III 2, 851ff., following other German scholars, praised Pericles for starting the war at the most favorable time for Athens. An amusing variant can be found in G. Dobesch's article on Pericles in *Der Kleine Pauly* (4.635): Pericles wanted war "um angesichts krasser Zerfallstendenzen in der Bürgerschaft wieder den alten opferfreudigen Idealismus zu wecken"—a theme reminiscent of the 1930s in Germany and Italy. Kagan is equally idealistic, in a different tradition (*Outbreak* 328): Pericles "was not unwilling to give way on any of the Spartan grievances" but could not accept "Spartan interference in the Athenian Empire at Potidaea and Aegina, or with Athenian commercial and imperial policy [!] as represented by the Megarian Decree." He does not devote serious attention to the Peloponnesian claims that

Athens had broken the oaths of the Thirty Years' Peace, which surely should not simply be written off as lies. Kagan also thinks the offer of arbitration genuine and believes Pericles "would surely have abided by the decision." I find it more difficult than Kagan does to believe that Pericles would have entrusted the decision on Athenian imperial policy to, say, the city of Dyme, and would have accepted its verdict.

Ste. Croix perhaps deserves special mention, as throughout. According to him (*Origins* 210), Thucydides' picture should be fully accepted, and he fairly represents it as regards Sparta ("most eager for war, and egged on by a highly aggressive Corinth"); but he interprets Thucydides as depicting Athens as "anxious to avoid war, provided this can be done without giving way to Spartan demands." In a sense, of course, this is correct. Pericles, like anyone in private life or in public decisions, was anxious to avoid fighting if he could have his own way without giving anything up to his opponent. We have seen that Thucydides in fact misrepresents the Spartans as acting precisely in this way. But I fear the author has interpreted Thucydides as meaning that Pericles was willing to make reasonable concessions, and that is simply a misreading, as well as being (as far as we can see) false in fact. Ste. Croix, of course, believes that it was Sparta that broke the oaths of 445 (294 et al.), a view that is certainly based very firmly on Thucydides, as this investigation has tried to show. He claims that his own interpretation is based on the best sources, above all Thucydides, and that "anyone who dislikes that picture had better begin by trying to discredit Thucydides, if he can" (290). It has (again) been the aim of this investigation, not to "discredit" Thucydides, but to show that he must not be followed in slavish adoration and treated like a provider of revealed truth. He was an Athenian of his time, trying to convey the strong feelings that he himself naturally held about Periclean democracy and its disintegration owing to the war.

62. Thucydides reports the change of mind, resulting in a strictly limited defensive alliance with Corcyra. Plutarch (*Per.* 29.1) supplies the vital fact. Kagan very properly points out (*Outbreak* 237–38) that Thucydides must be regarded as having deliberately suppressed it. In the light of this, and of so many other penetrating criticisms of Thucydides' account (in which he contrasts with, e.g., Ste. Croix), it is a pity that he did not investigate Thucydides' account as a whole. The present investigation might have been unnecessary if he had. Meyer, *Forschungen* II (cit. n. 1), 325–26, thinks that Pericles would have preferred a full Athenian commitment, but "permitted" the defensive treaty. That Pericles would have preferred a full commitment may be regarded as certain. Thucydides' report that the Assembly accepted the treaty because they believed war with the Peloponnesians inevitable (44.2) indirectly documents Pericles' inspiration for the decision (for it was always he who stressed the inevitability of the war); but the series of provocative actions on which Pericles embarked after the apparent success of a limited commitment at Sybota shows his own conclusions from this premise. It is unlikely that he thought differently at the time of the treaty. Some scholars have been too prone to exaggerate his power at this time, when (as we know) he had to face opposition. It would be absurd to suppose that he never had to compromise, and the difficult decision over Corcyra was

presumably one of the occasions when he did not fully get his way. It was noted even in antiquity that Lacedaemonius, son of Cimon, was one of the commanders sent out with the small fleet to aid Corcyra (45.1); Plutarch (*Per.* 29.2) found it ascribed to a desire on Pericles' part to humiliate him by putting him in charge of only ten ships. This absurdity shows that Plutarch found no genuine tradition on what Thucydides had chosen not to report, beyond the mention of Pericles' name. Kagan (243) regards "the choice of Lacedaemonius" as "the shrewdest and most Periclean stroke" because it forced him to execute Pericles' policy. As I have suggested above, the premise is highly implausible and the conclusion unacceptable. The older opinion (e.g., Busolt) that the choice of Lacedaemonius shows a desire to make sure the limitations in the treaty were strictly observed is surely the obvious one; and it seems unlikely that either the limitations or the choice was due to Pericles. If he "permitted" the limited treaty (thus Meyer), then he was in the same sense compelled to "permit" the selection of Lacedaemonius by the Assembly.

63. This is a considerably expanded version of a paper delivered on the occasion of the colloquium as part of which it was first published and then, in various forms, before other audiences. Discussion on those occasions has helped to improve it. I should like to express particular thanks to members of what was the Ancient History Section of the Academy of the German Democratic Republic and to colleagues at the University of North Carolina for their stimulating questions, some of which have in part been answered in this version. I am also grateful to the National Humanities Center, which in the fall of 1988 provided a very pleasant environment for the completion of this version, among several other projects.

CHAPTER 5

Athens, the Locrians, and Naupactus

1. E. Curtius, "Studien zur Geschichte von Korinth," *Hermes* 10 (1876) 215–43. For the decree, first published in 1869, see Meiggs–Lewis, *GHI* 20. The earlier colony decree, more recently discovered (Meiggs–Lewis 13), does not seem to be relevant to our discussion.

2. *Griechische Geschichte* II⁶ (1888), pp. 168ff., 172ff. (fitting in the colony decree, not yet known at the time of his first edition, 1861). He does not explain how, on his view, Tolmides actually captured Naupactus: unless we assume a previous *periplous* (improbable and unreported), it is difficult to see how he could have got there.

3. *Geschichte des Altertums* III (Stuttgart 1901), p. 597; unchanged in Stier's edition, IV 1 (Stuttgart 1944), p. 563.

4. For Meyer's chronology see p. 591 of the first edition. He basically accepts Diodorus, to whom in general he gives little credit: in this instance, his dates happen, by accident ("Es ist Zufall"), to be essentially correct. In a characteristic piece of imaginative fiction, he adds to his reconstruction that the Naupac-

tians may have begged the Ozolians to take the city over, to defend it against the Aetolians.

5. Oldfather argues for both a strategic and a commercial purpose in the Athenian decision to occupy Naupactus: the main purpose was the protection of Athenian trading interests against both Locrian and Aetolian piracy.

6. Meiggs and Lewis (p. 37), who also belong to this school, consistently date the law “certainly earlier than the seizure of Naupaktos by Athens . . . c. 460 . . . (Thuc. 1.103.3); how much earlier, we cannot be sure.” They follow Jeffery, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece* (Oxford 1961) 108, in dating it “(?) 500–475,” to fit in with this view. They would probably admit that Jeffery’s date is almost a pure guess, and that on epigraphic grounds a date even decades later could hardly be excluded.

7. Although in his general discussion of his method in using Thucydides’ evidence as against other sources, he merely excludes acceptance of any later source where it contradicts Thucydides (84–85), he here inexplicably claims that Diodorus’ report “deserves no credence” even though it in no way contradicts Thucydides, except in chronology, as arrived at by emending Thucydides’ well-attested “tenth year” (1.103.1) out of the way. See further n. 14 below.

8. As will be clear, I am not denying that there are instances of the use of ἔχειν that do support Steup’s view. But it must be stressed that mere reference to passages, without scrutiny and detailed analysis, is inadequate and will often turn out to be misleading.

9. Professor Philip Stadter, after reading the original article, told me that *view* and *ἔρτι* also precede their verbs in Herodotus and Xenophon.

10. I have tried to compile that list and discuss Thucydides’ attitude in Chapter 4.

11. To toss off the suggestion that Thucydides made a mistake, as Gomme does, is too easy and explains nothing.

12. Cooperation with the Spartan campaign (and, consequently, with the Phocians) is frequently stated as a fact, but is derived entirely from this Athenian action. It ought perhaps to be mentioned that Oldfather’s reference to a later Athenian action at Eretria as parallel to that at Opus is unacceptable as such. Hesychius, s.v. Ἐρετριάκδς κατάλογος, records a *psephisma* of 442/1 [Oldfather misstates the date as 444], calling for the sons of the wealthiest Eretrians to be taken as hostages. To take the sons of leading citizens as hostages was, of course, standard practice. It is very different from taking the leading men themselves. Moreover, Hesychius does not give a number, although the decree must have specified one. (We know nothing about the background to this—further evidence as to the inadequacy of our information on the Pentecontaetia.)

13. For my own views on the chronology of these actions, see p. 214 n. 53. I there saw no reason to doubt Tolmides’ settlement of the Messenians at Naupactus, but was not sure whether to accept Diodorus’ report that he actually captured the place on that occasion. At the time, I had not yet thought about the story of the Locrians. I would also now add that the *periplous* as such acquires a more serious purpose, commensurate with the effort, if planned not

merely to show Athenian power and inflict some damage en route, but to capture a strategic site that could not be reached in any other way. (It would clearly be logistically impossible for Athenian forces to take Naupactus by an overland expedition.) To phrase it differently: if we were asked to conjecture how Naupactus was in fact taken (which is what we must do if we confine ourselves to Thucydides' evidence), it would be hard to avoid the answer that it must have been as a result of a *periplous* of Peloponnese; and that of Tolmides is the only relevant one recorded. Even if the Arthidographer on whom Diodorus' information is ultimately based was only guessing (which need not be assumed), his guess was the only rational one. [After completing this article, I was, through the kindness of Professor D. M. Lewis and Dr. Hornblower, shown an advance copy of the treatment of these points in the new *Cambridge Ancient History*, volume V. I am happy to see that Diodorus' report that Tolmides settled the Messenians at Naupactus is there "provisionally" accepted. The view that Tolmides actually captured Naupactus on that occasion is described (without any argument in the portion shown to me) as certainly contradicting Thucydides: I do not know what alternative occasion is proposed for the capture of Naupactus, but the issue will no doubt be faced and discussed.]

14. See n. 7 above with text [and compare what I have seen of the treatment in the new *CAH*: see preceding note]. It is interesting to compare an earlier scholar who set an example of rational reliance on Thucydides which Gomme might well have considered. William Mitford, *History of Greece* II (London 1814), p. 394 n. 12, set down his principles as follows: "I have been very cautious of following any other writer, in relating the transactions of these times, when not in some degree supported by [Thucydides]." He goes on to denigrate Diodorus, comparing his relationship to Thucydides to that of Livy to Polybius. Yet he here thinks Diodorus' account "in itself probable, and consistent with every authenticated fact," and he accepts Tolmides' settlement of the Messenians at Naupactus and the capture of Naupactus by Tolmides. (It is not clear how he chronologically correlates these two events.) He also accepts 455 as the date, no doubt from Diodorus (who gives 456/5, the date of the *Atthis* for the *periplous*): *ibid.* 397.

15. Peaceful accommodation may already have been revealed by Meiggs-Lewis, *GHI* 74, though that document is too late to be confidently used as evidence for the original relationship. Meiggs-Lewis referred to an unpublished inscription confirming this interpretation. [I see from the new *CAH* that it is still unpublished!] This was noted by E. Mastrokostas in *Arch. Delt.* 19 B 2 (1964 [1966]) 295 as "very important," and as describing the foundation of a joint community by the Messenians and the Naupactians. It is perhaps worth making clear that the "Naupactians," both in that text and in *GHI* 74, should be taken to be Thucydides' Ozolians at Naupactus, not any putative pre-Locrian population, of whom we have no record and whom we cannot even further define. The foundation document for the Locrian colony (see n. 1 above) does not mention any accommodation with those inhabitants and we must assume they were expelled. That the Locrian colonists, like colonists elsewhere, called themselves citizens of the colony (in this case "Naupactians") was in any case to be ex-

pected and is clear from the foundation document. The Messenians were probably not sufficiently numerous to fill and defend the large city [for its size, see now the careful description in *CAH*] by themselves and would naturally want to share it with the “Naupactians.” That the two communities, although jointly protected by Athena Polias, remained notionally and perhaps politically separate is, however, shown by *GHI* 74.

16. See Chapter 4 above. I should like to thank Dr. Simon Hornblower for helping to eliminate some errors in this article and for enabling me to obtain permission to see a page (with notes) of the forthcoming *CAH*, volume V. Any remaining errors are my own fault.

CHAPTER 6

Thucydides and the *Archē* of Philip

1. For these documents see *IG* I³ 89 and 67 respectively, 89 with expectedly thorough and scholarly commentary by D. M. Lewis. But there is no doubt that Thucydides’ formal (though deliberately nontechnical) phrase implies a formal alliance between Athens and Perdiccas. I would here also like to acknowledge my indebtedness to J. W. Cole, “Perdiccas and Athens,” *Phoenix* 28 (1974) 55ff., giving useful background and sober judgments. It will be clear that I do not read Thucydides as he does; e.g., I do not think that Athens’ alliance with Perdiccas’ opponents compels the conclusion that Perdiccas had proved himself unreliable as an ally (p. 57). I do not know on what N. G. L. Hammond bases his account of these events in the course of his summary of Perdiccas’ accession troubles (*The Macedonian State* [Oxford 1990] 71): the few sources he cites do nothing to support or even explain his reconstruction.

2. I shall frequently have to contradict Gomme (*A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* I and II [Oxford 1945, 1956], hereafter *HCT*), whose fervent belief in Thucydides’ essential infallibility seems to me to epitomize the attitude which the true historian must overcome. But I want to make it clear how much we all owe to his careful reading of Thucydides and his collection of relevant evidence in his interpretation. For supplementation we now have Simon Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides* (vol. I, Oxford 1991), with excellent up-to-date bibliographies, but unfortunately much briefer than I should have liked to see it.

3. Thus, “who were making common cause against himself” (Smith in the Loeb edition); better still Romilly in the Budé: “unis dans leur opposition contre lui.” Jowett, following Crawley, perhaps sails a bit close to the wind: “who were *leagued* against him” (my emphasis), implying a military alliance.

4. For this and other lexical information I have used Bétant’s *Lexicon*: although not perfect, it is adequate for my purposes in this study.

5. See pp. 133–37 above.

6. The alleged “treaty with Philip” (see n. 1 above with text) seems to be a purely defensive treaty, which is another reason for not identifying it with the alliance reported by Thucydides. Gomme accepted it as that treaty, duly point-

ing out that it would therefore not imply immediate action against Perdiccas. (Perhaps a case of wishful thinking.) Cole (cit. n. 1 above) seems to have a mistaken view of the geography involved: according to him (p. 62), Philip joined the Athenians while Derdas' brothers were making a synchronized invasion from the east (*sic*). It has been argued (thus Gomme, *HCT* I 212) that Derdas must by now have been dead, because his brothers led the invasion. I see no reason to believe this. He may not have wanted to risk leaving his country and letting his brothers stay at home. Cf. Antiochus of Orestis (Thuc. 2.80.6), who actually preferred putting his soldiers under foreign command to leaving his kingdom.

7. See my discussion pp. 133 and 139, with nn. 18 and 32, above.

8. He says that, when the Athenians heard of the revolts in the north, they sent forty ships and two thousand Athenian hoplites under Callias and some other generals, to deal with the rebels (πρὸς τὰ ἀφεστῶτα). That force, when landing in Macedonia, found that Therme had been taken and Pydna was being besieged by the men already there; so, ignoring their clear orders, they joined the force besieging Pydna. It seems inconceivable that any Athenian general would have dared to act in this way. Thucydides also foreshortens the chronology: the Athenian accounts (*IG* I³ 365) show a payment to a general for Macedonia in the second prytany of 432/1 (c. August 432). In Thucydides, the fleet sent out to attack Perdiccas seems to leave as early as possible in (April?) 432, and finds Potidaea already in revolt. Aristeus arrives forty days after the revolt (not later than early June), and the second Athenian contingent, already in Macedonia, on hearing of his arrival, makes the "enforced" treaty. It is difficult to put this later than mid-June, at the very latest late June. And that cannot be reconciled with the contemporary record that shows war in Macedonia still going on in August. However, this cannot be argued at length here.

9. Gomme (*HCT* I 216-17) cites Grote and Steup for this, but realizes that Thucydides would have had to distinguish such a presumed place from the better-known town on the other side of the gulf. He then gives up in despair, yet accepts the emendation. It is one of Gomme's most unsatisfactory disquisitions.

10. τοῦ χωρίου τῆς Βεροίας (p. 50 Hude).

11. Similarly F. Geyer (*Makedonien bis zur Thronbesteigung Philipps II* [Munich and Berlin 1930] 57-58): such a breach of the treaty by the Athenians "wider alle Vernunft gewesen wäre und zugleich den Worten des Thukydides [I 62, 2] widerspricht, nach denen P e r d i k k a s den Vertrag gebrochen hat." E. M. Borza (*In the Shadow of Olympus* [Princeton 1990] 143f.) accepts the Athenian attack after the treaty, but then (rather unexpectedly) comments: "Rarely can one find a clearer example of a settlement made in bad faith by both parties" (my emphasis). On the route, he concludes that Thucydides' "passage defies reason" (p. 295) and puts the puzzle down to Thucydides' own confusion. Thucydides is routinely given the benefit of the doubt.

12. It should be noted that ἐπιστρέφειν, though it implies a turn, does not necessarily mean a turn of 180 degrees. However, although the road by land, if one wanted to get from Pydna to Potidaea that way (for reasons that would still need explanation), may have led via Beroea (see M. B. Hatzopoulos, in *Tivo*

Studies in Ancient Macedonian Topography [Athens 1987] 17–60—an outstanding effort at tracing the road system in this area in antiquity), this does not *require* the emendation in Thucydides' text (Hatzopoulos, p. 54—recognizing the proper meaning of ἐπιστρέφειν [p. 56]). If Hatzopoulos is right in his identification of Strepsa as lying “some 35 to 50 km *east* of Gigonos” (his emphasis), it follows, as he sees, that the emendation in Thucydides' text becomes impossible. But the argument for his identification is not conclusive. In any case, Hatzopoulos was concerned solely with the topography and not with the historiographical implications; else this part of my essay might have been unnecessary. The new suggestion for Strepsa is ignored by Borza, both in his text and on his map II, even though he cites Hatzopoulos' article in connection with the Athenians' route. I too am still inclined to seek Strepsa where it has traditionally been sought, either a little south or a little west of Therme, but in any case on the coast. This location was accepted, i.a., by Charles Edson, in his pioneering article on the topography of this region, “Strepsa (Thucydides 1.61.4),” *CP* 50 (1955) 169–90—now supplemented and largely superseded by Hatzopoulos.

13. Hatzopoulos 52–53 (conclusions). Note (p. 51) possible shortcuts usable in summer, reducing the distance. (Not taken into account in my calculations.) It is unfortunate that Thucydides' praise of Archelaus (2.100.2) as having done more for the Macedonian system of roads and fortifications than all his predecessors together (he also mentions horses and arms) is usually accepted as basic fact (thus still Hatzopoulos 53), like so much of the information we find in Thucydides. It probably tells us no more than that Thucydides got his information from the court of Archelaus, which he may well have visited during his exile. The Macedonian army does not appear to be more distinguished in its record after Archelaus than before (in some respects one might argue the opposite); and here, under Perdiccas, we find Macedonian towns strongly fortified. We recall that a well-equipped Athenian force could not take Pydna by siege or even Beroea by surprise; and that Sitalces' (admittedly less well equipped and less interested) forces could not take a town that chose to resist. I do not see any good reason to doubt that, whatever improvements Archelaus may in fact have made, he did not leave Macedon significantly stronger than he received it. In particular, I see no reason to doubt that the road traced by Hatzopoulos was in as much use (and in as good condition) under Perdiccas as under Archelaus.

14. The measuring was done on the Greek official map (1:200,000) sheet 48. I should add, to attest the accuracy of the procedure, that the distance between Beroia and Thessaloniki, along the modern road, came to about 80 kilometers when measured in this way on sheets 15 and 18.

15. The misunderstanding is certainly as old as Thomas Hobbes, “by moderate journeys” (pp. 30–31 in the reprint London 1822). Translators in other languages have been no better. Not to multiply examples, I quote only J. de Romilly in the Budé edition: “par petites étapes.” For another flagrant example of conventional mistranslation, see Chapter 5 above.

16. *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* (Berkeley 1978) 154.

17. It is interesting to observe that, when Herodotus and Thucydides use

ταῖτατος in unambiguous contexts, for speed in covering a distance, it refers to rapid movement. In Herodotus, we find it (apart from the famous march of the Spartans, for which see text) on one other occasion: in 2.117 he contrasts the speed of Alexander's crossing with Helen (he had a fair wind and a calm sea) with the story in Homer of uncharted delays. In Thuc. 3.3.5 (the only other instance) a man succeeds in reaching Mytilene in time to warn the citizens of the measures Athens has decided to take against them: they thus have time to prepare for the Athenian attack. These instances point to the meaning in our passage being the same. After all, what would be the point of (as the traditional rendering has it) Thucydides' going out of his way to stress the *slowness* of this march? Whereas the stress on speed is, in the context, meaningful and important. Small units may have used different routes (see n. 13).

18. I.e., in clearly branding Perdiccas as the one who had ("for the second time") broken the treaty. It is interesting that, a few years later, we see that Perdiccas had acquired a reputation as a liar in Athens, no doubt through the efforts of such as Thucydides. This is clear from the often-quoted line by Hermippus (F 63 KA) making a "shipload of lies" the characteristic export of Macedonia to Athens. (Cole [cit. n. 1 above] 61 takes this seriously.) Dr. Hornblower has reminded me of the fact (obvious, but always to be borne in mind) that it was the politicians, and especially politicians with special interests and "expertise" in particular areas, who shaped the thought and the decisions of the Assembly. Unless there was positive opposition, the Assembly would vote what was put before it, regarding areas that it did not know or care much about. Thus, in the fourth century, a serious policy was pursued in Thrace, which the ordinary Athenian apparently never understood and which could be ridiculed when it suited a hostile politician. (See my discussion in *Pulpuveva* 4 [1983] 63–65.)

19. Gomme (*HCT* II 241) is mistaken on this: "either to his own kingdom of part of Macedonia (100.3) or to seize the throne from Perdikkas." Philip never had a kingdom, only an *archē*, and Gomme did not consider Thucydides' allegation that the purpose of Sitalces was to install Amyntas in the "kingship of the Macedonians" (see text: Gomme has no comment on that passage). There is no doubt about what Thucydides means all along—nor on the fact that it cannot be true.

20. *A History of Macedonia* I (Oxford 1972) 167ff.; cf. II (Oxford 1979) map 4 on p. 128. For some more recent interpretations, see also L. Gounaropoulou and M. B. Hatzopoulos, *Les Milliaires de la Voie Egnatienne entre Héraclée des Lyncestes et Thessalonique* (Athens 1985). The details of the topography are not important for our present purpose.

21. Thucydides is difficult to follow at this point, since he changes his standpoint without any warning. Having (as we saw, following Hammond) presented the movement of the army toward the area west of the Axios from the army's point of view, he suddenly goes on to describe Bottiaea and Pieria, which they did not try to penetrate, as ἔσω τούτων with respect to that area, which will only make sense if we take Athens as the point of reference. This has naturally

confused some translators, but Hammond's guidance, and the use of a map, will show the meaning beyond doubt.

22. This, incidentally, shows that the foundation of Amphipolis had not caused any resentment, indeed must have been welcomed, in the Odrysian kingdom. When a few years later we find Hagnon despatched as (obviously) *persona grata* with Sitalces, this cannot be divorced from the fact that he had been the founder of the colony.

23. At the beginning of the chapter he tells us of the negotiations between the two kings, in the imperfect (presumably as going on). It is only after this that he starts to tell us about the Athenians' failure to appear (καὶ ἐπειδὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ παρήσαν . . .). He does not say what Sitalces' objectives were. Since the plan to put Amyntas on the Macedonian throne is plain fiction, and in any case clearly cannot be intended here, the only objective we know of was the fulfillment of his promise to the Athenians. But the negotiations with Perdiccas cannot be related to that either. Thucydides here manages to convey the impression that the two kings were engaged in some disreputable scheme not further specified, but no doubt connected with the mysterious "unfulfilled promise" by Perdiccas. The negotiations, like that promise, must be suspected to be pure fiction, whether or not the historian himself believed in them.

24. *HCT* II 248–49: "all Sitalces did more was to raid Chalkidike for a week." Here as often, Gomme may be taken as a gauge of how the intelligent reader was intended to understand Thucydides' account. His commentary is one of the best guides to Thucydides' intentions, even though (for all its wide erudition) somewhat lacking in critical evaluation.

25. Information from U.S. Office of Strategic Services, Branch of Research and Analysis, map no. 2220 (13 April 1943). The "mean temperature" given on that map is presumably the mean daily mean for each month. The scale is too small for details within each month to be clearly visible, but the curve falls fairly steeply and seems to reach forty-two degrees by late December and forty by January.

26. 101.5: ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ οὐδὲν ἐπράσσετο ὧν ἕνεκα ἐσέβαλε.

27. Dr. Hornblower has suggested to me that Thucydides "likes to focus on one . . . specimen of a national type" and depict him as being "good" by contrast with his fellow countrymen: the "good" Macedonian is Archelaus (as we have seen), just as the "good" Spartan is Brasidas and the "good" Syracusan Hermocrates. This acute observation may easily be extended to Athens, where (almost explicitly) all leaders suffer by comparison with Pericles.

28. That the fear was not unjustified is shown by the massacre perpetrated by a Thracian auxiliary force called in by the Athenians a few years later. When the Athenians decided they did not want to pay them, they sent them back under the Athenian Diitrephes, who was instructed to raid enemy territory on the way—and (it seems) to compensate the Thracians for their disappointment by allowing them to collect some booty. He did this chiefly by guiding them to the undefended Boeotian town of Mycalessus, which he turned over to them. We do not know whether the massacre that followed took him by surprise, but the

incident (Thuc. 7.27.1–2 and 29) throws much light on what might be expected of Thracians—and Athenians. It is on this occasion that Thucydides, who knew Thracians better than most Athenians did, expresses his opinion of them, and indeed of barbarians in general: “For the Thracian people, like the most typical [?] barbarians (ὁμοῖα τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ βαρβαρικοῦ), is most murderous when it feels confident” (7.29.4). It is perhaps worth noting that Diitrephes was later sent by the oligarchic conspirators at Samos to command on their behalf in Thrace (where he abolished the democracy at Thasos: Thuc. 8.64.2): he presumably had Thracian contacts before. (Cf. Paus. 1.23.3: his bronze statue in Athens.)

29. For this, see Chapter 4 above.

30. I owe thanks to Dr. Simon Hornblower for encouraging me to work out these ideas (among others) in full form by inviting me to address his seminar on Greek historiography.

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